Commit Graph

63 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds 79e178a57d + Features
- increase left match history buffer size to provide inproved conflict
     resolution in overlapping execution rules.
   - switch buffer allocation to use a memory pool and GFP_KERNEL
     where possible.
   - add compression of policy blobs to reduce memory usage.
 + Cleanups
   - fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
 + Bug fixes
   - fix unsigned len comparison in update_for_len macro
   - fix sparse warning for type-casting of current->real_cred
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Features:

   - increase left match history buffer size to provide improved
     conflict resolution in overlapping execution rules.

   - switch buffer allocation to use a memory pool and GFP_KERNEL where
     possible.

   - add compression of policy blobs to reduce memory usage.

  Cleanups:

   - fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"

  Bug fixes:

   - fix unsigned len comparison in update_for_len macro

   - fix sparse warning for type-casting of current->real_cred"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-12-03' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
  apparmor: make it so work buffers can be allocated from atomic context
  apparmor: reduce rcu_read_lock scope for aa_file_perm mediation
  apparmor: fix wrong buffer allocation in aa_new_mount
  apparmor: fix unsigned len comparison with less than zero
  apparmor: increase left match history buffer size
  apparmor: Switch to GFP_KERNEL where possible
  apparmor: Use a memory pool instead per-CPU caches
  apparmor: Force type-casting of current->real_cred
  apparmor: fix spelling mistake "immutible" -> "immutable"
  apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
  apparmor: fix missing ZLIB defines
  apparmor: fix blob compression build failure on ppc
  apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression
2019-12-03 12:51:35 -08:00
Mike Salvatore 156e42996b apparmor: reset pos on failure to unpack for various functions
Each function that manipulates the aa_ext struct should reset it's "pos"
member on failure. This ensures that, on failure, no changes are made to
the state of the aa_ext struct.

There are paths were elements are optional and the error path is
used to indicate the optional element is not present. This means
instead of just aborting on error the unpack stream can become
unsynchronized on optional elements, if using one of the affected
functions.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d9 ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-06-18 16:04:16 -07:00
Jann Horn 8404d7a674 apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag string
A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.

Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d9 ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-06-18 16:04:16 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner b886d83c5b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:17 +02:00
John Johansen 145a0ef21c apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
When blob compression is turned on, if the policy namespace is forced
onto a policy load, the policy load will fail as the namespace name
being referenced is inside the compressed policy blob, resulting in
invalid or names that are too long. So duplicate the name before the
blob is compressed.

Fixes: 876dd866c084 ("apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-04-11 14:56:37 -07:00
John Johansen 6a59d9243d apparmor: fix blob compression build failure on ppc
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function 'deflate_compress':
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1064:4: error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree'; did you mean 'kfree'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    vfree(stgbuf);
    ^~~~~
    kfree

Fixes: 876dd866c084 ("apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-04-11 14:56:37 -07:00
Chris Coulson 63c16c3a76 apparmor: Initial implementation of raw policy blob compression
This adds an initial implementation of raw policy blob compression,
using deflate. Compression level can be controlled via a new sysctl,
"apparmor.rawdata_compression_level", which can be set to a value
between 0 (no compression) and 9 (highest compression).

Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-04-11 14:56:29 -07:00
John Johansen d8dbb581d4 apparmor: fix double free when unpack of secmark rules fails
if secmark rules fail to unpack a double free happens resulting in
the following oops

[ 1295.584074] audit: type=1400 audit(1549970525.256:51): apparmor="STATUS" info="failed to unpack profile secmark rules" error=-71 profile="unconfined" name="/root/test" pid=29882 comm="apparmor_parser" name="/root/test" offset=120
[ 1374.042334] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 1374.042336] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:294!
[ 1374.042404] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 1374.042436] CPU: 0 PID: 29921 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.20.7-042007-generic #201902061234
[ 1374.042461] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 1374.042489] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x164/0x180
[ 1374.042502] Code: 74 05 41 0f b6 72 51 4c 89 d7 e8 37 cd f8 ff eb 8b 41 b8 01 00 00 00 48 89 d9 48 89 da 4c 89 d6 e8 11 f6 ff ff e9 72 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 49 8b 42 08 a8 01 75 c2 0f 0b 48 8b 3d a9 f4 19 01 e9 c5 fe
[ 1374.042552] RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b812d7b90 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1374.042568] RAX: ffff91e437679200 RBX: ffff91e437679200 RCX: ffff91e437679200
[ 1374.042589] RDX: 00000000000088b6 RSI: ffff91e43da27060 RDI: ffff91e43d401a80
[ 1374.042609] RBP: ffffaf7b812d7ba8 R08: 0000000000027080 R09: ffffffffa6627a6d
[ 1374.042629] R10: ffffd3af41dd9e40 R11: ffff91e43a1740dc R12: ffff91e3f52e8000
[ 1374.042650] R13: ffffffffa6627a6d R14: ffffffffffffffb9 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 1374.042675] FS:  00007f928df77740(0000) GS:ffff91e43da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1374.042697] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1374.042714] CR2: 000055a0c3ab6b50 CR3: 0000000079ed8004 CR4: 0000000000360ef0
[ 1374.042737] Call Trace:
[ 1374.042750]  kzfree+0x2d/0x40
[ 1374.042763]  aa_free_profile+0x12b/0x270
[ 1374.042776]  unpack_profile+0xc1/0xf10
[ 1374.042790]  aa_unpack+0x115/0x4e0
[ 1374.042802]  aa_replace_profiles+0x8e/0xcc0
[ 1374.042817]  ? kvmalloc_node+0x6d/0x80
[ 1374.042831]  ? __check_object_size+0x166/0x192
[ 1374.042845]  policy_update+0xcf/0x1b0
[ 1374.042858]  profile_load+0x7d/0xa0
[ 1374.042871]  __vfs_write+0x3a/0x190
[ 1374.042883]  ? apparmor_file_permission+0x1a/0x20
[ 1374.042899]  ? security_file_permission+0x31/0xc0
[ 1374.042918]  ? _cond_resched+0x19/0x30
[ 1374.042931]  vfs_write+0xab/0x1b0
[ 1374.042963]  ksys_write+0x55/0xc0
[ 1374.043004]  __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 1374.043046]  do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110
[ 1374.043087]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 9caafbe2b4 ("apparmor: Parse secmark policy")
Reported-by: Alex Murray <alex.murray@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2019-03-12 03:48:02 -07:00
Matthew Garrett 9caafbe2b4 apparmor: Parse secmark policy
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-10-03 06:18:38 -07:00
John Johansen c037bd6158 apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
The patch 736ec752d95e: "AppArmor: policy routines for loading and
unpacking policy" from Jul 29, 2010, leads to the following static
checker warning:

    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:410 verify_accept()
    warn: bitwise AND condition is false here

    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:413 verify_accept()
    warn: bitwise AND condition is false here

security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
   392  #define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK             0xffffffff
   393  #define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK            0xffffffff
   394
   395  /**
   396   * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
   397   * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)
   398   * @flags: flags governing dfa
   399   *
   400   * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error
   401   */
   402  static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
   403  {
   404          int i;
   405
   406          /* verify accept permissions */
   407          for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) {
   408                  int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
   409
   410                  if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
   411                          return 0;
   412
   413                  if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK)
   414                          return 0;

fixes: 736ec752d9 ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-08-22 18:44:42 -07:00
Kees Cook 6396bb2215 treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
John Johansen 56974a6fcf apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be
            available in v8 abi complaint policy.

Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2018-03-13 17:25:48 -07:00
John Johansen 73f488cd90 apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching
This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended
conditional using dfa matching.

This has a couple of advantages
- pattern matching can be used for the xattr match

- xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required

- the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with
  other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional
  work lands.

The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch
conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch
will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on
the executable name.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:02 -08:00
Matthew Garrett 8e51f9087f apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and value
Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more
extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for
this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile
if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised
by the IMA subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:02 -08:00
John Johansen d8889d49e4 apparmor: move context.h to cred.h
Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context
fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context
remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it
deals with.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:01 -08:00
John Johansen a6a52579e5 apparmor: split load data into management struct and data blob
Splitting the management struct from the actual data blob will allow
us in the future to do some sharing and other data reduction
techniques like replacing the the raw data with compressed data.

Prepare for this by separating the management struct from the data
blob.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2018-02-09 11:30:00 -08:00
John Johansen feb3c766a3 apparmor: fix possible recursive lock warning in __aa_create_ns
Use mutex_lock_nested to provide lockdep the parent child lock ordering of
the tree.

This fixes the lockdep Warning
[  305.275177] ============================================
[  305.275178] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[  305.275179] 4.14.0-rc7+ #320 Not tainted
[  305.275180] --------------------------------------------
[  305.275181] apparmor_parser/1339 is trying to acquire lock:
[  305.275182]  (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff970544dd>] __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275187]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  305.275187]  (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0
[  305.275190]
               other info that might help us debug this:
[  305.275191]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  305.275192]        CPU0
[  305.275193]        ----
[  305.275193]   lock(&ns->lock);
[  305.275194]   lock(&ns->lock);
[  305.275195]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  305.275196]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[  305.275198] 2 locks held by apparmor_parser/1339:
[  305.275198]  #0:  (sb_writers#10){.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff96e9c6b7>] vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0
[  305.275202]  #1:  (&ns->lock){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff97054b5d>] aa_prepare_ns+0x3d/0xd0
[  305.275205]
               stack backtrace:
[  305.275207] CPU: 1 PID: 1339 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7+ #320
[  305.275208] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  305.275209] Call Trace:
[  305.275212]  dump_stack+0x85/0xcb
[  305.275214]  __lock_acquire+0x141c/0x1460
[  305.275216]  ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275218]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540
[  305.275219]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x183/0x540
[  305.275221]  lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0
[  305.275223]  ? lock_acquire+0xed/0x1e0
[  305.275224]  ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275227]  __mutex_lock+0x89/0x920
[  305.275228]  ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275230]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190
[  305.275231]  ? __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275233]  ? __lockdep_init_map+0x57/0x1d0
[  305.275234]  ? lockdep_init_map+0x9/0x10
[  305.275236]  ? __rwlock_init+0x32/0x60
[  305.275238]  mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[  305.275240]  ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[  305.275241]  __aa_create_ns+0x6d/0x1e0
[  305.275243]  aa_prepare_ns+0xc2/0xd0
[  305.275245]  aa_replace_profiles+0x168/0xf30
[  305.275247]  ? __might_fault+0x85/0x90
[  305.275250]  policy_update+0xb9/0x380
[  305.275252]  profile_load+0x7e/0x90
[  305.275254]  __vfs_write+0x28/0x150
[  305.275256]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x72/0x80
[  305.275257]  ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60
[  305.275259]  ? __sb_start_write+0xdc/0x1c0
[  305.275261]  ? vfs_write+0x1a7/0x1d0
[  305.275262]  vfs_write+0xca/0x1d0
[  305.275264]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x11f/0x190
[  305.275266]  SyS_write+0x49/0xa0
[  305.275268]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
[  305.275271] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6b22e8c74
[  305.275272] RSP: 002b:00007ffeaaee6288 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  305.275273] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeaaee62a4 RCX: 00007fa6b22e8c74
[  305.275274] RDX: 0000000000000a51 RSI: 00005566a8198c10 RDI: 0000000000000004
[  305.275275] RBP: 0000000000000a39 R08: 0000000000000a51 R09: 0000000000000000
[  305.275276] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005566a8198c10
[  305.275277] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00005566a72ecb88 R15: 00005566a72ec3a8

Fixes: 73688d1ed0 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-11-21 02:17:16 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 80c094a47d Revert "apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation"
This reverts commit 651e28c553.

This caused a regression:
 "The specific problem is that dnsmasq refuses to start on openSUSE Leap
  42.2.  The specific cause is that and attempt to open a PF_LOCAL socket
  gets EACCES.  This means that networking doesn't function on a system
  with a 4.14-rc2 system."

Sadly, the developers involved seemed to be in denial for several weeks
about this, delaying the revert.  This has not been a good release for
the security subsystem, and this area needs to change development
practices.

Reported-and-bisected-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Tracked-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-26 19:35:35 +02:00
John Johansen 651e28c553 apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:58 -07:00
John Johansen 2410aa96d6 apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
why an unpack failed.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:58 -07:00
Christos Gkekas 86aea56f14 apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
verify_header() is currently checking whether interface version is less
than 5 *and* greater than 7, which always evaluates to false. Instead it
should check whether it is less than 5 *or* greater than 7.

Signed-off-by: Christos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:57 -07:00
Geert Uytterhoeven 19fe43a54f apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
with W=2:

    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function ‘unpack_trans_table’:
    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:469: warning: declaration of ‘pos’ shadows a previous local
    security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:451: warning: shadowed declaration is here

Rename the old "pos" to "saved_pos" to fix this.

Fixes: 5379a33120 ("apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-09-22 13:00:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds e24dd9ee53 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:

 - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:

     * several bug fixes and cleanups

     * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
       on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
       securityfs symlinks

     * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
       carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
       converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
       base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
       will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
       a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.

     * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
       features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
       Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
       of this.

 - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
   permission. From Paul:

      "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
       the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.

       Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
       Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
       labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
       capabilities on policy load"

   There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
   lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.

 - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
   cap_capable call in privilege check.

 - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.

 - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
   LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.

 - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
   the boot command line.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
  apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
  seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
  seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
  seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
  IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
  ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
  ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
  integrity: Small code improvements
  ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
  ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
  ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
  ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
  ima: use memdup_user_nul
  ima: fix up #endif comments
  IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
  ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
  ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
  ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
  ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
  ...
2017-07-05 11:26:35 -07:00
John Johansen 5379a33120 apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 17:11:45 -07:00
John Johansen 637f688dc3 apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts
Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on
the context and converting the label to a singular profile where
possible.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 17:11:38 -07:00
John Johansen cf797c0e5e apparmor: convert to profile block critical sections
There are still a few places where profile replacement fails to update
and a stale profile is used for mediation. Fix this by moving to
accessing the current label through a critical section that will
always ensure mediation is using the current label regardless of
whether the tasks cred has been updated or not.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-10 17:11:34 -07:00
John Johansen 5d5182cae4 apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles
The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should
be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace
and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-08 12:51:49 -07:00
John Johansen 72c8a76864 apparmor: allow profiles to provide info to disconnected paths
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-06-08 11:29:34 -07:00
Kees Cook 26fccd9ed2 doc: ReSTify apparmor.txt
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.

Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2017-05-18 10:32:38 -06:00
Michal Hocko a7c3e901a4 mm: introduce kv[mz]alloc helpers
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.

There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree.  Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.

As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.

Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead.  This is patch 6.  There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com

This patch (of 9):

Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code.  Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers.  Some of them are
really creative when doing so.  Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly.  This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures.  This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.

This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them.  In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL).  Those need to be
fixed separately.

While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers.  Existing ones would have to die
slowly.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>	[ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:12 -07:00
John Johansen 2c17cd3681 apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for policy unpack
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:55 -08:00
William Hua e025be0f26 apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra data
Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace.
This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted
helper can extract and use from live policy.

Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:51 -08:00
John Johansen 31f75bfecd apparmor: make computing policy hashes conditional on kernel parameter
Allow turning off the computation of the policy hashes via the
apparmor.hash_policy kernel parameter.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:50 -08:00
John Johansen ef88a7ac55 apparmor: change aad apparmor_audit_data macro to a fn macro
The aad macro can replace aad strings when it is not intended to. Switch
to a fn macro so it is only applied when intended.

Also at the same time cleanup audit_data initialization by putting
common boiler plate behind a macro, and dropping the gfp_t parameter
which will become useless.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:47 -08:00
John Johansen 04dc715e24 apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load
Verify that profiles in a load set specify the same policy ns and
audit the name of the policy ns that policy is being loaded for.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:43 -08:00
John Johansen 5ac8c355ae apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform
Store loaded policy and allow introspecting it through apparmorfs. This
has several uses from debugging, policy validation, and policy checkpoint
and restore for containers.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:42 -08:00
John Johansen 11c236b89d apparmor: add a default null dfa
Instead of testing whether a given dfa exists in every code path, have
a default null dfa that is used when loaded policy doesn't provide a
dfa.

This will let us get rid of special casing and avoid dereference bugs
when special casing is missed.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:34 -08:00
John Johansen 6604d4c1c1 apparmor: allow policydb to be used as the file dfa
Newer policy will combine the file and policydb dfas, allowing for
better optimizations. However to support older policy we need to
keep the ability to address the "file" dfa separately. So dup
the policydb as if it is the file dfa and set the appropriate start
state.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:33 -08:00
John Johansen 474d6b7510 apparmor: prepare to support newer versions of policy
Newer policy encodes more than just version in the version tag,
so add masking to make sure the comparison remains correct.

Note: this is fully compatible with older policy as it will never set
the bits being masked out.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:32 -08:00
John Johansen 5ebfb12822 apparmor: add support for force complain flag to support learning mode
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:31 -08:00
John Johansen abbf873403 apparmor: remove paranoid load switch
Policy should always under go a full paranoid verification.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:30 -08:00
John Johansen 30b026a8d1 apparmor: pass gfp_t parameter into profile allocation
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2017-01-16 01:18:29 -08:00
Arnd Bergmann 7616ac70d1 apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling
The newly added Kconfig option could never work and just causes a build error
when disabled:

security/apparmor/lsm.c:675:25: error: 'CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT' undeclared here (not in a function)
 bool aa_g_hash_policy = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT;

The problem is that the macro undefined in this case, and we need to use the IS_ENABLED()
helper to turn it into a boolean constant.

Another minor problem with the original patch is that the option is even offered
in sysfs when SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is not enabled, so this also hides the option
in that case.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Fixes: 6059f71f1e ("apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is used")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-07-27 17:39:26 +10:00
John Johansen 5f20fdfed1 apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547

If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2016-07-12 08:43:10 -07:00
John Johansen 23ca7b640b apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2016-07-12 08:43:10 -07:00
John Johansen 6059f71f1e apparmor: add parameter to control whether policy hashing is used
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2016-07-12 08:43:10 -07:00
John Johansen f8eb8a1324 apparmor: add the ability to report a sha1 hash of loaded policy
Provide userspace the ability to introspect a sha1 hash value for each
profile currently loaded.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:08 -07:00
John Johansen 556d0be74b apparmor: add an optional profile attachment string for profiles
Add the ability to take in and report a human readable profile attachment
string for profiles so that attachment specifications can be easily
inspected.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:07 -07:00
John Johansen 038165070a apparmor: allow setting any profile into the unconfined state
Allow emulating the default profile behavior from boot, by allowing
loading of a profile in the unconfined state into a new NS.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:07 -07:00
John Johansen 8651e1d657 apparmor: make free_profile available outside of policy.c
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2013-08-14 11:42:06 -07:00