mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
synced 2024-10-09 18:19:06 +00:00
xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl
commit42d8644bd7
upstream. The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of bounds access. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes:1246ae0bb9
("xen: add variable hypercall caller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
84c6c2af4c
commit
ed3adb562f
1 changed files with 3 additions and 0 deletions
|
@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call,
|
|||
__HYPERCALL_DECLS;
|
||||
__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
|
||||
|
||||
if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0]))
|
||||
return -EINVAL;
|
||||
|
||||
asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
|
||||
: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
|
||||
: [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue