We want to leverage keyring to store sensitive keys, and then use those
keys for symmetric encryption via the crypto API. Among the key types we
wish to support are: user, logon, encrypted, and trusted.
User key types are already able to have their data copied to user space,
but logon does not support this. Further, trusted and encrypted keys will
return their encrypted data back to user space on read, which does not
make them ideal for symmetric encryption.
To support symmetric encryption for these key types, add a new
ALG_SET_KEY_BY_KEY_SERIAL setsockopt() option to the crypto API. This
allows users to pass a key_serial_t to the crypto API to perform
symmetric encryption. The behavior is the same as ALG_SET_KEY, but
the crypto key data is copied in kernel space from a keyring key,
which allows for the support of logon, encrypted, and trusted key types.
Keyring keys must have the KEY_(POS|USR|GRP|OTH)_SEARCH permission set
to leverage this feature. This follows the asymmetric_key type where key
lookup calls eventually lead to keyring_search_rcu() without the
KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM flag set.
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare
having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure.
Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these
cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should
no longer be used[2].
This code was transformed with the help of Coccinelle:
(linux-5.19-rc2$ spatch --jobs $(getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN) --sp-file script.cocci --include-headers --dir . > output.patch)
@@
identifier S, member, array;
type T1, T2;
@@
struct S {
...
T1 member;
T2 array[
- 0
];
};
-fstrict-flex-arrays=3 is coming and we need to land these changes
to prevent issues like these in the short future:
../fs/minix/dir.c:337:3: warning: 'strcpy' will always overflow; destination buffer has size 0,
but the source string has length 2 (including NUL byte) [-Wfortify-source]
strcpy(de3->name, ".");
^
Since these are all [0] to [] changes, the risk to UAPI is nearly zero. If
this breaks anything, we can use a union with a new member name.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.16/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/78
Build-tested-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/62b675ec.wKX6AOZ6cbE71vtF%25lkp@intel.com/
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # For ndctl.h
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Commit 3f69cc6076 ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm
names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names
in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field
stayed at the original 64 bytes.
This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name,
which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed
is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be
defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length
(either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way
these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1).
We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would
break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed
sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a
sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'.
One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only
when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an
easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names.
Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible
array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel.
Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind().
This addresses the syzbot report
"UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e).
Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 3f69cc6076 ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Extend the user-space RNG interface:
1. Add entropy input via ALG_SET_DRBG_ENTROPY setsockopt option;
2. Add additional data input via sendmsg syscall.
This allows DRBG to be tested with test vectors, for example for the
purpose of CAVP testing, which otherwise isn't possible.
To prevent erroneous use of entropy input, it is hidden under
CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP config option and requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN to
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many user space API headers have licensing information, which is either
incomplete, badly formatted or just a shorthand for referring to the
license under which the file is supposed to be. This makes it hard for
compliance tools to determine the correct license.
Update these files with an SPDX license identifier. The identifier was
chosen based on the license information in the file.
GPL/LGPL licensed headers get the matching GPL/LGPL SPDX license
identifier with the added 'WITH Linux-syscall-note' exception, which is
the officially assigned exception identifier for the kernel syscall
exception:
NOTE! This copyright does *not* cover user programs that use kernel
services by normal system calls - this is merely considered normal use
of the kernel, and does *not* fall under the heading of "derived work".
This exception makes it possible to include GPL headers into non GPL
code, without confusing license compliance tools.
Headers which have either explicit dual licensing or are just licensed
under a non GPL license are updated with the corresponding SPDX
identifier and the GPLv2 with syscall exception identifier. The format
is:
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR SPDX-ID-OF-OTHER-LICENSE)
SPDX license identifiers are a legally binding shorthand, which can be
used instead of the full boiler plate text. The update does not remove
existing license information as this has to be done on a case by case
basis and the copyright holders might have to be consulted. This will
happen in a separate step.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne. See the previous patch in this series for the
methodology of how this patch was researched.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
AEAD requires the caller to specify the following information separate
from the data stream. This information allows the AEAD interface handler
to identify the AAD, ciphertext/plaintext and the authentication tag:
* Associated authentication data of arbitrary length and
length
* Length of authentication tag for encryption
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
