Commit Graph

60 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Harald Welte 4fdb3bb723 [NETLINK]: Add properly module refcounting for kernel netlink sockets.
- Remove bogus code for compiling netlink as module
- Add module refcounting support for modules implementing a netlink
  protocol
- Add support for autoloading modules that implement a netlink protocol
  as soon as someone opens a socket for that protocol

Signed-off-by: Harald Welte <laforge@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-29 15:35:08 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger 056ede6cfa [TCP]: Report congestion control algorithm in tcp_diag.
Enhancement to the tcp_diag interface used by the iproute2 ss command
to report the tcp congestion control being used by a socket.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-23 12:21:28 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger 7c99c909fa [TCP]: Change tcp_diag to use the existing __RTA_PUT() macro.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-23 12:20:36 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger 317a76f9a4 [TCP]: Add pluggable congestion control algorithm infrastructure.
Allow TCP to have multiple pluggable congestion control algorithms.
Algorithms are defined by a set of operations and can be built in
or modules.  The legacy "new RENO" algorithm is used as a starting
point and fallback.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-23 12:19:55 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2ad69c55a2 [NET] rename struct tcp_listen_opt to struct listen_sock
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-18 22:48:55 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 0e87506fcc [NET] Generalise tcp_listen_opt
This chunks out the accept_queue and tcp_listen_opt code and moves
them to net/core/request_sock.c and include/net/request_sock.h, to
make it useful for other transport protocols, DCCP being the first one
to use it.

Next patches will rename tcp_listen_opt to accept_sock and remove the
inline tcp functions that just call a reqsk_queue_ function.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-18 22:47:59 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 60236fdd08 [NET] Rename open_request to request_sock
Ok, this one just renames some stuff to have a better namespace and to
dissassociate it from TCP:

struct open_request  -> struct request_sock
tcp_openreq_alloc    -> reqsk_alloc
tcp_openreq_free     -> reqsk_free
tcp_openreq_fastfree -> __reqsk_free

With this most of the infrastructure closely resembles a struct
sock methods subset.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-18 22:47:21 -07:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2e6599cb89 [NET] Generalise TCP's struct open_request minisock infrastructure
Kept this first changeset minimal, without changing existing names to
ease peer review.

Basicaly tcp_openreq_alloc now receives the or_calltable, that in turn
has two new members:

->slab, that replaces tcp_openreq_cachep
->obj_size, to inform the size of the openreq descendant for
  a specific protocol

The protocol specific fields in struct open_request were moved to a
class hierarchy, with the things that are common to all connection
oriented PF_INET protocols in struct inet_request_sock, the TCP ones
in tcp_request_sock, that is an inet_request_sock, that is an
open_request.

I.e. this uses the same approach used for the struct sock class
hierarchy, with sk_prot indicating if the protocol wants to use the
open_request infrastructure by filling in sk_prot->rsk_prot with an
or_calltable.

Results? Performance is improved and TCP v4 now uses only 64 bytes per
open request minisock, down from 96 without this patch :-)

Next changeset will rename some of the structs, fields and functions
mentioned above, struct or_calltable is way unclear, better name it
struct request_sock_ops, s/struct open_request/struct request_sock/g,
etc.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-18 22:46:52 -07:00
Herbert Xu 2a0a6ebee1 [NETLINK]: Synchronous message processing.
Let's recap the problem.  The current asynchronous netlink kernel
message processing is vulnerable to these attacks:

1) Hit and run: Attacker sends one or more messages and then exits
before they're processed.  This may confuse/disable the next netlink
user that gets the netlink address of the attacker since it may
receive the responses to the attacker's messages.

Proposed solutions:

a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.
c) Restrict/prohibit binding.

2) Starvation: Because various netlink rcv functions were written
to not return until all messages have been processed on a socket,
it is possible for these functions to execute for an arbitrarily
long period of time.  If this is successfully exploited it could
also be used to hold rtnl forever.

Proposed solutions:

a) Synchronous processing.
b) Stream mode socket.

Firstly let's cross off solution c).  It only solves the first
problem and it has user-visible impacts.  In particular, it'll
break user space applications that expect to bind or communicate
with specific netlink addresses (pid's).

So we're left with a choice of synchronous processing versus
SOCK_STREAM for netlink.

For the moment I'm sticking with the synchronous approach as
suggested by Alexey since it's simpler and I'd rather spend
my time working on other things.

However, it does have a number of deficiencies compared to the
stream mode solution:

1) User-space to user-space netlink communication is still vulnerable.

2) Inefficient use of resources.  This is especially true for rtnetlink
since the lock is shared with other users such as networking drivers.
The latter could hold the rtnl while communicating with hardware which
causes the rtnetlink user to wait when it could be doing other things.

3) It is still possible to DoS all netlink users by flooding the kernel
netlink receive queue.  The attacker simply fills the receive socket
with a single netlink message that fills up the entire queue.  The
attacker then continues to call sendmsg with the same message in a loop.

Point 3) can be countered by retransmissions in user-space code, however
it is pretty messy.

In light of these problems (in particular, point 3), we should implement
stream mode netlink at some point.  In the mean time, here is a patch
that implements synchronous processing.  

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-03 14:55:09 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00