From ce48ee81a1930b2218bea23490adb6673c88bf70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Fabio M. De Francesco" Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 21:02:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted". Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet --- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst index 7b410aef9c5c..0febe458597c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst @@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve -------------------------------------------------------- 1. For MDS ~~~~~~~~~~ -Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in -user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks -which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such -attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings +running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all +siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing +code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the +sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes +(host or guest mode). 2. For L1TF ~~~~~~~~~~~