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- apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
- apparmor: Fix regression in profile conflict logic -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAABCgAGBQJaWWwtAAoJEAUvNnAY1cPY/0gP/iHnqNR705LOuLzy7Iya0Iy+ n8J9Tba9dQMGpiR8W5EIMklP0Hj+Wt50ngwmemJrjNpALphGeET16Qg01iYQcPNh fR/oc9ZA5vpn7fFTnQZzlvcxRZCBJtuuqBcvM6oNjVVqLh6t6EN+viqh97XFZyc+ XFFYdCTRQ1JSgW7RIw/h8rFAvfPXIuXA7SwAQ/+PXlxOMi0fbZGbsVAiXPI1+pmX wXj3Vtgisb/i4cSJtG9wujGs/SNjmN/2Yyzj2ZjKh3Y4lxug2bko3BfrrbD7uAeL XOARp9ELjUk5m9tI9NuGpr9iIT392BaVvJDKyN8byK8skMOOsomG/zypVFLAbsBc w0dN5IxLvyk3lH7amSBj+aJKQV0cthss0L11WlMuftLiqsDzRMec2md35+T3eSt3 AQ132tTHcQ3SiMd4b/yxXe1CjJEo62dBQzppLpV27lcpurOJdhQYEAC0vfXGpkgJ 5UIn7t5wNpb5GC+CBSQ+qFhBTtGEY9MdhcM/mZJrBTRWmId7umm3UdUtihVz8qlJ uue+S8h3L7TUFkdIRcGgViJrcQsvDFhabkHvsKppl5CYRrT6Lu46XBTZV6ioZcsm maIuVY7agFVk4Z0Fyc+zYM7e/IDoVVBdBwUKDWNnEkFmRKE7RrWsBq59PBksLUtz G/8zxZ//8MRhlm5uyuid =Myva -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor Pull apparmor regression fixes from John Johansen: "This fixes a couple bugs I have been working with Matthew Garrett on this week. Specifically a regression in the handling of a conflicting profile attachment and label match restrictions for ptrace when profiles are stacked. Summary: - fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels - fix regression in profile conflict logic" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-01-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: apparmor: Fix regression in profile conflict logic apparmor: fix ptrace label match when matching stacked labels
This commit is contained in:
commit
852b0a8902
3 changed files with 40 additions and 25 deletions
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@ -330,10 +330,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
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continue;
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if (profile->xmatch) {
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if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
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conflict = true;
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continue;
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} else if (profile->xmatch_len > len) {
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if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) {
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unsigned int state;
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u32 perm;
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@ -342,6 +339,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name,
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perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
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/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
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if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
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if (profile->xmatch_len == len) {
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conflict = true;
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continue;
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}
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candidate = profile;
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len = profile->xmatch_len;
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conflict = false;
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@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
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#define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \
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xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args)
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#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \
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xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2)))
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void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
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void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
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@ -64,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
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FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
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}
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/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
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/* TODO: conditionals */
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static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
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struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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struct aa_perms perms = { };
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/* need because of peer in cross check */
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if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;
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aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
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aad(sa)->peer = peer;
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aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
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&perms);
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aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
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return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
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}
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static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
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struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
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struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
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!PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return 0;
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
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}
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static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
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struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
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struct common_audit_data *sa)
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{
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if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
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return 0;
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if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
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return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),
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profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,
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request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,
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sa));
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/* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
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if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)
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return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
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/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
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if (&tracer->label == tracee)
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return 0;
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aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
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aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;
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aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
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aad(sa)->request = 0;
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aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
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@ -115,10 +123,13 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
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int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
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u32 request)
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{
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struct aa_profile *profile;
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u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
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DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
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return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,
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request, &sa);
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return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
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profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
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profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
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}
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