Commit graph

196 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Miklos Szeredi
f7ad3c6be9 vfs: add helpers to get root and pwd
Add three helpers that retrieve a refcounted copy of the root and cwd
from the supplied fs_struct.

 get_fs_root()
 get_fs_pwd()
 get_fs_root_and_pwd()

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-08-11 00:28:20 -04:00
Eric Paris
e61ce86737 fsnotify: rename fsnotify_mark_entry to just fsnotify_mark
The name is long and it serves no real purpose.  So rename
fsnotify_mark_entry to just fsnotify_mark.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:53 -04:00
Eric Paris
2dfc1cae4c inotify: remove inotify in kernel interface
nothing uses inotify in the kernel, drop it!

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:31 -04:00
Eric Paris
28a3a7eb3b audit: reimplement audit_trees using fsnotify rather than inotify
Simply switch audit_trees from using inotify to using fsnotify for it's
inode pinning and disappearing act information.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:17 -04:00
Eric Paris
ae7b8f4108 Audit: clean up the audit_watch split
No real changes, just cleanup to the audit_watch split patch which we done
with minimal code changes for easy review.  Now fix interfaces to make
things work better.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2010-07-28 09:58:16 -04:00
Eric Paris
449cedf099 audit: preface audit printk with audit
There have been a number of reports of people seeing the message:
"name_count maxed, losing inode data: dev=00:05, inode=3185"
in dmesg.  These usually lead to people reporting problems to the filesystem
group who are in turn clueless what they mean.

Eventually someone finds me and I explain what is going on and that
these come from the audit system.  The basics of the problem is that the
audit subsystem never expects a single syscall to 'interact' (for some
wish washy meaning of interact) with more than 20 inodes.  But in fact
some operations like loading kernel modules can cause changes to lots of
inodes in debugfs.

There are a couple real fixes being bandied about including removing the
fixed compile time limit of 20 or not auditing changes in debugfs (or
both) but neither are small and obvious so I am not sending them for
immediate inclusion (I hope Al forwards a real solution next devel
window).

In the meantime this patch simply adds 'audit' to the beginning of the
crap message so if a user sees it, they come blame me first and we can
talk about what it means and make sure we understand all of the reasons
it can happen and make sure this gets solved correctly in the long run.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-04-05 13:19:45 -07:00
Tejun Heo
5a0e3ad6af include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files.  percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.

percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed.  Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability.  As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.

  http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py

The script does the followings.

* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
  only the necessary includes are there.  ie. if only gfp is used,
  gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.

* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
  blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
  to its surrounding.  It's put in the include block which contains
  core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
  alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
  doesn't seem to be any matching order.

* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
  because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
  an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
  file.

The conversion was done in the following steps.

1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
   over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
   and ~3000 slab.h inclusions.  The script emitted errors for ~400
   files.

2. Each error was manually checked.  Some didn't need the inclusion,
   some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
   embedding .c file was more appropriate for others.  This step added
   inclusions to around 150 files.

3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
   from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.

4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
   e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
   APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.

5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
   editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
   files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell.  Most gfp.h
   inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
   wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros.  Each
   slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
   necessary.

6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.

7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
   were fixed.  CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
   distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
   more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
   build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).

   * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
   * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
   * ia64 SMP allmodconfig
   * s390 SMP allmodconfig
   * alpha SMP allmodconfig
   * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig

8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
   a separate patch and serve as bisection point.

Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-30 22:02:32 +09:00
Al Viro
cccc6bba3f Lose the first argument of audit_inode_child()
it's always equal to ->d_name.name of the second argument

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2010-02-08 14:38:36 -05:00
Al Viro
5300990c03 Sanitize f_flags helpers
* pull ACC_MODE to fs.h; we have several copies all over the place
* nightmarish expression calculating f_mode by f_flags deserves a helper
too (OPEN_FMODE(flags))

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-12-22 12:27:34 -05:00
Eric Paris
44e51a1b78 Audit: rearrange audit_context to save 16 bytes per struct
pahole pointed out that on x86_64 struct audit_context can be rearrainged
to save 16 bytes per struct.  Since we have an audit_context per task this
can acually be a pretty significant gain.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-09-24 03:50:26 -04:00
Al Viro
916d75761c Fix rule eviction order for AUDIT_DIR
If syscall removes the root of subtree being watched, we
definitely do not want the rules refering that subtree
to be destroyed without the syscall in question having
a chance to match them.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-06-24 00:02:38 -04:00
Eric Paris
9d96098510 Audit: clean up all op= output to include string quoting
A number of places in the audit system we send an op= followed by a string
that includes spaces.  Somehow this works but it's just wrong.  This patch
moves all of those that I could find to be quoted.

Example:

Change From: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=remove rule
key="number2" list=4 res=0

Change To: type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1244666690.117:31): auid=0 ses=1
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op="remove rule"
key="number2" list=4 res=0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-24 00:00:52 -04:00
Eric Paris
cfcad62c74 audit: seperate audit inode watches into a subfile
In preparation for converting audit to use fsnotify instead of inotify we
seperate the inode watching code into it's own file.  This is similar to
how the audit tree watching code is already seperated into audit_tree.c

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-23 23:50:59 -04:00
Eric Paris
b87ce6e418 Audit: better estimation of execve record length
The audit execve record splitting code estimates the length of the message
generated.  But it forgot to include the "" that wrap each string in its
estimation.  This means that execve messages with lots of tiny (1-2 byte)
arguments could still cause records greater than 8k to be emitted.  Simply
fix the estimate.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2009-06-23 23:50:34 -04:00
Eric Paris
def5754341 Audit: remove spaces from audit_log_d_path
audit_log_d_path had spaces in the strings which would be emitted on the
error paths.  This patch simply replaces those spaces with an _ or removes
the needless spaces entirely.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:49:04 -04:00
Eric Paris
679173b724 audit: audit_set_auditable defined but not used
after 0590b9335a audit_set_auditable() is now only
used by the audit tree code.  If CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE is unset it will be defined
but unused.  This patch simply moves the function inside a CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
block.

cc1: warnings being treated as errors
/home/acme_unencrypted/git/linux-2.6-tip/kernel/auditsc.c:745: error: ‘audit_set_auditable’ defined but not used
make[2]: *** [kernel/auditsc.o] Error 1
make[1]: *** [kernel] Error 2
make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:48:52 -04:00
Paul Moore
6d208da89a audit: Fix possible return value truncation in audit_get_context()
The audit subsystem treats syscall return codes as type long, unfortunately
the audit_get_context() function mistakenly converts the return code to an
int type in the parameters which could cause problems on systems where the
sizeof(int) != sizeof(long).

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:46:19 -04:00
Randy Dunlap
6b96255998 auditsc: fix kernel-doc notation
Fix auditsc kernel-doc notation:

Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): No description found for parameter 'attr'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2156): Excess function parameter 'u_attr' description in '__audit_mq_open'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): No description found for parameter 'notification'
Warning(linux-2.6.28-git7//kernel/auditsc.c:2204): Excess function parameter 'u_notification' description in '__audit_mq_notify'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
cc:	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
cc:	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:39:19 -04:00
Jiri Pirko
ca96a895a6 audit: EXECVE record - removed bogus newline
(updated)
Added hunk that changes the comment, the rest is the same.

EXECVE records contain a newline after every argument. auditd converts
"\n" to " " so you cannot see newlines even in raw logs, but they're
there nevertheless. If you're not using auditd, you need to work round
them. These '\n' chars are can be easily replaced by spaces when
creating record in kernel. Note there is no need for trailing '\n' in
an audit record.

record before this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\"\na1=\"a\"\na2=\"b\"\na3=\"c\"\n"

record after this patch:
"type=EXECVE msg=audit(1231421801.566:31): argc=4 a0=\"./test\" a1=\"a\" a2=\"b\" a3=\"c\""

Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-04-05 13:38:59 -04:00
Al Viro
5ad4e53bd5 Get rid of indirect include of fs_struct.h
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly.  sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-03-31 23:00:27 -04:00
Al Viro
e048e02c89 make sure that filterkey of task,always rules is reported
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:42 -05:00
Al Viro
0590b9335a fixing audit rule ordering mess, part 1
Problem: ordering between the rules on exit chain is currently lost;
all watch and inode rules are listed after everything else _and_
exit,never on one kind doesn't stop exit,always on another from
being matched.

Solution: assign priorities to rules, keep track of the current
highest-priority matching rule and its result (always/never).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
57f71a0af4 sanitize audit_log_capset()
* no allocations
* return void
* don't duplicate checked for dummy context

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
157cf649a7 sanitize audit_fd_pair()
* no allocations
* return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
564f6993ff sanitize audit_mq_open()
* don't bother with allocations
* don't do double copy_from_user()
* don't duplicate parts of check for audit_dummy_context()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:41 -05:00
Al Viro
c32c8af43b sanitize AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
* logging the original value of *msg_prio in mq_timedreceive(2)
  is insane - the argument is write-only (i.e. syscall always
  ignores the original value and only overwrites it).
* merge __audit_mq_timed{send,receive}
* don't do copy_from_user() twice
* don't mess with allocations in auditsc part
* ... and don't bother checking !audit_enabled and !context in there -
  we'd already checked for audit_dummy_context().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
20114f71b2 sanitize audit_mq_notify()
* don't copy_from_user() twice
* don't bother with allocations
* don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context()
* make it return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
7392906ea9 sanitize audit_mq_getsetattr()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* don't duplicate parts of audit_dummy_context()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
e816f370cb sanitize audit_ipc_set_perm()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* simplify callers

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:40 -05:00
Al Viro
a33e675100 sanitize audit_ipc_obj()
* get rid of allocations
* make it return void
* simplify callers

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
Al Viro
f3298dc4f2 sanitize audit_socketcall
* don't bother with allocations
* now that it can't fail, make it return void

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
Al Viro
4f6b434fee don't reallocate buffer in every audit_sockaddr()
No need to do that more than once per process lifetime; allocating/freeing
on each sendto/accept/etc. is bloody pointless.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2009-01-04 15:14:39 -05:00
James Morris
cbacc2c7f0 Merge branch 'next' into for-linus 2008-12-25 11:40:09 +11:00
Al Viro
48887e63d6 [PATCH] fix broken timestamps in AVC generated by kernel threads
Timestamp in audit_context is valid only if ->in_syscall is set.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:41 -05:00
Randy Dunlap
7f0ed77d24 [patch 1/1] audit: remove excess kernel-doc
Delete excess kernel-doc notation in kernel/auditsc.c:

Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1481): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_entry'
Warning(linux-2.6.27-git10//kernel/auditsc.c:1564): Excess function parameter or struct member 'tsk' description in 'audit_syscall_exit'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:40 -05:00
Al Viro
a64e64944f [PATCH] return records for fork() both to child and parent
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-12-09 02:27:38 -05:00
David Howells
d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells
c69e8d9c01 CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:19 +11:00
David Howells
b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells
76aac0e9a1 CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11:00
Eric Paris
e68b75a027 When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the
actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:22 +11:00
Eric Paris
3fc689e96c Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a
non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP.  Before and after the bprm capability
are applied.  This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236):  cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11:00
Eric Paris
851f7ff56d This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATH
records of any file that has file capabilities set.  Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.

An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11:00
Alan Cox
dbda4c0b97 tty: Fix abusers of current->sighand->tty
Various people outside the tty layer still stick their noses in behind the
scenes. We need to make sure they also obey the locking and referencing rules.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-10-13 09:51:42 -07:00
Cordelia
c4bacefb7a [PATCH] audit: Moved variable declaration to beginning of function
got rid of compilation warning:
ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code

Signed-off-by: Cordelia Sam <cordesam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-09-01 23:06:45 -04:00
zhangxiliang
1a61c88def Re: [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is set
Sorry, I miss a blank between if and "(".
And I add "unlikely" to check "ctx" in audit_match_perm() and audit_match_filetype().
This is a new patch for it.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-04 06:13:50 -04:00
zhangxiliang
980dfb0db3 [PATCH] Fix the kernel panic of audit_filter_task when key field is set
When calling audit_filter_task(), it calls audit_filter_rules() with audit_context is NULL.
If the key field is set, the result in audit_filter_rules() will be set to 1 and
ctx->filterkey will be set to key.
But the ctx is NULL in this condition, so kernel will panic.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 12:15:03 -04:00
Eric Paris
ee1d315663 [PATCH] Audit: Collect signal info when SIGUSR2 is sent to auditd
Makes the kernel audit subsystem collect information about the sending
process when that process sends SIGUSR2 to the userspace audit daemon.
SIGUSR2 is a new interesting signal to auditd telling auditd that it
should try to start logging to disk again and the error condition which
caused it to stop logging to disk (usually out of space) has been
rectified.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-01 12:05:32 -04:00
Roland McGrath
86a1c34a92 x86_64 syscall audit fast-path
This adds a fast path for 64-bit syscall entry and exit when
TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is set, but no other kind of syscall tracing.
This path does not need to save and restore all registers as
the general case of tracing does.  Avoiding the iret return path
when syscall audit is enabled helps performance a lot.

Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
2008-07-23 17:47:32 -07:00
Al Viro
8b67dca942 [PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
Argument is S_IF... | <index>, where index is normally 0 or 1.
Triggers if chosen element of ctx->names[] is present and the
mode of object in question matches the upper bits of argument.
I.e. for things like "is the argument of that chmod a directory",
etc.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-04-28 06:28:37 -04:00