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selftests/bpf: Verify ca_name of struct mptcp_sock
This patch verifies another member of struct mptcp_sock, ca_name. Add a new function get_msk_ca_name() to read the sysctl tcp_congestion_control and verify it in verify_msk(). v3: Access the sysctl through the filesystem to avoid compatibility issues with the busybox sysctl command. v4: use ASSERT_* instead of CHECK_FAIL (Andrii) v5: use ASSERT_STRNEQ() instead of strncmp() (Andrii) Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliang.tang@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220519233016.105670-7-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com
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3 changed files with 39 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ BPF_PROG(name, args)
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#define SOL_TCP 6
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#endif
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#ifndef TCP_CA_NAME_MAX
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#define TCP_CA_NAME_MAX 16
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#endif
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#define tcp_jiffies32 ((__u32)bpf_jiffies64())
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struct sock_common {
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@ -230,6 +234,7 @@ struct mptcp_sock {
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struct inet_connection_sock sk;
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__u32 token;
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char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
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} __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
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#endif
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@ -7,10 +7,15 @@
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#include "network_helpers.h"
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#include "mptcp_sock.skel.h"
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#ifndef TCP_CA_NAME_MAX
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#define TCP_CA_NAME_MAX 16
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#endif
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struct mptcp_storage {
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__u32 invoked;
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__u32 is_mptcp;
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__u32 token;
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char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
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};
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static int verify_tsk(int map_fd, int client_fd)
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@ -31,14 +36,37 @@ static int verify_tsk(int map_fd, int client_fd)
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return err;
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}
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static void get_msk_ca_name(char ca_name[])
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{
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size_t len;
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int fd;
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fd = open("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_congestion_control", O_RDONLY);
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if (!ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "failed to open tcp_congestion_control"))
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return;
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len = read(fd, ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
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if (!ASSERT_GT(len, 0, "failed to read ca_name"))
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goto err;
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if (len > 0 && ca_name[len - 1] == '\n')
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ca_name[len - 1] = '\0';
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err:
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close(fd);
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}
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static int verify_msk(int map_fd, int client_fd, __u32 token)
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{
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char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
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int err, cfd = client_fd;
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struct mptcp_storage val;
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if (!ASSERT_GT(token, 0, "invalid token"))
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return -1;
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get_msk_ca_name(ca_name);
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err = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map_fd, &cfd, &val);
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if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_lookup_elem"))
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return err;
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@ -52,6 +80,9 @@ static int verify_msk(int map_fd, int client_fd, __u32 token)
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if (!ASSERT_EQ(val.token, token, "unexpected token"))
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err++;
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if (!ASSERT_STRNEQ(val.ca_name, ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX, "unexpected ca_name"))
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err++;
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return err;
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}
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct mptcp_storage {
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__u32 invoked;
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__u32 is_mptcp;
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__u32 token;
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char ca_name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
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};
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struct {
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@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ int _sockops(struct bpf_sock_ops *ctx)
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return 1;
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storage->token = 0;
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__builtin_memset(storage->ca_name, 0, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
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} else {
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msk = bpf_skc_to_mptcp_sock(sk);
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if (!msk)
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@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ int _sockops(struct bpf_sock_ops *ctx)
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return 1;
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storage->token = msk->token;
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__builtin_memcpy(storage->ca_name, msk->ca_name, TCP_CA_NAME_MAX);
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}
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storage->invoked++;
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storage->is_mptcp = is_mptcp;
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