Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
- Avoid 'constexpr', which is a keyword in C23
- Allow 'dtbs_check' and 'dt_compatible_check' run independently of
'dt_binding_check'
- Fix weak references to avoid GOT entries in position-independent
code generation
- Convert the last use of 'optional' property in arch/sh/Kconfig
- Remove support for the 'optional' property in Kconfig
- Remove support for Clang's ThinLTO caching, which does not work with
the .incbin directive
- Change the semantics of $(src) so it always points to the source
directory, which fixes Makefile inconsistencies between upstream and
downstream
- Fix 'make tar-pkg' for RISC-V to produce a consistent package
- Provide reasonable default coverage for objtool, sanitizers, and
profilers
- Remove redundant OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, KASAN_SANITIZE, etc.
- Remove the last use of tristate choice in drivers/rapidio/Kconfig
- Various cleanups and fixes in Kconfig
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Avoid 'constexpr', which is a keyword in C23
- Allow 'dtbs_check' and 'dt_compatible_check' run independently of
'dt_binding_check'
- Fix weak references to avoid GOT entries in position-independent code
generation
- Convert the last use of 'optional' property in arch/sh/Kconfig
- Remove support for the 'optional' property in Kconfig
- Remove support for Clang's ThinLTO caching, which does not work with
the .incbin directive
- Change the semantics of $(src) so it always points to the source
directory, which fixes Makefile inconsistencies between upstream and
downstream
- Fix 'make tar-pkg' for RISC-V to produce a consistent package
- Provide reasonable default coverage for objtool, sanitizers, and
profilers
- Remove redundant OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD, KASAN_SANITIZE, etc.
- Remove the last use of tristate choice in drivers/rapidio/Kconfig
- Various cleanups and fixes in Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (46 commits)
kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in sym_check_prop()
rapidio: remove choice for enumeration
kconfig: lxdialog: remove initialization with A_NORMAL
kconfig: m/nconf: merge two item_add_str() calls
kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display value of bool choice
kconfig: m/nconf: remove dead code to display children of choice members
kconfig: gconf: show checkbox for choice correctly
kbuild: use GCOV_PROFILE and KCSAN_SANITIZE in scripts/Makefile.modfinal
Makefile: remove redundant tool coverage variables
kbuild: provide reasonable defaults for tool coverage
modules: Drop the .export_symbol section from the final modules
kconfig: use menu_list_for_each_sym() in sym_check_choice_deps()
kconfig: use sym_get_choice_menu() in conf_write_defconfig()
kconfig: add sym_get_choice_menu() helper
kconfig: turn defaults and additional prompt for choice members into error
kconfig: turn missing prompt for choice members into error
kconfig: turn conf_choice() into void function
kconfig: use linked list in sym_set_changed()
kconfig: gconf: use MENU_CHANGED instead of SYMBOL_CHANGED
kconfig: gconf: remove debug code
...
Support for posted interrupts on bare metal
Posted interrupts is a virtualization feature which allows to inject
interrupts directly into a guest without host interaction. The VT-d
interrupt remapping hardware sets the bit which corresponds to the
interrupt vector in a vector bitmap which is either used to inject the
interrupt directly into the guest via a virtualized APIC or in case
that the guest is scheduled out provides a host side notification
interrupt which informs the host that an interrupt has been marked
pending in the bitmap.
This can be utilized on bare metal for scenarios where multiple
devices, e.g. NVME storage, raise interrupts with a high frequency. In
the default mode these interrupts are handles independently and
therefore require a full roundtrip of interrupt entry/exit.
Utilizing posted interrupts this roundtrip overhead can be avoided by
coalescing these interrupt entries to a single entry for the posted
interrupt notification. The notification interrupt then demultiplexes
the pending bits in a memory based bitmap and invokes the corresponding
device specific handlers.
Depending on the usage scenario and device utilization throughput
improvements between 10% and 130% have been measured.
As this is only relevant for high end servers with multiple device
queues per CPU attached and counterproductive for situations where
interrupts are arriving at distinct times, the functionality is opt-in
via a kernel command line parameter.
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Merge tag 'x86-irq-2024-05-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 interrupt handling updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Add support for posted interrupts on bare metal.
Posted interrupts is a virtualization feature which allows to inject
interrupts directly into a guest without host interaction. The VT-d
interrupt remapping hardware sets the bit which corresponds to the
interrupt vector in a vector bitmap which is either used to inject the
interrupt directly into the guest via a virtualized APIC or in case
that the guest is scheduled out provides a host side notification
interrupt which informs the host that an interrupt has been marked
pending in the bitmap.
This can be utilized on bare metal for scenarios where multiple
devices, e.g. NVME storage, raise interrupts with a high frequency. In
the default mode these interrupts are handles independently and
therefore require a full roundtrip of interrupt entry/exit.
Utilizing posted interrupts this roundtrip overhead can be avoided by
coalescing these interrupt entries to a single entry for the posted
interrupt notification. The notification interrupt then demultiplexes
the pending bits in a memory based bitmap and invokes the
corresponding device specific handlers.
Depending on the usage scenario and device utilization throughput
improvements between 10% and 130% have been measured.
As this is only relevant for high end servers with multiple device
queues per CPU attached and counterproductive for situations where
interrupts are arriving at distinct times, the functionality is opt-in
via a kernel command line parameter"
* tag 'x86-irq-2024-05-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/irq: Use existing helper for pending vector check
iommu/vt-d: Enable posted mode for device MSIs
iommu/vt-d: Make posted MSI an opt-in command line option
x86/irq: Extend checks for pending vectors to posted interrupts
x86/irq: Factor out common code for checking pending interrupts
x86/irq: Install posted MSI notification handler
x86/irq: Factor out handler invocation from common_interrupt()
x86/irq: Set up per host CPU posted interrupt descriptors
x86/irq: Reserve a per CPU IDT vector for posted MSIs
x86/irq: Add a Kconfig option for posted MSI
x86/irq: Remove bitfields in posted interrupt descriptor
x86/irq: Unionize PID.PIR for 64bit access w/o casting
KVM: VMX: Move posted interrupt descriptor out of VMX code
Now Kbuild provides reasonable defaults for objtool, sanitizers, and
profilers.
Remove redundant variables.
Note:
This commit changes the coverage for some objects:
- include arch/mips/vdso/vdso-image.o into UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV
- include arch/sparc/vdso/vdso-image-*.o into UBSAN
- include arch/sparc/vdso/vma.o into UBSAN
- include arch/x86/entry/vdso/extable.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV
- include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso-image-*.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV
- include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.o into KASAN, KCSAN, UBSAN, GCOV, KCOV
- include arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.o into GCOV, KCOV
- include arch/x86/um/vdso/vma.o into KASAN, GCOV, KCOV
I believe these are positive effects because all of them are kernel
space objects.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
While we normally don't do such feature-enabling on 32-bit
kernels anymore, this change is small, straightforward & tested on
upstream glibc.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-shstk-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stacks from Ingo Molnar:
"Enable shadow stacks for x32.
While we normally don't do such feature-enabling for 32-bit anymore,
this change is small, straightforward & tested on upstream glibc"
* tag 'x86-shstk-2024-05-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/shstk: Enable shadow stacks for x32
Kbuild conventionally uses $(obj)/ for generated files, and $(src)/ for
checked-in source files. It is merely a convention without any functional
difference. In fact, $(obj) and $(src) are exactly the same, as defined
in scripts/Makefile.build:
src := $(obj)
When the kernel is built in a separate output directory, $(src) does
not accurately reflect the source directory location. While Kbuild
resolves this discrepancy by specifying VPATH=$(srctree) to search for
source files, it does not cover all cases. For example, when adding a
header search path for local headers, -I$(srctree)/$(src) is typically
passed to the compiler.
This introduces inconsistency between upstream and downstream Makefiles
because $(src) is used instead of $(srctree)/$(src) for the latter.
To address this inconsistency, this commit changes the semantics of
$(src) so that it always points to the directory in the source tree.
Going forward, the variables used in Makefiles will have the following
meanings:
$(obj) - directory in the object tree
$(src) - directory in the source tree (changed by this commit)
$(objtree) - the top of the kernel object tree
$(srctree) - the top of the kernel source tree
Consequently, $(srctree)/$(src) in upstream Makefiles need to be replaced
with $(src).
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
The syzbot-reported stack trace from hell in this discussion thread
actually has three nested page faults:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000d5f4fc0616e816d4@google.com
... and I think that's actually the important thing here:
- the first page fault is from user space, and triggers the vsyscall
emulation.
- the second page fault is from __do_sys_gettimeofday(), and that should
just have caused the exception that then sets the return value to
-EFAULT
- the third nested page fault is due to _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() ->
preempt_schedule() -> trace_sched_switch(), which then causes a BPF
trace program to run, which does that bpf_probe_read_compat(), which
causes that page fault under pagefault_disable().
It's quite the nasty backtrace, and there's a lot going on.
The problem is literally the vsyscall emulation, which sets
current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
and that causes the fixup_exception() code to send the signal *despite* the
exception being caught.
And I think that is in fact completely bogus. It's completely bogus
exactly because it sends that signal even when it *shouldn't* be sent -
like for the BPF user mode trace gathering.
In other words, I think the whole "sig_on_uaccess_err" thing is entirely
broken, because it makes any nested page-faults do all the wrong things.
Now, arguably, I don't think anybody should enable vsyscall emulation any
more, but this test case clearly does.
I think we should just make the "send SIGSEGV" be something that the
vsyscall emulation does on its own, not this broken per-thread state for
something that isn't actually per thread.
The x86 page fault code actually tried to deal with the "incorrect nesting"
by having that:
if (in_interrupt())
return;
which ignores the sig_on_uaccess_err case when it happens in interrupts,
but as shown by this example, these nested page faults do not need to be
about interrupts at all.
IOW, I think the only right thing is to remove that horrendously broken
code.
The attached patch looks like the ObviouslyCorrect(tm) thing to do.
NOTE! This broken code goes back to this commit in 2011:
4fc3490114 ("x86-64: Set siginfo and context on vsyscall emulation faults")
... and back then the reason was to get all the siginfo details right.
Honestly, I do not for a moment believe that it's worth getting the siginfo
details right here, but part of the commit says:
This fixes issues with UML when vsyscall=emulate.
... and so my patch to remove this garbage will probably break UML in this
situation.
I do not believe that anybody should be running with vsyscall=emulate in
2024 in the first place, much less if you are doing things like UML. But
let's see if somebody screams.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+83e7f982ca045ab4405c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wh9D6f7HUkDgZHKmDCHUQmp+Co89GP+b8+z+G56BKeyNg@mail.gmail.com
All MSI vectors are multiplexed into a single notification vector when
posted MSI is enabled. It is the responsibility of the notification vector
handler to demultiplex MSI vectors. In the handler the MSI vector handlers
are dispatched without IDT delivery for each pending MSI interrupt.
For example, the interrupt flow will change as follows:
(3 MSIs of different vectors arrive in a a high frequency burst)
BEFORE:
interrupt(MSI)
irq_enter()
handler() /* EOI */
irq_exit()
process_softirq()
interrupt(MSI)
irq_enter()
handler() /* EOI */
irq_exit()
process_softirq()
interrupt(MSI)
irq_enter()
handler() /* EOI */
irq_exit()
process_softirq()
AFTER:
interrupt /* Posted MSI notification vector */
irq_enter()
atomic_xchg(PIR)
handler()
handler()
handler()
pi_clear_on()
apic_eoi()
irq_exit()
process_softirq()
Except for the leading MSI, CPU notifications are skipped/coalesced.
For MSIs which arrive at a low frequency, the demultiplexing loop does not
wait for more interrupts to coalesce. Therefore, there's no additional
latency other than the processing time.
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423174114.526704-9-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com
Add a FRED-specific INT80 handler and document why it differs from the
current one. Eventually, the common bits will be unified once FRED hw is
available and it turns out that no further changes are needed but for
now, keep the handlers separate for everyone's sanity's sake.
[ bp: Zap duplicated commit message, massage. ]
Fixes: 55617fb991 ("x86/entry: Do not allow external 0x80 interrupts")
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240417174731.4189592-1-xin@zytor.com
The code in thunk_64.S and thunk_32.S are exactly the same except for
the comments. Merge them in to thunk.S.
And since thunk_32.S was originated from thunk_64.S, the new merged
thunk.S is actually renamed from thunk_64.S.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240407090558.3395-9-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks may allow a malicious application to
influence indirect branch prediction in kernel by poisoning the branch
history. eIBRS isolates indirect branch targets in ring0. The BHB can
still influence the choice of indirect branch predictor entry, and although
branch predictor entries are isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled,
the BHB itself is not isolated between modes.
Alder Lake and new processors supports a hardware control BHI_DIS_S to
mitigate BHI. For older processors Intel has released a software sequence
to clear the branch history on parts that don't support BHI_DIS_S. Add
support to execute the software sequence at syscall entry and VMexit to
overwrite the branch history.
For now, branch history is not cleared at interrupt entry, as malicious
applications are not believed to have sufficient control over the
registers, since previous register state is cleared at interrupt
entry. Researchers continue to poke at this area and it may become
necessary to clear at interrupt entry as well in the future.
This mitigation is only defined here. It is enabled later.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Make <asm/syscall.h> build a switch statement instead, and the compiler can
either decide to generate an indirect jump, or - more likely these days due
to mitigations - just a series of conditional branches.
Yes, the conditional branches also have branch prediction, but the branch
prediction is much more controlled, in that it just causes speculatively
running the wrong system call (harmless), rather than speculatively running
possibly wrong random less controlled code gadgets.
This doesn't mitigate other indirect calls, but the system call indirection
is the first and most easily triggered case.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
1. Add shadow stack support to x32 signal.
2. Use the 64-bit map_shadow_stack syscall for x32.
3. Set up shadow stack for x32.
Tested with shadow stack enabled x32 glibc on Intel Tiger Lake:
I configured x32 glibc with --enable-cet, build glibc and
run all glibc tests with shadow stack enabled. There are
no regressions. I verified that shadow stack is enabled
via /proc/pid/status.
Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315140433.1966543-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com
- Generate a list of built DTB files (arch/*/boot/dts/dtbs-list)
- Use more threads when building Debian packages in parallel
- Fix warnings shown during the RPM kernel package uninstallation
- Change OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_*.o etc. to take a relative path to
Makefile
- Support GCC's -fmin-function-alignment flag
- Fix a null pointer dereference bug in modpost
- Add the DTB support to the RPM package
- Various fixes and cleanups in Kconfig
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Generate a list of built DTB files (arch/*/boot/dts/dtbs-list)
- Use more threads when building Debian packages in parallel
- Fix warnings shown during the RPM kernel package uninstallation
- Change OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_*.o etc. to take a relative path to
Makefile
- Support GCC's -fmin-function-alignment flag
- Fix a null pointer dereference bug in modpost
- Add the DTB support to the RPM package
- Various fixes and cleanups in Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v6.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (67 commits)
kconfig: tests: test dependency after shuffling choices
kconfig: tests: add a test for randconfig with dependent choices
kconfig: tests: support KCONFIG_SEED for the randconfig runner
kbuild: rpm-pkg: add dtb files in kernel rpm
kconfig: remove unneeded menu_is_visible() call in conf_write_defconfig()
kconfig: check prompt for choice while parsing
kconfig: lxdialog: remove unused dialog colors
kconfig: lxdialog: fix button color for blackbg theme
modpost: fix null pointer dereference
kbuild: remove GCC's default -Wpacked-bitfield-compat flag
kbuild: unexport abs_srctree and abs_objtree
kbuild: Move -Wenum-{compare-conditional,enum-conversion} into W=1
kconfig: remove named choice support
kconfig: use linked list in get_symbol_str() to iterate over menus
kconfig: link menus to a symbol
kbuild: fix inconsistent indentation in top Makefile
kbuild: Use -fmin-function-alignment when available
alpha: merge two entries for CONFIG_ALPHA_GAMMA
alpha: merge two entries for CONFIG_ALPHA_EV4
kbuild: change DTC_FLAGS_<basetarget>.o to take the path relative to $(obj)
...
- The biggest change is the rework of the percpu code,
to support the 'Named Address Spaces' GCC feature,
by Uros Bizjak:
- This allows C code to access GS and FS segment relative
memory via variables declared with such attributes,
which allows the compiler to better optimize those accesses
than the previous inline assembly code.
- The series also includes a number of micro-optimizations
for various percpu access methods, plus a number of
cleanups of %gs accesses in assembly code.
- These changes have been exposed to linux-next testing for
the last ~5 months, with no known regressions in this area.
- Fix/clean up __switch_to()'s broken but accidentally
working handling of FPU switching - which also generates
better code.
- Propagate more RIP-relative addressing in assembly code,
to generate slightly better code.
- Rework the CPU mitigations Kconfig space to be less idiosyncratic,
to make it easier for distros to follow & maintain these options.
- Rework the x86 idle code to cure RCU violations and
to clean up the logic.
- Clean up the vDSO Makefile logic.
- Misc cleanups and fixes.
[ Please note that there's a higher number of merge commits in
this branch (three) than is usual in x86 topic trees. This happened
due to the long testing lifecycle of the percpu changes that
involved 3 merge windows, which generated a longer history
and various interactions with other core x86 changes that we
felt better about to carry in a single branch. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'x86-core-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core x86 updates from Ingo Molnar:
- The biggest change is the rework of the percpu code, to support the
'Named Address Spaces' GCC feature, by Uros Bizjak:
- This allows C code to access GS and FS segment relative memory
via variables declared with such attributes, which allows the
compiler to better optimize those accesses than the previous
inline assembly code.
- The series also includes a number of micro-optimizations for
various percpu access methods, plus a number of cleanups of %gs
accesses in assembly code.
- These changes have been exposed to linux-next testing for the
last ~5 months, with no known regressions in this area.
- Fix/clean up __switch_to()'s broken but accidentally working handling
of FPU switching - which also generates better code
- Propagate more RIP-relative addressing in assembly code, to generate
slightly better code
- Rework the CPU mitigations Kconfig space to be less idiosyncratic, to
make it easier for distros to follow & maintain these options
- Rework the x86 idle code to cure RCU violations and to clean up the
logic
- Clean up the vDSO Makefile logic
- Misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'x86-core-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
x86/idle: Select idle routine only once
x86/idle: Let prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt() return bool
x86/idle: Cleanup idle_setup()
x86/idle: Clean up idle selection
x86/idle: Sanitize X86_BUG_AMD_E400 handling
sched/idle: Conditionally handle tick broadcast in default_idle_call()
x86: Increase brk randomness entropy for 64-bit systems
x86/vdso: Move vDSO to mmap region
x86/vdso/kbuild: Group non-standard build attributes and primary object file rules together
x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-{32,64}.o
x86/retpoline: Ensure default return thunk isn't used at runtime
x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_COMPAT_32 to specify vdso32
x86/vdso: Use $(addprefix ) instead of $(foreach )
x86/vdso: Simplify obj-y addition
x86/vdso: Consolidate targets and clean-files
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_RETHUNK => CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_SRSO => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY => CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CONFIG_SLS => CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
...
The current CR3 handling for kernel page table isolation in the paranoid
return paths which are relevant for #NMI, #MCE, #VC, #DB and #DF is
unconditionally writing CR3 with the value retrieved on exception entry.
In the vast majority of cases when returning to the kernel this is a
pointless exercise because CR3 was not modified on exception entry. The
only situation where this is necessary is when the exception interrupts a
entry from user before switching to kernel CR3 or interrupts an exit to
user after switching back to user CR3.
As CR3 writes can be expensive on some systems this becomes measurable
overhead with high frequency #NMIs such as perf.
Avoid this overhead by checking the CR3 value, which was saved on entry,
and write it back to CR3 only when it us a user CR3.
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Merge tag 'x86-entry-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 entry update from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single update for the x86 entry code:
The current CR3 handling for kernel page table isolation in the
paranoid return paths which are relevant for #NMI, #MCE, #VC, #DB and
#DF is unconditionally writing CR3 with the value retrieved on
exception entry.
In the vast majority of cases when returning to the kernel this is a
pointless exercise because CR3 was not modified on exception entry.
The only situation where this is necessary is when the exception
interrupts a entry from user before switching to kernel CR3 or
interrupts an exit to user after switching back to user CR3.
As CR3 writes can be expensive on some systems this becomes measurable
overhead with high frequency #NMIs such as perf.
Avoid this overhead by checking the CR3 value, which was saved on
entry, and write it back to CR3 only when it is a user CR3"
* tag 'x86-entry-2024-03-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/entry: Avoid redundant CR3 write on paranoid returns
FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most of
the technical nightmares which IDT exposes:
1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved in
nested exception scenarios.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested exceptions
as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on each entry which
requires a massive effort in the low level entry of #NMI code to handle
this.
3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user which
makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs to be
especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI.
4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which is a
problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a stack trace.
5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment
6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion on
large systems.
7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources
FRED addresses these shortcomings by:
1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save exception
cause registers. This ensures that the meta information for each
exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra complexity of
preserving it in software.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested
exception uses the currently interrupt stack.
3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS BASE
handling which is required to establish kernel context for per CPU
variable access is done in hardware.
4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the return
from NMI.
5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP
6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design because it
uses a central entry points for kernel and user space and the CPUstores
the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt, syscall) on the entry stack
along with the vector number. The entry code has to demultiplex this
information, but this removes the vector space restriction.
The first hardware implementations will still have the current
restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires
further changes to the local APIC.
7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which
allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the
required local APIC changes are in place.
The series implements the initial FRED support by:
- Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to
accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism.
- Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED
requires to store context and meta information
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have information
pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB.
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE
- Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to
demultiplex the events
- Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary
tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc.
The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs. the existing IDT
implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths like
context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the
impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the extended
stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and therefore have no
impact on IDT based systems.
It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED
simulation and as of now there are know outstanding problems.
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Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 FRED support from Thomas Gleixner:
"Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED).
FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most
of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes:
1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved
in nested exception scenarios.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested
exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on
each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry
of #NMI code to handle this.
3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user
which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs
to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI.
4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which
is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a
stack trace.
5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment
6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion
on large systems.
7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources
FRED addresses these shortcomings by:
1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save
exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information
for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra
complexity of preserving it in software.
2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested
exception uses the currently interrupt stack.
3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS
BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for
per CPU variable access is done in hardware.
4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the
return from NMI.
5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP
6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design
because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space
and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt,
syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The
entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes
the vector space restriction.
The first hardware implementations will still have the current
restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires
further changes to the local APIC.
7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which
allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the
required local APIC changes are in place.
The series implements the initial FRED support by:
- Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to
accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism.
- Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED
requires to store context and meta information
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have
information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB.
- Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE
- Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to
demultiplex the events
- Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary
tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc.
The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs the existing IDT
implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths
like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the
impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the
extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and
therefore have no impact on IDT based systems.
It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED
simulation and as of now there are no outstanding problems"
* tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization
MAINTAINERS: Add a maintainer entry for FRED
x86/fred: Fix a build warning with allmodconfig due to 'inline' failing to inline properly
x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED
x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions
x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init()
KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling
x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI
x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code
x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled
x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler
x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code
x86/fred: Add a machine check entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a NMI entry stub for FRED
x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED
x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries
x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED
x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task
x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed when FRED is enabled
...
The vDSO (and its initial randomization) was introduced in commit 2aae950b21
("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu"), but
had very low entropy. The entropy was improved in commit 394f56fe48
("x86_64, vdso: Fix the vdso address randomization algorithm"), but there
is still improvement to be made.
In principle there should not be executable code at a low entropy offset
from the stack, since the stack and executable code having separate
randomization is part of what makes ASLR stronger.
Remove the only executable code near the stack region and give the vDSO
the same randomized base as other mmap mappings including the linker
and other shared objects. This results in higher entropy being provided
and there's little to no advantage in separating this from the existing
executable code there. This is already how other architectures like
arm64 handle the vDSO.
As an side, while it's sensible for userspace to reserve the initial mmap
base as a region for executable code with a random gap for other mmap
allocations, along with providing randomization within that region, there
isn't much the kernel can do to help due to how dynamic linkers load the
shared objects.
This was extracted from the PaX RANDMMAP feature.
[kees: updated commit log with historical details and other tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/280
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240210091827.work.233-kees@kernel.org
Commit 54b8ae66ae ("kbuild: change *FLAGS_<basetarget>.o to take the
path relative to $(obj)") changed the syntax of per-file compiler flags.
The situation is the same for the following variables:
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_<basetarget>.o
GCOV_PROFILE_<basetarget>.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o
KMSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o
KMSAN_ENABLE_CHECKS_<basetarget>.o
UBSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_<basetarget>.o
KCSAN_SANITIZE_<basetarget>.o
KCSAN_INSTRUMENT_BARRIERS_<basetarget>.o
The <basetarget> is the filename of the target with its directory and
suffix stripped.
This syntax comes into a trouble when two files with the same basename
appear in one Makefile, for example:
obj-y += dir1/foo.o
obj-y += dir2/foo.o
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o := y
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_foo.o is applied to both dir1/foo.o and
dir2/foo.o. This syntax is not flexbile enough to handle cases where
one of them is a standard object, but the other is not.
It is more sensible to use the relative path to the Makefile, like this:
obj-y += dir1/foo.o
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_dir1/foo.o := y
obj-y += dir2/foo.o
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_dir2/foo.o := y
To maintain the current behavior, I made adjustments to the following two
Makefiles:
- arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile, which compiles vclock_gettime.o, vgetcpu.o,
and their vdso32 variants.
- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile, which compiles vmx/vmenter.o and svm/vmenter.o
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
The fresh changes to the vDSO Makefile in:
289d0a475c ("x86/vdso: Use CONFIG_COMPAT_32 to specify vdso32")
329b77b59f ("x86/vdso: Simplify obj-y addition")
Conflicted with a pending change in:
b388e57d46 ("x86/vdso: Fix rethunk patching for vdso-image-{32,64}.o")
Which was resolved in a simple fasion in this merge commit:
f14df823a6 ("Merge branch 'x86/vdso' into x86/core, to resolve conflict and to prepare for dependent changes")
... but all these changes make me look and notice a bit of historic baggage
left in the Makefile:
- Disordered build rules where non-standard build attributes relating to
were placed sometimes several lines after - and sometimes *before*
the .o build rules of the object files... Functional but inconsistent.
- Inconsistent vertical spacing, stray whitespaces, inconsistent spelling
of 'vDSO' over the years, a few spelling mistakes and inconsistent
capitalization of comment blocks.
Tidy it all up. No functional changes intended.
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
We also want to change arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile in a followup
commit, so merge the trees for this.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
For CONFIG_RETHUNK kernels, objtool annotates all the function return
sites so they can be patched during boot. By design, after
apply_returns() is called, all tail-calls to the compiler-generated
default return thunk (__x86_return_thunk) should be patched out and
replaced with whatever's needed for any mitigations (or lack thereof).
The commit
4461438a84 ("x86/retpoline: Ensure default return thunk isn't used at runtime")
adds a runtime check and a WARN_ONCE() if the default return thunk ever
gets executed after alternatives have been applied. This warning is
a sanity check to make sure objtool and apply_returns() are doing their
job.
As Nathan reported, that check found something:
Unpatched return thunk in use. This should not happen!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:2856 __warn_thunk+0x27/0x40
RIP: 0010:__warn_thunk+0x27/0x40
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs
? __warn
? __warn_thunk
? report_bug
? console_unlock
? handle_bug
? exc_invalid_op
? asm_exc_invalid_op
? ia32_binfmt_init
? __warn_thunk
warn_thunk_thunk
do_one_initcall
kernel_init_freeable
? __pfx_kernel_init
kernel_init
ret_from_fork
? __pfx_kernel_init
ret_from_fork_asm
</TASK>
Boris debugged to find that the unpatched return site was in
init_vdso_image_64(), and its translation unit wasn't being analyzed by
objtool, so it never got annotated. So it got ignored by
apply_returns().
This is only a minor issue, as this function is only called during boot.
Still, objtool needs full visibility to the kernel. Fix it by enabling
objtool on vdso-image-{32,64}.o.
Note this problem can only be seen with !CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT, as that
requires objtool to run individually on all translation units rather on
vmlinux.o.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240215032049.GA3944823@dev-arch.thelio-3990X
Mitigation for MDS is to use VERW instruction to clear any secrets in
CPU Buffers. Any memory accesses after VERW execution can still remain
in CPU buffers. It is safer to execute VERW late in return to user path
to minimize the window in which kernel data can end up in CPU buffers.
There are not many kernel secrets to be had after SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3.
Add support for deploying VERW mitigation after user register state is
restored. This helps minimize the chances of kernel data ending up into
CPU buffers after executing VERW.
Note that the mitigation at the new location is not yet enabled.
Corner case not handled
=======================
Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:
1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
less rare or target it.
3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
an actual attack. There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
any interest.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-2-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
MDS mitigation requires clearing the CPU buffers before returning to
user. This needs to be done late in the exit-to-user path. Current
location of VERW leaves a possibility of kernel data ending up in CPU
buffers for memory accesses done after VERW such as:
1. Kernel data accessed by an NMI between VERW and return-to-user can
remain in CPU buffers since NMI returning to kernel does not
execute VERW to clear CPU buffers.
2. Alyssa reported that after VERW is executed,
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y scrubs the stack used by a system
call. Memory accesses during stack scrubbing can move kernel stack
contents into CPU buffers.
3. When caller saved registers are restored after a return from
function executing VERW, the kernel stack accesses can remain in
CPU buffers(since they occur after VERW).
To fix this VERW needs to be moved very late in exit-to-user path.
In preparation for moving VERW to entry/exit asm code, create macros
that can be used in asm. Also make VERW patching depend on a new feature
flag X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-1-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com
Make sure the default return thunk is not used after all return
instructions have been patched by the alternatives because the default
return thunk is insufficient when it comes to mitigating Retbleed or
SRSO.
Fix based on an earlier version by David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>.
[ bp: Fix the compilation error of warn_thunk_thunk being an invisible
symbol, hoist thunk macro into calling.h ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231010171020.462211-4-david.kaplan@amd.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104132446.GEZZaxnrIgIyat0pqf@fat_crate.local
In arch/x86/Kconfig, COMPAT_32 is defined as (IA32_EMULATION || X86_32).
Use it to eliminate redundancy in Makefile.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121235701.239606-5-masahiroy@kernel.org
Add objects to obj-y in a more straightforward way.
CONFIG_X86_32 and CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION are not enabled simultaneously,
but even if they are, Kbuild graciously deduplicates obj-y entries.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121235701.239606-3-masahiroy@kernel.org
'targets' and 'clean-files' do not need to list the same files because
the files listed in 'targets' are cleaned up.
Refactor the code.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121235701.239606-2-masahiroy@kernel.org
Add cpu_init_fred_exceptions() to:
- Set FRED entrypoints for events happening in ring 0 and 3.
- Specify the stack level for IRQs occurred ring 0.
- Specify dedicated event stacks for #DB/NMI/#MCE/#DF.
- Enable FRED and invalidtes IDT.
- Force 32-bit system calls to use "int $0x80" only.
Add fred_complete_exception_setup() to:
- Initialize system_vectors as done for IDT systems.
- Set unused sysvec_table entries to fred_handle_spurious_interrupt().
Co-developed-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-35-xin3.li@intel.com
In IRQ/NMI induced VM exits, KVM VMX needs to execute the respective
handlers, which requires the software to create a FRED stack frame,
and use it to invoke the handlers. Add fred_irq_entry_from_kvm() for
this job.
Export fred_entry_from_kvm() because VMX can be compiled as a module.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-32-xin3.li@intel.com
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS could be used besides actual entry code; in that case
%rbp shouldn't be cleared (otherwise the frame pointer is destroyed) and
UNWIND_HINT shouldn't be added.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-31-xin3.li@intel.com
If the stack frame contains an invalid user context (e.g. due to invalid SS,
a non-canonical RIP, etc.) the ERETU instruction will trap (#SS or #GP).
From a Linux point of view, this really should be considered a user space
failure, so use the standard fault fixup mechanism to intercept the fault,
fix up the exception frame, and redirect execution to fred_entrypoint_user.
The end result is that it appears just as if the hardware had taken the
exception immediately after completing the transition to user space.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-30-xin3.li@intel.com
Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled,
otherwise the existing IDT code is chosen.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-29-xin3.li@intel.com
Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler into the IDT
or the FRED system interrupt handler table.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-28-xin3.li@intel.com
The code to actually handle kernel and event entry/exit using
FRED. It is split up into two files thus:
- entry_64_fred.S contains the actual entrypoints and exit code, and
saves and restores registers.
- entry_fred.c contains the two-level event dispatch code for FRED.
The first-level dispatch is on the event type, and the second-level
is on the event vector.
[ bp: Fold in an allmodconfig clang build fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129064521.5168-1-xin3.li@intel.com
and a CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=n build fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240127093728.1323-3-xin3.li@intel.com]
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Originally-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231209214214.2932-1-xin3.li@intel.com
struct pt_regs is hard to read because the member or section related
comments are not aligned with the members.
The 'cs' and 'ss' members of pt_regs are type of 'unsigned long' while
in reality they are only 16-bit wide. This works so far as the
remaining space is unused, but FRED will use the remaining bits for
other purposes.
To prepare for FRED:
- Cleanup the formatting
- Convert 'cs' and 'ss' to u16 and embed them into an union
with a u64
- Fixup the related printk() format strings
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Originally-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-14-xin3.li@intel.com
idtentry_sysvec is really just DECLARE_IDTENTRY defined in
<asm/idtentry.h>, no need to define it separately.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-3-xin3.li@intel.com
The CR3 restore happens in:
1. #NMI return.
2. paranoid_exit() (i.e. #MCE, #VC, #DB and #DF return)
Contrary to the implication in commit 21e9445911 ("x86/mm: Optimize
RESTORE_CR3"), the kernel never modifies CR3 in any of these exceptions,
except for switching from user to kernel pagetables under PTI. That
means that most of the time when returning from an exception that
interrupted the kernel no CR3 restore is necessary. Writing CR3 is
expensive on some machines.
Most of the time because the interrupt might have come during kernel entry
before the user to kernel CR3 switch or the during exit after the kernel to
user switch. In the former case skipping the restore would be correct, but
definitely not for the latter.
So check the saved CR3 value and restore it only, if it is a user CR3.
Give the macro a new name to clarify its usage, and remove a comment that
was describing the original behaviour along with the not longer needed jump
label.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108113950.360438-1-jackmanb@google.com
[Rewrote commit message; responded to review comments]
Change-Id: I6e56978c4753fb943a7897ff101f519514fa0827
A series from Baoquan He cleans up the asm-generic/io.h to remove the
ioremap_uc() definition from everything except x86, which still needs it
for pre-PAT systems. This series notably contains a patch from Jiaxun Yang
that converts MIPS to use asm-generic/io.h like every other architecture
does, enabling future cleanups.
Some of my own patches fix -Wmissing-prototype warnings in architecture
specific code across several architectures. This is now needed as the
warning is enabled by default. There are still some remaining warnings
in minor platforms, but the series should catch most of the widely used
ones make them more consistent with one another.
David McKay fixes a bug in __generic_cmpxchg_local() when this is used
on 64-bit architectures. This could currently only affect parisc64
and sparc64.
Additional cleanups address from Linus Walleij, Uwe Kleine-König,
Thomas Huth, and Kefeng Wang help reduce unnecessary inconsistencies
between architectures.
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Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"A series from Baoquan He cleans up the asm-generic/io.h to remove the
ioremap_uc() definition from everything except x86, which still needs
it for pre-PAT systems. This series notably contains a patch from
Jiaxun Yang that converts MIPS to use asm-generic/io.h like every
other architecture does, enabling future cleanups.
Some of my own patches fix -Wmissing-prototype warnings in
architecture specific code across several architectures. This is now
needed as the warning is enabled by default. There are still some
remaining warnings in minor platforms, but the series should catch
most of the widely used ones make them more consistent with one
another.
David McKay fixes a bug in __generic_cmpxchg_local() when this is used
on 64-bit architectures. This could currently only affect parisc64 and
sparc64.
Additional cleanups address from Linus Walleij, Uwe Kleine-König,
Thomas Huth, and Kefeng Wang help reduce unnecessary inconsistencies
between architectures"
* tag 'asm-generic-6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
asm-generic: Fix 32 bit __generic_cmpxchg_local
Hexagon: Make pfn accessors statics inlines
ARC: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
mips: remove extraneous asm-generic/iomap.h include
sparc: Use $(kecho) to announce kernel images being ready
arm64: vdso32: Define BUILD_VDSO32_64 to correct prototypes
csky: fix arch_jump_label_transform_static override
arch: add do_page_fault prototypes
arch: add missing prepare_ftrace_return() prototypes
arch: vdso: consolidate gettime prototypes
arch: include linux/cpu.h for trap_init() prototype
arch: fix asm-offsets.c building with -Wmissing-prototypes
arch: consolidate arch_irq_work_raise prototypes
hexagon: Remove CONFIG_HEXAGON_ARCH_VERSION from uapi header
asm/io: remove unnecessary xlate_dev_mem_ptr() and unxlate_dev_mem_ptr()
mips: io: remove duplicated codes
arch/*/io.h: remove ioremap_uc in some architectures
mips: add <asm-generic/io.h> including
Step 5/10 of the namespace unification of CPU mitigations related Kconfig options.
[ mingo: Converted a few more uses in comments/messages as well. ]
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ariel Miculas <amiculas@cisco.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231121160740.1249350-6-leitao@debian.org
Jeff Xu