commit 998b30c394 upstream.
Syzkaller reports a NULL deref bug as follows:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000138 by task file1/1955
CPU: 1 PID: 1955 Comm: file1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-00103-gef4d3ea40565 #75
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0
? io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
kasan_check_range+0x140/0x190
io_tctx_exit_cb+0x53/0xd3
task_work_run+0x164/0x250
? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
get_signal+0x1c3/0x2440
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0
? exit_signals+0x8b0/0x8b0
? do_raw_read_unlock+0x3b/0x70
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x50/0x230
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x82/0x2470
? kmem_cache_free+0x260/0x4b0
? putname+0xfe/0x140
? get_sigframe_size+0x10/0x10
? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x226/0x710
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x79/0x100
? putname+0xfe/0x140
? do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x238/0x710
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0023:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 002b:00000000fffb7790 EFLAGS: 00000200 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000b
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
This happens because the adding of task_work from io_ring_exit_work()
isn't synchronized with canceling all work items from eg exec. The
execution of the two are ordered in that they are both run by the task
itself, but if io_tctx_exit_cb() is queued while we're canceling all
work items off exec AND gets executed when the task exits to userspace
rather than in the main loop in io_uring_cancel_generic(), then we can
find current->io_uring == NULL and hit the above crash.
It's safe to add this NULL check here, because the execution of the two
paths are done by the task itself.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d56d938b4b ("io_uring: do ctx initiated file note removal")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221206093833.3812138-1-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com
[axboe: add code comment and also put an explanation in the commit msg]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7cfe7a0948 upstream.
With how task_work is added and signaled, we can have TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
set and no task_work pending as it got run in a previous loop. Treat
TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL like get_signal(), always clear it if set regardless
of whether or not task_work is pending to run.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 46a525e199 ("io_uring: don't gate task_work run on TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a26a35e901 upstream.
poll_refs carry two functions, the first is ownership over the request.
The second is notifying the io_poll_check_events() that there was an
event but wake up couldn't grab the ownership, so io_poll_check_events()
should retry.
We want to make poll_refs more robust against overflows. Instead of
always incrementing it, which covers two purposes with one atomic, check
if poll_refs is elevated enough and if so set a retry flag without
attempts to grab ownership. The gap between the bias check and following
atomics may seem racy, but we don't need it to be strict. Moreover there
might only be maximum 4 parallel updates: by the first and the second
poll entries, __io_arm_poll_handler() and cancellation. From those four,
only poll wake ups may be executed multiple times, but they're protected
by a spin.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Fixes: aa43477b04 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c762bc31f8683b3270f3587691348a7119ef9c9d.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2f3893437a upstream.
Replace atomically substracting the ownership reference at the end of
arming a poll with a cmpxchg. We try to release ownership by setting 0
assuming that poll_refs didn't change while we were arming. If it did
change, we keep the ownership and use it to queue a tw, which is fully
capable to process all events and (even tolerates spurious wake ups).
It's a bit more elegant as we reduce races b/w setting the cancellation
flag and getting refs with this release, and with that we don't have to
worry about any kinds of underflows. It's not the fastest path for
polling. The performance difference b/w cmpxchg and atomic dec is
usually negligible and it's not the fastest path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa43477b04 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c95251624397ea6def568ff040cad2d7926fd51.1668963050.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 12ad3d2d6c ]
There is an interesting race condition of poll_refs which could result
in a NULL pointer dereference. The crash trace is like:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 30781 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-g493ffd6605b2 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entry io_uring/poll.c:154 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entries+0x171/0x5b4 io_uring/poll.c:190
Code: ...
RSP: 0018:ffff88810dfefba0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc900030c4000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000
RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: ffffffff9764d3dd R09: fffffbfff3836781
R10: fffffbfff3836781 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11003422d60
R13: ffff88801a116b04 R14: ffff88801a116ac0 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f9c07497700(0000) GS:ffff88811a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffb5c00ea98 CR3: 0000000105680005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
io_apoll_task_func+0x3f/0xa0 io_uring/poll.c:299
handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1037 [inline]
tctx_task_work+0x37e/0x4f0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1090
task_work_run+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:177
get_signal+0x2402/0x25a0 kernel/signal.c:2635
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3b/0x660 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:166 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc2/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:201
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x58/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The root cause for this is a tiny overlooking in
io_poll_check_events() when cocurrently run with poll cancel routine
io_poll_cancel_req().
The interleaving to trigger use-after-free:
CPU0 | CPU1
|
io_apoll_task_func() | io_poll_cancel_req()
io_poll_check_events() |
// do while first loop |
v = atomic_read(...) |
// v = poll_refs = 1 |
... | io_poll_mark_cancelled()
| atomic_or()
| // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
|
atomic_sub_return(...) |
// poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG |
// loop continue |
|
| io_poll_execute()
| io_poll_get_ownership()
| // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
| // gets the ownership
v = atomic_read(...) |
// poll_refs not change |
|
if (v & IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG) |
return -ECANCELED; |
// io_poll_check_events return |
// will go into |
// io_req_complete_failed() free req |
|
| io_apoll_task_func()
| // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()
And the interleaving to trigger the kernel WARNING:
CPU0 | CPU1
|
io_apoll_task_func() | io_poll_cancel_req()
io_poll_check_events() |
// do while first loop |
v = atomic_read(...) |
// v = poll_refs = 1 |
... | io_poll_mark_cancelled()
| atomic_or()
| // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
|
atomic_sub_return(...) |
// poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG |
// loop continue |
|
v = atomic_read(...) |
// v = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG |
| io_poll_execute()
| io_poll_get_ownership()
| // poll_refs =
IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1
| // gets the ownership
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!(v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK))) |
// v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK = 0 WARN |
|
| io_apoll_task_func()
| // also go into
io_req_complete_failed()
By looking up the source code and communicating with Pavel, the
implementation of this atomic poll refs should continue the loop of
io_poll_check_events() just to avoid somewhere else to grab the
ownership. Therefore, this patch simply adds another AND operation to
make sure the loop will stop if it finds the poll_refs is exactly equal
to IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG. Since io_poll_cancel_req() grabs ownership and
will finally make its way to io_req_complete_failed(), the req will
be reclaimed as expected.
Fixes: aa43477b04 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
[axboe: tweak description and code style]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9d94c04c0d ]
There is an interesting reference bug when -ENOMEM occurs in calling of
io_install_fixed_file(). KASan report like below:
[ 14.057131] ==================================================================
[ 14.059161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.060975] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b09cf20 by task kworker/u8:2/45
[ 14.062684]
[ 14.062768] CPU: 2 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1
[ 14.063099] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 14.063666] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
[ 14.063936] Call Trace:
[ 14.064065] <TASK>
[ 14.064175] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48
[ 14.064360] print_report+0x172/0x475
[ 14.064547] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x83/0xe0
[ 14.064758] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xef/0x170
[ 14.064975] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065167] kasan_report+0xad/0x130
[ 14.065353] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065553] unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90
[ 14.065744] __io_sqe_files_unregister+0x87/0x1e0
[ 14.065989] ? io_rsrc_refs_drop+0x1c/0xd0
[ 14.066199] io_ring_exit_work+0x388/0x6a5
[ 14.066410] ? io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x5bf/0x5bf
[ 14.066674] ? try_to_wake_up+0xdb/0x910
[ 14.066873] ? virt_to_head_page+0xbe/0xbe
[ 14.067080] ? __schedule+0x574/0xd20
[ 14.067273] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20
[ 14.067492] ? strscpy+0xb5/0x190
[ 14.067665] process_one_work+0x423/0x710
[ 14.067879] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0
[ 14.068073] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 14.068284] kthread+0x163/0x1a0
[ 14.068454] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[ 14.068697] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[ 14.068886] </TASK>
[ 14.069000]
[ 14.069088] Allocated by task 289:
[ 14.069269] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.069463] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 14.069652] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x70
[ 14.069899] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc5/0x200
[ 14.070100] __alloc_file+0x20/0x160
[ 14.070283] alloc_empty_file+0x3b/0xc0
[ 14.070479] path_openat+0xc3/0x1770
[ 14.070689] do_filp_open+0x150/0x270
[ 14.070888] do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x270
[ 14.071081] __x64_sys_openat+0xc8/0x140
[ 14.071283] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 14.071466] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.071791]
[ 14.071874] Freed by task 0:
[ 14.072027] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.072224] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 14.072415] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50
[ 14.072627] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190
[ 14.072858] kmem_cache_free+0x98/0x340
[ 14.073075] rcu_core+0x427/0xe50
[ 14.073249] __do_softirq+0x110/0x3cd
[ 14.073440]
[ 14.073523] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 14.073801] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.074017] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[ 14.074264] call_rcu+0x41/0x550
[ 14.074436] task_work_run+0xf4/0x170
[ 14.074619] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120
[ 14.074858] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40
[ 14.075092] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90
[ 14.075272] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.075529]
[ 14.075612] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 14.075900] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
[ 14.076098] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0
[ 14.076325] task_work_add+0x72/0x1b0
[ 14.076512] fput+0x65/0xc0
[ 14.076657] filp_close+0x8e/0xa0
[ 14.076825] __x64_sys_close+0x15/0x50
[ 14.077019] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 14.077199] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 14.077448]
[ 14.077530] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800b09cf00
[ 14.077530] which belongs to the cache filp of size 232
[ 14.078105] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
[ 14.078105] 232-byte region [ffff88800b09cf00, ffff88800b09cfe8)
[ 14.078685]
[ 14.078771] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 14.079046] page:000000001bd520e7 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800b09de00 pfn:0xb09c
[ 14.079575] head:000000001bd520e7 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 14.079946] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1)
[ 14.080244] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff88800493cc80
[ 14.080629] raw: ffff88800b09de00 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 14.081016] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 14.081293]
[ 14.081376] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 14.081618] ffff88800b09ce00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 14.081974] ffff88800b09ce80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 14.082336] >ffff88800b09cf00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.082690] ^
[ 14.082909] ffff88800b09cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
[ 14.083266] ffff88800b09d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 14.083622] ==================================================================
The actual tracing of this bug is shown below:
commit 8c71fe7502 ("io_uring: ensure fput() called correspondingly
when direct install fails") adds an additional fput() in
io_fixed_fd_install() when io_file_bitmap_get() returns error values. In
that case, the routine will never make it to io_install_fixed_file() due
to an early return.
static int io_fixed_fd_install(...)
{
if (alloc_slot) {
...
ret = io_file_bitmap_get(ctx);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
...
}
...
ret = io_install_fixed_file(req, file, issue_flags, file_slot);
...
}
In the above scenario, the reference is okay as io_fixed_fd_install()
ensures the fput() is called when something bad happens, either via
bitmap or via inner io_install_fixed_file().
However, the commit 61c1b44a21 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file
slot alloc") breaks the balance because it places fput() into the common
path for both io_file_bitmap_get() and io_install_fixed_file(). Since
io_install_fixed_file() handles the fput() itself, the reference
underflow come across then.
There are some extra commits make the current code into
io_fixed_fd_install() -> __io_fixed_fd_install() ->
io_install_fixed_file()
However, the fact that there is an extra fput() is called if
io_install_fixed_file() calls fput(). Traversing through the code, I
find that the existing two callers to __io_fixed_fd_install():
io_fixed_fd_install() and io_msg_send_fd() have fput() when handling
error return, this patch simply removes the fput() in
io_install_fixed_file() to fix the bug.
Fixes: 61c1b44a21 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file slot alloc")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/be4ba4b.5d44.184a0a406a4.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7fdbc5f014 upstream.
When we post a CQE we wake all ring pollers as it normally should be.
However, if a CQE was generated by a multishot poll request targeting
its own ring, it'll wake that request up, which will make it to post
a new CQE, which will wake the request and so on until it exhausts all
CQ entries.
Don't allow multishot polling io_uring files but downgrade them to
oneshots, which was always stated as a correct behaviour that the
userspace should check for.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa43477b04 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3124038c0e7474d427538c2d915335ec28c92d21.1668785722.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 100d6b17c0 upstream.
Having REQ_F_POLLED set doesn't guarantee that the request is
executed as a multishot from the polling path. Fortunately for us, if
the code thinks it's multishot issue when it's not, it can only ask to
skip completion so leaking the request. Use issue_flags to mark
multipoll issues.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1300ebb20286b ("io_uring: multishot recv")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/37762040ba9c52b81b92a2f5ebfd4ee484088951.1668710222.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9148286476 upstream.
Having REQ_F_POLLED set doesn't guarantee that the request is
executed as a multishot from the polling path. Fortunately for us, if
the code thinks it's multishot issue when it's not, it can only ask to
skip completion so leaking the request. Use issue_flags to mark
multipoll issues.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 390ed29b5e ("io_uring: add IORING_ACCEPT_MULTISHOT for accept")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7700ac57653f2823e30b34dc74da68678c0c5f13.1668710222.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b98186aee2 upstream.
When io_poll_check_events() collides with someone attempting to queue a
task work, it'll spin for one more time. However, it'll continue to use
the mask from the first iteration instead of updating it. For example,
if the first wake up was a EPOLLIN and the second EPOLLOUT, the
userspace will not get EPOLLOUT in time.
Clear the mask for all subsequent iterations to force vfs_poll().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: aa43477b04 ("io_uring: poll rework")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2dac97e8f691231049cb259c4ae57e79e40b537c.1668710222.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 30a33669fa ]
io_poll_double_prepare() | io_poll_wake()
| poll->head = NULL
smp_load(&poll->head); /* NULL */ |
flags = req->flags; |
| req->flags &= ~SINGLE_POLL;
req->flags = flags | DOUBLE_POLL |
The idea behind io_poll_double_prepare() is to serialise with the
first poll entry by taking the wq lock. However, it's not safe to assume
that io_poll_wake() is not running when we can't grab the lock and so we
may race modifying req->flags.
Skip double poll setup if that happens. It's ok because the first poll
entry will only be removed when it's definitely completing, e.g.
pollfree or oneshot with a valid mask.
Fixes: 49f1c68e04 ("io_uring: optimise submission side poll_refs")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b7fab2d502f6121a7d7b199fe4d914a43ca9cdfd.1668184658.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0fc8c2acbf ]
io_cqring_wait (and it's wake function io_has_work) used cached_cq_tail in
order to calculate the number of CQEs. cached_cq_tail is set strictly
before the user visible rings->cq.tail
However as far as userspace is concerned, if io_uring_enter(2) is called
with a minimum number of events, they will verify by checking
rings->cq.tail.
It is therefore possible for io_uring_enter(2) to return early with fewer
events visible to the user.
Instead make the wait functions read from the user visible value, so there
will be no discrepency.
This is triggered eventually by the following reproducer:
struct io_uring_sqe *sqe;
struct io_uring_cqe *cqe;
unsigned int cqe_ready;
struct io_uring ring;
int ret, i;
ret = io_uring_queue_init(N, &ring, 0);
assert(!ret);
while(true) {
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
sqe = io_uring_get_sqe(&ring);
io_uring_prep_nop(sqe);
sqe->flags |= IOSQE_ASYNC;
}
ret = io_uring_submit(&ring);
assert(ret == N);
do {
ret = io_uring_wait_cqes(&ring, &cqe, N, NULL, NULL);
} while(ret == -EINTR);
cqe_ready = io_uring_cq_ready(&ring);
assert(!ret);
assert(cqe_ready == N);
io_uring_cq_advance(&ring, N);
}
Fixes: ad3eb2c89f ("io_uring: split overflow state into SQ and CQ side")
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221108153016.1854297-1-dylany@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3851d25c75 upstream.
We already check if the chosen starting offset for the buffer IDs fit
within an unsigned short, as 65535 is the maximum value for a provided
buffer. But if the caller asks to add N buffers at offset M, and M + N
would exceed the size of the unsigned short, we simply add buffers with
wrapping around the ID.
This is not necessarily a bug and could in fact be a valid use case, but
it seems confusing and inconsistent with the initial check for starting
offset. Let's check for wrap consistently, and error the addition if we
do need to wrap.
Reported-by: Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com>
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/726
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 02bac94bd8 ]
We should not be completing requests from a task context that has already
undergone io_uring cancellations, i.e. __io_uring_cancel(), as there are
some assumptions, e.g. around cached task refs draining. Remove
iopolling from io_ring_ctx_wait_and_kill() as it can be called later
after PF_EXITING is set with the last task_work run.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7c03cc91455c4a1af49c6b9cbda4e57ea467aa11.1665891182.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 46a525e199 ]
This isn't a reliable mechanism to tell if we have task_work pending, we
really should be looking at whether we have any items queued. This is
problematic if forward progress is gated on running said task_work. One
such example is reading from a pipe, where the write side has been closed
right before the read is started. The fput() of the file queues TWA_RESUME
task_work, and we need that task_work to be run before ->release() is
called for the pipe. If ->release() isn't called, then the read will sit
forever waiting on data that will never arise.
Fix this by io_run_task_work() so it checks if we have task_work pending
rather than rely on TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for that. The latter obviously
doesn't work for task_work that is queued without TWA_SIGNAL.
Reported-by: Christiano Haesbaert <haesbaert@haesbaert.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/665
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 5c61795ea9 ]
This debug statement was never meant to go into the upstream release,
kill it off before it ends up in a release. It was just part of the
testing for the initial version of the patch.
Fixes: 2ec33a6c3c ("io_uring/rw: ensure kiocb_end_write() is always called")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 996d3efeb0 upstream.
If the CPU mask allocation for a node fails, then the memory allocated for
the 'io_wqe' struct of the current node doesn't get freed on the error
handling path, since it has not yet been added to the 'wqes' array.
This was spotted when fuzzing v6.1-rc1 with Syzkaller:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880093d5000 (size 1024):
comm "syz-executor.2", pid 7701, jiffies 4295048595 (age 13.900s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000cb463369>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x18e/0x720
[<00000000147a3f9c>] kmalloc_node_trace+0x2a/0x130
[<000000004e107011>] io_wq_create+0x7b9/0xdc0
[<00000000c38b2018>] io_uring_alloc_task_context+0x31e/0x59d
[<00000000867399da>] __io_uring_add_tctx_node.cold+0x19/0x1ba
[<000000007e0e7a79>] io_uring_setup.cold+0x1b80/0x1dce
[<00000000b545e9f6>] __x64_sys_io_uring_setup+0x5d/0x80
[<000000008a8a7508>] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90
[<000000004ac08bec>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Fixes: 0e03496d19 ("io-wq: use private CPU mask")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rafael Mendonca <rafaelmendsr@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221020014710.902201-1-rafaelmendsr@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit edf8143879 upstream.
If a protocol doesn't support zerocopy it will silently fall back to
copying. This type of behaviour has always been a source of troubles
so it's better to fail such requests instead.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.0
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2db3c7f16bb6efab4b04569cd16e6242b40c5cb3.1666346426.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2ec33a6c3c upstream.
A previous commit moved the notifications and end-write handling, but
it is now missing a few spots where we also want to call both of those.
Without that, we can potentially be missing file notifications, and
more importantly, have an imbalance in the super_block writers sem
accounting.
Fixes: b000145e99 ("io_uring/rw: defer fsnotify calls to task context")
Reported-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221010050319.GC2703033@dread.disaster.area/
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ upstream commit 108893ddcc ]
send zc is not restricted to !IO_URING_F_UNLOCKED anymore and so
we can't use task-tw ordering trick to order notification cqes
with requests completions. In this case leave it alone and let
io_send_zc_cleanup() flush it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 53bdc88aac ("io_uring/notif: order notif vs send CQEs")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0031f3a00d492e814a4a0935a2029a46d9c9ba06.1664486545.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ upstream commit 6ae91ac9a6 ]
We currently only add a notification CQE when the send succeded, i.e.
cqe.res >= 0. However, it'd be more robust to do buffer notifications
for failed requests as well in case drivers decide do something fanky.
Always return a buffer notification after initial prep, don't hide it.
This behaviour is better aligned with documentation and the patch also
helps the userspace to respect it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0
Suggested-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9c8bead87b2b980fcec441b8faef52188b4a6588.1664292100.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ upstream commit 0b048557db ]
In preparation for using struct io_sr_msg for zerocopy sends, clean up
types. First, flags can be u16 as it's provided by the userspace in u16
ioprio, as well as addr_len. This saves us 4 bytes. Also use unsigned
for size and done_io, both are as well limited to u32.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/42c2639d6385b8b2181342d2af3a42d3b1c5bcd2.1662639236.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit aa1df3a360 ]
Overflowing CQEs may result in reordering, which is buggy in case of
links, F_MORE and so on. If we guarantee that we don't reorder for
the unlikely event of a CQ ring overflow, then we can further extend
this to not have to terminate multishot requests if it happens. For
other operations, like zerocopy sends, we have no choice but to honor
CQE ordering.
Reported-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ec3bc55687b0768bbe20fb62d7d06cfced7d7e70.1663892031.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3b8fdd1dc3 ]
If we have doubly sized SQEs, then we need to shift the sq index by 1
to account for using two entries for a single request. The CQE dumping
gets this right, but the SQE one does not.
Improve the SQE dumping in general, the information dumped is pretty
sparse and doesn't even cover the whole basic part of the SQE. Include
information on the extended part of the SQE, if doubly sized SQEs are
in use. A typical dump now looks like the following:
[...]
SQEs: 32
32: opcode:URING_CMD, fd:0, flags:1, off:3225964160, addr:0x0, rw_flags:0x0, buf_index:0 user_data:2721, e0:0x0, e1:0xffffb8041000, e2:0x100000000000, e3:0x5500, e4:0x7, e5:0x0, e6:0x0, e7:0x0
33: opcode:URING_CMD, fd:0, flags:1, off:3225964160, addr:0x0, rw_flags:0x0, buf_index:0 user_data:2722, e0:0x0, e1:0xffffb8043000, e2:0x100000000000, e3:0x5508, e4:0x7, e5:0x0, e6:0x0, e7:0x0
34: opcode:URING_CMD, fd:0, flags:1, off:3225964160, addr:0x0, rw_flags:0x0, buf_index:0 user_data:2723, e0:0x0, e1:0xffffb8045000, e2:0x100000000000, e3:0x5510, e4:0x7, e5:0x0, e6:0x0, e7:0x0
[...]
Fixes: ebdeb7c01d ("io_uring: add support for 128-byte SQEs")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 42b6419d0a upstream.
->mm_account should be released only after we free all registered
buffers, otherwise __io_sqe_buffers_unregister() will see a NULL
->mm_account and skip locked_vm accounting.
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6d798f65ed4ab8db3664c4d3397d4af16ca98846.1664849932.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0091bfc817 upstream.
Instead of putting io_uring's registered files in unix_gc() we want it
to be done by io_uring itself. The trick here is to consider io_uring
registered files for cycle detection but not actually putting them down.
Because io_uring can't register other ring instances, this will remove
all refs to the ring file triggering the ->release path and clean up
with io_ring_ctx_free().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b06314c47 ("io_uring: add file set registration")
Reported-and-tested-by: David Bouman <dbouman03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
[axboe: add kerneldoc comment to skb, fold in skb leak fix]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3fb1bd6881 upstream.
We treat EINPROGRESS like EAGAIN, but if we're retrying post getting
EINPROGRESS, then we just need to check the socket for errors and
terminate the request.
This was exposed on a bluetooth connection request which ends up
taking a while and hitting EINPROGRESS, and yields a CQE result of
-EBADFD because we're retrying a connect on a socket that is now
connected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 87f80d623c ("io_uring: handle connect -EINPROGRESS like -EAGAIN")
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/671
Reported-by: Aidan Sun <aidansun05@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d7cce96c44 upstream.
IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER restricts what tasks can submit requests.
Extend it to registration as well, so non-owning task can't do
registrations. It's not necessary at the moment but might be useful in
the future.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.0
Fixes: 97bbdc06a4 ("io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/f52a6a9c8a8990d4a831f73c0571e7406aac2bba.1664237592.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3e4cb6ebbb upstream.
I hit a very bad problem during my tests of SENDMSG_ZC.
BUG(); in first_iovec_segment() triggered very easily.
The problem was io_setup_async_msg() in the partial retry case,
which seems to happen more often with _ZC.
iov_iter_iovec_advance() may change i->iov in order to have i->iov_offset
being only relative to the first element.
Which means kmsg->msg.msg_iter.iov is no longer the
same as kmsg->fast_iov.
But this would rewind the copy to be the start of
async_msg->fast_iov, which means the internal
state of sync_msg->msg.msg_iter is inconsitent.
I tested with 5 vectors with length like this 4, 0, 64, 20, 8388608
and got a short writes with:
- ret=2675244 min_ret=8388692 => remaining 5713448 sr->done_io=2675244
- ret=-EAGAIN => io_uring_poll_arm
- ret=4911225 min_ret=5713448 => remaining 802223 sr->done_io=7586469
- ret=-EAGAIN => io_uring_poll_arm
- ret=802223 min_ret=802223 => res=8388692
While this was easily triggered with SENDMSG_ZC (queued for 6.1),
it was a potential problem starting with 7ba89d2af1
in 5.18 for IORING_OP_RECVMSG.
And also with 4c3c09439c in 5.19
for IORING_OP_SENDMSG.
However 257e84a537 introduced the critical
code into io_setup_async_msg() in 5.11.
Fixes: 7ba89d2af1 ("io_uring: ensure recv and recvmsg handle MSG_WAITALL correctly")
Fixes: 257e84a537 ("io_uring: refactor sendmsg/recvmsg iov managing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b2e7be246e2fb173520862b0c7098e55767567a2.1664436949.git.metze@samba.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf68b5b343 upstream.
req->cqe.res is set in io_read() to the amount of bytes left to be done,
which is used to figure out whether to fail a read or not. However,
io_read() may do another without returning, and we stash the previous
value into ->bytes_done but forget to update cqe.res. Then we ask a read
to do strictly less than cqe.res but expect the return to be exactly
cqe.res.
Fix the bug by updating cqe.res for retries.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Beld Zhang <beldzhang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3a1088440c7be98e5800267af922a67da0ef9f13.1664235732.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-29' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Two fixes that should go into 6.0:
- Tweak the single issuer logic to register the task at creation,
rather than at first submit. SINGLE_ISSUER was added for 6.0, and
after some discussion on this, we decided to make it a bit stricter
while it's still possible to do so (Dylan).
- Stefan from Samba had some doubts on the level triggered poll that
was added for this release. Rather than attempt to mess around with
it now, just do the quick one-liner to disable it for release and
we have time to discuss and change it for 6.1 instead (me)"
* tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-29' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
io_uring/poll: disable level triggered poll
io_uring: register single issuer task at creation
Stefan reports that there are issues with the level triggered
notification. Since we're late in the cycle, and it was introduced for
the 6.0 release, just disable it at prep time and we can bring this
back when Samba is happy with it.
Reported-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Instead of picking the task from the first submitter task, rather use the
creator task or in the case of disabled (IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED) the
enabling task.
This approach allows a lot of simplification of the logic here. This
removes init logic from the submission path, which can always be a bit
confusing, but also removes the need for locking to write (or read) the
submitter_task.
Users that want to move a ring before submitting can create the ring
disabled and then enable it on the submitting task.
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Fixes: 97bbdc06a4 ("io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Merge tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-23' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux
Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"Just a single fix for an issue with un-reaped IOPOLL requests on ring
exit"
* tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-23' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
io_uring: ensure that cached task references are always put on exit
io_uring caches task references to avoid doing atomics for each of them
per request. If a request is put from the same task that allocated it,
then we can maintain a per-ctx cache of them. This obviously relies
on io_uring always pruning caches in a reliable way, and there's
currently a case off io_uring fd release where we can miss that.
One example is a ring setup with IOPOLL, which relies on the task
polling for completions, which will free them. However, if such a task
submits a request and then exits or closes the ring without reaping
the completion, then ring release will reap and put. If release happens
from that very same task, the completed request task refs will get
put back into the cache pool. This is problematic, as we're now beyond
the point of pruning caches.
Manually drop these caches after doing an IOPOLL reap. This releases
references from the current task, which is enough. If another task
happens to be doing the release, then the caching will not be
triggered and there's no issue.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e98e49b2bb ("io_uring: extend task put optimisations")
Reported-by: Homin Rhee <hominlab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Merge tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-18' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Nothing really major here, but figured it'd be nicer to just get these
flushed out for -rc6 so that the 6.1 branch will have them as well.
That'll make our lives easier going forward in terms of development,
and avoid trivial conflicts in this area.
- Simple trace rename so that the returned opcode name is consistent
with the enum definition (Stefan)
- Send zc rsrc request vs notification lifetime fix (Pavel)"
* tag 'io_uring-6.0-2022-09-18' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux:
io_uring/opdef: rename SENDZC_NOTIF to SEND_ZC
io_uring/net: fix zc fixed buf lifetime
