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3 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Biggers
002ced4be6 fscrypto: only allow setting encryption policy on directories
The FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY ioctl allowed setting an encryption
policy on nondirectory files.  This was unintentional, and in the case
of nonempty regular files did not behave as expected because existing
data was not actually encrypted by the ioctl.

In the case of ext4, the user could also trigger filesystem errors in
->empty_dir(), e.g. due to mismatched "directory" checksums when the
kernel incorrectly tried to interpret a regular file as a directory.

This bug affected ext4 with kernels v4.8-rc1 or later and f2fs with
kernels v4.6 and later.  It appears that older kernels only permitted
directories and that the check was accidentally lost during the
refactoring to share the file encryption code between ext4 and f2fs.

This patch restores the !S_ISDIR() check that was present in older
kernels.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2016-09-09 23:38:12 -04:00
Eric Biggers
163ae1c6ad fscrypto: add authorization check for setting encryption policy
On an ext4 or f2fs filesystem with file encryption supported, a user
could set an encryption policy on any empty directory(*) to which they
had readonly access.  This is obviously problematic, since such a
directory might be owned by another user and the new encryption policy
would prevent that other user from creating files in their own directory
(for example).

Fix this by requiring inode_owner_or_capable() permission to set an
encryption policy.  This means that either the caller must own the file,
or the caller must have the capability CAP_FOWNER.

(*) Or also on any regular file, for f2fs v4.6 and later and ext4
    v4.8-rc1 and later; a separate bug fix is coming for that.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+; check fs/{ext4,f2fs}
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2016-09-09 23:37:14 -04:00
Jaegeuk Kim
0b81d07790 fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs tree to fs/crypto
This patch adds the renamed functions moved from the f2fs crypto files.

1. definitions for per-file encryption used by ext4 and f2fs.

2. crypto.c for encrypt/decrypt functions
 a. IO preparation:
  - fscrypt_get_ctx / fscrypt_release_ctx
 b. before IOs:
  - fscrypt_encrypt_page
  - fscrypt_decrypt_page
  - fscrypt_zeroout_range
 c. after IOs:
  - fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages
  - fscrypt_pullback_bio_page
  - fscrypt_restore_control_page

3. policy.c supporting context management.
 a. For ioctls:
  - fscrypt_process_policy
  - fscrypt_get_policy
 b. For context permission
  - fscrypt_has_permitted_context
  - fscrypt_inherit_context

4. keyinfo.c to handle permissions
  - fscrypt_get_encryption_info
  - fscrypt_free_encryption_info

5. fname.c to support filename encryption
 a. general wrapper functions
  - fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr
  - fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk
  - fscrypt_setup_filename
  - fscrypt_free_filename

 b. specific filename handling functions
  - fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer
  - fscrypt_fname_free_buffer

6. Makefile and Kconfig

Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ildar Muslukhov <ildarm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Uday Savagaonkar <savagaon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
2016-03-17 21:19:33 -07:00