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ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name

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If/when file data signatures are distributed with the file data, this
patch will not be needed.  In the current environment where only some
files are signed, the ability to differentiate between file systems is
needed.  Some file systems consider the file system magic number
internal to the file system.

This patch defines a new IMA policy condition named "fsname", based on
the superblock's file_system_type (sb->s_type) name. This allows policy
rules to be expressed in terms of the filesystem name.

The following sample rules require file signatures on rootfs files
executed or mmap'ed.

appraise func=BPRM_CHECK fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig
appraise func=FILE_MMAP fsname=rootfs appraise_type=imasig

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This commit is contained in:
Mimi Zohar 2018-01-15 11:20:36 -05:00
parent fa516b66a1
commit f1b08bbcbd
2 changed files with 25 additions and 2 deletions
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2
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
View file

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Description:
audit | hash | dont_hash
condition:= base | lsm [option]
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
[euid=] [fowner=]]
[euid=] [fowner=] [fsname=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]

25
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
View file

@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define IMA_PCR 0x0100
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
void *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
};
/*
@ -273,6 +275,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
&& strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
!uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
return false;
@ -540,7 +545,7 @@ enum {
Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname,
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
@ -565,6 +570,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
@ -776,6 +782,17 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
case Opt_fsname:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from);
entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entry->fsname) {
result = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
result = 0;
entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
break;
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
@ -1104,6 +1121,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);