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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

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Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-06-15

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 5 non-merge commits during the last 11 day(s) which contain
a total of 10 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix marking incorrect umem ring as done in libbpf's
   xsk_socket__create_shared() helper, from Kev Jackson.

2) Fix oob leakage under a spectre v1 type confusion
   attack, from Daniel Borkmann.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
David S. Miller 2021-06-15 15:26:07 -07:00
commit a4f0377db1
10 changed files with 115 additions and 16 deletions
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68
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
View file

@ -6483,6 +6483,27 @@ struct bpf_sanitize_info {
bool mask_to_left;
};
static struct bpf_verifier_state *
sanitize_speculative_path(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn,
u32 next_idx, u32 curr_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *branch;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
branch = push_stack(env, next_idx, curr_idx, true);
if (branch && insn) {
regs = branch->frame[branch->curframe]->regs;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->src_reg);
}
}
return branch;
}
static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
@ -6566,12 +6587,26 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
tmp = *dst_reg;
*dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
}
ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
ret = sanitize_speculative_path(env, NULL, env->insn_idx + 1,
env->insn_idx);
if (!ptr_is_dst_reg && ret)
*dst_reg = tmp;
return !ret ? REASON_STACK : 0;
}
static void sanitize_mark_insn_seen(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
/* If we simulate paths under speculation, we don't update the
* insn as 'seen' such that when we verify unreachable paths in
* the non-speculative domain, sanitize_dead_code() can still
* rewrite/sanitize them.
*/
if (!vstate->speculative)
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
}
static int sanitize_err(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn, int reason,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg,
@ -8750,14 +8785,28 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (err)
return err;
}
if (pred == 1) {
/* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
/* Only follow the goto, ignore fall-through. If needed, push
* the fall-through branch for simulation under speculative
* execution.
*/
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
!sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
*insn_idx))
return -EFAULT;
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else if (pred == 0) {
/* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
/* Only follow the fall-through branch, since that's where the
* program will go. If needed, push the goto branch for
* simulation under speculative execution.
*/
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1 &&
!sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn,
*insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
*insn_idx))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
@ -10630,7 +10679,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
@ -10857,7 +10906,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return err;
env->insn_idx++;
env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = env->pass_cnt;
sanitize_mark_insn_seen(env);
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
@ -11366,6 +11415,7 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
struct bpf_insn *insn = new_prog->insnsi;
u32 old_seen = old_data[off].seen;
u32 prog_len;
int i;
@ -11386,7 +11436,8 @@ static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
for (i = off; i < off + cnt - 1; i++) {
new_data[i].seen = env->pass_cnt;
/* Expand insni[off]'s seen count to the patched range. */
new_data[i].seen = old_seen;
new_data[i].zext_dst = insn_has_def32(env, insn + i);
}
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
@ -12710,6 +12761,9 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* insn_aux_data was touched. These variables are compared to clear temporary
* data from failed pass. For testing and experiments do_check_common() can be
* run multiple times even when prior attempt to verify is unsuccessful.
*
* Note that special handling is needed on !env->bypass_spec_v1 if this is
* ever called outside of error path with subsequent program rejection.
*/
static void sanitize_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{

2
tools/lib/bpf/xsk.c
View file

@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ int xsk_socket__create_shared(struct xsk_socket **xsk_ptr,
goto out_put_ctx;
}
if (xsk->fd == umem->fd)
umem->rx_ring_setup_done = true;
umem->tx_ring_setup_done = true;
}
err = xsk_get_mmap_offsets(xsk->fd, &off);

2
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
View file

@ -1147,7 +1147,7 @@ static void do_test_single(struct bpf_test *test, bool unpriv,
}
}
if (test->insn_processed) {
if (!unpriv && test->insn_processed) {
uint32_t insn_processed;
char *proc;

2
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/and.c
View file

@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R1 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 0
},

14
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds.c
View file

@ -508,6 +508,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT
},
{
@ -528,6 +530,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, -1),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT
},
{
@ -569,6 +573,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@ -589,6 +595,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@ -609,6 +617,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@ -674,6 +684,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@ -695,6 +707,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
.result = ACCEPT,
},

2
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/dead_code.c
View file

@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_0, 10, -4),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 7,
},

22
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jmp32.c
View file

@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
@ -150,6 +152,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
@ -213,6 +217,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
@ -280,6 +286,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -348,6 +356,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -416,6 +426,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -484,6 +496,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -552,6 +566,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -620,6 +636,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -688,6 +706,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},
@ -756,6 +776,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 2,
},

10
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/jset.c
View file

@ -82,8 +82,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.retval_unpriv = 1,
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.retval = 1,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
@ -141,7 +141,8 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
@ -162,6 +163,7 @@
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R9 !read_ok",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
},

2
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c
View file

@ -420,6 +420,8 @@
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
},
.errstr_unpriv = "R7 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.result = ACCEPT,
.retval = 0,
},

7
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c
View file

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
.fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars",
.errstr_unpriv = "R2 pointer comparison prohibited",
.retval = 0,
},
{
@ -159,7 +159,8 @@
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
// fake-dead code; targeted from branch A to
// prevent dead code sanitization
// prevent dead code sanitization, rejected
// via branch B however
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
@ -167,7 +168,7 @@
.fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
.errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths or scalars",
.errstr_unpriv = "R0 invalid mem access 'inv'",
.retval = 0,
},
{