The Ultravisor is expected to explicitly call H_SVM_PAGE_IN for all the
pages of the SVM before calling H_SVM_INIT_DONE. This causes a huge
delay in tranistioning the VM to SVM. The Ultravisor is only interested
in the pages that contain the kernel, initrd and other important data
structures. The rest contain throw-away content.
However if not all pages are requested by the Ultravisor, the Hypervisor
continues to consider the GFNs corresponding to the non-requested pages
as normal GFNs. This can lead to data-corruption and undefined behavior.
In H_SVM_INIT_DONE handler, move all the PFNs associated with the SVM's
GFNs to secure-PFNs. Skip the GFNs that are already Paged-in or Shared
or Paged-in followed by a Paged-out.
Reviewed-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Page-merging of pages in memory-slots associated with a Secure VM
is disabled in H_SVM_PAGE_IN handler.
This operation should have been done the much earlier; the moment the VM
is initiated for secure-transition. Delaying this operation increases
the probability for those pages to acquire new references, making it
impossible to migrate those pages in H_SVM_PAGE_IN handler.
Disable page-migration in H_SVM_INIT_START handling.
Reviewed-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Changeset 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
enabled a new feature at Sphinx: it will now generate index for each
document title, plus to each chapter inside it.
There's a drawback, though: one document cannot have two sections
with the same name anymore.
A followup patch will change the logic of autosectionlabel to
avoid most creating references for every single section title,
but still we need to be able to reference the chapters inside
a document.
There are a few places where there are two chapters with the
same name. This patch renames one of the chapters, in order to
avoid symbol conflict within the same document.
PS.: as I don't speach Chinese, I had some help from a friend
(Wen Liu) at the Chinese translation for "publishing patches"
for this document:
Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/5.Posting.rst
Fixes: 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2bffb91e4a63d41bf5fae1c23e1e8b3bba0b8806.1584716446.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Implement the H_SVM_INIT_ABORT hcall which the Ultravisor can use to
abort an SVM after it has issued the H_SVM_INIT_START and before the
H_SVM_INIT_DONE hcalls. This hcall could be used when Ultravisor
encounters security violations or other errors when starting an SVM.
Note that this hcall is different from UV_SVM_TERMINATE ucall which
is used by HV to terminate/cleanup an VM that has becore secure.
The H_SVM_INIT_ABORT basically undoes operations that were done
since the H_SVM_INIT_START hcall - i.e page-out all the VM pages back
to normal memory, and terminate the SVM.
(If we do not bring the pages back to normal memory, the text/data
of the VM would be stuck in secure memory and since the SVM did not
go secure, its MSR_S bit will be clear and the VM wont be able to
access its pages even to do a clean exit).
Based on patches and discussion with Paul Mackerras, Ram Pai and
Bharata Rao.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bharata@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
The documentation pages for 'elfnote' and 'ultravisor'
are not included in the powerpc documentation index, this
generates Sphinx warnings:
WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree
Additionally, when one includes these missing doc pages,
more Sphinx warnings appear. Unused footnote references,
syntax highlighting and table of content ordering has
been adjusted.
Signed-off-by: Adam Zerella <adam.zerella@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190915052905.13431-1-adam.zerella@gmail.com
Protected Execution Facility (PEF) is an architectural change for
POWER 9 that enables Secure Virtual Machines (SVMs). When enabled,
PEF adds a new higher privileged mode, called Ultravisor mode, to POWER
architecture. Along with the new mode there is new firmware called the
Protected Execution Ultravisor (or Ultravisor for short).
POWER 9 DD2.3 chips (PVR=0x004e1203) or greater will be PEF-capable.
Attached documentation provides an overview of PEF and defines the API
for various interfaces that must be implemented in the Ultravisor
firmware as well as in the KVM Hypervisor.
Based on input from Mike Anderson, Thiago Bauermann, Claudio Carvalho,
Ben Herrenschmidt, Guerney Hunt, Paul Mackerras.
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Guerney Hunt <gdhh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Anderson <andmike@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190822034838.27876-2-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com
Ram Pai