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6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Serge E. Hallyn
5975c725df define convenient securebits masks for prctl users (v2)
Hi James, would you mind taking the following into
security-testing?

The securebits are used by passing them to prctl with the
PR_{S,G}ET_SECUREBITS commands.  But the defines must be
shifted to be used in prctl, which begs to be confused and
misused by userspace.  So define some more convenient
values for userspace to specify.  This way userspace does

	prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, SECBIT_NOROOT);

instead of

	prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 1 << SECURE_NOROOT);

(Thanks to Michael for the idea)

This patch also adds include/linux/securebits to the installed headers.
Then perhaps it can be included by glibc's sys/prctl.h.

Changelog:
	Oct 29: Stephen Rothwell points out that issecure can
		be under __KERNEL__.
	Oct 14: (Suggestions by Michael Kerrisk):
		1. spell out SETUID in SECBIT_NO_SETUID*
		2. SECBIT_X_LOCKED does not imply SECBIT_X
		3. add definitions for keepcaps
        Oct 14: As suggested by Michael Kerrisk, don't
		use SB_* as that convention is already in
		use.  Use SECBIT_ prefix instead.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-10-30 08:27:25 +11:00
David Howells
86a264abe5 CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:18 +11:00
David Howells
b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
Andrew G. Morgan
086f7316f0 security: filesystem capabilities: fix fragile setuid fixup code
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the
case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()).  The effect
of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing
securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is
configured.)

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-04 10:40:08 -07:00
Andrew G. Morgan
3898b1b4eb capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead.  That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.

Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege.  Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.

Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege.  In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.

The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0.  This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()).  This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.

With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:

  prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);

This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 08:58:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00