[ Upstream commit ab10c22bc3 ]
When dumping wiphy information, we try to split the data into
many submessages, but for old userspace we still support the
old mode where this doesn't happen.
However, in this case we were not resetting our state correctly
and dumping multiple messages for each wiphy, which would have
broken such older userspace.
This was broken pretty much immediately afterwards because it
only worked in the original commit where non-split dumps didn't
have any more data than split dumps...
Fixes: fe1abafd94 ("nl80211: re-add channel width and extended capa advertising")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200928130717.3e6d9c6bada2.Ie0f151a8d0d00a8e1e18f6a8c9244dd02496af67@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b38e7819ca ]
Keyu Man reported that the ICMP rate limiter could be used
by attackers to get useful signal. Details will be provided
in an upcoming academic publication.
Our solution is to add some noise, so that the attackers
no longer can get help from the predictable token bucket limiter.
Fixes: 4cdf507d54 ("icmp: add a global rate limitation")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 18ded910b5 ]
In the header prediction fast path for a bulk data receiver, if no
data is newly acknowledged then we do not call tcp_ack() and do not
call tcp_ack_update_window(). This means that a bulk receiver that
receives large amounts of data can have the incoming sequence numbers
wrap, so that the check in tcp_may_update_window fails:
after(ack_seq, tp->snd_wl1)
If the incoming receive windows are zero in this state, and then the
connection that was a bulk data receiver later wants to send data,
that connection can find itself persistently rejecting the window
updates in incoming ACKs. This means the connection can persistently
fail to discover that the receive window has opened, which in turn
means that the connection is unable to send anything, and the
connection's sending process can get permanently "stuck".
The fix is to update snd_wl1 in the header prediction fast path for a
bulk data receiver, so that it keeps up and does not see wrapping
problems.
This fix is based on a very nice and thorough analysis and diagnosis
by Apollon Oikonomopoulos (see link below).
This is a stable candidate but there is no Fixes tag here since the
bug predates current git history. Just for fun: looks like the bug
dates back to when header prediction was added in Linux v2.1.8 in Nov
1996. In that version tcp_rcv_established() was added, and the code
only updates snd_wl1 in tcp_ack(), and in the new "Bulk data transfer:
receiver" code path it does not call tcp_ack(). This fix seems to
apply cleanly at least as far back as v3.2.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reported-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apoikos@dmesg.gr>
Tested-by: Apollon Oikonomopoulos <apoikos@dmesg.gr>
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg692430.html
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201022143331.1887495-1-ncardwell.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 280e3ebdaf ]
Check that the NFC_ATTR_FIRMWARE_NAME attributes are provided by
the netlink client prior to accessing them.This prevents potential
unhandled NULL pointer dereference exceptions which can be triggered
by malicious user-mode programs, if they omit one or both of these
attributes.
Similar to commit a0323b979f ("nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the activate_target handler").
Fixes: 9674da8759 ("NFC: Add firmware upload netlink command")
Signed-off-by: Defang Bo <bodefang@126.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1603107538-4744-1-git-send-email-bodefang@126.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ed42989eab ]
skb_unshare() drops a reference count on the old skb unconditionally,
so in the failure case, we end up freeing the skb twice here.
And because the skb is allocated in fclone and cloned by caller
tipc_msg_reassemble(), the consequence is actually freeing the
original skb too, thus triggered the UAF by syzbot.
Fix this by replacing this skb_unshare() with skb_cloned()+skb_copy().
Fixes: ff48b6222e ("tipc: use skb_unshare() instead in tipc_buf_append()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e96a7ba46281824cc46a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 874fb9e2ca ]
Tobias reported regressions in IPsec tests following the patch
referenced by the Fixes tag below. The root cause is dropping the
reset of the flowi4_oif after the fib_lookup. Apparently it is
needed for xfrm cases, so restore the oif update to ip_route_output_flow
right before the call to xfrm_lookup_route.
Fixes: 2fbc6e89b2 ("ipv4: Update exception handling for multipath routes via same device")
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ca44c16b0 upstream.
This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection
state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <hegtvedt@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b560a208cd upstream.
This checks if BT_HS is enabled relecting it on MGMT_SETTING_HS instead
of always reporting it as supported.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f19425641c upstream.
Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels
like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when
calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been
introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eddb773211 upstream.
This fixes various places where a stack variable is used uninitialized.
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 38b1dc47a3 ]
If someone calls setsockopt() twice to set a server key keyring, the first
keyring is leaked.
Fix it to return an error instead if the server key keyring is already set.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fa1d113a0f ]
conn->state_lock may be taken in softirq mode, but a previous patch
replaced an outer lock in the response-packet event handling code, and lost
the _bh from that when doing so.
Fix this by applying the _bh annotation to the state_lock locking.
Fixes: a1399f8bb0 ("rxrpc: Call channels should have separate call number spaces")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9a059cd5ca ]
If rxrpc_read() (which allows KEYCTL_READ to read a key), sees a token of a
type it doesn't recognise, it can BUG in a couple of places, which is
unnecessary as it can easily get back to userspace.
Fix this to print an error message instead.
Fixes: 99455153d0 ("RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 56305118e0 ]
The session key should be encoded with just the 8 data bytes and
no length; ENCODE_DATA precedes it with a 4 byte length, which
confuses some existing tools that try to parse this format.
Add an ENCODE_BYTES macro that does not include a length, and use
it for the key. Also adjust the expected length.
Note that commit 774521f353 ("rxrpc: Fix an assertion in
rxrpc_read()") had fixed a BUG by changing the length rather than
fixing the encoding. The original length was correct.
Fixes: 99455153d0 ("RxRPC: Parse security index 5 keys (Kerberos 5)")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e94ee17134 ]
The struct flowi must never be interpreted by itself as its size
depends on the address family. Therefore it must always be grouped
with its original family value.
In this particular instance, the original family value is lost in
the function xfrm_state_find. Therefore we get a bogus read when
it's coupled with the wrong family which would occur with inter-
family xfrm states.
This patch fixes it by keeping the original family value.
Note that the same bug could potentially occur in LSM through
the xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook. I checked the current code
there and it seems to be safe for now as only secid is used which
is part of struct flowi_common. But that API should be changed
so that so that we don't get new bugs in the future. We could
do that by replacing fl with just secid or adding a family field.
Reported-by: syzbot+577fbac3145a6eb2e7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 48b8d78315 ("[XFRM]: State selection update to use inner...")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8366685b28 ]
When we clone state only add_time was cloned. It missed values like
bytes, packets. Now clone the all members of the structure.
v1->v3:
- use memcpy to copy the entire structure
Fixes: 80c9abaabf ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7aa05d3047 ]
XFRMA_SEC_CTX was not cloned from the old to the new.
Migrate this attribute during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE
v1->v2:
- return -ENOMEM on error
v2->v3:
- fix return type to int
Fixes: 80c9abaabf ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8aa7b526dc upstream.
With multiple DNAT rules it's possible that after destination
translation the resulting tuples collide.
For example, two openvswitch flows:
nw_dst=10.0.0.10,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))
nw_dst=10.0.0.20,tp_dst=10, actions=ct(commit,table=2,nat(dst=20.0.0.1:20))
Assuming two TCP clients initiating the following connections:
10.0.0.10:5000->10.0.0.10:10
10.0.0.10:5000->10.0.0.20:10
Both tuples would translate to 10.0.0.10:5000->20.0.0.1:20 causing
nf_conntrack_confirm() to fail because of tuple collision.
Netfilter handles this case by allocating a null binding for SNAT at
egress by default. Perform the same operation in openvswitch for DNAT
if no explicit SNAT is requested by the user and allocate a null binding
for SNAT for packets in the "original" direction.
Reported-at: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1877128
Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Fixes: 05752523e5 ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT.")
Signed-off-by: Dumitru Ceara <dceara@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1cc5ef91d2 upstream.
The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So
check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in
order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example
kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than
NFPROTO_NUMPROTO.
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:...
Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121)
CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM
task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121
pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
...
Call trace:
__cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24
name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468
nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258
ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4
netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184
nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180
netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770
netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4
___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c
SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still
allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number.
Fixes: c1d10adb4a ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com>
[pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git]
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit acf69c9462 upstream.
Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.
This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.
The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.
This addresses CVE-2020-14386
Fixes: 8913336a7e ("packet: add PACKET_RESERVE sockopt")
Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[ snu: backported to pre-5.3, changed tp_drops counting/locking ]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Nuernberger <snu@amazon.com>
CC: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
CC: Amit Shah <aams@amazon.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit df12eb6d6c ]
Whenever the vsock backend on the host sends a packet through the RX
queue, it expects an answer on the TX queue. Unfortunately, there is one
case where the host side will hang waiting for the answer and might
effectively never recover if no timeout mechanism was implemented.
This issue happens when the guest side starts binding to the socket,
which insert a new bound socket into the list of already bound sockets.
At this time, we expect the guest to also start listening, which will
trigger the sk_state to move from TCP_CLOSE to TCP_LISTEN. The problem
occurs if the host side queued a RX packet and triggered an interrupt
right between the end of the binding process and the beginning of the
listening process. In this specific case, the function processing the
packet virtio_transport_recv_pkt() will find a bound socket, which means
it will hit the switch statement checking for the sk_state, but the
state won't be changed into TCP_LISTEN yet, which leads the code to pick
the default statement. This default statement will only free the buffer,
while it should also respond to the host side, by sending a packet on
its TX queue.
In order to simply fix this unfortunate chain of events, it is important
that in case the default statement is entered, and because at this stage
we know the host side is waiting for an answer, we must send back a
packet containing the operation VIRTIO_VSOCK_OP_RST.
One could say that a proper timeout mechanism on the host side will be
enough to avoid the backend to hang. But the point of this patch is to
ensure the normal use case will be provided with proper responsiveness
when it comes to establishing the connection.
Signed-off-by: Sebastien Boeuf <sebastien.boeuf@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4c7246dc45 ]
We are going to add 'struct vsock_sock *' parameter to
virtio_transport_get_ops().
In some cases, like in the virtio_transport_reset_no_sock(),
we don't have any socket assigned to the packet received,
so we can't use the virtio_transport_get_ops().
In order to allow virtio_transport_reset_no_sock() to use the
'.send_pkt' callback from the 'vhost_transport' or 'virtio_transport',
we add the 'struct virtio_transport *' to it and to its caller:
virtio_transport_recv_pkt().
We moved the 'vhost_transport' and 'virtio_transport' definition,
to pass their address to the virtio_transport_recv_pkt().
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 17dd136738 ]
Before to call vdev->config->reset(vdev) we need to be sure that
no one is accessing the device, for this reason, we add new variables
in the struct virtio_vsock to stop the workers during the .remove().
This patch also add few comments before vdev->config->reset(vdev)
and vdev->config->del_vqs(vdev).
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9c7a5582f5 ]
Some callbacks used by the upper layers can run while we are in the
.remove(). A potential use-after-free can happen, because we free
the_virtio_vsock without knowing if the callbacks are over or not.
To solve this issue we move the assignment of the_virtio_vsock at the
end of .probe(), when we finished all the initialization, and at the
beginning of .remove(), before to release resources.
For the same reason, we do the same also for the vdev->priv.
We use RCU to be sure that all callbacks that use the_virtio_vsock
ended before freeing it. This is not required for callbacks that
use vdev->priv, because after the vdev->config->del_vqs() we are sure
that they are ended and will no longer be invoked.
We also take the mutex during the .remove() to avoid that .probe() can
run while we are resetting the device.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 74c09b7275 ]
Scenario:
* Multicast frame send from mesh to a BLA backbone (multiple nodes
with their bat0 bridged together, with BLA enabled)
Issue:
* BLA backbone nodes receive the frame multiple times on bat0,
once from mesh->bat0 and once from each backbone_gw from LAN
For unicast, a node will send only to the best backbone gateway
according to the TQ. However for multicast we currently cannot determine
if multiple destination nodes share the same backbone if they don't share
the same backbone with us. So we need to keep sending the unicasts to
all backbone gateways and let the backbone gateways decide which one
will forward the frame. We can use the CLAIM mechanism to make this
decision.
One catch: The batman-adv gateway feature for DHCP packets potentially
sends multicast packets in the same batman-adv unicast header as the
multicast optimizations code. And we are not allowed to drop those even
if we did not claim the source address of the sender, as for such
packets there is only this one multicast-in-unicast packet.
How can we distinguish the two cases?
The gateway feature uses a batman-adv unicast 4 address header. While
the multicast-to-unicasts feature uses a simple, 3 address batman-adv
unicast header. So let's use this to distinguish.
Fixes: fe2da6ff27 ("batman-adv: check incoming packet type for bla")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4bba9dab86 ]
The fix for receiving (internally generated) bla packets outside the
interrupt context introduced the usage of in_interrupt(). But this
functionality is only defined in linux/preempt.h which was not included
with the same patch.
Fixes: 279e89b228 ("batman-adv: bla: use netif_rx_ni when not in interrupt context")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7dda5b3384 ]
The unicast packet rerouting code makes several assumptions. For
instance it assumes that there is always exactly one destination in the
TT. This breaks for multicast frames in a unicast packets in several ways:
For one thing if there is actually no TT entry and the destination node
was selected due to the multicast tvlv flags it announced. Then an
intermediate node will wrongly drop the packet.
For another thing if there is a TT entry but the TTVN of this entry is
newer than the originally addressed destination node: Then the
intermediate node will wrongly redirect the packet, leading to
duplicated multicast packets at a multicast listener and missing
packets at other multicast listeners or multicast routers.
Fixing this by not applying the unicast packet rerouting to batman-adv
unicast packets with a multicast payload. We are not able to detect a
roaming multicast listener at the moment and will just continue to send
the multicast frame to both the new and old destination for a while in
case of such a roaming multicast listener.
Fixes: a73105b8d4 ("batman-adv: improved client announcement mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 097930e85f ]
It seems that due to a copy & paste error the void pointer
in batadv_choose_backbone_gw() is cast to the wrong type.
Fixing this by using "struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw" instead of "struct
batadv_bla_claim" which better matches the caller's side.
For now it seems that we were lucky because the two structs both have
their orig/vid and addr/vid in the beginning. However I stumbled over
this issue when I was trying to add some debug variables in front of
"orig" in batadv_backbone_gw, which caused hash lookups to fail.
Fixes: 07568d0369 ("batman-adv: don't rely on positions in struct for hashing")
Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <ll@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit adf1d69264 ]
After sending Inquiry Cancel command to the controller, it is possible
that Inquiry Complete event comes before Inquiry Cancel command complete
event. In this case the Inquiry Cancel command will have status of
Command Disallowed since there is no Inquiry session to be cancelled.
This case should not be treated as error, otherwise we can reach an
inconsistent state.
Example of a btmon trace when this happened:
< HCI Command: Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) plen 0
> HCI Event: Inquiry Complete (0x01) plen 1
Status: Success (0x00)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4
Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) ncmd 1
Status: Command Disallowed (0x0c)
Signed-off-by: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b25b60d7bf ]
'maxlen' is the total size of the destination buffer. There is only one
caller and this value is 256.
When we compute the size already used and what we would like to add in
the buffer, the trailling NULL character is not taken into account.
However, this trailling character will be added by the 'strcat' once we
have checked that we have enough place.
So, there is a off-by-one issue and 1 byte of the stack could be
erroneously overwridden.
Take into account the trailling NULL, when checking if there is enough
place in the destination buffer.
While at it, also replace a 'sprintf' by a safer 'snprintf', check for
output truncation and avoid a superfluous 'strlen'.
Fixes: dc9a16e49d ("svc: Add /proc/sys/sunrpc/transport files")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
[ cel: very minor fix to documenting comment
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 08bb4da901 ]
Some controllers have been observed to send zero'd events under some
conditions. This change guards against this condition as well as adding
a trace to facilitate diagnosability of this condition.
Signed-off-by: Alain Michaud <alainm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 86b18aaa2b ]
sk_buff.qlen can be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_from_queue / unix_dgram_sendmsg
read to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 5371 on cpu 96:
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x9a9/0xb70 include/linux/skbuff.h:1821
net/unix/af_unix.c:1761
____sys_sendmsg+0x33e/0x370
___sys_sendmsg+0xa6/0xf0
__sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xf0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
write to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 99:
__skb_try_recv_from_queue+0x327/0x410 include/linux/skbuff.h:2029
__skb_try_recv_datagram+0xbe/0x220
unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xee/0x850
____sys_recvmsg+0x1fb/0x210
___sys_recvmsg+0xa2/0xf0
__sys_recvmsg+0x66/0xf0
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Since only the read is operating as lockless, it could introduce a logic
bug in unix_recvq_full() due to the load tearing. Fix it by adding
a lockless variant of skb_queue_len() and unix_recvq_full() where
READ_ONCE() is on the read while WRITE_ONCE() is on the write similar to
the commit d7d16a8935 ("net: add skb_queue_empty_lockless()").
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6c08fc896b ]
There is no lock preventing both l2cap_sock_release() and
chan->ops->close() from running at the same time.
If we consider Thread A running l2cap_chan_timeout() and Thread B running
l2cap_sock_release(), expected behavior is:
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()
B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan()
B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill()
where,
sock_orphan() clears "sk->sk_socket" and l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() marks
socket as SOCK_ZAPPED.
In l2cap_sock_kill(), there is an "if-statement" that checks if both
sock_orphan() and sock_teardown() has been run i.e. sk->sk_socket is NULL
and socket is marked as SOCK_ZAPPED. Socket is killed if the condition is
satisfied.
In the race condition, following occurs:
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
B::l2cap_sock_release()->sock_orphan()
B::l2cap_sock_release()->l2cap_sock_kill()
A::l2cap_chan_timeout()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()
In this scenario, "if-statement" is true in both B::l2cap_sock_kill() and
A::l2cap_sock_kill() and we hit "refcount: underflow; use-after-free" bug.
Similar condition occurs at other places where teardown/sock_kill is
happening:
l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
l2cap_disconnect_rsp()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()
l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
l2cap_conn_del()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()
l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_chan_del()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
l2cap_disconnect_req()->l2cap_sock_close_cb()->l2cap_sock_kill()
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_chan_close()->l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen()->l2cap_sock_kill()
Protect teardown/sock_kill and orphan/sock_kill by adding hold_lock on
l2cap channel to ensure that the socket is killed only after marked as
zapped and orphan.
Signed-off-by: Manish Mandlik <mmandlik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a3ea86739f ]
if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1e3f9f073c ]
if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2fbc6e89b2 ]
Kfir reported that pmtu exceptions are not created properly for
deployments where multipath routes use the same device.
After some digging I see 2 compounding problems:
1. ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu is updating the flowi4_oif *after*
the route lookup. This is the second use case where this has
been a problem (the first is related to use of vti devices with
VRF). I can not find any reason for the oif to be changed after the
lookup; the code goes back to the start of git. It does not seem
logical so remove it.
2. fib_lookups for exceptions do not call fib_select_path to handle
multipath route selection based on the hash.
The end result is that the fib_lookup used to add the exception
always creates it based using the first leg of the route.
An example topology showing the problem:
| host1
+------+
| eth0 | .209
+------+
|
+------+
switch | br0 |
+------+
|
+---------+---------+
| host2 | host3
+------+ +------+
| eth0 | .250 | eth0 | 192.168.252.252
+------+ +------+
+-----+ +-----+
| vti | .2 | vti | 192.168.247.3
+-----+ +-----+
\ /
=================================
tunnels
192.168.247.1/24
for h in host1 host2 host3; do
ip netns add ${h}
ip -netns ${h} link set lo up
ip netns exec ${h} sysctl -wq net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
done
ip netns add switch
ip -netns switch li set lo up
ip -netns switch link add br0 type bridge stp 0
ip -netns switch link set br0 up
for n in 1 2 3; do
ip -netns switch link add eth-sw type veth peer name eth-h${n}
ip -netns switch li set eth-h${n} master br0 up
ip -netns switch li set eth-sw netns host${n} name eth0
done
ip -netns host1 addr add 192.168.252.209/24 dev eth0
ip -netns host1 link set dev eth0 up
ip -netns host1 route add 192.168.247.0/24 \
nexthop via 192.168.252.250 dev eth0 nexthop via 192.168.252.252 dev eth0
ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.250/24 dev eth0
ip -netns host2 link set dev eth0 up
ip -netns host2 addr add 192.168.252.252/24 dev eth0
ip -netns host3 link set dev eth0 up
ip netns add tunnel
ip -netns tunnel li set lo up
ip -netns tunnel li add br0 type bridge
ip -netns tunnel li set br0 up
for n in $(seq 11 20); do
ip -netns tunnel addr add dev br0 192.168.247.${n}/24
done
for n in 2 3
do
ip -netns tunnel link add vti${n} type veth peer name eth${n}
ip -netns tunnel link set eth${n} mtu 1360 master br0 up
ip -netns tunnel link set vti${n} netns host${n} mtu 1360 up
ip -netns host${n} addr add dev vti${n} 192.168.247.${n}/24
done
ip -netns tunnel ro add default nexthop via 192.168.247.2 nexthop via 192.168.247.3
ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.11
ip netns exec host1 ping -M do -s 1400 -c3 -I 192.168.252.209 192.168.247.15
ip -netns host1 ro ls cache
Before this patch the cache always shows exceptions against the first
leg in the multipath route; 192.168.252.250 per this example. Since the
hash has an initial random seed, you may need to vary the final octet
more than what is listed. In my tests, using addresses between 11 and 19
usually found 1 that used both legs.
With this patch, the cache will have exceptions for both legs.
Fixes: 4895c771c7 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions")
Reported-by: Kfir Itzhak <mastertheknife@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ff48b6222e ]
In tipc_buf_append() it may change skb's frag_list, and it causes
problems when this skb is cloned. skb_unclone() doesn't really
make this skb's flag_list available to change.
Shuang Li has reported an use-after-free issue because of this
when creating quite a few macvlan dev over the same dev, where
the broadcast packets will be cloned and go up to the stack:
[ ] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pskb_expand_head+0x86d/0xea0
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] dump_stack+0x7c/0xb0
[ ] print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x220
[ ] kasan_report.cold.10+0x37/0x7c
[ ] check_memory_region+0x183/0x1e0
[ ] pskb_expand_head+0x86d/0xea0
[ ] process_backlog+0x1df/0x660
[ ] net_rx_action+0x3b4/0xc90
[ ]
[ ] Allocated by task 1786:
[ ] kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x220
[ ] skb_clone+0x10a/0x300
[ ] macvlan_broadcast+0x2f6/0x590 [macvlan]
[ ] macvlan_process_broadcast+0x37c/0x516 [macvlan]
[ ] process_one_work+0x66a/0x1060
[ ] worker_thread+0x87/0xb10
[ ]
[ ] Freed by task 3253:
[ ] kmem_cache_free+0x82/0x2a0
[ ] skb_release_data+0x2c3/0x6e0
[ ] kfree_skb+0x78/0x1d0
[ ] tipc_recvmsg+0x3be/0xa40 [tipc]
So fix it by using skb_unshare() instead, which would create a new
skb for the cloned frag and it'll be safe to change its frag_list.
The similar things were also done in sctp_make_reassembled_event(),
which is using skb_copy().
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Fixes: 37e22164a8 ("tipc: rename and move message reassembly function")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a4b5cc9e10 ]
I confirmed that the problem fixed by commit 2a63866c8b ("tipc: fix
shutdown() of connectionless socket") also applies to stream socket.
----------
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fds[2] = { -1, -1 };
socketpair(PF_TIPC, SOCK_STREAM /* or SOCK_DGRAM */, 0, fds);
if (fork() == 0)
_exit(read(fds[0], NULL, 1));
shutdown(fds[0], SHUT_RDWR); /* This must make read() return. */
wait(NULL); /* To be woken up by _exit(). */
return 0;
}
----------
Since shutdown(SHUT_RDWR) should affect all processes sharing that socket,
unconditionally setting sk->sk_shutdown to SHUTDOWN_MASK will be the right
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit db7cd91a4b ]
When IPV6_SEG6_HMAC is enabled and CRYPTO is disabled, it results in the
following Kbuild warning:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CRYPTO_HMAC
Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- IPV6_SEG6_HMAC [=y] && NET [=y] && INET [=y] && IPV6 [=y]
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CRYPTO_SHA1
Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- IPV6_SEG6_HMAC [=y] && NET [=y] && INET [=y] && IPV6 [=y]
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CRYPTO_SHA256
Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- IPV6_SEG6_HMAC [=y] && NET [=y] && INET [=y] && IPV6 [=y]
The reason is that IPV6_SEG6_HMAC selects CRYPTO_HMAC, CRYPTO_SHA1, and
CRYPTO_SHA256 without depending on or selecting CRYPTO while those configs
are subordinate to CRYPTO.
Honor the kconfig menu hierarchy to remove kconfig dependency warnings.
Fixes: bf355b8d2c ("ipv6: sr: add core files for SR HMAC support")
Signed-off-by: Necip Fazil Yildiran <fazilyildiran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ba9e04a7dd ]
Currently, in tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack() and tcp_v4_send_reset(), we
echo the TOS value of the received packets in the response.
However, we do not want to echo the lower 2 ECN bits in accordance
with RFC 3168 6.1.5 robustness principles.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
