security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening
This moves the stackleak plugin options to Kconfig.hardening's memory initialization menu. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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Kees Cook
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@ -108,57 +108,6 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
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in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
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at the cost of weakened randomization.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
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returning from system calls. That reduces the information which
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kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized
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stack variable attacks.
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The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel
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compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary
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and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
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before deploying it.
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This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
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int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
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default 100
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range 0 4096
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
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the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
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It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
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a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
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If unsure, leave the default value 100.
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config STACKLEAK_METRICS
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bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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depends on PROC_FS
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help
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If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
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the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
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shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
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previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
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can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
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your workloads.
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config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
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runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
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CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
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bool
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM
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@ -88,6 +88,63 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
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initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
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by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
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returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
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the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces
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the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces
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potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information
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exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack
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depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks
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most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance
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impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than
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the function calling complexity.
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The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation
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sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you
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are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
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deploying it.
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This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
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int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
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default 100
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range 0 4096
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
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the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
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It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
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a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
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If unsure, leave the default value 100.
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config STACKLEAK_METRICS
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bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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depends on PROC_FS
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help
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If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
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the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth
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shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and
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previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it
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can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for
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your workloads.
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config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
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bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
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help
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This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
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runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
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CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
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endmenu
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endmenu
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