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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

hardening: Clarify Kconfig text for auto-var-init 

Clarify the details around the automatic variable initialization modes
available. Specifically this details the values used for pattern init
and expands on the rationale for zero init safety. Additionally makes
zero init the default when available.

Cc: glider@google.com
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2021-07-20 14:54:17 -07:00
parent a82adfd5c7
commit dcb7c0b946
1 changed files with 31 additions and 19 deletions
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50
security/Kconfig.hardening
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@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ choice
prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
default INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO if CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
default INIT_STACK_NONE
help
This option enables initialization of stack variables at
@ -39,11 +40,11 @@ choice
syscalls.
This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
uninitialized variables. The selected class of variable will be
initialized before use in a function.
config INIT_STACK_NONE
bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
bool "no automatic stack variable initialization (weakest)"
help
Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ choice
and is disallowed.
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
bool "zero-init everything passed by reference (very strong)"
depends on GCC_PLUGINS
depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK)
select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
@ -91,33 +92,44 @@ choice
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
exposures.
As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the
stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining
this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow
and is disallowed.
config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
bool "pattern-init everything (strongest)"
depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
help
Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
left uninitialized.
Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
with a specific debug value. This is intended to eliminate
all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
information exposures, even variables that were warned about
having been left uninitialized.
Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big.
non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big. The
pattern is situation-specific; Clang on 64-bit uses 0xAA
repeating for all types and padding except float and double
which use 0xFF repeating (-NaN). Clang on 32-bit uses 0xFF
repeating for all types and padding.
config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)"
bool "zero-init everything (strongest and safest)"
depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
help
Initializes everything on the stack with a zero
value. This is intended to eliminate all classes
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
left uninitialized.
Initializes everything on the stack (including padding)
with a zero value. This is intended to eliminate all
classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and
information exposures, even variables that were warned
about having been left uninitialized.
Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings,
pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore
more suitable as a security mitigation measure.
Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings
(immediately NUL-terminated), pointers (NULL), indices
(index 0), and sizes (0 length), so it is therefore more
suitable as a production security mitigation than pattern
initialization.
endchoice