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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned,
now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will
be maintained as an LTS kernel.
The architecture specific system call tables are updated for
the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references
to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall.
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Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
- The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned,
now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be
maintained as an LTS kernel.
- The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the
added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the
long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall.
* tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi
asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture
arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures
syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64
lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support
Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions
kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers
arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture
commit c35559f94e ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall")
recently added support for map_shadow_stack() but it is limited to x86
only for now. There is a possibility that other architectures (namely,
arm64 and RISC-V), that are implementing equivalent support for shadow
stacks, might need to add support for it.
Independent of that, reserving arch-specific syscall numbers in the
syscall tables of all architectures is good practice and would help
avoid future conflicts. map_shadow_stack() is marked as a conditional
syscall in sys_ni.c. Adding it to the syscall tables of other
architectures is harmless and would return ENOSYS when exercised.
Note, map_shadow_stack() was assigned #453 during the merge process
since #452 was taken by fchmodat2().
For Powerpc, map it to sys_ni_syscall() as is the norm for Powerpc
syscall tables.
For Alpha, map_shadow_stack() takes up #563 as Alpha still diverges from
the common syscall numbering system in the other architectures.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230515212255.GA562920@debug.ba.rivosinc.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b402b80b-a7c6-4ef0-b977-c0f5f582b78a@sirena.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the
syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still
point to the old sys_lookup_dcookie() definition. Update syscall tables
of all architectures to directly point to sys_ni_syscall() instead.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> # for perf
Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding
sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are
too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct
futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the
syscall.
This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for
destination.
This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of
futex by having a different flags word per uaddr.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.511860556@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This
syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET
except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments,
takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and
uses FUTEX2 flags.
The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.164324363@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall
implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it
uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags.
The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105247.936205525@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
This registers the new fchmodat2 syscall in most places as nuber 452,
with alpha being the exception where it's 562. I found all these sites
by grepping for fspick, which I assume has found me everything.
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Message-Id: <a677d521f048e4ca439e7080a5328f21eb8e960e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
cachestat is previously only wired in for x86 (and architectures using
the generic unistd.h table):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230503013608.2431726-1-nphamcs@gmail.com/
This patch wires cachestat in for all the other architectures.
[nphamcs@gmail.com: wire up cachestat for arm64]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230511092843.3896327-1-nphamcs@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230510195806.2902878-1-nphamcs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [powerpc]
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k]
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> [s390]
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
s390 supports ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, therefore wire up the
memfd_secret system call, which depends on it.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
These are all handled correctly when calling the native system call entry
point, so remove the special cases.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-6-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210809185259.405936-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time.
Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known
caller of of the bdflush system call is unaffected by it's removal.
Since the code is not needed delete it.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36123b5d-daa0-6c2b-f2d4-a942f069fd54@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sg10quue.fsf_-_@disp2133
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
In commit fa8b90070a ("quota: wire up quotactl_path") we have wired up
new quotactl_path syscall. However some people in LWN discussion have
objected that the path based syscall is missing dirfd and flags argument
which is mostly standard for contemporary path based syscalls. Indeed
they have a point and after a discussion with Christian Brauner and
Sascha Hauer I've decided to disable the syscall for now and update its
API. Since there is no userspace currently using that syscall and it
hasn't been released in any major release, we should be fine.
CC: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CC: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210512153621.n5u43jsytbik4yze@wittgenstein
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
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Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd92 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Commit b0a0c2615f ("epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2") wired up
the 64 bit syscall instead of the compat variant in a couple of places.
Fixes: b0a0c2615f ("epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2")
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull compat mount cleanups from Al Viro:
"The last remnants of mount(2) compat buried by Christoph.
Buried into NFS, that is.
Generally I'm less enthusiastic about "let's use in_compat_syscall()
deep in call chain" kind of approach than Christoph seems to be, but
in this case it's warranted - that had been an NFS-specific wart,
hopefully not to be repeated in any other filesystems (read: any new
filesystem introducing non-text mount options will get NAKed even if
it doesn't mess the layout up).
IOW, not worth trying to grow an infrastructure that would avoid that
use of in_compat_syscall()..."
* 'compat.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: remove compat_sys_mount
fs,nfs: lift compat nfs4 mount data handling into the nfs code
nfs: simplify nfs4_parse_monolithic
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native syscalls
can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native vmsplice syscall
can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native readv and writev
syscalls can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
compat_sys_mount is identical to the regular sys_mount now, so remove it
and use the native version everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since commit 61a47c1ad3 ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.
We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.
So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.
[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Support 6Ghz band in ath11k driver, from Rajkumar Manoharan.
2) Support UDP segmentation in code TSO code, from Eric Dumazet.
3) Allow flashing different flash images in cxgb4 driver, from Vishal
Kulkarni.
4) Add drop frames counter and flow status to tc flower offloading,
from Po Liu.
5) Support n-tuple filters in cxgb4, from Vishal Kulkarni.
6) Various new indirect call avoidance, from Eric Dumazet and Brian
Vazquez.
7) Fix BPF verifier failures on 32-bit pointer arithmetic, from
Yonghong Song.
8) Support querying and setting hardware address of a port function via
devlink, use this in mlx5, from Parav Pandit.
9) Support hw ipsec offload on bonding slaves, from Jarod Wilson.
10) Switch qca8k driver over to phylink, from Jonathan McDowell.
11) In bpftool, show list of processes holding BPF FD references to
maps, programs, links, and btf objects. From Andrii Nakryiko.
12) Several conversions over to generic power management, from Vaibhav
Gupta.
13) Add support for SO_KEEPALIVE et al. to bpf_setsockopt(), from Dmitry
Yakunin.
14) Various https url conversions, from Alexander A. Klimov.
15) Timestamping and PHC support for mscc PHY driver, from Antoine
Tenart.
16) Support bpf iterating over tcp and udp sockets, from Yonghong Song.
17) Support 5GBASE-T i40e NICs, from Aleksandr Loktionov.
18) Add kTLS RX HW offload support to mlx5e, from Tariq Toukan.
19) Fix the ->ndo_start_xmit() return type to be netdev_tx_t in several
drivers. From Luc Van Oostenryck.
20) XDP support for xen-netfront, from Denis Kirjanov.
21) Support receive buffer autotuning in MPTCP, from Florian Westphal.
22) Support EF100 chip in sfc driver, from Edward Cree.
23) Add XDP support to mvpp2 driver, from Matteo Croce.
24) Support MPTCP in sock_diag, from Paolo Abeni.
25) Commonize UDP tunnel offloading code by creating udp_tunnel_nic
infrastructure, from Jakub Kicinski.
26) Several pci_ --> dma_ API conversions, from Christophe JAILLET.
27) Add FLOW_ACTION_POLICE support to mlxsw, from Ido Schimmel.
28) Add SK_LOOKUP bpf program type, from Jakub Sitnicki.
29) Refactor a lot of networking socket option handling code in order to
avoid set_fs() calls, from Christoph Hellwig.
30) Add rfc4884 support to icmp code, from Willem de Bruijn.
31) Support TBF offload in dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciornei.
32) Support XDP_REDIRECT in qede driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
33) Support PCI relaxed ordering in mlx5 driver, from Aya Levin.
34) Support TCP syncookies in MPTCP, from Flowian Westphal.
35) Fix several tricky cases of PMTU handling wrt. briding, from Stefano
Brivio.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2056 commits)
net: thunderx: initialize VF's mailbox mutex before first usage
usb: hso: remove bogus check for EINPROGRESS
usb: hso: no complaint about kmalloc failure
hso: fix bailout in error case of probe
ip_tunnel_core: Fix build for archs without _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM
selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test
mptcp: be careful on subflow creation
selftests: rtnetlink: make kci_test_encap() return sub-test result
selftests: rtnetlink: correct the final return value for the test
net: dsa: sja1105: use detected device id instead of DT one on mismatch
tipc: set ub->ifindex for local ipv6 address
ipv6: add ipv6_dev_find()
net: openvswitch: silence suspicious RCU usage warning
Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit"
ptp: only allow phase values lower than 1 period
farsync: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
wan: wanxl: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API
hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down
dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning
net: macb: Properly handle phylink on at91sam9x
...
Now that the ->compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone
there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate.
This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt
optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket.
It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat
syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into
a consolidation patch like this one.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the
linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and
AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken.
Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement
both flags.
The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as
AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together
with the explanatory comment.
Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can
be useful and is trivial to implement.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner:
"Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd()
syscall.
This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process
based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access()
permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and
Andy) on the target.
One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user
notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification
feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a
file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually
handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can
then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the
supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually
emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses.
There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one
future user:
- Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users
should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects
to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be
redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user
notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead
of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g.
127.0.0.1:8080.
- LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate
mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes.
With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections
will be possible.
- The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner.
Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a
broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals
during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence,
in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication
based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval.
The thread for this can be found at
https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html
With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections
for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions
on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general.
Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people
pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as
well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included.
I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below.
There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to
correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various
sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though
they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1
since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing
build warnings.
Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is
needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers
that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath,
iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device.
The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid
allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and
PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the
relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl()
thread-management."
* tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu
test: Add test for pidfd getfd
arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall
vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit 629e014bb8 ("fs: completely ignore unknown open flags")
[4]: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17523
[5]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190930183316.10190-2-cyphar@cyphar.com/
[6]: https://youtu.be/ggD-eb3yPVs
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Tested (64-bit and compat mode) using program from
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604212930.jaaztvkent32b7d3@brauner.io
with the following:
return syscall(__NR_clone, flags, 0, pidfd, 0, 0);
changed to:
return syscall(__NR_clone, 0, flags, pidfd, 0, 0);
due to CLONE_BACKWARDS2.
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Wire up the mount API syscalls on non-x86 arches.
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add the io_uring and pidfd_send_signal system calls to all architectures.
These system calls are designed to handle both native and compat tasks,
so all entries are the same across architectures, only arm-compat and
the generic tale still use an old format.
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
This adds 21 new system calls on each ABI that has 32-bit time_t
today. All of these have the exact same semantics as their existing
counterparts, and the new ones all have macro names that end in 'time64'
for clarification.
This gets us to the point of being able to safely use a C library
that has 64-bit time_t in user space. There are still a couple of
loose ends to tie up in various areas of the code, but this is the
big one, and should be entirely uncontroversial at this point.
In particular, there are four system calls (getitimer, setitimer,
waitid, and getrusage) that don't have a 64-bit counterpart yet,
but these can all be safely implemented in the C library by wrapping
around the existing system calls because the 32-bit time_t they
pass only counts elapsed time, not time since the epoch. They
will be dealt with later.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
A lot of system calls that pass a time_t somewhere have an implementation
using a COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() on 64-bit architectures, and have
been reworked so that this implementation can now be used on 32-bit
architectures as well.
The missing step is to redefine them using the regular SYSCALL_DEFINEx()
to get them out of the compat namespace and make it possible to build them
on 32-bit architectures.
Any system call that ends in 'time' gets a '32' suffix on its name for
that version, while the others get a '_time32' suffix, to distinguish
them from the normal version, which takes a 64-bit time argument in the
future.
In this step, only 64-bit architectures are changed, doing this rename
first lets us avoid touching the 32-bit architectures twice.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Most architectures define system call numbers for the rseq and pkey system
calls, even when they don't support the features, and perhaps never will.
Only a few architectures are missing these, so just define them anyway
for consistency. If we decide to add them later to one of these, the
system call numbers won't get out of sync then.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
The IPC system call handling is highly inconsistent across architectures,
some use sys_ipc, some use separate calls, and some use both. We also
have some architectures that require passing IPC_64 in the flags, and
others that set it implicitly.
For the addition of a y2038 safe semtimedop() system call, I chose to only
support the separate entry points, but that requires first supporting
the regular ones with their own syscall numbers.
The IPC_64 is now implied by the new semctl/shmctl/msgctl system
calls even on the architectures that require passing it with the ipc()
multiplexer.
I'm not adding the new semtimedop() or semop() on 32-bit architectures,
those will get implemented using the new semtimedop_time64() version
that gets added along with the other time64 calls.
Three 64-bit architectures (powerpc, s390 and sparc) get semtimedop().
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Now that all these wrappers are automatically generated, we can
remove the entire file, and instead point to the regualar syscalls
like all other architectures do.
The 31-bit pointer extension is now handled in the __s390_sys_*()
wrappers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190116131527.2071570-6-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Linus Torvalds