SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoning

The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:
Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 17:17:25 -07:00 committed by Kees Cook
parent 0c6cfa622c
commit 98c8865136
2 changed files with 0 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -760,19 +760,6 @@ bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/*
* cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
* security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
*/
if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
return true;
if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
(POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);

View File

@ -3708,12 +3708,6 @@ static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
/*
* cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
* security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
*/
BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
kfree(tsec);
}