cifsd: add the check to prevent potential overflow with smb_strtoUTF16() and UNICODE_LEN()

Add the check to prevent potential overflow with smb_strtoUTF16() and
UNICODE_LEN().

Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
This commit is contained in:
Namjae Jeon 2021-05-26 16:37:05 +09:00
parent 7047805976
commit a2d0b5034a

View file

@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int ksmbd_gen_sess_key(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *hash,
static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *ntlmv2_hash,
char *dname)
{
int ret, len;
int ret, len, conv_len;
wchar_t *domain = NULL;
__le16 *uniname = NULL;
struct ksmbd_crypto_ctx *ctx;
@ -279,15 +279,17 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *ntlmv2_hash,
goto out;
}
if (len) {
len = smb_strtoUTF16(uniname, user_name(sess->user), len,
conv_len = smb_strtoUTF16(uniname, user_name(sess->user), len,
sess->conn->local_nls);
UniStrupr(uniname);
if (conv_len < 0 || conv_len > len) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
UniStrupr(uniname);
ret = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx),
(char *)uniname,
UNICODE_LEN(len));
UNICODE_LEN(conv_len));
if (ret) {
ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with user\n");
goto out;
@ -301,12 +303,16 @@ static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *ntlmv2_hash,
goto out;
}
len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, dname, len,
conv_len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, dname, len,
sess->conn->local_nls);
if (conv_len < 0 || conv_len > len) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_update(CRYPTO_HMACMD5(ctx),
(char *)domain,
UNICODE_LEN(len));
UNICODE_LEN(conv_len));
if (ret) {
ksmbd_debug(AUTH, "Could not update with domain\n");
goto out;
@ -584,6 +590,7 @@ ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
wchar_t *name;
__u8 *target_name;
unsigned int len, flags, blob_off, blob_len, type, target_info_len = 0;
unsigned int uni_len, conv_len;
int cflags = sess->ntlmssp.client_flags;
memcpy(chgblob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
@ -611,19 +618,24 @@ ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
chgblob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
len = strlen(ksmbd_netbios_name());
name = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL);
name = kmalloc(2 + UNICODE_LEN(len), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!name)
return -ENOMEM;
len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)name, ksmbd_netbios_name(), len,
conv_len = smb_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)name, ksmbd_netbios_name(), len,
sess->conn->local_nls);
len = UNICODE_LEN(len);
if (conv_len < 0 || conv_len > len) {
kfree(name);
return -EINVAL;
}
uni_len = UNICODE_LEN(conv_len);
blob_off = sizeof(struct challenge_message);
blob_len = blob_off + len;
blob_len = blob_off + uni_len;
chgblob->TargetName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
chgblob->TargetName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
chgblob->TargetName.Length = cpu_to_le16(uni_len);
chgblob->TargetName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(uni_len);
chgblob->TargetName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(blob_off);
/* Initialize random conn challenge */
@ -635,18 +647,18 @@ ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
chgblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(blob_len);
target_name = (__u8 *)chgblob + blob_off;
memcpy(target_name, name, len);
tinfo = (struct target_info *)(target_name + len);
memcpy(target_name, name, uni_len);
tinfo = (struct target_info *)(target_name + uni_len);
chgblob->TargetInfoArray.Length = 0;
/* Add target info list for NetBIOS/DNS settings */
for (type = NTLMSSP_AV_NB_COMPUTER_NAME;
type <= NTLMSSP_AV_DNS_DOMAIN_NAME; type++) {
tinfo->Type = cpu_to_le16(type);
tinfo->Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
memcpy(tinfo->Content, name, len);
tinfo = (struct target_info *)((char *)tinfo + 4 + len);
target_info_len += 4 + len;
tinfo->Length = cpu_to_le16(uni_len);
memcpy(tinfo->Content, name, uni_len);
tinfo = (struct target_info *)((char *)tinfo + 4 + uni_len);
target_info_len += 4 + uni_len;
}
/* Add terminator subblock */