selftests/bpf: Verify ca_name of struct mptcp_sock

This patch verifies another member of struct mptcp_sock, ca_name. Add a
new function get_msk_ca_name() to read the sysctl tcp_congestion_control
and verify it in verify_msk().

v3: Access the sysctl through the filesystem to avoid compatibility
    issues with the busybox sysctl command.

v4: use ASSERT_* instead of CHECK_FAIL (Andrii)

v5: use ASSERT_STRNEQ() instead of strncmp() (Andrii)

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliang.tang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220519233016.105670-7-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com
This commit is contained in:
Geliang Tang 2022-05-19 16:30:15 -07:00 committed by Andrii Nakryiko
parent 0266223467
commit ccc090f469
3 changed files with 39 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ BPF_PROG(name, args)
#define SOL_TCP 6
#endif
#ifndef TCP_CA_NAME_MAX
#define TCP_CA_NAME_MAX 16
#endif
#define tcp_jiffies32 ((__u32)bpf_jiffies64())
struct sock_common {
@ -230,6 +234,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock {
struct inet_connection_sock sk;
__u32 token;
char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
#endif

View file

@ -7,10 +7,15 @@
#include "network_helpers.h"
#include "mptcp_sock.skel.h"
#ifndef TCP_CA_NAME_MAX
#define TCP_CA_NAME_MAX 16
#endif
struct mptcp_storage {
__u32 invoked;
__u32 is_mptcp;
__u32 token;
char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
};
static int verify_tsk(int map_fd, int client_fd)
@ -31,14 +36,37 @@ static int verify_tsk(int map_fd, int client_fd)
return err;
}
static void get_msk_ca_name(char ca_name[])
{
size_t len;
int fd;
fd = open("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_congestion_control", O_RDONLY);
if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "failed to open tcp_congestion_control"))
return;
len = read(fd, ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
if (!ASSERT_GT(len, 0, "failed to read ca_name"))
goto err;
if (len > 0 && ca_name[len - 1] == '\n')
ca_name[len - 1] = '\0';
err:
close(fd);
}
static int verify_msk(int map_fd, int client_fd, __u32 token)
{
char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
int err, cfd = client_fd;
struct mptcp_storage val;
if (!ASSERT_GT(token, 0, "invalid token"))
return -1;
get_msk_ca_name(ca_name);
err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_fd, &cfd, &val);
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem"))
return err;
@ -52,6 +80,9 @@ static int verify_msk(int map_fd, int client_fd, __u32 token)
if (!ASSERT_EQ(val.token, token, "unexpected token"))
err++;
if (!ASSERT_STRNEQ(val.ca_name, ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX, "unexpected ca_name"))
err++;
return err;
}

View file

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct mptcp_storage {
__u32 invoked;
__u32 is_mptcp;
__u32 token;
char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
};
struct {
@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ int _sockops(struct bpf_sock_ops *ctx)
return 1;
storage->token = 0;
__builtin_memset(storage->ca_name, 0, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
} else {
msk = bpf_skc_to_mptcp_sock(sk);
if (!msk)
@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ int _sockops(struct bpf_sock_ops *ctx)
return 1;
storage->token = msk->token;
__builtin_memcpy(storage->ca_name, msk->ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
}
storage->invoked++;
storage->is_mptcp = is_mptcp;