Fix another "confused deputy" weakness[1]. Writes to /proc/$pid/attr/
files need to check the opener credentials, since these fds do not
transition state across execve(). Without this, it is possible to
trick another process (which may have different credentials) to write
to its own /proc/$pid/attr/ files, leading to unexpected and possibly
exploitable behaviors.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/security/credentials.html?highlight=confused#open-file-credentials
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To resolve the symbol fuction name for wchan, use the printk format
specifier %ps instead of manually looking up the symbol function name
via lookup_symbol_name().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201217165413.GA1959@ls3530.fritz.box
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The generic_fillattr() helper fills in the basic attributes associated
with an inode. Enable it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is
accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user
namespace before we store the uid and gid. If the initial user namespace
is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-12-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton:
- lots of little subsystems
- a few post-linux-next MM material. Most of the rest awaits more
merging of other trees.
Subsystems affected by this series: alpha, procfs, misc, core-kernel,
bitmap, lib, lz4, checkpatch, nilfs, kdump, rapidio, gcov, bfs, relay,
resource, ubsan, reboot, fault-injection, lzo, apparmor, and mm (swap,
memory-hotplug, pagemap, cleanups, and gup).
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (86 commits)
mm: fix some spelling mistakes in comments
mm: simplify follow_pte{,pmd}
mm: unexport follow_pte_pmd
apparmor: remove duplicate macro list_entry_is_head()
lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c: make lzogeneric1x_1_compress() static
fault-injection: handle EI_ETYPE_TRUE
reboot: hide from sysfs not applicable settings
reboot: allow to override reboot type if quirks are found
reboot: remove cf9_safe from allowed types and rename cf9_force
reboot: allow to specify reboot mode via sysfs
reboot: refactor and comment the cpu selection code
lib/ubsan.c: mark type_check_kinds with static keyword
kcov: don't instrument with UBSAN
ubsan: expand tests and reporting
ubsan: remove UBSAN_MISC in favor of individual options
ubsan: enable for all*config builds
ubsan: disable UBSAN_TRAP for all*config
ubsan: disable object-size sanitizer under GCC
ubsan: move cc-option tests into Kconfig
ubsan: remove redundant -Wno-maybe-uninitialized
...
Delete repeated words in fs/proc/.
{the, which}
where "which which" was changed to "with which".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028191525.13413-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:
perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes)
sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock)
by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex)
While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is
exec.
There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673250 ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate
architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall
numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL
infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls.
This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache.
The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be
in the format of:
<arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER>
where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall,
and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter.
For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like:
x86_64 0 ALLOW
x86_64 1 ALLOW
x86_64 2 ALLOW
x86_64 3 ALLOW
[...]
x86_64 132 ALLOW
x86_64 133 ALLOW
x86_64 134 FILTER
x86_64 135 FILTER
x86_64 136 FILTER
x86_64 137 ALLOW
x86_64 138 ALLOW
x86_64 139 FILTER
x86_64 140 ALLOW
x86_64 141 ALLOW
[...]
This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default
of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the
application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For
the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94e663fa53136f5a11f432c661794d1ee7060779.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
For oom_score_adj values in the range [942,999], the current
calculations will print 16 for oom_adj. This patch simply limits the
output so output is inline with docs.
Signed-off-by: Charles Haithcock <chaithco@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201020165130.33927-1-chaithco@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure the async io-wq workers inherit the loginuid and sessionid from
the original task, and restore them to unset once we're done with the
async work item.
While at it, disable the ability for kernel threads to write to their own
loginuid.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Currently __set_oom_adj loops through all processes in the system to keep
oom_score_adj and oom_score_adj_min in sync between processes sharing
their mm. This is done for any task with more that one mm_users, which
includes processes with multiple threads (sharing mm and signals).
However for such processes the loop is unnecessary because their signal
structure is shared as well.
Android updates oom_score_adj whenever a tasks changes its role
(background/foreground/...) or binds to/unbinds from a service, making it
more/less important. Such operation can happen frequently. We noticed
that updates to oom_score_adj became more expensive and after further
investigation found out that the patch mentioned in "Fixes" introduced a
regression. Using Pixel 4 with a typical Android workload, write time to
oom_score_adj increased from ~3.57us to ~362us. Moreover this regression
linearly depends on the number of multi-threaded processes running on the
system.
Mark the mm with a new MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag bit when task is created with
(CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK). Change __set_oom_adj to use
MMF_MULTIPROCESS instead of mm_users to decide whether oom_score_adj
update should be synchronized between multiple processes. To prevent
races between clone() and __set_oom_adj(), when oom_score_adj of the
process being cloned might be modified from userspace, we use
oom_adj_mutex. Its scope is changed to global.
The combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD) is rarely used except for
the case of vfork(). To prevent performance regressions of vfork(), we
skip taking oom_adj_mutex and setting MMF_MULTIPROCESS when CLONE_VFORK is
specified. Clearing the MMF_MULTIPROCESS flag (when the last process
sharing the mm exits) is left out of this patch to keep it simple and
because it is believed that this threading model is rare. Should there
ever be a need for optimizing that case as well, it can be done by hooking
into the exit path, likely following the mm_update_next_owner pattern.
With the combination of (CLONE_VM && !CLONE_THREAD && !CLONE_VFORK) being
quite rare, the regression is gone after the change is applied.
[surenb@google.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200902012558.2335613-1-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 44a70adec9 ("mm, oom_adj: make sure processes sharing mm have same view of oom_score_adj")
Reported-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Kellner <christian@kellner.me>
Cc: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200824153036.3201505-1-surenb@google.com
Debugged-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Recently we found an issue on our production environment that when memcg
oom is triggered the oom killer doesn't chose the process with largest
resident memory but chose the first scanned process. Note that all
processes in this memcg have the same oom_score_adj, so the oom killer
should chose the process with largest resident memory.
Bellow is part of the oom info, which is enough to analyze this issue.
[7516987.983223] memory: usage 16777216kB, limit 16777216kB, failcnt 52843037
[7516987.983224] memory+swap: usage 16777216kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
[7516987.983225] kmem: usage 301464kB, limit 9007199254740988kB, failcnt 0
[...]
[7516987.983293] [ pid ] uid tgid total_vm rss pgtables_bytes swapents oom_score_adj name
[7516987.983510] [ 5740] 0 5740 257 1 32768 0 -998 pause
[7516987.983574] [58804] 0 58804 4594 771 81920 0 -998 entry_point.bas
[7516987.983577] [58908] 0 58908 7089 689 98304 0 -998 cron
[7516987.983580] [58910] 0 58910 16235 5576 163840 0 -998 supervisord
[7516987.983590] [59620] 0 59620 18074 1395 188416 0 -998 sshd
[7516987.983594] [59622] 0 59622 18680 6679 188416 0 -998 python
[7516987.983598] [59624] 0 59624 1859266 5161 548864 0 -998 odin-agent
[7516987.983600] [59625] 0 59625 707223 9248 983040 0 -998 filebeat
[7516987.983604] [59627] 0 59627 416433 64239 774144 0 -998 odin-log-agent
[7516987.983607] [59631] 0 59631 180671 15012 385024 0 -998 python3
[7516987.983612] [61396] 0 61396 791287 3189 352256 0 -998 client
[7516987.983615] [61641] 0 61641 1844642 29089 946176 0 -998 client
[7516987.983765] [ 9236] 0 9236 2642 467 53248 0 -998 php_scanner
[7516987.983911] [42898] 0 42898 15543 838 167936 0 -998 su
[7516987.983915] [42900] 1000 42900 3673 867 77824 0 -998 exec_script_vr2
[7516987.983918] [42925] 1000 42925 36475 19033 335872 0 -998 python
[7516987.983921] [57146] 1000 57146 3673 848 73728 0 -998 exec_script_J2p
[7516987.983925] [57195] 1000 57195 186359 22958 491520 0 -998 python2
[7516987.983928] [58376] 1000 58376 275764 14402 290816 0 -998 rosmaster
[7516987.983931] [58395] 1000 58395 155166 4449 245760 0 -998 rosout
[7516987.983935] [58406] 1000 58406 18285584 3967322 37101568 0 -998 data_sim
[7516987.984221] oom-kill:constraint=CONSTRAINT_MEMCG,nodemask=(null),cpuset=3aa16c9482ae3a6f6b78bda68a55d32c87c99b985e0f11331cddf05af6c4d753,mems_allowed=0-1,oom_memcg=/kubepods/podf1c273d3-9b36-11ea-b3df-246e9693c184,task_memcg=/kubepods/podf1c273d3-9b36-11ea-b3df-246e9693c184/1f246a3eeea8f70bf91141eeaf1805346a666e225f823906485ea0b6c37dfc3d,task=pause,pid=5740,uid=0
[7516987.984254] Memory cgroup out of memory: Killed process 5740 (pause) total-vm:1028kB, anon-rss:4kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
[7516988.092344] oom_reaper: reaped process 5740 (pause), now anon-rss:0kB, file-rss:0kB, shmem-rss:0kB
We can find that the first scanned process 5740 (pause) was killed, but
its rss is only one page. That is because, when we calculate the oom
badness in oom_badness(), we always ignore the negtive point and convert
all of these negtive points to 1. Now as oom_score_adj of all the
processes in this targeted memcg have the same value -998, the points of
these processes are all negtive value. As a result, the first scanned
process will be killed.
The oom_socre_adj (-998) in this memcg is set by kubelet, because it is a
a Guaranteed pod, which has higher priority to prevent from being killed
by system oom.
To fix this issue, we should make the calculation of oom point more
accurate. We can achieve it by convert the chosen_point from 'unsigned
long' to 'long'.
[cai@lca.pw: reported a issue in the previous version]
[mhocko@suse.com: fixed the issue reported by Cai]
[mhocko@suse.com: add the comment in proc_oom_score()]
[laoar.shao@gmail.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594396651-9931-1-git-send-email-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594309987-9919-1-git-send-email-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Opening files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace is useful for
checkpointing and restoring to recover files that are unreachable via
the file system such as deleted files, or memfd files.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-5-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Convert the last few remaining mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap
locking API. These were missed by coccinelle for some reason (I think
coccinelle does not support some of the preprocessor constructs in these
files ?)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: convert linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next leftovers]
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-6-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+ Features
- Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
- add a valid state flags check
- add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
- add apparmor subdir to proc attr interface
- fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
- add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
- ensure that dfa state tables have entries
+ Cleanups
- Use true and false for bool variable
- Remove semicolon
- Clean code by removing redundant instructions
- Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
- remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment
- remove useless aafs_create_symlink
+ Bug fixes
- Fix memory leak of profile proxy
- fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
- fix nnp subset test for unconfined
- check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-06-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features:
- Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
- add a valid state flags check
- add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
- add apparmor subdir to proc attr interface
- fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
- add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
- ensure that dfa state tables have entries
Cleanups:
- Use true and false for bool variable
- Remove semicolon
- Clean code by removing redundant instructions
- Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
- remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment
- remove useless aafs_create_symlink
Bug fixes:
- Fix memory leak of profile proxy
- fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
- fix nnp subset test for unconfined
- check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-06-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: Fix memory leak of profile proxy
apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
apparmor: Use true and false for bool variable
security/apparmor/label.c: Clean code by removing redundant instructions
apparmor: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
apparmor: ensure that dfa state tables have entries
apparmor: remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment.
apparmor: add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
apparmor: fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
apparmor: fix nnp subset test for unconfined
apparmor: remove useless aafs_create_symlink
apparmor: add proc subdir to attrs
apparmor: add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
apparmor: add a valid state flags check
AppArmor: Remove semicolon
apparmor: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman:
"This has four sets of changes:
- modernize proc to support multiple private instances
- ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly
- remove has_group_leader_pid
- use pids not tasks in posix-cpu-timers lookup
Alexey updated proc so each mount of proc uses a new superblock. This
allows people to actually use mount options with proc with no fear of
messing up another mount of proc. Given the kernel's internal mounts
of proc for things like uml this was a real problem, and resulted in
Android's hidepid mount options being ignored and introducing security
issues.
The rest of the changes are small cleanups and fixes that came out of
my work to allow this change to proc. In essence it is swapping the
pids in de_thread during exec which removes a special case the code
had to handle. Then updating the code to stop handling that special
case"
* 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
remove the no longer needed pid_alive() check in __task_pid_nr_ns()
posix-cpu-timers: Replace __get_task_for_clock with pid_for_clock
posix-cpu-timers: Replace cpu_timer_pid_type with clock_pid_type
posix-cpu-timers: Extend rcu_read_lock removing task_struct references
signal: Remove has_group_leader_pid
exec: Remove BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid)
posix-cpu-timer: Unify the now redundant code in lookup_task
posix-cpu-timer: Tidy up group_leader logic in lookup_task
proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once
rculist: Add hlists_swap_heads_rcu
proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid
Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
proc: use named enums for better readability
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
syzbot found that
touch /proc/testfile
causes NULL pointer dereference at tomoyo_get_local_path()
because inode of the dentry is NULL.
Before c59f415a7c, Tomoyo received pid_ns from proc's s_fs_info
directly. Since proc_pid_ns() can only work with inode, using it in
the tomoyo_get_local_path() was wrong.
To avoid creating more functions for getting proc_ns, change the
argument type of the proc_pid_ns() function. Then, Tomoyo can use
the existing super_block to get pid_ns.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000002f0c7505a5b0e04c@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200518180738.2939611-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c1af344512918c61362c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c59f415a7c ("Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull pid leak fix from Eric Biederman:
"Oleg noticed that put_pid(thread_pid) was not getting called when proc
was not compiled in.
Let's get that fixed before 5.7 is released and causes problems for
anyone"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Put thread_pid in release_task not proc_flush_pid
Combine the pid_task and thes test has_group_leader_pid into a single
dereference by using pid_task(PIDTYPE_TGID).
This makes the code simpler and proof against needing to even think
about any shenanigans that de_thread might get up to.
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> writes:
Procfs modernization:
---------------------
Historically procfs was always tied to pid namespaces, during pid
namespace creation we internally create a procfs mount for it. However,
this has the effect that all new procfs mounts are just a mirror of the
internal one, any change, any mount option update, any new future
introduction will propagate to all other procfs mounts that are in the
same pid namespace.
This may have solved several use cases in that time. However today we
face new requirements, and making procfs able to support new private
instances inside same pid namespace seems a major point. If we want to
to introduce new features and security mechanisms we have to make sure
first that we do not break existing usecases. Supporting private procfs
instances will allow to support new features and behaviour without
propagating it to all other procfs mounts.
Today procfs is more of a burden especially to some Embedded, IoT,
sandbox, container use cases. In user space we are over-mounting null
or inaccessible files on top to hide files and information. If we want
to hide pids we have to create PID namespaces otherwise mount options
propagate to all other proc mounts, changing a mount option value in one
mount will propagate to all other proc mounts. If we want to introduce
new features, then they will propagate to all other mounts too, resulting
either maybe new useful functionality or maybe breaking stuff. We have
also to note that userspace should not workaround procfs, the kernel
should just provide a sane simple interface.
In this regard several developers and maintainers pointed out that
there are problems with procfs and it has to be modernized:
"Here's another one: split up and modernize /proc." by Andy Lutomirski [1]
Discussion about kernel pointer leaks:
"And yes, as Kees and Daniel mentioned, it's definitely not just dmesg.
In fact, the primary things tend to be /proc and /sys, not dmesg
itself." By Linus Torvalds [2]
Lot of other areas in the kernel and filesystems have been updated to be
able to support private instances, devpts is one major example [3].
Which will be used for:
1) Embedded systems and IoT: usually we have one supervisor for
apps, we have some lightweight sandbox support, however if we create
pid namespaces we have to manage all the processes inside too,
where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of apps each one inside
its own mount namespace, maybe use network namespaces for vlans
setups, but right now we only want mount namespaces, without all the
other complexity. We want procfs to behave more like a real file system,
and block access to inodes that belong to other users. The 'hidepid=' will
not work since it is a shared mount option.
2) Containers, sandboxes and Private instances of file systems - devpts case
Historically, lot of file systems inside Linux kernel view when instantiated
were just a mirror of an already created and mounted filesystem. This was the
case of devpts filesystem, it seems at that time the requirements were to
optimize things and reuse the same memory, etc. This design used to work but not
anymore with today's containers, IoT, hostile environments and all the privacy
challenges that Linux faces.
In that regards, devpts was updated so that each new mounts is a total
independent file system by the following patches:
"devpts: Make each mount of devpts an independent filesystem" by
Eric W. Biederman [3] [4]
3) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some
subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee
that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook
will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to
force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run.
The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to
the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate
to all other procfs mounts.
This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user
sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other
syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a
per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(),
clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private
procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on
/proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will
allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with
pids that the user can ptrace or not.
By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see
inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other
processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine
and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be
ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict
/proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a
generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes
and which user can not.
Side notes:
* This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse
arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls
that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using
filesystem syscalls. With this change all LSMs should be able to analyze
open/read/write/close... on /proc/<pid>/
4) This will allow to implement new features either in kernel or
userspace without having to worry about procfs.
In containers, sandboxes, etc we have workarounds to hide some /proc
inodes, this should be supported natively without doing extra complex
work, the kernel should be able to support sane options that work with
today and future Linux use cases.
5) Creation of new superblock with all procfs options for each procfs
mount will fix the ignoring of mount options. The problem is that the
second mount of procfs in the same pid namespace ignores the mount
options. The mount options are ignored without error until procfs is
remounted.
Before:
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
mount("proc", "/tmp/proc", "proc", 0, "hidepid=1") = 0
+++ exited with 0 +++
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=2 0 0
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=1 0 0
After:
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0
proc /proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=ptraceable 0 0
proc /tmp/proc proc rw,relatime,hidepid=invisible 0 0
Introduced changes:
-------------------
Each mount of procfs creates a separate procfs instance with its own
mount options.
This series adds few new mount options:
* New 'hidepid=ptraceable' or 'hidepid=4' mount option to show only ptraceable
processes in the procfs. This allows to support lightweight sandboxes in
Embedded Linux, also solves the case for LSM where now with this mount option,
we make sure that they have a ptrace path in procfs.
* 'subset=pid' that allows to hide non-pid inodes from procfs. It can be used
in containers and sandboxes, as these are already trying to hide and block
access to procfs inodes anyway.
ChangeLog:
----------
* Rebase on top of v5.7-rc1.
* Fix a resource leak if proc is not mounted or if proc is simply reconfigured.
* Add few selftests.
* After a discussion with Eric W. Biederman, the numerical values for hidepid
parameter have been removed from uapi.
* Remove proc_self and proc_thread_self from the pid_namespace struct.
* I took into account the comment of Kees Cook.
* Update Reviewed-by tags.
* 'subset=pidfs' renamed to 'subset=pid' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan.
* Include Reviewed-by tags.
* Rebase on top of Eric W. Biederman's procfs changes.
* Add human readable values of 'hidepid' as suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
* Started using RCU lock to clean dcache entries as suggested by Linus Torvalds.
* 'pidonly=1' renamed to 'subset=pidfs' as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan.
* HIDEPID_* moved to uapi/ as they are user interface to mount().
Suggested-by Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
* 'hidepid=' and 'gid=' mount options are moved from pid namespace to superblock.
* 'newinstance' mount option removed as suggested by Eric W. Biederman.
Mount of procfs always creates a new instance.
* 'limit_pids' renamed to 'hidepid=3'.
* I took into account the comment of Linus Torvalds [7].
* Documentation added.
* Fixed a bug that caused a problem with the Fedora boot.
* The 'pidonly' option is visible among the mount options.
* Renamed mount options to 'newinstance' and 'pids='
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
* Fixed order of commit, Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
* Many bug fixes.
* Removed 'unshared' mount option and replaced it with 'limit_pids'
which is attached to the current procfs mount.
Suggested-by Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
* Do not fill dcache with pid entries that we can not ptrace.
* Many bug fixes.
References:
-----------
[1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/ksummit-discuss/2017-January/004215.html
[2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/05/5
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/689539/
[4] http://lxr.free-electrons.com/source/Documentation/filesystems/devpts.txt?v=3.14
[5] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/2/407
[6] https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/5/3/357
[7] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/11/505
Alexey Gladkov (7):
proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount
option
proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options
and new mount behavior
proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
proc: use named enums for better readability
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 92 +++++++++---
fs/proc/base.c | 48 +++++--
fs/proc/generic.c | 9 ++
fs/proc/inode.c | 30 +++-
fs/proc/root.c | 131 +++++++++++++-----
fs/proc/self.c | 6 +-
fs/proc/thread_self.c | 6 +-
fs/proc_namespace.c | 14 +-
include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 12 --
include/linux/proc_fs.h | 30 +++-
tools/testing/selftests/proc/.gitignore | 2 +
tools/testing/selftests/proc/Makefile | 2 +
.../selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c | 50 +++++++
.../selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c | 48 +++++++
14 files changed, 384 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-fsconfig-hidepid.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-multiple-procfs.c
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200419141057.621356-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Oleg pointed out that in the unlikely event the kernel is compiled
with CONFIG_PROC_FS unset that release_task will now leak the pid.
Move the put_pid out of proc_flush_pid into release_task to fix this
and to guarantee I don't make that mistake again.
When possible it makes sense to keep get and put in the same function
so it can easily been seen how they pair up.
Fixes: 7bc3e6e55a ("proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
If "hidepid=4" mount option is set then do not instantiate pids that
we can not ptrace. "hidepid=4" means that procfs should only contain
pids that the caller can ptrace.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This patch allows to have multiple procfs instances inside the
same pid namespace. The aim here is lightweight sandboxes, and to allow
that we have to modernize procfs internals.
1) The main aim of this work is to have on embedded systems one
supervisor for apps. Right now we have some lightweight sandbox support,
however if we create pid namespacess we have to manages all the
processes inside too, where our goal is to be able to run a bunch of
apps each one inside its own mount namespace without being able to
notice each other. We only want to use mount namespaces, and we want
procfs to behave more like a real mount point.
2) Linux Security Modules have multiple ptrace paths inside some
subsystems, however inside procfs, the implementation does not guarantee
that the ptrace() check which triggers the security_ptrace_check() hook
will always run. We have the 'hidepid' mount option that can be used to
force the ptrace_may_access() check inside has_pid_permissions() to run.
The problem is that 'hidepid' is per pid namespace and not attached to
the mount point, any remount or modification of 'hidepid' will propagate
to all other procfs mounts.
This also does not allow to support Yama LSM easily in desktop and user
sessions. Yama ptrace scope which restricts ptrace and some other
syscalls to be allowed only on inferiors, can be updated to have a
per-task context, where the context will be inherited during fork(),
clone() and preserved across execve(). If we support multiple private
procfs instances, then we may force the ptrace_may_access() on
/proc/<pids>/ to always run inside that new procfs instances. This will
allow to specifiy on user sessions if we should populate procfs with
pids that the user can ptrace or not.
By using Yama ptrace scope, some restricted users will only be able to see
inferiors inside /proc, they won't even be able to see their other
processes. Some software like Chromium, Firefox's crash handler, Wine
and others are already using Yama to restrict which processes can be
ptracable. With this change this will give the possibility to restrict
/proc/<pids>/ but more importantly this will give desktop users a
generic and usuable way to specifiy which users should see all processes
and which users can not.
Side notes:
* This covers the lack of seccomp where it is not able to parse
arguments, it is easy to install a seccomp filter on direct syscalls
that operate on pids, however /proc/<pid>/ is a Linux ABI using
filesystem syscalls. With this change LSMs should be able to analyze
open/read/write/close...
In the new patch set version I removed the 'newinstance' option
as suggested by Eric W. Biederman.
Selftest has been added to verify new behavior.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Michael Kerrisk suggested to replace numeric clock IDs with symbolic names.
Now the content of these files looks like this:
$ cat /proc/774/timens_offsets
monotonic 864000 0
boottime 1728000 0
For setting offsets, both representations of clocks (numeric and symbolic)
can be used.
As for compatibility, it is acceptable to change things as long as
userspace doesn't care. The format of timens_offsets files is very new and
there are no userspace tools yet which rely on this format.
But three projects crun, util-linux and criu rely on the interface of
setting time offsets and this is why it's required to continue supporting
the numeric clock IDs on write.
Fixes: 04a8682a71 ("fs/proc: Introduce /proc/pid/timens_offsets")
Suggested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200411154031.642557-1-avagin@gmail.com
syzbot wrote:
> ========================================================
> WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected
> 5.6.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
> --------------------------------------------------------
> swapper/1/0 just changed the state of lock:
> ffffffff898090d8 (tasklist_lock){.+.?}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x9f/0x320 fs/fcntl.c:840
> but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past:
> (&pid->wait_pidfd){+.+.}-{2:2}
>
>
> and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them.
>
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
> Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
>
> CPU0 CPU1
> ---- ----
> lock(&pid->wait_pidfd);
> local_irq_disable();
> lock(tasklist_lock);
> lock(&pid->wait_pidfd);
> <Interrupt>
> lock(tasklist_lock);
>
> *** DEADLOCK ***
>
> 4 locks held by swapper/1/0:
The problem is that because wait_pidfd.lock is taken under the tasklist
lock. It must always be taken with irqs disabled as tasklist_lock can be
taken from interrupt context and if wait_pidfd.lock was already taken this
would create a lock order inversion.
Oleg suggested just disabling irqs where I have added extra calls to
wait_pidfd.lock. That should be safe and I think the code will eventually
do that. It was rightly pointed out by Christian that sharing the
wait_pidfd.lock was a premature optimization.
It is also true that my pre-merge window testing was insufficient. So
remove the premature optimization and give struct pid a dedicated lock of
it's own for struct pid things. I have verified that lockdep sees all 3
paths where we take the new pid->lock and lockdep does not complain.
It is my current day dream that one day pid->lock can be used to guard the
task lists as well and then the tasklist_lock won't need to be held to
deliver signals. That will require taking pid->lock with irqs disabled.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/00000000000011d66805a25cd73f@google.com/
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+343f75cdeea091340956@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+832aabf700bc3ec920b9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+f675f964019f884dbd0f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a9fb1457d720a55d6dc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 7bc3e6e55a ("proc: Use a list of inodes to flush from proc")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This changes do_io_accounting to use the new exec_update_mutex
instead of cred_guard_mutex.
This fixes possible deadlocks when the trace is accessing
/proc/$pid/io for instance.
This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This changes lock_trace to use the new exec_update_mutex
instead of cred_guard_mutex.
This fixes possible deadlocks when the trace is accessing
/proc/$pid/stack for instance.
This should be safe, as the credentials are only used for reading,
and task->mm is updated on execve under the new exec_update_mutex.
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Rework the flushing of proc to use a list of directory inodes that
need to be flushed.
The list is kept on struct pid not on struct task_struct, as there is
a fixed connection between proc inodes and pids but at least for the
case of de_thread the pid of a task_struct changes.
This removes the dependency on proc_mnt which allows for different
mounts of proc having different mount options even in the same pid
namespace and this allows for the removal of proc_mnt which will
trivially the first mount of proc to honor it's mount options.
This flushing remains an optimization. The functions
pid_delete_dentry and pid_revalidate ensure that ordinary dcache
management will not attempt to use dentries past the point their
respective task has died. When unused the shrinker will
eventually be able to remove these dentries.
There is a case in de_thread where proc_flush_pid can be
called early for a given pid. Which winds up being
safe (if suboptimal) as this is just an optiimization.
Only pid directories are put on the list as the other
per pid files are children of those directories and
d_invalidate on the directory will get them as well.
So that the pid can be used during flushing it's reference count is
taken in release_task and dropped in proc_flush_pid. Further the call
of proc_flush_pid is moved after the tasklist_lock is released in
release_task so that it is certain that the pid has already been
unhashed when flushing it taking place. This removes a small race
where a dentry could recreated.
As struct pid is supposed to be small and I need a per pid lock
I reuse the only lock that currently exists in struct pid the
the wait_pidfd.lock.
The net result is that this adds all of this functionality
with just a little extra list management overhead and
a single extra pointer in struct pid.
v2: Initialize pid->inodes. I somehow failed to get that
initialization into the initial version of the patch. A boot
failure was reported by "kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>", and
failure to initialize that pid->inodes matches all of the reported
symptoms.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull openat2 support from Al Viro:
"This is the openat2() series from Aleksa Sarai.
I'm afraid that the rest of namei stuff will have to wait - it got
zero review the last time I'd posted #work.namei, and there had been a
leak in the posted series I'd caught only last weekend. I was going to
repost it on Monday, but the window opened and the odds of getting any
review during that... Oh, well.
Anyway, openat2 part should be ready; that _did_ get sane amount of
review and public testing, so here it comes"
From Aleksa's description of the series:
"For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown
flags are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road
to being added to openat(2).
Furthermore, the need for some sort of control over VFS's path
resolution (to avoid malicious paths resulting in inadvertent
breakouts) has been a very long-standing desire of many userspace
applications.
This patchset is a revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[3] patchset
(which was a variant of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[4] which
was a spin-off of the Capsicum project[5]) with a few additions and
changes made based on the previous discussion within [6] as well as
others I felt were useful.
In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of
AT_NO_JUMPS, the flag has been split up into separate flags. However,
instead of being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new
syscall openat2(2) which provides several other improvements to the
openat(2) interface (see the patch description for more details). The
following new LOOKUP_* flags are added:
LOOKUP_NO_XDEV:
Blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards, or through
absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do not
trigger this. Magic-link traversal which implies a vfsmount jump is
also blocked (though magic-link jumps on the same vfsmount are
permitted).
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS:
Blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style links. This is done
by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during resolution in a
filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match with the only
reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm happy to change
the name.
It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.
In order to correctly detect magic-links, the introduction of a new
LOOKUP_MAGICLINK_JUMPED state flag was required.
LOOKUP_BENEATH:
Disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
paths in openat(2) are also disallowed.
Conceptually this flag is to ensure you "stay below" a certain
point in the filesystem tree -- but this requires some additional
to protect against various races that would allow escape using
"..".
Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done
as in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.
In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:
LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS:
Does what it says on the tin. No symlink resolution is allowed at
all, including magic-links. Just as with LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this
can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an fd for the symlink as
long as no parent path had a symlink component.
LOOKUP_IN_ROOT:
This is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than blocking
attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements to be
scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that
chroot(2) is not.
If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to
cross magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.
The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[7] when opening
paths in a potentially malicious container.
There is a long list of CVEs that could have bene mitigated by
having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT (such as CVE-2017-1002101,
CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and CVE-2019-5736, just to name a
few).
In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
libpathrs[8] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution.
It features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.
Future work would include implementing things like
RESOLVE_NO_AUTOMOUNT and possibly a RESOLVE_NO_REMOTE (to allow
programs to be sure they don't hit DoSes though stale NFS handles)"
* 'work.openat2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
Documentation: path-lookup: include new LOOKUP flags
selftests: add openat2(2) selftests
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
namei: LOOKUP_{IN_ROOT,BENEATH}: permit limited ".." resolution
namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_BENEATH: O_BENEATH-like scoped resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_XDEV: block mountpoint crossing
namei: LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: block magic-link resolution
namei: LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: block symlink resolution
namei: allow set_root() to produce errors
namei: allow nd_jump_link() to produce errors
nsfs: clean-up ns_get_path() signature to return int
namei: only return -ECHILD from follow_dotdot_rcu()
Pull x86 resource control updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main change in this tree is the extension of the resctrl procfs
ABI with a new file that helps tooling to navigate from tasks back to
resctrl groups: /proc/{pid}/cpu_resctrl_groups.
Also fix static key usage for certain feature combinations and
simplify the task exit resctrl case"
* 'x86-cache-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/resctrl: Add task resctrl information display
x86/resctrl: Check monitoring static key in the MBM overflow handler
x86/resctrl: Do not reconfigure exiting tasks
Monitoring tools that want to find out which resctrl control and monitor
groups a task belongs to must currently read the "tasks" file in every
group until they locate the process ID.
Add an additional file /proc/{pid}/cpu_resctrl_groups to provide this
information:
1) res:
mon:
resctrl is not available.
2) res:/
mon:
Task is part of the root resctrl control group, and it is not associated
to any monitor group.
3) res:/
mon:mon0
Task is part of the root resctrl control group and monitor group mon0.
4) res:group0
mon:
Task is part of resctrl control group group0, and it is not associated
to any monitor group.
5) res:group0
mon:mon1
Task is part of resctrl control group group0 and monitor group mon1.
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Jinshi Chen <jinshi.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200115092851.14761-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com
This patch provides a /proc/<pid>/attr/apparmor/
subdirectory. Enabling userspace to use the apparmor attributes
without having to worry about collisions with selinux or smack on
interface files in /proc/<pid>/attr.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
API to set time namespace offsets for children processes, i.e.:
echo "$clockid $offset_sec $offset_nsec" > /proc/self/timens_offsets
Co-developed-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112012724.250792-28-dima@arista.com
In preparation for LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, it's necessary to add the
ability for nd_jump_link() to return an error which the corresponding
get_link() caller must propogate back up to the VFS.
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This fixes two problems reported with the cmdline simplification and
cleanup last year:
- the setproctitle() special cases didn't quite match the original
semantics, and it can be noticeable:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/alpine.LNX.2.21.1904052326230.3249@kich.toxcorp.com/
- it could leak an uninitialized byte from the temporary buffer under
the right (wrong) circustances:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190712160913.17727-1-izbyshev@ispras.ru/
It rewrites the logic entirely, splitting it into two separate commits
(and two separate functions) for the two different cases ("unedited
cmdline" vs "setproctitle() has been used to change the command line").
* proc-cmdline:
/proc/<pid>/cmdline: add back the setproctitle() special case
/proc/<pid>/cmdline: remove all the special cases
This makes the setproctitle() special case very explicit indeed, and
handles it with a separate helper function entirely. In the process, it
re-instates the original semantics of simply stopping at the first NUL
character when the original last NUL character is no longer there.
[ The original semantics can still be seen in mm/util.c: get_cmdline()
that is limited to a fixed-size buffer ]
This makes the logic about when we use the string lengths etc much more
obvious, and makes it easier to see what we do and what the two very
different cases are.
Note that even when we allow walking past the end of the argument array
(because the setproctitle() might have overwritten and overflowed the
original argv[] strings), we only allow it when it overflows into the
environment region if it is immediately adjacent.
[ Fixed for missing 'count' checks noted by Alexey Izbyshev ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/alpine.LNX.2.21.1904052326230.3249@kich.toxcorp.com/
Fixes: 5ab8271899 ("fs/proc: simplify and clarify get_mm_cmdline() function")
Cc: Jakub Jankowski <shasta@toxcorp.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Start off with a clean slate that only reads exactly from arg_start to
arg_end, without any oddities. This simplifies the code and in the
process removes the case that caused us to potentially leak an
uninitialized byte from the temporary kernel buffer.
Note that in order to start from scratch with an understandable base,
this simplifies things _too_ much, and removes all the legacy logic to
handle setproctitle() having changed the argument strings.
We'll add back those special cases very differently in the next commit.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190712160913.17727-1-izbyshev@ispras.ru/
Fixes: f5b65348fd ("proc: fix missing final NUL in get_mm_cmdline() rewrite")
Cc: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
oom_unkillable_task() can be called from three different contexts i.e.
global OOM, memcg OOM and oom_score procfs interface. At the moment
oom_unkillable_task() does a task_in_mem_cgroup() check on the given
process. Since there is no reason to perform task_in_mem_cgroup()
check for global OOM and oom_score procfs interface, those contexts
provide NULL memcg and skips the task_in_mem_cgroup() check. However
for memcg OOM context, the oom_unkillable_task() is always called from
mem_cgroup_scan_tasks() and thus task_in_mem_cgroup() check becomes
redundant and effectively dead code. So, just remove the
task_in_mem_cgroup() check altogether.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190624212631.87212-2-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Do not remain stuck forever if something goes wrong. Using a killable
lock permits cleanup of stuck tasks and simplifies investigation.
It seems ->d_revalidate() could return any error (except ECHILD) to abort
validation and pass error as result of lookup sequence.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix proc_map_files_lookup() return value, per Andrei]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156007493995.3335.9595044802115356911.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 AVX512 status update from Ingo Molnar:
"This adds a new ABI that the main scheduler probably doesn't want to
deal with but HPC job schedulers might want to use: the
AVX512_elapsed_ms field in the new /proc/<pid>/arch_status task status
file, which allows the user-space job scheduler to cluster such tasks,
to avoid turbo frequency drops"
* 'x86-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt: Add arch_status file
x86/process: Add AVX-512 usage elapsed time to /proc/pid/arch_status
proc: Add /proc/<pid>/arch_status
Remove the d_is_dir() check from tgid_pidfd_to_pid().
It is pointless since you should never get &proc_tgid_base_operations
for f_op on a non-directory.
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Exposing architecture specific per process information is useful for
various reasons. An example is the AVX512 usage on x86 which is important
for task placement for power/performance optimizations.
Adding this information to the existing /prcc/pid/status file would be the
obvious choise, but it has been agreed on that a explicit arch_status file
is better in separating the generic and architecture specific information.
[ tglx: Massage changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Aubrey Li <aubrey.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
Cc: adobriyan@gmail.com
Cc: aubrey.li@intel.com
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606012236.9391-1-aubrey.li@linux.intel.com
The name clear_all_latency_tracing is misleading, in fact which only
clear per task's latency_record[], and we do have another function named
clear_global_latency_tracing which clear the global latency_record[]
buffer.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190226114602.16902-1-linf@wangsu.com
Signed-off-by: Lin Feng <linf@wangsu.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
