mirrors
/
linux-stable
mirror of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks 

Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.

Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match

instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ahmed S. Darwish 2008-03-01 22:01:11 +02:00 committed by James Morris
parent 03d37d25e0
commit d7a96f3a1a
3 changed files with 22 additions and 55 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

7
kernel/audit.c
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*
* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
*
* Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux.
* Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules.
* 2) Minimal run-time overhead:
* a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0).
* b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record
@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@ -882,10 +881,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_enabled = audit_default;
audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
/* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
* when a new policy is loaded. */
selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL

61
kernel/auditfilter.c
View File

@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@ -39,7 +38,7 @@
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
* selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
kfree(f->se_str);
selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@ -598,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
&f->se_rule);
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
(void **)&f->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
@ -863,9 +862,9 @@ out:
return new;
}
/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
@ -878,12 +877,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
df->se_str = se_str;
/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
&df->se_rule);
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
(void **)&df->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
"invalid\n", df->se_str);
ret = 0;
}
@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
* of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
* of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@ -1763,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@ -1806,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
@ -1817,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);

9
kernel/auditsc.c
View File

@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
f->se_rule,
ctx);
@ -549,12 +548,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}