netfilter: bridge: check len before accessing more nh data

In the while loop of br_nf_check_hbh_len(), similar to ip6_parse_tlv(),
before accessing 'nh[off + 1]', it should add a check 'len < 2'; and
before parsing IPV6_TLV_JUMBO, it should add a check 'optlen > len',
in case of overflows.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
This commit is contained in:
Xin Long 2023-03-07 16:31:28 -05:00 committed by Florian Westphal
parent 9ccff83b13
commit a7f1a2f43e

View file

@ -50,54 +50,49 @@ static int br_nf_check_hbh_len(struct sk_buff *skb)
u32 pkt_len;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + 8))
goto bad;
return -1;
nh = (unsigned char *)(ipv6_hdr(skb) + 1);
len = (nh[1] + 1) << 3;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, off + len))
goto bad;
return -1;
nh = skb_network_header(skb);
off += 2;
len -= 2;
while (len > 0) {
int optlen = nh[off + 1] + 2;
int optlen;
switch (nh[off]) {
case IPV6_TLV_PAD1:
optlen = 1;
break;
if (nh[off] == IPV6_TLV_PAD1) {
off++;
len--;
continue;
}
if (len < 2)
return -1;
optlen = nh[off + 1] + 2;
if (optlen > len)
return -1;
case IPV6_TLV_PADN:
break;
case IPV6_TLV_JUMBO:
if (nh[off] == IPV6_TLV_JUMBO) {
if (nh[off + 1] != 4 || (off & 3) != 2)
goto bad;
return -1;
pkt_len = ntohl(*(__be32 *)(nh + off + 2));
if (pkt_len <= IPV6_MAXPLEN ||
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len)
goto bad;
return -1;
if (pkt_len > skb->len - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))
goto bad;
return -1;
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb,
pkt_len + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))
goto bad;
return -1;
nh = skb_network_header(skb);
break;
default:
if (optlen > len)
goto bad;
break;
}
off += optlen;
len -= optlen;
}
if (len == 0)
return 0;
bad:
return -1;
return len ? -1 : 0;
}
int br_validate_ipv6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)