diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 46f54188f00a..dd98763c8b00 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1836,6 +1836,39 @@ static int sctp_process_hn_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, return 0; } +static int sctp_verify_ext_param(union sctp_params param) +{ + __u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t); + int have_auth = 0; + int have_asconf = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) { + switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) { + case SCTP_CID_AUTH: + have_auth = 1; + break; + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF: + case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK: + have_asconf = 1; + break; + } + } + + /* ADD-IP Security: The draft requires us to ABORT or ignore the + * INIT/INIT-ACK if ADD-IP is listed, but AUTH is not. Do this + * only if ADD-IP is turned on and we are not backward-compatible + * mode. + */ + if (sctp_addip_noauth) + return 1; + + if (sctp_addip_enable && !have_auth && have_asconf) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + static void sctp_process_ext_param(struct sctp_association *asoc, union sctp_params param) { @@ -1966,7 +1999,11 @@ static sctp_ierror_t sctp_verify_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc, case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS: case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE: case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND: + break; + case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT: + if (!sctp_verify_ext_param(param)) + return SCTP_IERROR_ABORT; break; case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: @@ -2139,10 +2176,11 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid, !asoc->peer.peer_hmacs)) asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0; - - /* If the peer claims support for ADD-IP without support - * for AUTH, disable support for ADD-IP. - * Do this only if backward compatible mode is turned off. + /* In a non-backward compatible mode, if the peer claims + * support for ADD-IP but not AUTH, the ADD-IP spec states + * that we MUST ABORT the association. Section 6. The section + * also give us an option to silently ignore the packet, which + * is what we'll do here. */ if (!sctp_addip_noauth && (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) { @@ -2150,6 +2188,7 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_association *asoc, sctp_cid_t cid, SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP | SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY); asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 0; + goto clean_up; } /* Walk list of transports, removing transports in the UNKNOWN state. */ diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 0c9f37eb7d8d..511d8c9a171a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -507,7 +507,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, &err_chunk)) { /* This chunk contains fatal error. It is to be discarded. - * Send an ABORT, with causes if there is any. + * Send an ABORT, with causes. If there are no causes, + * then there wasn't enough memory. Just terminate + * the association. */ if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(ep, asoc, arg, @@ -526,9 +528,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, } else { error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_RESOURCE; } - } else { - sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - error = SCTP_ERROR_INV_PARAM; } /* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.3: