netfilter: x_tables: avoid out-of-bounds reads in xt_request_find_{match|target}

It looks like syzbot found its way into netfilter territory.

Issue here is that @name comes from user space and might
not be null terminated.

Out-of-bound reads happen, KASAN is not happy.

v2 added similar fix for xt_request_find_target(),
as Florian advised.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Dumazet 2018-01-24 17:16:09 -08:00 committed by Pablo Neira Ayuso
parent 889c604fd0
commit da17c73b6e

View file

@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ xt_request_find_match(uint8_t nfproto, const char *name, uint8_t revision)
{
struct xt_match *match;
if (strnlen(name, XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) == XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
match = xt_find_match(nfproto, name, revision);
if (IS_ERR(match)) {
request_module("%st_%s", xt_prefix[nfproto], name);
@ -251,6 +254,9 @@ struct xt_target *xt_request_find_target(u8 af, const char *name, u8 revision)
{
struct xt_target *target;
if (strnlen(name, XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) == XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
target = xt_find_target(af, name, revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
request_module("%st_%s", xt_prefix[af], name);