During the power event S3+ sleep/resume, hardware will lose all the
encryption keys for every hardware session, even though the
session state might still be marked as alive after resume. Therefore,
we should consider the session as dead on suspend and invalidate all the
objects. The session will be automatically restarted on the first
protected submission on resume.
v2: runtime suspend also invalidates the keys
v3: fix return codes, simplify rpm ops (Chris), use the new worker func
v4: invalidate the objects on suspend, don't re-create the arb sesson on
resume (delayed to first submission).
v5: move irq changes back to irq patch (Rodrigo)
v6: drop invalidation in runtime suspend (Rodrigo)
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-13-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
Now that we can handle destruction and re-creation of the arb session,
we can postpone the start of the session to the first submission that
requires it, to avoid keeping it running with no user.
v10: increase timeout when waiting in intel_pxp_start as firmware
session startup is slower right after boot.
v13: increase the same timeout by 50 milisec because previous timeout
was not enough to cover two lower level 100 milisec timeouts
in the session termination + creation steps.
Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-12-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
This api allow user mode to create protected buffers and to mark
contexts as making use of such objects. Only when using contexts
marked in such a way is the execution guaranteed to work as expected.
Contexts can only be marked as using protected content at creation time
(i.e. the parameter is immutable) and they must be both bannable and not
recoverable. Given that the protected session gets invalidated on
suspend, contexts created this way hold a runtime pm wakeref until
they're either destroyed or invalidated.
All protected objects and contexts will be considered invalid when the
PXP session is destroyed and all new submissions using them will be
rejected. All intel contexts within the invalidated gem contexts will be
marked banned. Userspace can detect that an invalidation has occurred via
the RESET_STATS ioctl, where we report it the same way as a ban due to a
hang.
v5: squash patches, rebase on proto_ctx, update kerneldoc
v6: rebase on obj create_ext changes
v7: Use session counter to check if an object it valid, hold wakeref in
context, don't add a new flag to RESET_STATS (Daniel)
v8: don't increase guilty count for contexts banned during pxp
invalidation (Rodrigo)
v9: better comments, avoid wakeref put race between pxp_inval and
context_close, add usage examples (Rodrigo)
v10: modify internal set/get-protected-context functions to not
return -ENODEV when setting PXP param to false or getting param
when running on pxp-unsupported hw or getting param when i915
was built with CONFIG_PXP off
Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bommu Krishnaiah <krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>
Cc: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-11-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
The HW will generate a teardown interrupt when session termination is
required, which requires i915 to submit a terminating batch. Once the HW
is done with the termination it will generate another interrupt, at
which point it is safe to re-create the session.
Since the termination and re-creation flow is something we want to
trigger from the driver as well, use a common work function that can be
called both from the irq handler and from the driver set-up flows, which
has the addded benefit of allowing us to skip any extra locks because
the work itself serializes the operations.
v2: use struct completion instead of bool (Chris)
v3: drop locks, clean up functions and improve comments (Chris),
move to common work function.
v4: improve comments, simplify wait logic (Rodrigo)
v5: unconditionally set interrupts, rename state_attacked var (Rodrigo)
v10: remove inclusion of intel_gt_types.h from intel_pxp.h (Jani)
Signed-off-by: Alan Previn <alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-10-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
Teardown is triggered when the display topology changes and no
long meets the secure playback requirement, and hardware trashes
all the encryption keys for display. Additionally, we want to emit a
teardown operation to make sure we're clean on boot and resume
v2: emit in the ring, use high prio request (Chris)
v3: better defines, stalling flush, cleaned up and renamed submission
funcs (Chris)
v12: fix uninitialized variable bug
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-9-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
Create the arbitrary session, with the fixed session id 0xf, after
system boot, for the case that application allocates the protected
buffer without establishing any protection session. Because the
hardware requires at least one alive session for protected buffer
creation. This arbitrary session will need to be re-created after
teardown or power event because hardware encryption key won't be
valid after such cases.
The session ID is exposed as part of the uapi so it can be used as part
of userspace commands.
v2: use gt->uncore->rpm (Chris)
v3: s/arb_is_in_play/arb_is_valid (Chris), move set-up to the new
init_hw function
v4: move interface defs to separate header, set arb_is valid to false
on fini (Rodrigo)
v5: handle async component binding
Signed-off-by: Huang, Sean Z <sean.z.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210924191452.1539378-8-alan.previn.teres.alexis@intel.com
