diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 6cd6daefaaed..dcff82205477 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -12,11 +12,14 @@ Description:
 		then closing the file.  The new policy takes effect after
 		the file ima/policy is closed.
 
+		IMA appraisal, if configured, uses these file measurements
+		for local measurement appraisal.
+
 		rule format: action [condition ...]
 
-		action: measure | dont_measure
+		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise
 		condition:= base | lsm
-			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
+			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=] [fowner]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 
@@ -24,36 +27,50 @@ Description:
 			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			uid:= decimal value
+			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 
 		default policy:
 			# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
 			# SYSFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
 			# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
 			# TMPFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+			# RAMFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
 			measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+			appraise fowner=0
 
 		The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
 		all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
-		open for read by root in do_filp_open.
+		open for read by root in do_filp_open.  The default appraisal
+		policy appraises all files owned by root.
 
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
 			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
 
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+			dont_appraise obj_type=auditd_log_t
 			measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 			measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index ad7e2e5088c1..949dddcfd177 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1051,6 +1051,14 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 	ihash_entries=	[KNL]
 			Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
 
+	ima_appraise=	[IMA] appraise integrity measurements
+			Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "fix" }
+			default: "enforce"
+
+	ima_appraise_tcb [IMA]
+			The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
+			owned by uid=0.
+
 	ima_audit=	[IMA]
 			Format: { "0" | "1" }
 			0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 29e38a1f7f77..cce7df53b694 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /**
  * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+		ima_inode_post_setattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
 	}
 
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 701985e4ccda..a41f23f90b17 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)
 		if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync)
 			file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
 	}
+	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
 	security_file_free(file);
-	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
 		     !(file->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
 		cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 4d45b7189e7e..107f457143c3 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -295,11 +295,13 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (error) {
+		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+		return error;
+	}
+
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 6ac8e50c6cf5..2c7223d7e73b 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -39,5 +39,32 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+#else
+static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				     const char *xattr_name,
+				     const void *xattr_value,
+				     size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_H */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index a0c41256cb92..66c5fe9550a5 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -22,13 +22,14 @@ enum integrity_status {
 
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
-extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode);
 extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
 
 #else
-static inline int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+static inline struct integrity_iint_cache *
+				integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h
index e5d122031542..77a3e686d566 100644
--- a/include/linux/xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/xattr.h
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
 #define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
 #define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
 
+#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima"
+#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX
+
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 8901501425f4..eb5484504f50 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 	XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+	XATTR_NAME_IMA,
 #endif
 	XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
 	NULL
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 399641c3e846..d82a5a13d855 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #include "integrity.h"
 
 static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
 static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
 
 int iint_initialized;
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
 
-	assert_spin_locked(&integrity_iint_lock);
-
 	while (n) {
 		iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node);
 
@@ -63,9 +61,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode)
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return NULL;
 
-	spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 
 	return iint;
 }
@@ -74,59 +72,53 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
 {
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
+	iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
 }
 
 /**
- * integrity_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode
  * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ * @return: allocated iint
+ *
+ * Caller must lock i_mutex
  */
-int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct rb_node **p;
-	struct rb_node *new_node, *parent = NULL;
-	struct integrity_iint_cache *new_iint, *test_iint;
-	int rc;
+	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *test_iint;
 
-	new_iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
-	if (!new_iint)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		return iint;
 
-	new_iint->inode = inode;
-	new_node = &new_iint->rb_node;
+	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!iint)
+		return NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* i_flags */
-	spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 
 	p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;
 	while (*p) {
 		parent = *p;
 		test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache,
 				     rb_node);
-		rc = -EEXIST;
 		if (inode < test_iint->inode)
 			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
-		else if (inode > test_iint->inode)
-			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
 		else
-			goto out_err;
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
 	}
 
+	iint->inode = inode;
+	node = &iint->rb_node;
 	inode->i_flags |= S_IMA;
-	rb_link_node(new_node, parent, p);
-	rb_insert_color(new_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
+	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);
 
-	spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* i_flags */
-
-	return 0;
-out_err:
-	spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);	/* i_flags */
-	iint_free(new_iint);
-
-	return rc;
+	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	return iint;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -142,10 +134,10 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 	if (!IS_IMA(inode))
 		return;
 
-	spin_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 	iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode);
 	rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree);
-	spin_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
+	write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);
 
 	iint_free(iint);
 }
@@ -157,7 +149,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
-	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	iint->ima_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 809ccf19d09c..d232c73647ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -56,3 +56,18 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	default y
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE
+	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
+	  It requires the system to be labeled with a security extended
+	  attribute containing the file hash measurement.  To protect
+	  the security extended attributes from offline attack, enable
+	  and configure EVM.
+
+	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
+	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
+	  If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 5f740f6971e1..3f2ca6bdc384 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e7c99fd0d223..069a4aa63e95 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 extern int ima_initialized;
 extern int ima_used_chip;
 extern char *ima_hash;
+extern int ima_appraise;
 
 /* IMA inode template definition */
 struct ima_template_data {
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 }
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
+int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file);
@@ -123,14 +125,45 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
 struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
 void ima_delete_rules(void);
 
+/* Appraise integrity measurements */
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX	0x02
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+
+#else
+static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct file *file,
+					   const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode,
+				    enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				    struct file *file)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 032ff03ad907..33d46859753a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -9,13 +9,17 @@
  * License.
  *
  * File: ima_api.c
- *	Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
- *	and store_template.
+ *	Implements must_appraise_or_measure, collect_measurement,
+ *	appraise_measurement, store_measurement and store_template.
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
-
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include "ima.h"
+
 static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
 
 /*
@@ -93,7 +97,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
 }
 
 /**
- * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
+ * ima_must_appraise_or_measure - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
  * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
@@ -105,15 +109,22 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
- * Return 0 to measure. For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy,
- * or other error, return an error code.
-*/
+ * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
+ *
+ */
+int ima_must_appraise_or_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
+{
+	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		flags &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, flags);
+}
+
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 {
-	int must_measure;
-
-	must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
-	return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask, IMA_MEASURE);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -129,16 +140,24 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file)
 {
-	int result = -EEXIST;
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+	int result = 0;
 
-	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
 
-		memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
-		if (!result)
+		iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+		result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->ima_xattr.digest);
+		if (!result) {
 			iint->version = i_version;
+			iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
+		}
 	}
+	if (result)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
+				    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+				    result, 0);
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -167,6 +186,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	int violation = 0;
 
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+		return;
+
 	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
@@ -174,7 +196,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		return;
 	}
 	memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
-	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	strcpy(entry->template.file_name,
 	       (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ?
 	       file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4cdf36ad884a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
+{
+	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
+		ima_appraise = 0;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
+		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
+
+/*
+ * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag
+ *
+ * Return 1 to appraise
+ */
+int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		return 0;
+
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
+}
+
+static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			  struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	iint->ima_xattr.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST;
+	__vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
+			      sizeof iint->ima_xattr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_measurement - appraise file measurement
+ *
+ * Call evm_verifyxattr() to verify the integrity of 'security.ima'.
+ * Assuming success, compare the xattr hash with the collected measurement.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_appraise_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
+	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+	const char *op = "appraise_data";
+	char *cause = "unknown";
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ima_appraise)
+		return 0;
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
+		return iint->ima_status;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)&xattr_value,
+				0, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (rc <= 0) {
+		if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
+			goto out;
+
+		cause = "missing-hash";
+		status =
+		    (inode->i_size == 0) ? INTEGRITY_PASS : INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint);
+	if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) {
+		if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)
+		    || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
+			cause = "missing-HMAC";
+		else if (status == INTEGRITY_FAIL)
+			cause = "invalid-HMAC";
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	switch (xattr_value->type) {
+	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
+		rc = memcmp(xattr_value->digest, iint->ima_xattr.digest,
+			    IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc) {
+			cause = "invalid-hash";
+			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+			print_hex_dump_bytes("security.ima: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+					     xattr_value, sizeof(*xattr_value));
+			print_hex_dump_bytes("collected: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+					     (u8 *)&iint->ima_xattr,
+					     sizeof iint->ima_xattr);
+			break;
+		}
+		status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		break;
+	case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
+		iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
+		rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+					     xattr_value->digest, rc - 1,
+					     iint->ima_xattr.digest,
+					     IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		} else if (rc) {
+			cause = "invalid-signature";
+			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+		} else {
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+		cause = "unknown-ima-data";
+		break;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) &&
+		    (!xattr_value ||
+		     xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) {
+			ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+		}
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename,
+				    op, cause, rc, 0);
+	} else {
+		iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
+	}
+	iint->ima_status = status;
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_update_xattr - update 'security.ima' hash value
+ */
+void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG)
+		return;
+
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return;
+
+	ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_post_setattr - reflect file metadata changes
+ * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
+ *
+ * Changes to a dentry's metadata might result in needing to appraise.
+ *
+ * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller
+ * to lock the inode's i_mutex.
+ */
+void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+	int must_appraise, rc;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)
+	    || !inode->i_op->removexattr)
+		return;
+
+	must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR);
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint) {
+		if (must_appraise)
+			iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
+		else
+			iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED);
+	}
+	if (!must_appraise)
+		rc = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA);
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
+ *
+ * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
+ */
+static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+			     const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !ima_appraise || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+
+	iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
+	return;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				   xattr_value_len);
+	if (result == 1) {
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+		result = 0;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+	if (result == 1) {
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(dentry->d_inode);
+		result = 0;
+	}
+	return result;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 9b3ade7468b2..b21ee5b5495a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 	struct scatterlist sg[1];
 	loff_t i_size, offset = 0;
 	char *rbuf;
-	int rc;
+	int rc, read = 0;
 
 	rc = init_desc(&desc);
 	if (rc != 0)
@@ -59,6 +59,10 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+		file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+		read = 1;
+	}
 	i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
@@ -80,6 +84,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
 	kfree(rbuf);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+	if (read)
+		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
 out:
 	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index be8294915cf7..df6521296051 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -22,12 +22,19 @@
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
 int ima_initialized;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
+int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+#else
+int ima_appraise;
+#endif
+
 char *ima_hash = "sha1";
 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -52,7 +59,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-	int rc;
+	int must_measure;
 	bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
 	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
 
@@ -67,8 +74,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
-	if (rc < 0)
+	must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+	if (!must_measure)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
@@ -100,17 +107,21 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-				  struct inode *inode,
-				  struct file *file)
+				  struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE &&
-	    atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
-	    iint->version != inode->i_version)
-		iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
-	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+	if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
+		return;
+
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
+	    iint->version != inode->i_version) {
+		iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
+			ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -140,29 +151,37 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
-	int rc = 0;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = ima_must_measure(inode, mask, function);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
-retry:
-	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
-	if (!iint) {
-		rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
-		if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
-			goto retry;
-		return rc;
-	}
+	/* Determine if in appraise/measurement policy,
+	 * returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE bitmask.  */
+	action = ima_must_appraise_or_measure(inode, mask, function);
+	if (!action)
+		return 0;
 
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
-	rc = iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED ? 1 : 0;
-	if (rc != 0)
+	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
+
+	iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
+	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED) */
+	iint->flags |= action;
+	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED)) >> 1);
+
+	/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
+	if (!action) {
+		if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
+			rc = iint->ima_status;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -177,11 +196,16 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 				pathname = NULL;
 		}
 	}
-	ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
+		ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
+				      !pathname ? filename : pathname);
+	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
+		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
+					      !pathname ? filename : pathname);
 	kfree(pathbuf);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-	return rc;
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
+	return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -197,14 +221,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  */
 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int rc;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (!file)
 		return 0;
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
 		rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 					 MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
-	return 0;
+	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -228,7 +252,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 				 (strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
 				 bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
 				 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
-	return 0;
+	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -249,7 +273,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
 				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
 				 FILE_CHECK);
-	return 0;
+	return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1a9583008aae..0d6d60b4ba6f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -24,22 +24,30 @@
 #define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
+#define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
 
-enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
+#define UNKNOWN			0
+#define MEASURE			1	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
+#define DONT_MEASURE		2
+#define MEASURE_MASK		3
+#define APPRAISE		4	/* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
+#define DONT_APPRAISE		8
+#define APPRAISE_MASK		12
 
 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
 	LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
 };
 
-struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
+struct ima_rule_entry {
 	struct list_head list;
-	enum ima_action action;
+	int action;
 	unsigned int flags;
 	enum ima_hooks func;
 	int mask;
 	unsigned long fsmagic;
 	uid_t uid;
+	uid_t fowner;
 	struct {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
@@ -48,7 +56,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
 
 /*
  * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
- * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
  */
 
 /*
@@ -57,7 +65,7 @@ struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
  * and running executables.
  */
-static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
@@ -75,19 +83,41 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
-static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = 0,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+};
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
+static struct list_head *ima_rules;
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
 
 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
-static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
+static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
 {
 	ima_use_tcb = 1;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
+__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+
+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
+static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
@@ -98,7 +128,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
  *
  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
  */
-static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -114,6 +144,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid)
 		return false;
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && rule->fowner != inode->i_uid)
+		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid, sid;
@@ -163,39 +195,58 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
  * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
  * change.)
  */
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+		     int flags)
 {
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
-		bool rc;
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
 
-		rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
-		if (rc)
-			return entry->action;
+		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
+			continue;
+
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
+			continue;
+
+		action |= (entry->action & (IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_MEASURE));
+		actmask &= (entry->action & APPRAISE_MASK) ?
+		    ~APPRAISE_MASK : ~MEASURE_MASK;
+		if (!actmask)
+			break;
 	}
-	return 0;
+
+	return action;
 }
 
 /**
  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
  *
- * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
- * the new measure_policy_rules.
+ * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
+ * the new ima_policy_rules.
  */
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
-	int i, entries;
+	int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
 
 	/* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
-	if (ima_use_tcb)
-		entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
-	else
-		entries = 0;
+	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
+			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
+	
+	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
+		if (i < measure_entries)
+			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+		else {
+			int j = i - measure_entries;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
-		list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
-	ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
+			list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+				      &ima_default_rules);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -212,8 +263,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 	int result = 1;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
-	if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
-		ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
+	if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+		ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
 		cause = "complete";
 		result = 0;
 	}
@@ -224,14 +275,17 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
 enum {
 	Opt_err = -1,
 	Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
+	Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
-	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
+	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_measure, "measure"},
 	{Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+	{Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
+	{Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
 	{Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
 	{Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
@@ -242,10 +296,11 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
 	{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
-static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 			     char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
 {
 	int result;
@@ -269,7 +324,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
 }
 
-static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char *p;
@@ -278,6 +333,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
 
 	entry->uid = -1;
+	entry->fowner = -1;
 	entry->action = UNKNOWN;
 	while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
 		substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
@@ -306,11 +362,27 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 
 			entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
 			break;
+		case Opt_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = APPRAISE;
+			break;
+		case Opt_dont_appraise:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
+
+			if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+				result = -EINVAL;
+
+			entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
+			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
 
 			if (entry->func)
-				result  = -EINVAL;
+				result = -EINVAL;
 
 			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
@@ -375,6 +447,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 					entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
 			}
 			break;
+		case Opt_fowner:
+			ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
+
+			if (entry->fowner != -1) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			if (!result) {
+				entry->fowner = (uid_t) lnum;
+				if (entry->fowner != lnum)
+					result = -EINVAL;
+				else
+					entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
+			}
+			break;
 		case Opt_obj_user:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
 			result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
@@ -426,7 +515,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 }
 
 /**
- * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
  *
  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
@@ -436,12 +525,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
 	const char *op = "update_policy";
 	char *p;
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
 
 	/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
-	if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
+	if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "already exists",
 				    -EACCES, audit_info);
@@ -474,9 +563,9 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 		return result;
 	}
 
-	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+	list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -484,12 +573,12 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
 void ima_delete_rules(void)
 {
-	struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
 
-	mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
+	mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
 		list_del(&entry->list);
 		kfree(entry);
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 7a25ecec5aaa..4eec1b14193e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 
 /* iint cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURED		0x01
+#define IMA_MEASURE		0x01
+#define IMA_MEASURED		0x02
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		0x04
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		0x08
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		0x10
+#define IMA_DIGSIG		0x20
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01,
@@ -35,8 +40,8 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode in question */
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned char flags;
-	u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
+	struct evm_ima_xattr_data ima_xattr;
+	enum integrity_status ima_status;
 	enum integrity_status evm_status;
 };
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 68c1b9b45d93..d23b43522a5a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -571,6 +571,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
 	ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
@@ -606,6 +609,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
 	ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);