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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap 

Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Guy Briggs 2017-10-11 20:57:07 -04:00 committed by James Morris
parent 4c7e715fc8
commit fc7eadf768
1 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions
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20
security/commoncap.c
View File

@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
bool *has_cap)
bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
*has_cap = true;
*has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
goto out;
}
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ out:
* set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
* updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
*/
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
if (has_cap || is_setid)
if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*