bpf, docs: Split general purpose eBPF documentation out of filter.rst
filter.rst starts out documenting the classic BPF and then spills into introducing and documentating eBPF. Move the eBPF documentation into rwo new files under Documentation/bpf/ for the instruction set and the verifier and link to the BPF documentation from filter.rst. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211119163215.971383-6-hch@lst.de
This commit is contained in:
Christoph Hellwig
Alexei Starovoitov
parent
bc84e959e5
commit
88691e9e1e
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@ -5,16 +5,15 @@ BPF Documentation
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This directory contains documentation for the BPF (Berkeley Packet
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Filter) facility, with a focus on the extended BPF version (eBPF).
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This kernel side documentation is still work in progress. The main
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textual documentation is (for historical reasons) described in
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:ref:`networking-filter`, which describe both classical and extended
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BPF instruction-set.
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This kernel side documentation is still work in progress.
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The Cilium project also maintains a `BPF and XDP Reference Guide`_
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that goes into great technical depth about the BPF Architecture.
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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instruction-set
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verifier
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libbpf/index
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btf
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faq
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@ -34,4 +33,4 @@ that goes into great technical depth about the BPF Architecture.
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* :ref:`genindex`
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.. Links:
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.. _BPF and XDP Reference Guide: https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/bpf/
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.. _BPF and XDP Reference Guide: https://docs.cilium.io/en/latest/bpf/
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@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
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====================
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eBPF Instruction Set
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====================
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eBPF is designed to be JITed with one to one mapping, which can also open up
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the possibility for GCC/LLVM compilers to generate optimized eBPF code through
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an eBPF backend that performs almost as fast as natively compiled code.
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Some core changes of the eBPF format from classic BPF:
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- Number of registers increase from 2 to 10:
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The old format had two registers A and X, and a hidden frame pointer. The
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new layout extends this to be 10 internal registers and a read-only frame
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pointer. Since 64-bit CPUs are passing arguments to functions via registers
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the number of args from eBPF program to in-kernel function is restricted
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to 5 and one register is used to accept return value from an in-kernel
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function. Natively, x86_64 passes first 6 arguments in registers, aarch64/
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sparcv9/mips64 have 7 - 8 registers for arguments; x86_64 has 6 callee saved
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registers, and aarch64/sparcv9/mips64 have 11 or more callee saved registers.
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Therefore, eBPF calling convention is defined as:
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* R0 - return value from in-kernel function, and exit value for eBPF program
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* R1 - R5 - arguments from eBPF program to in-kernel function
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* R6 - R9 - callee saved registers that in-kernel function will preserve
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* R10 - read-only frame pointer to access stack
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Thus, all eBPF registers map one to one to HW registers on x86_64, aarch64,
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etc, and eBPF calling convention maps directly to ABIs used by the kernel on
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64-bit architectures.
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On 32-bit architectures JIT may map programs that use only 32-bit arithmetic
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and may let more complex programs to be interpreted.
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R0 - R5 are scratch registers and eBPF program needs spill/fill them if
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necessary across calls. Note that there is only one eBPF program (== one
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eBPF main routine) and it cannot call other eBPF functions, it can only
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call predefined in-kernel functions, though.
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- Register width increases from 32-bit to 64-bit:
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Still, the semantics of the original 32-bit ALU operations are preserved
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via 32-bit subregisters. All eBPF registers are 64-bit with 32-bit lower
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subregisters that zero-extend into 64-bit if they are being written to.
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That behavior maps directly to x86_64 and arm64 subregister definition, but
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makes other JITs more difficult.
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32-bit architectures run 64-bit eBPF programs via interpreter.
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Their JITs may convert BPF programs that only use 32-bit subregisters into
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native instruction set and let the rest being interpreted.
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Operation is 64-bit, because on 64-bit architectures, pointers are also
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64-bit wide, and we want to pass 64-bit values in/out of kernel functions,
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so 32-bit eBPF registers would otherwise require to define register-pair
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ABI, thus, there won't be able to use a direct eBPF register to HW register
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mapping and JIT would need to do combine/split/move operations for every
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register in and out of the function, which is complex, bug prone and slow.
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Another reason is the use of atomic 64-bit counters.
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- Conditional jt/jf targets replaced with jt/fall-through:
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While the original design has constructs such as ``if (cond) jump_true;
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else jump_false;``, they are being replaced into alternative constructs like
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``if (cond) jump_true; /* else fall-through */``.
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- Introduces bpf_call insn and register passing convention for zero overhead
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calls from/to other kernel functions:
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Before an in-kernel function call, the eBPF program needs to
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place function arguments into R1 to R5 registers to satisfy calling
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convention, then the interpreter will take them from registers and pass
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to in-kernel function. If R1 - R5 registers are mapped to CPU registers
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that are used for argument passing on given architecture, the JIT compiler
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doesn't need to emit extra moves. Function arguments will be in the correct
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registers and BPF_CALL instruction will be JITed as single 'call' HW
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instruction. This calling convention was picked to cover common call
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situations without performance penalty.
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After an in-kernel function call, R1 - R5 are reset to unreadable and R0 has
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a return value of the function. Since R6 - R9 are callee saved, their state
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is preserved across the call.
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For example, consider three C functions::
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u64 f1() { return (*_f2)(1); }
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u64 f2(u64 a) { return f3(a + 1, a); }
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u64 f3(u64 a, u64 b) { return a - b; }
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GCC can compile f1, f3 into x86_64::
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f1:
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movl $1, %edi
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movq _f2(%rip), %rax
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jmp *%rax
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f3:
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movq %rdi, %rax
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subq %rsi, %rax
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ret
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Function f2 in eBPF may look like::
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f2:
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bpf_mov R2, R1
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bpf_add R1, 1
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bpf_call f3
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bpf_exit
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If f2 is JITed and the pointer stored to ``_f2``. The calls f1 -> f2 -> f3 and
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returns will be seamless. Without JIT, __bpf_prog_run() interpreter needs to
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be used to call into f2.
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For practical reasons all eBPF programs have only one argument 'ctx' which is
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already placed into R1 (e.g. on __bpf_prog_run() startup) and the programs
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can call kernel functions with up to 5 arguments. Calls with 6 or more arguments
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are currently not supported, but these restrictions can be lifted if necessary
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in the future.
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On 64-bit architectures all register map to HW registers one to one. For
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example, x86_64 JIT compiler can map them as ...
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::
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R0 - rax
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R1 - rdi
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R2 - rsi
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R3 - rdx
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R4 - rcx
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R5 - r8
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R6 - rbx
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R7 - r13
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R8 - r14
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R9 - r15
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R10 - rbp
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... since x86_64 ABI mandates rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9 for argument passing
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and rbx, r12 - r15 are callee saved.
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Then the following eBPF pseudo-program::
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bpf_mov R6, R1 /* save ctx */
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bpf_mov R2, 2
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bpf_mov R3, 3
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bpf_mov R4, 4
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bpf_mov R5, 5
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bpf_call foo
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bpf_mov R7, R0 /* save foo() return value */
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bpf_mov R1, R6 /* restore ctx for next call */
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bpf_mov R2, 6
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bpf_mov R3, 7
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bpf_mov R4, 8
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bpf_mov R5, 9
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bpf_call bar
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bpf_add R0, R7
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bpf_exit
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After JIT to x86_64 may look like::
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push %rbp
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mov %rsp,%rbp
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sub $0x228,%rsp
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mov %rbx,-0x228(%rbp)
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mov %r13,-0x220(%rbp)
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mov %rdi,%rbx
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mov $0x2,%esi
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mov $0x3,%edx
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mov $0x4,%ecx
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mov $0x5,%r8d
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callq foo
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mov %rax,%r13
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mov %rbx,%rdi
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mov $0x6,%esi
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mov $0x7,%edx
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mov $0x8,%ecx
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mov $0x9,%r8d
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callq bar
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add %r13,%rax
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mov -0x228(%rbp),%rbx
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mov -0x220(%rbp),%r13
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leaveq
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retq
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Which is in this example equivalent in C to::
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u64 bpf_filter(u64 ctx)
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{
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return foo(ctx, 2, 3, 4, 5) + bar(ctx, 6, 7, 8, 9);
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}
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In-kernel functions foo() and bar() with prototype: u64 (*)(u64 arg1, u64
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arg2, u64 arg3, u64 arg4, u64 arg5); will receive arguments in proper
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registers and place their return value into ``%rax`` which is R0 in eBPF.
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Prologue and epilogue are emitted by JIT and are implicit in the
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interpreter. R0-R5 are scratch registers, so eBPF program needs to preserve
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them across the calls as defined by calling convention.
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For example the following program is invalid::
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bpf_mov R1, 1
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bpf_call foo
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bpf_mov R0, R1
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bpf_exit
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After the call the registers R1-R5 contain junk values and cannot be read.
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An in-kernel `eBPF verifier`_ is used to validate eBPF programs.
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Also in the new design, eBPF is limited to 4096 insns, which means that any
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program will terminate quickly and will only call a fixed number of kernel
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functions. Original BPF and eBPF are two operand instructions,
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which helps to do one-to-one mapping between eBPF insn and x86 insn during JIT.
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The input context pointer for invoking the interpreter function is generic,
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its content is defined by a specific use case. For seccomp register R1 points
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to seccomp_data, for converted BPF filters R1 points to a skb.
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A program, that is translated internally consists of the following elements::
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op:16, jt:8, jf:8, k:32 ==> op:8, dst_reg:4, src_reg:4, off:16, imm:32
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So far 87 eBPF instructions were implemented. 8-bit 'op' opcode field
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has room for new instructions. Some of them may use 16/24/32 byte encoding. New
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instructions must be multiple of 8 bytes to preserve backward compatibility.
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eBPF is a general purpose RISC instruction set. Not every register and
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every instruction are used during translation from original BPF to eBPF.
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For example, socket filters are not using ``exclusive add`` instruction, but
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tracing filters may do to maintain counters of events, for example. Register R9
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is not used by socket filters either, but more complex filters may be running
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out of registers and would have to resort to spill/fill to stack.
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eBPF can be used as a generic assembler for last step performance
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optimizations, socket filters and seccomp are using it as assembler. Tracing
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filters may use it as assembler to generate code from kernel. In kernel usage
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may not be bounded by security considerations, since generated eBPF code
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may be optimizing internal code path and not being exposed to the user space.
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Safety of eBPF can come from the `eBPF verifier`_. In such use cases as
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described, it may be used as safe instruction set.
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Just like the original BPF, eBPF runs within a controlled environment,
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is deterministic and the kernel can easily prove that. The safety of the program
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can be determined in two steps: first step does depth-first-search to disallow
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loops and other CFG validation; second step starts from the first insn and
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descends all possible paths. It simulates execution of every insn and observes
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the state change of registers and stack.
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eBPF opcode encoding
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====================
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eBPF is reusing most of the opcode encoding from classic to simplify conversion
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of classic BPF to eBPF. For arithmetic and jump instructions the 8-bit 'code'
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field is divided into three parts::
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+----------------+--------+--------------------+
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| 4 bits | 1 bit | 3 bits |
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| operation code | source | instruction class |
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+----------------+--------+--------------------+
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(MSB) (LSB)
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Three LSB bits store instruction class which is one of:
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=================== ===============
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Classic BPF classes eBPF classes
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=================== ===============
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BPF_LD 0x00 BPF_LD 0x00
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BPF_LDX 0x01 BPF_LDX 0x01
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BPF_ST 0x02 BPF_ST 0x02
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BPF_STX 0x03 BPF_STX 0x03
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BPF_ALU 0x04 BPF_ALU 0x04
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BPF_JMP 0x05 BPF_JMP 0x05
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BPF_RET 0x06 BPF_JMP32 0x06
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BPF_MISC 0x07 BPF_ALU64 0x07
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=================== ===============
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When BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_ALU or BPF_JMP, 4th bit encodes source operand ...
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::
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BPF_K 0x00
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BPF_X 0x08
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* in classic BPF, this means::
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BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_X - use register X as source operand
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BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_K - use 32-bit immediate as source operand
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* in eBPF, this means::
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BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_X - use 'src_reg' register as source operand
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BPF_SRC(code) == BPF_K - use 32-bit immediate as source operand
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... and four MSB bits store operation code.
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If BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_ALU or BPF_ALU64 [ in eBPF ], BPF_OP(code) is one of::
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BPF_ADD 0x00
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BPF_SUB 0x10
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BPF_MUL 0x20
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BPF_DIV 0x30
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BPF_OR 0x40
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BPF_AND 0x50
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BPF_LSH 0x60
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BPF_RSH 0x70
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BPF_NEG 0x80
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BPF_MOD 0x90
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BPF_XOR 0xa0
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BPF_MOV 0xb0 /* eBPF only: mov reg to reg */
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BPF_ARSH 0xc0 /* eBPF only: sign extending shift right */
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BPF_END 0xd0 /* eBPF only: endianness conversion */
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If BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP or BPF_JMP32 [ in eBPF ], BPF_OP(code) is one of::
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BPF_JA 0x00 /* BPF_JMP only */
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BPF_JEQ 0x10
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BPF_JGT 0x20
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BPF_JGE 0x30
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BPF_JSET 0x40
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BPF_JNE 0x50 /* eBPF only: jump != */
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BPF_JSGT 0x60 /* eBPF only: signed '>' */
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BPF_JSGE 0x70 /* eBPF only: signed '>=' */
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BPF_CALL 0x80 /* eBPF BPF_JMP only: function call */
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BPF_EXIT 0x90 /* eBPF BPF_JMP only: function return */
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BPF_JLT 0xa0 /* eBPF only: unsigned '<' */
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BPF_JLE 0xb0 /* eBPF only: unsigned '<=' */
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BPF_JSLT 0xc0 /* eBPF only: signed '<' */
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BPF_JSLE 0xd0 /* eBPF only: signed '<=' */
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So BPF_ADD | BPF_X | BPF_ALU means 32-bit addition in both classic BPF
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and eBPF. There are only two registers in classic BPF, so it means A += X.
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In eBPF it means dst_reg = (u32) dst_reg + (u32) src_reg; similarly,
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BPF_XOR | BPF_K | BPF_ALU means A ^= imm32 in classic BPF and analogous
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src_reg = (u32) src_reg ^ (u32) imm32 in eBPF.
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Classic BPF is using BPF_MISC class to represent A = X and X = A moves.
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eBPF is using BPF_MOV | BPF_X | BPF_ALU code instead. Since there are no
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BPF_MISC operations in eBPF, the class 7 is used as BPF_ALU64 to mean
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exactly the same operations as BPF_ALU, but with 64-bit wide operands
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instead. So BPF_ADD | BPF_X | BPF_ALU64 means 64-bit addition, i.e.:
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dst_reg = dst_reg + src_reg
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Classic BPF wastes the whole BPF_RET class to represent a single ``ret``
|
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operation. Classic BPF_RET | BPF_K means copy imm32 into return register
|
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and perform function exit. eBPF is modeled to match CPU, so BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT
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in eBPF means function exit only. The eBPF program needs to store return
|
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value into register R0 before doing a BPF_EXIT. Class 6 in eBPF is used as
|
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BPF_JMP32 to mean exactly the same operations as BPF_JMP, but with 32-bit wide
|
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operands for the comparisons instead.
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For load and store instructions the 8-bit 'code' field is divided as::
|
||||
|
||||
+--------+--------+-------------------+
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| 3 bits | 2 bits | 3 bits |
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||||
| mode | size | instruction class |
|
||||
+--------+--------+-------------------+
|
||||
(MSB) (LSB)
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||||
|
||||
Size modifier is one of ...
|
||||
|
||||
::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_W 0x00 /* word */
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||||
BPF_H 0x08 /* half word */
|
||||
BPF_B 0x10 /* byte */
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||||
BPF_DW 0x18 /* eBPF only, double word */
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||||
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... which encodes size of load/store operation::
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B - 1 byte
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H - 2 byte
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||||
W - 4 byte
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||||
DW - 8 byte (eBPF only)
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||||
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||||
Mode modifier is one of::
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||||
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||||
BPF_IMM 0x00 /* used for 32-bit mov in classic BPF and 64-bit in eBPF */
|
||||
BPF_ABS 0x20
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BPF_IND 0x40
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||||
BPF_MEM 0x60
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||||
BPF_LEN 0x80 /* classic BPF only, reserved in eBPF */
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BPF_MSH 0xa0 /* classic BPF only, reserved in eBPF */
|
||||
BPF_ATOMIC 0xc0 /* eBPF only, atomic operations */
|
||||
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||||
eBPF has two non-generic instructions: (BPF_ABS | <size> | BPF_LD) and
|
||||
(BPF_IND | <size> | BPF_LD) which are used to access packet data.
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||||
|
||||
They had to be carried over from classic to have strong performance of
|
||||
socket filters running in eBPF interpreter. These instructions can only
|
||||
be used when interpreter context is a pointer to ``struct sk_buff`` and
|
||||
have seven implicit operands. Register R6 is an implicit input that must
|
||||
contain pointer to sk_buff. Register R0 is an implicit output which contains
|
||||
the data fetched from the packet. Registers R1-R5 are scratch registers
|
||||
and must not be used to store the data across BPF_ABS | BPF_LD or
|
||||
BPF_IND | BPF_LD instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
These instructions have implicit program exit condition as well. When
|
||||
eBPF program is trying to access the data beyond the packet boundary,
|
||||
the interpreter will abort the execution of the program. JIT compilers
|
||||
therefore must preserve this property. src_reg and imm32 fields are
|
||||
explicit inputs to these instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
For example::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_IND | BPF_W | BPF_LD means:
|
||||
|
||||
R0 = ntohl(*(u32 *) (((struct sk_buff *) R6)->data + src_reg + imm32))
|
||||
and R1 - R5 were scratched.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlike classic BPF instruction set, eBPF has generic load/store operations::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MEM | <size> | BPF_STX: *(size *) (dst_reg + off) = src_reg
|
||||
BPF_MEM | <size> | BPF_ST: *(size *) (dst_reg + off) = imm32
|
||||
BPF_MEM | <size> | BPF_LDX: dst_reg = *(size *) (src_reg + off)
|
||||
|
||||
Where size is one of: BPF_B or BPF_H or BPF_W or BPF_DW.
|
||||
|
||||
It also includes atomic operations, which use the immediate field for extra
|
||||
encoding::
|
||||
|
||||
.imm = BPF_ADD, .code = BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_W | BPF_STX: lock xadd *(u32 *)(dst_reg + off16) += src_reg
|
||||
.imm = BPF_ADD, .code = BPF_ATOMIC | BPF_DW | BPF_STX: lock xadd *(u64 *)(dst_reg + off16) += src_reg
|
||||
|
||||
The basic atomic operations supported are::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ADD
|
||||
BPF_AND
|
||||
BPF_OR
|
||||
BPF_XOR
|
||||
|
||||
Each having equivalent semantics with the ``BPF_ADD`` example, that is: the
|
||||
memory location addresed by ``dst_reg + off`` is atomically modified, with
|
||||
``src_reg`` as the other operand. If the ``BPF_FETCH`` flag is set in the
|
||||
immediate, then these operations also overwrite ``src_reg`` with the
|
||||
value that was in memory before it was modified.
|
||||
|
||||
The more special operations are::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_XCHG
|
||||
|
||||
This atomically exchanges ``src_reg`` with the value addressed by ``dst_reg +
|
||||
off``. ::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_CMPXCHG
|
||||
|
||||
This atomically compares the value addressed by ``dst_reg + off`` with
|
||||
``R0``. If they match it is replaced with ``src_reg``. In either case, the
|
||||
value that was there before is zero-extended and loaded back to ``R0``.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that 1 and 2 byte atomic operations are not supported.
|
||||
|
||||
Clang can generate atomic instructions by default when ``-mcpu=v3`` is
|
||||
enabled. If a lower version for ``-mcpu`` is set, the only atomic instruction
|
||||
Clang can generate is ``BPF_ADD`` *without* ``BPF_FETCH``. If you need to enable
|
||||
the atomics features, while keeping a lower ``-mcpu`` version, you can use
|
||||
``-Xclang -target-feature -Xclang +alu32``.
|
||||
|
||||
You may encounter ``BPF_XADD`` - this is a legacy name for ``BPF_ATOMIC``,
|
||||
referring to the exclusive-add operation encoded when the immediate field is
|
||||
zero.
|
||||
|
||||
eBPF has one 16-byte instruction: ``BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM`` which consists
|
||||
of two consecutive ``struct bpf_insn`` 8-byte blocks and interpreted as single
|
||||
instruction that loads 64-bit immediate value into a dst_reg.
|
||||
Classic BPF has similar instruction: ``BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_IMM`` which loads
|
||||
32-bit immediate value into a register.
|
||||
|
||||
.. Links:
|
||||
.. _eBPF verifier: verifiers.rst
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
|
|||
|
||||
=============
|
||||
eBPF verifier
|
||||
=============
|
||||
|
||||
The safety of the eBPF program is determined in two steps.
|
||||
|
||||
First step does DAG check to disallow loops and other CFG validation.
|
||||
In particular it will detect programs that have unreachable instructions.
|
||||
(though classic BPF checker allows them)
|
||||
|
||||
Second step starts from the first insn and descends all possible paths.
|
||||
It simulates execution of every insn and observes the state change of
|
||||
registers and stack.
|
||||
|
||||
At the start of the program the register R1 contains a pointer to context
|
||||
and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
|
||||
If verifier sees an insn that does R2=R1, then R2 has now type
|
||||
PTR_TO_CTX as well and can be used on the right hand side of expression.
|
||||
If R1=PTR_TO_CTX and insn is R2=R1+R1, then R2=SCALAR_VALUE,
|
||||
since addition of two valid pointers makes invalid pointer.
|
||||
(In 'secure' mode verifier will reject any type of pointer arithmetic to make
|
||||
sure that kernel addresses don't leak to unprivileged users)
|
||||
|
||||
If register was never written to, it's not readable::
|
||||
|
||||
bpf_mov R0 = R2
|
||||
bpf_exit
|
||||
|
||||
will be rejected, since R2 is unreadable at the start of the program.
|
||||
|
||||
After kernel function call, R1-R5 are reset to unreadable and
|
||||
R0 has a return type of the function.
|
||||
|
||||
Since R6-R9 are callee saved, their state is preserved across the call.
|
||||
|
||||
::
|
||||
|
||||
bpf_mov R6 = 1
|
||||
bpf_call foo
|
||||
bpf_mov R0 = R6
|
||||
bpf_exit
|
||||
|
||||
is a correct program. If there was R1 instead of R6, it would have
|
||||
been rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
load/store instructions are allowed only with registers of valid types, which
|
||||
are PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_MAP, PTR_TO_STACK. They are bounds and alignment checked.
|
||||
For example::
|
||||
|
||||
bpf_mov R1 = 1
|
||||
bpf_mov R2 = 2
|
||||
bpf_xadd *(u32 *)(R1 + 3) += R2
|
||||
bpf_exit
|
||||
|
||||
will be rejected, since R1 doesn't have a valid pointer type at the time of
|
||||
execution of instruction bpf_xadd.
|
||||
|
||||
At the start R1 type is PTR_TO_CTX (a pointer to generic ``struct bpf_context``)
|
||||
A callback is used to customize verifier to restrict eBPF program access to only
|
||||
certain fields within ctx structure with specified size and alignment.
|
||||
|
||||
For example, the following insn::
|
||||
|
||||
bpf_ld R0 = *(u32 *)(R6 + 8)
|
||||
|
||||
intends to load a word from address R6 + 8 and store it into R0
|
||||
If R6=PTR_TO_CTX, via is_valid_access() callback the verifier will know
|
||||
that offset 8 of size 4 bytes can be accessed for reading, otherwise
|
||||
the verifier will reject the program.
|
||||
If R6=PTR_TO_STACK, then access should be aligned and be within
|
||||
stack bounds, which are [-MAX_BPF_STACK, 0). In this example offset is 8,
|
||||
so it will fail verification, since it's out of bounds.
|
||||
|
||||
The verifier will allow eBPF program to read data from stack only after
|
||||
it wrote into it.
|
||||
|
||||
Classic BPF verifier does similar check with M[0-15] memory slots.
|
||||
For example::
|
||||
|
||||
bpf_ld R0 = *(u32 *)(R10 - 4)
|
||||
bpf_exit
|
||||
|
||||
is invalid program.
|
||||
Though R10 is correct read-only register and has type PTR_TO_STACK
|
||||
and R10 - 4 is within stack bounds, there were no stores into that location.
|
||||
|
||||
Pointer register spill/fill is tracked as well, since four (R6-R9)
|
||||
callee saved registers may not be enough for some programs.
|
||||
|
||||
Allowed function calls are customized with bpf_verifier_ops->get_func_proto()
|
||||
The eBPF verifier will check that registers match argument constraints.
|
||||
After the call register R0 will be set to return type of the function.
|
||||
|
||||
Function calls is a main mechanism to extend functionality of eBPF programs.
|
||||
Socket filters may let programs to call one set of functions, whereas tracing
|
||||
filters may allow completely different set.
|
||||
|
||||
If a function made accessible to eBPF program, it needs to be thought through
|
||||
from safety point of view. The verifier will guarantee that the function is
|
||||
called with valid arguments.
|
||||
|
||||
seccomp vs socket filters have different security restrictions for classic BPF.
|
||||
Seccomp solves this by two stage verifier: classic BPF verifier is followed
|
||||
by seccomp verifier. In case of eBPF one configurable verifier is shared for
|
||||
all use cases.
|
||||
|
||||
See details of eBPF verifier in kernel/bpf/verifier.c
|
||||
|
||||
Register value tracking
|
||||
=======================
|
||||
|
||||
In order to determine the safety of an eBPF program, the verifier must track
|
||||
the range of possible values in each register and also in each stack slot.
|
||||
This is done with ``struct bpf_reg_state``, defined in include/linux/
|
||||
bpf_verifier.h, which unifies tracking of scalar and pointer values. Each
|
||||
register state has a type, which is either NOT_INIT (the register has not been
|
||||
written to), SCALAR_VALUE (some value which is not usable as a pointer), or a
|
||||
pointer type. The types of pointers describe their base, as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
PTR_TO_CTX
|
||||
Pointer to bpf_context.
|
||||
CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
|
||||
Pointer to struct bpf_map. "Const" because arithmetic
|
||||
on these pointers is forbidden.
|
||||
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE
|
||||
Pointer to the value stored in a map element.
|
||||
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL
|
||||
Either a pointer to a map value, or NULL; map accesses
|
||||
(see maps.rst) return this type, which becomes a
|
||||
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE when checked != NULL. Arithmetic on
|
||||
these pointers is forbidden.
|
||||
PTR_TO_STACK
|
||||
Frame pointer.
|
||||
PTR_TO_PACKET
|
||||
skb->data.
|
||||
PTR_TO_PACKET_END
|
||||
skb->data + headlen; arithmetic forbidden.
|
||||
PTR_TO_SOCKET
|
||||
Pointer to struct bpf_sock_ops, implicitly refcounted.
|
||||
PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL
|
||||
Either a pointer to a socket, or NULL; socket lookup
|
||||
returns this type, which becomes a PTR_TO_SOCKET when
|
||||
checked != NULL. PTR_TO_SOCKET is reference-counted,
|
||||
so programs must release the reference through the
|
||||
socket release function before the end of the program.
|
||||
Arithmetic on these pointers is forbidden.
|
||||
|
||||
However, a pointer may be offset from this base (as a result of pointer
|
||||
arithmetic), and this is tracked in two parts: the 'fixed offset' and 'variable
|
||||
offset'. The former is used when an exactly-known value (e.g. an immediate
|
||||
operand) is added to a pointer, while the latter is used for values which are
|
||||
not exactly known. The variable offset is also used in SCALAR_VALUEs, to track
|
||||
the range of possible values in the register.
|
||||
|
||||
The verifier's knowledge about the variable offset consists of:
|
||||
|
||||
* minimum and maximum values as unsigned
|
||||
* minimum and maximum values as signed
|
||||
|
||||
* knowledge of the values of individual bits, in the form of a 'tnum': a u64
|
||||
'mask' and a u64 'value'. 1s in the mask represent bits whose value is unknown;
|
||||
1s in the value represent bits known to be 1. Bits known to be 0 have 0 in both
|
||||
mask and value; no bit should ever be 1 in both. For example, if a byte is read
|
||||
into a register from memory, the register's top 56 bits are known zero, while
|
||||
the low 8 are unknown - which is represented as the tnum (0x0; 0xff). If we
|
||||
then OR this with 0x40, we get (0x40; 0xbf), then if we add 1 we get (0x0;
|
||||
0x1ff), because of potential carries.
|
||||
|
||||
Besides arithmetic, the register state can also be updated by conditional
|
||||
branches. For instance, if a SCALAR_VALUE is compared > 8, in the 'true' branch
|
||||
it will have a umin_value (unsigned minimum value) of 9, whereas in the 'false'
|
||||
branch it will have a umax_value of 8. A signed compare (with BPF_JSGT or
|
||||
BPF_JSGE) would instead update the signed minimum/maximum values. Information
|
||||
from the signed and unsigned bounds can be combined; for instance if a value is
|
||||
first tested < 8 and then tested s> 4, the verifier will conclude that the value
|
||||
is also > 4 and s< 8, since the bounds prevent crossing the sign boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
PTR_TO_PACKETs with a variable offset part have an 'id', which is common to all
|
||||
pointers sharing that same variable offset. This is important for packet range
|
||||
checks: after adding a variable to a packet pointer register A, if you then copy
|
||||
it to another register B and then add a constant 4 to A, both registers will
|
||||
share the same 'id' but the A will have a fixed offset of +4. Then if A is
|
||||
bounds-checked and found to be less than a PTR_TO_PACKET_END, the register B is
|
||||
now known to have a safe range of at least 4 bytes. See 'Direct packet access',
|
||||
below, for more on PTR_TO_PACKET ranges.
|
||||
|
||||
The 'id' field is also used on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, common to all copies of
|
||||
the pointer returned from a map lookup. This means that when one copy is
|
||||
checked and found to be non-NULL, all copies can become PTR_TO_MAP_VALUEs.
|
||||
As well as range-checking, the tracked information is also used for enforcing
|
||||
alignment of pointer accesses. For instance, on most systems the packet pointer
|
||||
is 2 bytes after a 4-byte alignment. If a program adds 14 bytes to that to jump
|
||||
over the Ethernet header, then reads IHL and addes (IHL * 4), the resulting
|
||||
pointer will have a variable offset known to be 4n+2 for some n, so adding the 2
|
||||
bytes (NET_IP_ALIGN) gives a 4-byte alignment and so word-sized accesses through
|
||||
that pointer are safe.
|
||||
The 'id' field is also used on PTR_TO_SOCKET and PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL, common
|
||||
to all copies of the pointer returned from a socket lookup. This has similar
|
||||
behaviour to the handling for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL->PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, but
|
||||
it also handles reference tracking for the pointer. PTR_TO_SOCKET implicitly
|
||||
represents a reference to the corresponding ``struct sock``. To ensure that the
|
||||
reference is not leaked, it is imperative to NULL-check the reference and in
|
||||
the non-NULL case, and pass the valid reference to the socket release function.
|
||||
|
||||
Direct packet access
|
||||
====================
|
||||
|
||||
In cls_bpf and act_bpf programs the verifier allows direct access to the packet
|
||||
data via skb->data and skb->data_end pointers.
|
||||
Ex::
|
||||
|
||||
1: r4 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */
|
||||
2: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */
|
||||
3: r5 = r3
|
||||
4: r5 += 14
|
||||
5: if r5 > r4 goto pc+16
|
||||
R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp
|
||||
6: r0 = *(u16 *)(r3 +12) /* access 12 and 13 bytes of the packet */
|
||||
|
||||
this 2byte load from the packet is safe to do, since the program author
|
||||
did check ``if (skb->data + 14 > skb->data_end) goto err`` at insn #5 which
|
||||
means that in the fall-through case the register R3 (which points to skb->data)
|
||||
has at least 14 directly accessible bytes. The verifier marks it
|
||||
as R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14).
|
||||
id=0 means that no additional variables were added to the register.
|
||||
off=0 means that no additional constants were added.
|
||||
r=14 is the range of safe access which means that bytes [R3, R3 + 14) are ok.
|
||||
Note that R5 is marked as R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14). It also points
|
||||
to the packet data, but constant 14 was added to the register, so
|
||||
it now points to ``skb->data + 14`` and accessible range is [R5, R5 + 14 - 14)
|
||||
which is zero bytes.
|
||||
|
||||
More complex packet access may look like::
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
R0=inv1 R1=ctx R3=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R4=pkt_end R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp
|
||||
6: r0 = *(u8 *)(r3 +7) /* load 7th byte from the packet */
|
||||
7: r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12)
|
||||
8: r4 *= 14
|
||||
9: r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) /* load skb->data */
|
||||
10: r3 += r4
|
||||
11: r2 = r1
|
||||
12: r2 <<= 48
|
||||
13: r2 >>= 48
|
||||
14: r3 += r2
|
||||
15: r2 = r3
|
||||
16: r2 += 8
|
||||
17: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) /* load skb->data_end */
|
||||
18: if r2 > r1 goto pc+2
|
||||
R0=inv(id=0,umax_value=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) R1=pkt_end R2=pkt(id=2,off=8,r=8) R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8) R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=3570,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffe)) R5=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R10=fp
|
||||
19: r1 = *(u8 *)(r3 +4)
|
||||
|
||||
The state of the register R3 is R3=pkt(id=2,off=0,r=8)
|
||||
id=2 means that two ``r3 += rX`` instructions were seen, so r3 points to some
|
||||
offset within a packet and since the program author did
|
||||
``if (r3 + 8 > r1) goto err`` at insn #18, the safe range is [R3, R3 + 8).
|
||||
The verifier only allows 'add'/'sub' operations on packet registers. Any other
|
||||
operation will set the register state to 'SCALAR_VALUE' and it won't be
|
||||
available for direct packet access.
|
||||
|
||||
Operation ``r3 += rX`` may overflow and become less than original skb->data,
|
||||
therefore the verifier has to prevent that. So when it sees ``r3 += rX``
|
||||
instruction and rX is more than 16-bit value, any subsequent bounds-check of r3
|
||||
against skb->data_end will not give us 'range' information, so attempts to read
|
||||
through the pointer will give "invalid access to packet" error.
|
||||
|
||||
Ex. after insn ``r4 = *(u8 *)(r3 +12)`` (insn #7 above) the state of r4 is
|
||||
R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=255,var_off=(0x0; 0xff)) which means that upper 56 bits
|
||||
of the register are guaranteed to be zero, and nothing is known about the lower
|
||||
8 bits. After insn ``r4 *= 14`` the state becomes
|
||||
R4=inv(id=0,umax_value=3570,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffe)), since multiplying an 8-bit
|
||||
value by constant 14 will keep upper 52 bits as zero, also the least significant
|
||||
bit will be zero as 14 is even. Similarly ``r2 >>= 48`` will make
|
||||
R2=inv(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)), since the shift is not sign
|
||||
extending. This logic is implemented in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() function,
|
||||
which calls adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() for adding pointer to scalar (or vice
|
||||
versa) and adjust_scalar_min_max_vals() for operations on two scalars.
|
||||
|
||||
The end result is that bpf program author can access packet directly
|
||||
using normal C code as::
|
||||
|
||||
void *data = (void *)(long)skb->data;
|
||||
void *data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
|
||||
struct eth_hdr *eth = data;
|
||||
struct iphdr *iph = data + sizeof(*eth);
|
||||
struct udphdr *udp = data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph);
|
||||
|
||||
if (data + sizeof(*eth) + sizeof(*iph) + sizeof(*udp) > data_end)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (eth->h_proto != htons(ETH_P_IP))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (iph->protocol != IPPROTO_UDP || iph->ihl != 5)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (udp->dest == 53 || udp->source == 9)
|
||||
...;
|
||||
|
||||
which makes such programs easier to write comparing to LD_ABS insn
|
||||
and significantly faster.
|
||||
|
||||
Pruning
|
||||
=======
|
||||
|
||||
The verifier does not actually walk all possible paths through the program. For
|
||||
each new branch to analyse, the verifier looks at all the states it's previously
|
||||
been in when at this instruction. If any of them contain the current state as a
|
||||
subset, the branch is 'pruned' - that is, the fact that the previous state was
|
||||
accepted implies the current state would be as well. For instance, if in the
|
||||
previous state, r1 held a packet-pointer, and in the current state, r1 holds a
|
||||
packet-pointer with a range as long or longer and at least as strict an
|
||||
alignment, then r1 is safe. Similarly, if r2 was NOT_INIT before then it can't
|
||||
have been used by any path from that point, so any value in r2 (including
|
||||
another NOT_INIT) is safe. The implementation is in the function regsafe().
|
||||
Pruning considers not only the registers but also the stack (and any spilled
|
||||
registers it may hold). They must all be safe for the branch to be pruned.
|
||||
This is implemented in states_equal().
|
||||
|
||||
Understanding eBPF verifier messages
|
||||
====================================
|
||||
|
||||
The following are few examples of invalid eBPF programs and verifier error
|
||||
messages as seen in the log:
|
||||
|
||||
Program with unreachable instructions::
|
||||
|
||||
static struct bpf_insn prog[] = {
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Error:
|
||||
|
||||
unreachable insn 1
|
||||
|
||||
Program that reads uninitialized register::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_2),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (bf) r0 = r2
|
||||
R2 !read_ok
|
||||
|
||||
Program that doesn't initialize R0 before exiting::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (bf) r2 = r1
|
||||
1: (95) exit
|
||||
R0 !read_ok
|
||||
|
||||
Program that accesses stack out of bounds::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, 8, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 +8) = 0
|
||||
invalid stack off=8 size=8
|
||||
|
||||
Program that doesn't initialize stack before passing its address into function::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
|
||||
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
1: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
2: (b7) r1 = 0x0
|
||||
3: (85) call 1
|
||||
invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8
|
||||
|
||||
Program that uses invalid map_fd=0 while calling to map_lookup_elem() function::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
|
||||
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
|
||||
1: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
2: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
3: (b7) r1 = 0x0
|
||||
4: (85) call 1
|
||||
fd 0 is not pointing to valid bpf_map
|
||||
|
||||
Program that doesn't check return value of map_lookup_elem() before accessing
|
||||
map element::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
|
||||
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
|
||||
1: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
2: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
3: (b7) r1 = 0x0
|
||||
4: (85) call 1
|
||||
5: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 0
|
||||
R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'
|
||||
|
||||
Program that correctly checks map_lookup_elem() returned value for NULL, but
|
||||
accesses the memory with incorrect alignment::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
|
||||
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
|
||||
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
|
||||
1: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
2: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
3: (b7) r1 = 1
|
||||
4: (85) call 1
|
||||
5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
|
||||
R0=map_ptr R10=fp
|
||||
6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0
|
||||
misaligned access off 4 size 8
|
||||
|
||||
Program that correctly checks map_lookup_elem() returned value for NULL and
|
||||
accesses memory with correct alignment in one side of 'if' branch, but fails
|
||||
to do so in the other side of 'if' branch::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
|
||||
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
|
||||
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
|
||||
1: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
2: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
3: (b7) r1 = 1
|
||||
4: (85) call 1
|
||||
5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+2
|
||||
R0=map_ptr R10=fp
|
||||
6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 0
|
||||
7: (95) exit
|
||||
|
||||
from 5 to 8: R0=imm0 R10=fp
|
||||
8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 1
|
||||
R0 invalid mem access 'imm'
|
||||
|
||||
Program that performs a socket lookup then sets the pointer to NULL without
|
||||
checking it::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
|
||||
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 4),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (b7) r2 = 0
|
||||
1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r2
|
||||
2: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
3: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
4: (b7) r3 = 4
|
||||
5: (b7) r4 = 0
|
||||
6: (b7) r5 = 0
|
||||
7: (85) call bpf_sk_lookup_tcp#65
|
||||
8: (b7) r0 = 0
|
||||
9: (95) exit
|
||||
Unreleased reference id=1, alloc_insn=7
|
||||
|
||||
Program that performs a socket lookup but does not NULL-check the returned
|
||||
value::
|
||||
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
|
||||
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
|
||||
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 4),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
|
||||
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
|
||||
BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_sk_lookup_tcp),
|
||||
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
|
||||
|
||||
Error::
|
||||
|
||||
0: (b7) r2 = 0
|
||||
1: (63) *(u32 *)(r10 -8) = r2
|
||||
2: (bf) r2 = r10
|
||||
3: (07) r2 += -8
|
||||
4: (b7) r3 = 4
|
||||
5: (b7) r4 = 0
|
||||
6: (b7) r5 = 0
|
||||
7: (85) call bpf_sk_lookup_tcp#65
|
||||
8: (95) exit
|
||||
Unreleased reference id=1, alloc_insn=7
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Loading…
Reference in New Issue