Commit Graph

103 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds 0f979d815c Kbuild updates for v5.13 (2nd)
- Convert sh and sparc to use generic shell scripts to generate the
    syscall headers
 
  - refactor .gitignore files
 
  - Update kernel/config_data.gz only when the content of the .config is
    really changed, which avoids the unneeded re-link of vmlinux
 
  - move "remove stale files" workarounds to scripts/remove-stale-files
 
  - suppress unused-but-set-variable warnings by default for Clang as well
 
  - fix locale setting LANG=C to LC_ALL=C
 
  - improve 'make distclean'
 
  - always keep intermediate objects from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh
 
  - move IF_ENABLED out of <linux/kconfig.h> to make it self-contained
 
  - misc cleanups
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.13-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull more Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Convert sh and sparc to use generic shell scripts to generate the
   syscall headers

 - refactor .gitignore files

 - Update kernel/config_data.gz only when the content of the .config
   is really changed, which avoids the unneeded re-link of vmlinux

 - move "remove stale files" workarounds to scripts/remove-stale-files

 - suppress unused-but-set-variable warnings by default for Clang
   as well

 - fix locale setting LANG=C to LC_ALL=C

 - improve 'make distclean'

 - always keep intermediate objects from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh

 - move IF_ENABLED out of <linux/kconfig.h> to make it self-contained

 - misc cleanups

* tag 'kbuild-v5.13-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (25 commits)
  linux/kconfig.h: replace IF_ENABLED() with PTR_IF() in <linux/kernel.h>
  kbuild: Don't remove link-vmlinux temporary files on exit/signal
  kbuild: remove the unneeded comments for external module builds
  kbuild: make distclean remove tag files in sub-directories
  kbuild: make distclean work against $(objtree) instead of $(srctree)
  kbuild: refactor modname-multi by using suffix-search
  kbuild: refactor fdtoverlay rule
  kbuild: parameterize the .o part of suffix-search
  arch: use cross_compiling to check whether it is a cross build or not
  kbuild: remove ARCH=sh64 support from top Makefile
  .gitignore: prefix local generated files with a slash
  kbuild: replace LANG=C with LC_ALL=C
  Makefile: Move -Wno-unused-but-set-variable out of GCC only block
  kbuild: add a script to remove stale generated files
  kbuild: update config_data.gz only when the content of .config is changed
  .gitignore: ignore only top-level modules.builtin
  .gitignore: move tags and TAGS close to other tag files
  kernel/.gitgnore: remove stale timeconst.h and hz.bc
  usr/include: refactor .gitignore
  genksyms: fix stale comment
  ...
2021-05-08 10:00:11 -07:00
Linus Torvalds e6f0bf09f0 integrity-v5.13
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
  keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.

  Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"

* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
  ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
  integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
  ima: Fix function name error in comment.
  ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
  ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
  keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
  ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
  ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
2021-05-01 15:32:18 -07:00
Masahiro Yamada 9009b45581 .gitignore: prefix local generated files with a slash
The pattern prefixed with '/' matches files in the same directory,
but not ones in sub-directories.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
2021-05-02 00:43:35 +09:00
Nayna Jain 781a573948 ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is used for verifying the integrity of both kernel
and modules. Enabling IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG without MODULES causes a build
break.

Ensure the build time kernel signing key is only generated if both
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG and MODULES are enabled.

Fixes: 0165f4ca22 ("ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-04-26 21:54:23 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 81f2023158 certs: add 'x509_revocation_list' to gitignore
Commit d1f044103d ("certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs")
created a new generated file for revocation certs, but didn't tell git
to ignore it.  Thus causing unnecessary "git status" noise after a
kernel build with CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST enabled.

Add the proper gitignore magic.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-26 10:48:07 -07:00
Nayna Jain 6cbdfb3d91 ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
The kernel currently only loads the kernel module signing key onto the
builtin trusted keyring. Load the module signing key onto the IMA keyring
as well.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-04-09 10:40:20 -04:00
Nayna Jain 0165f4ca22 ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
The kernel build process currently only signs kernel modules when
MODULE_SIG is enabled. Also, sign the kernel modules at build time when
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2021-04-09 10:40:20 -04:00
Eric Snowberg d1f044103d certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs
Add a new Kconfig option called SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS. If set,
this option should be the filename of a PEM-formated file containing
X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring.

DH Changes:
 - Make the new Kconfig option depend on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST.
 - Fix SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS=n, but CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y[1][2].
 - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for extract-cert[3].
 - Use CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST for revocation_certificates.o[3].

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e1c15c74-82ce-3a69-44de-a33af9b320ea@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303034418.106762-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304175030.184131-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-4-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428673564.677100.4112098280028451629.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433312452.902181.4146169951896577982.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529606657.163428.3340689182456495390.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
2021-03-11 16:33:49 +00:00
Eric Snowberg 2565ca7f5e certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function
Move functionality within load_system_certificate_list to a common
function, so it can be reused in the future.

DH Changes:
 - Added inclusion of common.h to common.c (Eric [1]).

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/EDA280F9-F72D-4181-93C7-CDBE95976FF7@oracle.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200930201508.35113-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-3-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672825.677100.7545516389752262918.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433311696.902181.3599366124784670368.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605850.163428.7786675680201528556.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
2021-03-11 16:32:38 +00:00
Eric Snowberg 56c5812623 certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
This fixes CVE-2020-26541.

The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
entries.

Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
skipped.

Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.

[DH: Made the following changes:
 - Added to have a config option to enable the facility.  This allows a
   Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is
   enabled.[1][2]
 - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions.
 - Added kerneldoc comments.]

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
2021-03-11 16:31:28 +00:00
Mickaël Salaün a6cb0ab7da certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2021-01-21 16:16:10 +00:00
David Howells 4993e1f947 certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags.  KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it.  LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key.  blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes: 734114f878 ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2021-01-21 16:16:10 +00:00
Mickaël Salaün 84ffbefd65 certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a
binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string.  This string is
then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist
keyring.  When adding a key to the blacklist keyring,
blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal
string, but not that this string is lowercase.  It is then valid to set
hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the
kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that
hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
2021-01-21 16:16:10 +00:00
Alex Shi 0b2d443bf5 certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
certs/blacklist.c:84: warning: Function parameter or member 'hash' not
described in 'mark_hash_blacklisted'

Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
2021-01-21 16:16:10 +00:00
Masahiro Yamada d198b34f38 .gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
Add SPDX License Identifier to all .gitignore files.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-25 11:50:48 +01:00
Masahiro Yamada 2985bed680 .gitignore: remove too obvious comments
Some .gitignore files have comments like "Generated files",
"Ignore generated files" at the header part, but they are
too obvious.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-25 11:50:28 +01:00
Nayna Jain 2434f7d2d4 certs: Add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hash
The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is
misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a
binary.

This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return
-EPERM error if binary is blacklisted.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
2019-11-12 12:25:50 +11:00
Thiago Jung Bauermann 2a7bf67118 PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed.
For this reason, factor out the code which does that from
verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct
pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.

Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-08-05 18:40:18 -04:00
Linus Torvalds 028db3e290 Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9c (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade8475 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-10 18:43:43 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 0f75ef6a9c Keyrings ACL
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIVAwUAXRyyVvu3V2unywtrAQL3xQ//eifjlELkRAPm2EReWwwahdM+9QL/0bAy
 e8eAzP9EaphQGUhpIzM9Y7Cx+a8XW2xACljY8hEFGyxXhDMoLa35oSoJOeay6vQt
 QcgWnDYsET8Z7HOsFCP3ZQqlbbqfsB6CbIKtZoEkZ8ib7eXpYcy1qTydu7wqrl4A
 AaJalAhlUKKUx9hkGGJTh2xvgmxgSJkxx3cNEWJQ2uGgY/ustBpqqT4iwFDsgA/q
 fcYTQFfNQBsC8/SmvQgxJSc+reUdQdp0z1vd8qjpSdFFcTq1qOtK0qDdz1Bbyl24
 hAxvNM1KKav83C8aF7oHhEwLrkD+XiYKixdEiCJJp+A2i+vy2v8JnfgtFTpTgLNK
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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
 "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
  based on an internal ACL by the following means:

   - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
     list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
     Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.

     ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
     on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
     additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
     tags/namespaces.

     Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
     include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
     permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
     a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
     to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
     stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
     acquiring use of possessor permits.

   - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
     permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
     granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"

* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
  keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
2019-07-08 19:56:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds c84ca912b0 Keyrings namespacing
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Merge tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells:
 "These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware.

  Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier:

   - Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks
     assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it
     easier to add more bits into the key.

   - Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate
     on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of
     multiplications).

   - Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively.

  Then the main patches:

   - Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point
     of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not
     accessible cross-user_namespace.

     keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this.

   - Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
     rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating
     directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_*
     flags will only pick from the current user_namespace).

   - Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key
     shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of
     multiple keys with the same description, but different target
     domains to be held in the same keyring.

     keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this.

   - Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a
     domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected.

   - Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be
     differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New
     keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned
     the network domain in force when they are created.

   - Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down
     into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to
     request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock.

     This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are
     thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the
     appropriate network namespace down into dns_query().

     For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other
     cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the
     domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of
     the superblock"

* tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
  keys: Network namespace domain tag
  keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed
  keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
  keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
  keys: Namespace keyring names
  keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
  keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation
  keys: Simplify key description management
2019-07-08 19:36:47 -07:00
David Howells 2e12256b9a keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split.  This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.

============
WHY DO THIS?
============

The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.

For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:

 (1) Changing a key's ownership.

 (2) Changing a key's security information.

 (3) Setting a keyring's restriction.

And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:

 (4) Setting an expiry time.

 (5) Revoking a key.

and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:

 (6) Invalidating a key.

Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.

Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission.  It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.

As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:

 (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.

 (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.

 (3) Invalidation.

But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.

Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.


===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============

The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:

 (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
     changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.

 (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.

The SEARCH permission is split to create:

 (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.

 (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.

 (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.

The WRITE permission is also split to create:

 (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
     added, removed and replaced in a keyring.

 (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely.  This is
     split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.

 (3) REVOKE - see above.


Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together.  An ACE specifies a subject, such as:

 (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
 (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
 (*) Group - permitted to the key group
 (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone

Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.

Further subjects may be made available by later patches.

The ACE also specifies a permissions mask.  The set of permissions is now:

	VIEW		Can view the key metadata
	READ		Can read the key content
	WRITE		Can update/modify the key content
	SEARCH		Can find the key by searching/requesting
	LINK		Can make a link to the key
	SET_SECURITY	Can change owner, ACL, expiry
	INVAL		Can invalidate
	REVOKE		Can revoke
	JOIN		Can join this keyring
	CLEAR		Can clear this keyring


The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.

The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.

The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.

The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.

The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.

The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.


======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================

To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.

It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.

SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY.  WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR.  JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.

The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.

It will make the following mappings:

 (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH

 (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR

 (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set

 (4) CLEAR -> WRITE

Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.


=======
TESTING
=======

This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:

 (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
     returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
     if the type doesn't have ->read().  You still can't actually read the
     key.

 (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
     work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27 23:03:07 +01:00
David Howells dcf49dbc80 keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-26 21:02:32 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner b4d0d230cc treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-24 17:27:11 +02:00
Kairui Song 278311e417 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed
kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform
keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not
finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings.

This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature
should verify the signature using platform keyring.  Also, decrease
the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY,
so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it
won't generate extra noises.

Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> (for kexec_file_load part)
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description,
 and fixed checkpatch warning.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-02-04 17:34:07 -05:00
Kairui Song 219a3e8676 integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
commit 9dc92c4517 ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.

This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-02-04 17:29:19 -05:00
Masahiro Yamada 172caf1993 kbuild: remove redundant target cleaning on failure
Since commit 9c2af1c737 ("kbuild: add .DELETE_ON_ERROR special
target"), the target file is automatically deleted on failure.

The boilerplate code

  ... || { rm -f $@; false; }

is unneeded.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2019-01-06 09:46:51 +09:00
Masahiro Yamada c4df32c80d export.h: remove VMLINUX_SYMBOL() and VMLINUX_SYMBOL_STR()
With the special case handling for Blackfin and Metag was removed by
commit 94e58e0ac3 ("export.h: remove code for prefixing symbols with
underscore"), VMLINUX_SYMBOL() is no-op.

Replace the remaining usages, then remove the definition of
VMLINUX_SYMBOL() and VMLINUX_SYMBOL_STR().

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
2018-08-22 23:21:44 +09:00
Yannik Sembritzki 817aef2600 Replace magic for trusting the secondary keyring with #define
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.

Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-16 09:57:20 -07:00
Nick Desaulniers 2e20ce4a66 certs/blacklist: fix const confusion
Fixes commit 2be04df566 ("certs/blacklist_nohashes.c: fix const confusion
in certs blacklist")

Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-26 09:43:03 -07:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 5fb94e9ca3 docs: Fix some broken references
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
	./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix

Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.

Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-06-15 18:10:01 -03:00
Andi Kleen 2be04df566 certs/blacklist_nohashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist
const must be marked __initconst, not __initdata.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222001335.1987-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-21 15:35:43 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 5ccbdbf987 modsign: add markers to endif-statements in certs/Makefile
It's a bit hard for eye to track certs/Makefile if you are not
accustomed to it. This commit adds comments to key endif statements in
order to help to keep the context while reading this file.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-14 11:01:37 +10:00
Masahiro Yamada 6e7c2b4dd3 scripts/spelling.txt: add "intialise(d)" pattern and fix typo instances
Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:

  intialisation||initialisation
  intialised||initialised
  intialise||initialise

This commit does not intend to change the British spelling itself.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-18-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:13 -07:00
Mat Martineau 2b6aa412ff KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.

The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:10 -07:00
Mat Martineau aaf66c8838 KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functions
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.

Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03 10:24:56 -07:00
David Howells 734114f878 KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
Add the following:

 (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
     blacklisted certificates and signatures.

 (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
     blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string.  The key accepts
     no payload.

 (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
     at build time.  This is done by setting
     CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
     that are in the form:

	"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"

     where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
     include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.

The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.

Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:

	root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
	Keyring
	 723359729 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .blacklist
	 676257228 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46

The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.

A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-03 16:07:24 +01:00
David Howells d3bfe84129 certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.

Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).

The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.

If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:48:09 +01:00
David Howells 77f68bac94 KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful.  Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.

Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().

Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:44:15 +01:00
David Howells a511e1af8b KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:43 +01:00
David Howells 99716b7cae KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.

This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.

Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:24 +01:00
David Howells 5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
David Howells bda850cd21 PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.

verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 16:14:24 +01:00
David Howells e68503bd68 KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback.  This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.

If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function.  If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.

The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 16:14:24 +01:00
David Howells 0d1db3e370 certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
Fix the following warning found by kbuild:

	certs/system_certificates.S:24: Error: misaligned data

because:

	KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling

doesn't correctly align system_extra_cert_used.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-29 14:44:30 +00:00
Mehmet Kayaalp c4c3610595 KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
Place a system_extra_cert buffer of configurable size, right after the
system_certificate_list, so that inserted keys can be readily processed by
the existing mechanism. Added script takes a key file and a kernel image
and inserts its contents to the reserved area. The
system_certificate_list_size is also adjusted accordingly.

Call the script as:

    scripts/insert-sys-cert -b <vmlinux> -c <certfile>

If vmlinux has no symbol table, supply System.map file with -s flag.
Subsequent runs replace the previously inserted key, instead of appending
the new one.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-26 15:30:20 +00:00
Arnd Bergmann 5d06ee20b6 modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
When a user calls 'make -s', we can assume they don't want to
see any output except for warnings and errors, but instead
they see this for a warning free build:

 ###
 ### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules.
 ###
 ### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the
 ### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up.  It
 ### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random
 ### number generator if one is available.
 ###
 Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................++
 ..............................................................................................................................++
 writing new private key to 'certs/signing_key.pem'
 -----
 ###
 ### Key pair generated.
 ###

The output can confuse simple build testing scripts that just check
for an empty build log.

This patch silences all the output:
 - "echo" is changed to "@$(kecho)", which is dropped when "-s" gets
   passed
 - the openssl command itself is only printed with V=1, using the
   $(Q) macro
 - The output of openssl gets redirected to /dev/null on "-s" builds.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-26 11:16:38 +00:00
David Howells 5d2787cf0b KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-09 16:40:46 +00:00
Paul Gortmaker 48dbc164b4 certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
Currently we see this in "git status" if we build in the source dir:

Untracked files:
  (use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)

        certs/x509_certificate_list

It looks like it used to live in kernel/ so we squash that .gitignore
entry at the same time.  I didn't bother to dig through git history to
see when it moved, since it is just a minor annoyance at most.

Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 15:18:35 +01:00
David Woodhouse 3ee550f12c modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
Since commit 1329e8cc69 ("modsign: Extract signing cert from
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed"), the build system has carefully coped
with the signing key being specified as a relative path in either the
source or or the build trees.

However, the actual signing of modules has not worked if the filename
is relative to the source tree.

Fix that by moving the config_filename helper into scripts/Kbuild.include
so that it can be used from elsewhere, and then using it in the top-level
Makefile to find the signing key file.

Kill the intermediate $(MODPUBKEY) and $(MODSECKEY) variables too, while
we're at it. There's no need for them.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-08-14 16:32:52 +01:00
David Woodhouse 62172c81f2 modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
We couldn't use if_changed for this before, because it didn't live in
the kernel/ directory so we couldn't add it to $(targets). It was easier
just to leave it as it was.

Now it's in the certs/ directory we can use if_changed, the same as we
do for the trusted certificate list.

Aside from making things consistent, this means we don't need to depend
explicitly on the include/config/module/sig/key.h file. And we also get
to automatically do the right thing and re-extract the cert if the user
does odd things like using a relative filename and then playing silly
buggers with adding/removing that file in both the source and object
trees. We always favour the one in the object tree if it exists, and
now we'll correctly re-extract the cert when it changes. Previously we'd
*only* re-extract the cert if the config option changed, even if the
actual file we're using did change.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-08-14 16:06:19 +01:00
David Howells cfc411e7ff Move certificate handling to its own directory
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-14 16:06:13 +01:00