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687 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexander Potapenko
6471384af2 mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10.

Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options.

These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.

Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the
page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes.  SLOB allocator
isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates
handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly.

Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are
initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access
stale data by using a dangling pointer.

As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to
disable initialization for certain allocations.  There's not enough
evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways
to opt-out may result in things going out of control.

This patch (of 2):

The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make
control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic.

This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS.  And it
gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the
boot args.  (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks
where memory forensics is included in their threat models.)

init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap
objects with zeroes.  Initialization is done at allocation time at the
places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed.

init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects
with zeroes upon their deletion.  This helps to ensure sensitive data
doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses.

Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator
returns zeroed memory.  The two exceptions are slab caches with
constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag.  Those are never
zero-initialized to preserve their semantics.

Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults
can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON.

If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take
precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only
applied to unpoisoned allocations.

Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0:

hackbench, init_on_free=1:  +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%)
hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%)

Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1:  +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%)
Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%)

The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline
is within the standard error.

The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory
tagging (e.g.  arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free
hooks to set the tags for heap objects.  With MTE, tagging will have the
same cost as memory initialization.

Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where
in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized.  There are various
arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but
given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are
people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost,
it seems reasonable to include it in this series.

[glider@google.com: v8]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v9]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com
[glider@google.com: v10]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>		[page and dmapool parts
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>]
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:46 -07:00
Roman Gushchin
6cea1d569d mm: memcg/slab: unify SLAB and SLUB page accounting
Currently the page accounting code is duplicated in SLAB and SLUB
internals.  Let's move it into new (un)charge_slab_page helpers in the
slab_common.c file.  These helpers will be responsible for statistics
(global and memcg-aware) and memcg charging.  So they are replacing direct
memcg_(un)charge_slab() calls.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190611231813.3148843-6-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:44 -07:00
Roman Gushchin
4348669475 mm: memcg/slab: generalize postponed non-root kmem_cache deactivation
Currently SLUB uses a work scheduled after an RCU grace period to
deactivate a non-root kmem_cache.  This mechanism can be reused for
kmem_caches release, but requires generalization for SLAB case.

Introduce kmemcg_cache_deactivate() function, which calls
allocator-specific __kmem_cache_deactivate() and schedules execution of
__kmem_cache_deactivate_after_rcu() with all necessary locks in a worker
context after an rcu grace period.

Here is the new calling scheme:
  kmemcg_cache_deactivate()
    __kmemcg_cache_deactivate()                  SLAB/SLUB-specific
    kmemcg_rcufn()                               rcu
      kmemcg_workfn()                            work
        __kmemcg_cache_deactivate_after_rcu()    SLAB/SLUB-specific

instead of:
  __kmemcg_cache_deactivate()                    SLAB/SLUB-specific
    slab_deactivate_memcg_cache_rcu_sched()      SLUB-only
      kmemcg_rcufn()                             rcu
        kmemcg_workfn()                          work
          kmemcg_cache_deact_after_rcu()         SLUB-only

For consistency, all allocator-specific functions start with "__".

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190611231813.3148843-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:44 -07:00
Roman Gushchin
c03914b7aa mm: memcg/slab: postpone kmem_cache memcg pointer initialization to memcg_link_cache()
Patch series "mm: reparent slab memory on cgroup removal", v7.

# Why do we need this?

We've noticed that the number of dying cgroups is steadily growing on most
of our hosts in production.  The following investigation revealed an issue
in the userspace memory reclaim code [1], accounting of kernel stacks [2],
and also the main reason: slab objects.

The underlying problem is quite simple: any page charged to a cgroup holds
a reference to it, so the cgroup can't be reclaimed unless all charged
pages are gone.  If a slab object is actively used by other cgroups, it
won't be reclaimed, and will prevent the origin cgroup from being
reclaimed.

Slab objects, and first of all vfs cache, is shared between cgroups, which
are using the same underlying fs, and what's even more important, it's
shared between multiple generations of the same workload.  So if something
is running periodically every time in a new cgroup (like how systemd
works), we do accumulate multiple dying cgroups.

Strictly speaking pagecache isn't different here, but there is a key
difference: we disable protection and apply some extra pressure on LRUs of
dying cgroups, and these LRUs contain all charged pages.  My experiments
show that with the disabled kernel memory accounting the number of dying
cgroups stabilizes at a relatively small number (~100, depends on memory
pressure and cgroup creation rate), and with kernel memory accounting it
grows pretty steadily up to several thousands.

Memory cgroups are quite complex and big objects (mostly due to percpu
stats), so it leads to noticeable memory losses.  Memory occupied by dying
cgroups is measured in hundreds of megabytes.  I've even seen a host with
more than 100Gb of memory wasted for dying cgroups.  It leads to a
degradation of performance with the uptime, and generally limits the usage
of cgroups.

My previous attempt [3] to fix the problem by applying extra pressure on
slab shrinker lists caused a regressions with xfs and ext4, and has been
reverted [4].  The following attempts to find the right balance [5, 6]
were not successful.

So instead of trying to find a maybe non-existing balance, let's do
reparent accounted slab caches to the parent cgroup on cgroup removal.

# Implementation approach

There is however a significant problem with reparenting of slab memory:
there is no list of charged pages.  Some of them are in shrinker lists,
but not all.  Introducing of a new list is really not an option.

But fortunately there is a way forward: every slab page has a stable
pointer to the corresponding kmem_cache.  So the idea is to reparent
kmem_caches instead of slab pages.

It's actually simpler and cheaper, but requires some underlying changes:
1) Make kmem_caches to hold a single reference to the memory cgroup,
   instead of a separate reference per every slab page.
2) Stop setting page->mem_cgroup pointer for memcg slab pages and use
   page->kmem_cache->memcg indirection instead. It's used only on
   slab page release, so performance overhead shouldn't be a big issue.
3) Introduce a refcounter for non-root slab caches. It's required to
   be able to destroy kmem_caches when they become empty and release
   the associated memory cgroup.

There is a bonus: currently we release all memcg kmem_caches all together
with the memory cgroup itself.  This patchset allows individual
kmem_caches to be released as soon as they become inactive and free.

Some additional implementation details are provided in corresponding
commit messages.

# Results

Below is the average number of dying cgroups on two groups of our
production hosts.  They do run some sort of web frontend workload, the
memory pressure is moderate.  As we can see, with the kernel memory
reparenting the number stabilizes in 60s range; however with the original
version it grows almost linearly and doesn't show any signs of plateauing.
The difference in slab and percpu usage between patched and unpatched
versions also grows linearly.  In 7 days it exceeded 200Mb.

day           0    1    2    3    4    5    6    7
original     56  362  628  752 1070 1250 1490 1560
patched      23   46   51   55   60   57   67   69
mem diff(Mb) 22   74  123  152  164  182  214  241

# Links

[1]: commit 68600f623d ("mm: don't miss the last page because of round-off error")
[2]: commit 9b6f7e163c ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting")
[3]: commit 172b06c32b ("mm: slowly shrink slabs with a relatively small number of objects")
[4]: commit a9a238e83f ("Revert "mm: slowly shrink slabs with a relatively small number of objects")
[5]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/1/28/1865
[6]: https://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=155064763626437&w=2

This patch (of 10):

Initialize kmem_cache->memcg_params.memcg pointer in memcg_link_cache()
rather than in init_memcg_params().

Once kmem_cache will hold a reference to the memory cgroup, it will
simplify the refcounting.

For non-root kmem_caches memcg_link_cache() is always called before the
kmem_cache becomes visible to a user, so it's safe.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190611231813.3148843-2-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:43 -07:00
Marco Elver
10d1f8cb39 mm/slab: refactor common ksize KASAN logic into slab_common.c
This refactors common code of ksize() between the various allocators into
slab_common.c: __ksize() is the allocator-specific implementation without
instrumentation, whereas ksize() includes the required KASAN logic.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-5-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:42 -07:00
Kees Cook
a64b53780e mm/slab: sanity-check page type when looking up cache
This avoids any possible type confusion when looking up an object.  For
example, if a non-slab were to be passed to kfree(), the invalid
slab_cache pointer (i.e.  overlapped with some other value from the
struct page union) would be used for subsequent slab manipulations that
could lead to further memory corruption.

Since the page is already in cache, adding the PageSlab() check will
have nearly zero cost, so add a check and WARN() to virt_to_cache().
Additionally replaces an open-coded virt_to_cache().  To support the
failure mode this also updates all callers of virt_to_cache() and
cache_from_obj() to handle a NULL cache pointer return value (though
note that several already handle this case gracefully).

[dan.carpenter@oracle.com: restore IRQs in kfree()]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190613065637.GE16334@mwanda
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530045017.15252-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-12 11:05:41 -07:00
Qian Cai
7878c231da slab: remove /proc/slab_allocators
It turned out that DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK is still broken even after recent
recue efforts that when there is a large number of objects like
kmemleak_object which is normal on a debug kernel,

  # grep kmemleak /proc/slabinfo
  kmemleak_object   2243606 3436210 ...

reading /proc/slab_allocators could easily loop forever while processing
the kmemleak_object cache and any additional freeing or allocating
objects will trigger a reprocessing. To make a situation worse,
soft-lockups could easily happen in this sitatuion which will call
printk() to allocate more kmemleak objects to guarantee an infinite
loop.

Also, since it seems no one had noticed when it was totally broken
more than 2-year ago - see the commit fcf88917dd ("slab: fix a crash
by reading /proc/slab_allocators"), probably nobody cares about it
anymore due to the decline of the SLAB. Just remove it entirely.

Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-16 15:51:55 -07:00
Qian Cai
745e10146c mm/slab.c: fix an infinite loop in leaks_show()
"cat /proc/slab_allocators" could hang forever on SMP machines with
kmemleak or object debugging enabled due to other CPUs running do_drain()
will keep making kmemleak_object or debug_objects_cache dirty and unable
to escape the first loop in leaks_show(),

do {
	set_store_user_clean(cachep);
	drain_cpu_caches(cachep);
	...

} while (!is_store_user_clean(cachep));

For example,

do_drain
  slabs_destroy
    slab_destroy
      kmem_cache_free
        __cache_free
          ___cache_free
            kmemleak_free_recursive
              delete_object_full
                __delete_object
                  put_object
                    free_object_rcu
                      kmem_cache_free
                        cache_free_debugcheck --> dirty kmemleak_object

One approach is to check cachep->name and skip both kmemleak_object and
debug_objects_cache in leaks_show().  The other is to set store_user_clean
after drain_cpu_caches() which leaves a small window between
drain_cpu_caches() and set_store_user_clean() where per-CPU caches could
be dirty again lead to slightly wrong information has been stored but
could also speed up things significantly which sounds like a good
compromise.  For example,

 # cat /proc/slab_allocators
 0m42.778s # 1st approach
 0m0.737s  # 2nd approach

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411032635.10325-1-cai@lca.pw
Fixes: d31676dfde ("mm/slab: alternative implementation for DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 09:47:45 -07:00
Li RongQing
517f9f1ee5 mm/slab.c: remove unneed check in cpuup_canceled
nc is a member of percpu allocation memory, and cannot be NULL.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1553159353-5056-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 09:47:45 -07:00
Tobin C. Harding
16cb0ec75b slab: use slab_list instead of lru
Currently we use the page->lru list for maintaining lists of slabs.  We
have a list in the page structure (slab_list) that can be used for this
purpose.  Doing so makes the code cleaner since we are not overloading the
lru list.

Use the slab_list instead of the lru list for maintaining lists of slabs.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190402230545.2929-7-tobin@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 09:47:45 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
8f14772703 Merge branch 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 irq updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Here are the main changes in this tree:

   - Introduce x86-64 IRQ/exception/debug stack guard pages to detect
     stack overflows immediately and deterministically.

   - Clean up over a decade worth of cruft accumulated.

  The outcome of this should be more clear-cut faults/crashes when any
  of the low level x86 CPU stacks overflow, instead of silent memory
  corruption and sporadic failures much later on"

* 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits)
  x86/irq: Fix outdated comments
  x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug code
  x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages
  x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages
  x86/irq/64: Init hardirq_stack_ptr during CPU hotplug
  x86/irq/32: Handle irq stack allocation failure proper
  x86/irq/32: Invoke irq_ctx_init() from init_IRQ()
  x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr
  x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr
  x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array
  x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE
  x86/dumpstack/64: Speedup in_exception_stack()
  x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack
  x86/exceptions: Enable IST guard pages
  x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order
  x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array
  x86/cpu: Prepare TSS.IST setup for guard pages
  x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
  x86/irq/64: Use cpu entry area instead of orig_ist
  x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
  ...
2019-05-06 15:56:41 -07:00
Qian Cai
1a62b18d51 slab: store tagged freelist for off-slab slabmgmt
Commit 51dedad06b ("kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags")
calls kasan_reset_tag() for off-slab slab management object leading to
freelist being stored non-tagged.

However, cache_grow_begin() calls alloc_slabmgmt() which calls
kmem_cache_alloc_node() assigns a tag for the address and stores it in
the shadow address.  As the result, it causes endless errors below
during boot due to drain_freelist() -> slab_destroy() ->
kasan_slab_free() which compares already untagged freelist against the
stored tag in the shadow address.

Since off-slab slab management object freelist is such a special case,
just store it tagged.  Non-off-slab management object freelist is still
stored untagged which has not been assigned a tag and should not cause
any other troubles with this inconsistency.

  BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in slab_destroy+0x84/0x88
  Pointer tag: [ff], memory tag: [99]

  CPU: 0 PID: 1376 Comm: kworker/0:4 Tainted: G        W 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
  Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70             /C01_APACHE_MB         , BIOS L50_5.13_1.0.6 07/10/2018
  Workqueue: cgroup_destroy css_killed_work_fn
  Call trace:
   print_address_description+0x74/0x2a4
   kasan_report_invalid_free+0x80/0xc0
   __kasan_slab_free+0x204/0x208
   kasan_slab_free+0xc/0x18
   kmem_cache_free+0xe4/0x254
   slab_destroy+0x84/0x88
   drain_freelist+0xd0/0x104
   __kmem_cache_shrink+0x1ac/0x224
   __kmemcg_cache_deactivate+0x1c/0x28
   memcg_deactivate_kmem_caches+0xa0/0xe8
   memcg_offline_kmem+0x8c/0x3d4
   mem_cgroup_css_offline+0x24c/0x290
   css_killed_work_fn+0x154/0x618
   process_one_work+0x9cc/0x183c
   worker_thread+0x9b0/0xe38
   kthread+0x374/0x390
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

  Allocated by task 1625:
   __kasan_kmalloc+0x168/0x240
   kasan_slab_alloc+0x18/0x20
   kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1f8/0x3a0
   cache_grow_begin+0x4fc/0xa24
   cache_alloc_refill+0x2f8/0x3e8
   kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bc/0x3bc
   sock_alloc_inode+0x58/0x334
   alloc_inode+0xb8/0x164
   new_inode_pseudo+0x20/0xec
   sock_alloc+0x74/0x284
   __sock_create+0xb0/0x58c
   sock_create+0x98/0xb8
   __sys_socket+0x60/0x138
   __arm64_sys_socket+0xa4/0x110
   el0_svc_handler+0x2c0/0x47c
   el0_svc+0x8/0xc

  Freed by task 1625:
   __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x208
   kasan_slab_free+0xc/0x18
   kfree+0x1a8/0x1e0
   single_release+0x7c/0x9c
   close_pdeo+0x13c/0x43c
   proc_reg_release+0xec/0x108
   __fput+0x2f8/0x784
   ____fput+0x1c/0x28
   task_work_run+0xc0/0x1b0
   do_notify_resume+0xb44/0x1278
   work_pending+0x8/0x10

  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff809681b89e00
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
   128-byte region [ffff809681b89e00, ffff809681b89e80)
  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:ffff7fe025a06e00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:01ff80082000fb00
  index:0xffff809681b8fe04
  flags: 0x17ffffffc000200(slab)
  raw: 017ffffffc000200 ffff7fe025a06d08 ffff7fe022ef7b88 01ff80082000fb00
  raw: ffff809681b8fe04 ffff809681b80000 00000001000000e0 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
  page allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask
  0x2420c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_THISNODE)
   prep_new_page+0x4e0/0x5e0
   get_page_from_freelist+0x4ce8/0x50d4
   __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x738/0x38b8
   cache_grow_begin+0xd8/0xa24
   ____cache_alloc_node+0x14c/0x268
   __kmalloc+0x1c8/0x3fc
   ftrace_free_mem+0x408/0x1284
   ftrace_free_init_mem+0x20/0x28
   kernel_init+0x24/0x548
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff809681b89c00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
   ffff809681b89d00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
  >ffff809681b89e00: 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
                     ^
   ffff809681b89f00: 43 43 43 43 43 fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
   ffff809681b8a000: 6d fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190403022858.97584-1-cai@lca.pw
Fixes: 51dedad06b ("kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-04-19 09:46:04 -07:00
Qian Cai
80552f0f7a mm/slab: Remove store_stackinfo()
store_stackinfo() does not seem used in actual SLAB debugging.
Potentially, it could be added to check_poison_obj() to provide more
information but this seems like an overkill due to the declining
popularity of SLAB, so just remove it instead.

Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: rientjes@google.com
Cc: sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190416142258.18694-1-cai@lca.pw
2019-04-17 11:46:27 +02:00
Qian Cai
fcf88917dd slab: fix a crash by reading /proc/slab_allocators
The commit 510ded33e0 ("slab: implement slab_root_caches list")
changes the name of the list node within "struct kmem_cache" from "list"
to "root_caches_node", but leaks_show() still use the "list" which
causes a crash when reading /proc/slab_allocators.

You need to have CONFIG_SLAB=y and CONFIG_MEMCG=y to see the problem,
because without MEMCG all slab caches are root caches, and the "list"
node happens to be the right one.

Fixes: 510ded33e0 ("slab: implement slab_root_caches list")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-04-07 19:23:12 -10:00
Nicolas Boichat
6d6ea1e967 mm: add support for kmem caches in DMA32 zone
Patch series "iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s: Use DMA32 zone for page tables",
v6.

This is a followup to the discussion in [1], [2].

IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables (level 1
and 2) to be allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit
systems.

For L1 tables that are bigger than a page, we can just use
__get_free_pages with GFP_DMA32 (on arm64 systems only, arm would still
use GFP_DMA).

For L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate a full
page, so we considered 3 approaches:
 1. This series, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches.
 2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2 page
    tables (4096, so 4MB of memory).
 3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable to reuse
    freed fragments until the whole page is freed. [3]

This series is the most memory-efficient approach.

stable@ note:
  We confirmed that this is a regression, and IOMMU errors happen on 4.19
  and linux-next/master on MT8173 (elm, Acer Chromebook R13). The issue
  most likely starts from commit ad67f5a654 ("arm64: replace ZONE_DMA
  with ZONE_DMA32"), i.e. 4.15, and presumably breaks a number of Mediatek
  platforms (and maybe others?).

[1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-November/030876.html
[2] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/iommu/2018-December/031696.html
[3] https://patchwork.codeaurora.org/patch/671639/

This patch (of 3):

IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables to be
allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit systems.  On arm64,
this is done by passing GFP_DMA32 flag to memory allocation functions.

For IOMMU L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate
a full page using get_free_pages, so we considered 3 approaches:
 1. This patch, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches.
 2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2
    page tables (4096, so 4MB of memory).
 3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable
    to reuse freed fragments until the whole page is freed.

This change makes it possible to create a custom cache in DMA32 zone using
kmem_cache_create, then allocate memory using kmem_cache_alloc.

We do not create a DMA32 kmalloc cache array, as there are currently no
users of kmalloc(..., GFP_DMA32).  These calls will continue to trigger a
warning, as we keep GFP_DMA32 in GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK.

This implies that calls to kmem_cache_*alloc on a SLAB_CACHE_DMA32
kmem_cache must _not_ use GFP_DMA32 (it is anyway redundant and
unnecessary).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210011504.122604-2-drinkcat@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Sasha Levin <Alexander.Levin@microsoft.com>
Cc: Huaisheng Ye <yehs1@lenovo.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Yong Wu <yong.wu@mediatek.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@google.com>
Cc: Yingjoe Chen <yingjoe.chen@mediatek.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-29 10:01:37 -07:00
Mike Rapoport
a862f68a8b docs/core-api/mm: fix return value descriptions in mm/
Many kernel-doc comments in mm/ have the return value descriptions
either misformatted or omitted at all which makes kernel-doc script
unhappy:

$ make V=1 htmldocs
...
./mm/util.c:36: info: Scanning doc for kstrdup
./mm/util.c:41: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrdup'
./mm/util.c:57: info: Scanning doc for kstrdup_const
./mm/util.c:66: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrdup_const'
./mm/util.c:75: info: Scanning doc for kstrndup
./mm/util.c:83: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrndup'
...

Fixing the formatting and adding the missing return value descriptions
eliminates ~100 such warnings.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1549549644-4903-4-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 21:07:20 -08:00
Alexey Dobriyan
b9726c26dc numa: make "nr_node_ids" unsigned int
Number of NUMA nodes can't be negative.

This saves a few bytes on x86_64:

	add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 4/21 up/down: 27/-265 (-238)
	Function                                     old     new   delta
	hv_synic_alloc.cold                           88     110     +22
	prealloc_shrinker                            260     262      +2
	bootstrap                                    249     251      +2
	sched_init_numa                             1566    1567      +1
	show_slab_objects                            778     777      -1
	s_show                                      1201    1200      -1
	kmem_cache_init                              346     345      -1
	__alloc_workqueue_key                       1146    1145      -1
	mem_cgroup_css_alloc                        1614    1612      -2
	__do_sys_swapon                             4702    4699      -3
	__list_lru_init                              655     651      -4
	nic_probe                                   2379    2374      -5
	store_user_store                             118     111      -7
	red_zone_store                               106      99      -7
	poison_store                                 106      99      -7
	wq_numa_init                                 348     338     -10
	__kmem_cache_empty                            75      65     -10
	task_numa_free                               186     173     -13
	merge_across_nodes_store                     351     336     -15
	irq_create_affinity_masks                   1261    1246     -15
	do_numa_crng_init                            343     321     -22
	task_numa_fault                             4760    4737     -23
	swapfile_init                                179     156     -23
	hv_synic_alloc                               536     492     -44
	apply_wqattrs_prepare                        746     695     -51

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201223029.GA15820@avx2
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 21:07:19 -08:00
Qian Cai
92d1d07daa mm/slab.c: kmemleak no scan alien caches
Kmemleak throws endless warnings during boot due to in
__alloc_alien_cache(),

    alc = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
    init_arraycache(&alc->ac, entries, batch);
    kmemleak_no_scan(ac);

Kmemleak does not track the array cache (alc->ac) but the alien cache
(alc) instead, so let it track the latter by lifting kmemleak_no_scan()
out of init_arraycache().

There is another place that calls init_arraycache(), but
alloc_kmem_cache_cpus() uses the percpu allocation where will never be
considered as a leak.

  kmemleak: Found object by alias at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38
  CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
   show_stack+0x24/0x30
   dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
   lookup_object+0x84/0xac
   find_and_get_object+0x84/0xe4
   kmemleak_no_scan+0x74/0xf4
   setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
   __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
   do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
   enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
   setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
   __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
   create_cache+0xc0/0x198
   kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
   kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
   fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
   do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
   kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
   kernel_init+0x18/0x124
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
  kmemleak: Object 0xffff8007b9aa7e00 (size 256):
  kmemleak:   comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294697137
  kmemleak:   min_count = 1
  kmemleak:   count = 0
  kmemleak:   flags = 0x1
  kmemleak:   checksum = 0
  kmemleak:   backtrace:
       kmemleak_alloc+0x84/0xb8
       kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x31c/0x3a0
       __kmalloc_node+0x58/0x78
       setup_kmem_cache_node+0x26c/0x35c
       __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
       do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
       enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
       setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
       __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
       create_cache+0xc0/0x198
       kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
       kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
       fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
       do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
       kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
       kernel_init+0x18/0x124
  kmemleak: Not scanning unknown object at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38
  CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
   show_stack+0x24/0x30
   dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
   kmemleak_no_scan+0x90/0xf4
   setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
   __do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
   do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
   enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
   setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
   __kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
   create_cache+0xc0/0x198
   kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
   kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
   fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
   do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
   kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
   kernel_init+0x18/0x124
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190129184518.39808-1-cai@lca.pw
Fixes: 1fe00d50a9 ("slab: factor out initialization of array cache")
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 21:07:14 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
557ea25383 kasan, slab: remove redundant kasan_slab_alloc hooks
kasan_slab_alloc() calls in kmem_cache_alloc() and kmem_cache_alloc_node()
are redundant as they are already called via slab_alloc/slab_alloc_node()->
slab_post_alloc_hook()->kasan_slab_alloc().  Remove them.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4ca1655cdcfc4379c49c50f7bf80f81c4ad01485.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21 09:01:00 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
51dedad06b kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags
Similarly to "kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before
page_address", move kasan_poison_slab() before alloc_slabmgmt(), which
calls page_address(), to make page_address() return value to be
non-tagged.  This, combined with calling kasan_reset_tag() for off-slab
slab management object, leads to freelist being stored non-tagged.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dfb53b44a4d00de3879a05a9f04c1f55e584f7a1.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21 09:01:00 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
219667c23c kasan, slab: fix conflicts with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
Similarly to commit 96fedce27e ("kasan: make tag based mode work with
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY"), we need to reset pointer tags in
__check_heap_object() in mm/slab.c before doing any pointer math.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a5c0f958db10e69df5ff9f2b997866b56b7effc.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-21 09:01:00 -08:00
Christoph Lameter
09c2e76ed7 slab: alien caches must not be initialized if the allocation of the alien cache failed
Callers of __alloc_alien() check for NULL.  We must do the same check in
__alloc_alien_cache to avoid NULL pointer dereferences on allocation
failures.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/010001680f42f192-82b4e12e-1565-4ee0-ae1f-1e98974906aa-000000@email.amazonses.com
Fixes: 49dfc304ba ("slab: use the lock on alien_cache, instead of the lock on array_cache")
Fixes: c8522a3a58 ("Slab: introduce alloc_alien")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+d6ed4ec679652b4fd4e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-08 17:15:11 -08:00
Arun KS
ca79b0c211 mm: convert totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages variables to atomic
totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.

Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things.  It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:47 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
2813b9c029 kasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc
Tag-based KASAN doesn't check memory accesses through pointers tagged with
0xff.  When page_address is used to get pointer to memory that corresponds
to some page, the tag of the resulting pointer gets set to 0xff, even
though the allocated memory might have been tagged differently.

For slab pages it's impossible to recover the correct tag to return from
page_address, since the page might contain multiple slab objects tagged
with different values, and we can't know in advance which one of them is
going to get accessed.  For non slab pages however, we can recover the tag
in page_address, since the whole page was marked with the same tag.

This patch adds tagging to non slab memory allocated with pagealloc.  To
set the tag of the pointer returned from page_address, the tag gets stored
to page->flags when the memory gets allocated.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d758ddcef46a5abc9970182b9137e2fbee202a2c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
5b7c414822 mm: move obj_to_index to include/linux/slab_def.h
While with SLUB we can actually preassign tags for caches with contructors
and store them in pointers in the freelist, SLAB doesn't allow that since
the freelist is stored as an array of indexes, so there are no pointers to
store the tags.

Instead we compute the tag twice, once when a slab is created before
calling the constructor and then again each time when an object is
allocated with kmalloc.  Tag is computed simply by taking the lowest byte
of the index that corresponds to the object.  However in kasan_kmalloc we
only have access to the objects pointer, so we need a way to find out
which index this object corresponds to.

This patch moves obj_to_index from slab.c to include/linux/slab_def.h to
be reused by KASAN.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c02cd9e574cfd93858e43ac94b05e38f891fef64.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:44 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
4d176711ea kasan: preassign tags to objects with ctors or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
An object constructor can initialize pointers within this objects based on
the address of the object.  Since the object address might be tagged, we
need to assign a tag before calling constructor.

The implemented approach is to assign tags to objects with constructors
when a slab is allocated and call constructors once as usual.  The
downside is that such object would always have the same tag when it is
reallocated, so we won't catch use-after-frees on it.

Also pressign tags for objects from SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches, since
they can be validy accessed after having been freed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f158a8a74a031d66f0a9398a5b0ed453c37ba09a.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:43 -08:00
Andrey Konovalov
0116523cff kasan, mm: change hooks signatures
Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13.

This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1].  (Initially
this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale
at the end of this section).

The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive,
that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same
time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug
detection and being supported only for arm64.

The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are:

1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store
   pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer.

2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel
   memory.

3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into
   the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this
   chunk of memory to the same value.

4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add
   a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being
   accessed.

5. On a tag mismatch we report an error.

With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN,
with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported
by any architecture as it is purely software.

The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN.  The
word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into
the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows
to dereference such pointers.  The word "software" here means that shadow
memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in
software.  As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software
tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this
patchset.

A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which
would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead
of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation.

Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging
feature.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html

[2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html

[3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a

====== Rationale

On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem.
One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a
similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory
requirements.

Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>:

I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven
problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased
memory pressure well.  This includes

(a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go,
(c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1].

These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at
my disposal.

Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>:

Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to
/proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB).  KASAN's
overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant.

Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex.  running
KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do
not reproduce in test configuration.  These are the ones that often cost
the most engineering time to track down.

CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable.  RAM is critical, in our
experience.  Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life
miserable.

[1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/

====== Technical details

Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the
generic one. This patchset essentially does the following:

1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore.

2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow
   byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags.

3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes.

4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random
   tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value.

5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by
   calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and
   CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused).

6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode
   KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation,
   clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler,
   which reports the bug.

7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and
   acts as a redzone.

8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag.

Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons:

1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the
   same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object.

2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256
   probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even
   slightly less due to reserved tag values).

Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can
detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been
allocated by someone else.

====== Testing

Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of
kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover.
To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed.

It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find
potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken.
All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM
compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever
two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring
comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an
error code to a pointer type) has been used.  Then the kernel has been
booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run.

This yielded the following results.

The two places that look interesting are:

is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h
is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c

Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure
that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space.
Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata
or vmalloc regions, this should work as is.  To make sure debug checks to
those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we
operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added.

A few other cases that don't look that interesting:

Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects
(e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock):

tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c
pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c
unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c
lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c
mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c

ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c
fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c

Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers
don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique.

Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation:

is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c
object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h

Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong
to the same allocation if they have the same tag.

Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs.
As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is
the only one that looks feasible.

Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate
config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might
be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found
during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool.

====== Benchmarks

The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and
tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode.

Boot time [1]:
* ~1.7 sec for clean kernel
* ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN
* ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN

Network performance [2]:
* 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel
* 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN
* 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN

Slab memory usage after boot [3]:
* ~40 kb for clean kernel
* ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN
* ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN

KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts:
1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones.
2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot).
3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit,
   the more the chance to detect a use-after-free).

Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points:
1. 20% vs 260% overhead.
2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory.
3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine.

[1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized.
[2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`.
[3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`.

====== Some notes

A few notes:

1. The patchset can be found here:
   https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan

2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later).

3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later.

This patch (of 25):

Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned
from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc).  This patch
updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to
reflect that.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-12-28 12:11:43 -08:00
Paul E. McKenney
6564a25e6c slab: Replace synchronize_sched() with synchronize_rcu()
Now that synchronize_rcu() waits for preempt-disable regions of code
as well as RCU read-side critical sections, synchronize_sched() can be
replaced by synchronize_rcu().  This commit therefore makes this change.

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org>
2018-11-27 09:21:45 -08:00
Vlastimil Babka
cc252eae85 mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches
Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4.

As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces
kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses
them for dcache external names.  That allows us to repurpose the
NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series.

With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-*
caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting.  More importantly, it
also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages
separate from the regular kmalloc allocations.  The need for proper
accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving
process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs.  Without the
added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the
dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note:
I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc
allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some).  A
pathological case would be e.g.  one 64byte regular allocations with 63
external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not
freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can
thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation.

If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified,
they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding
__GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls.

Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately)
include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening
kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output.  The latter is potentially
an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the
values to be in bytes.

This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme:

...
kmalloc-rcl-4M         0      0 4194304    1 1024 : tunables    1    1    0 : slabdata      0      0      0
...
kmalloc-rcl-96         7     32    128   32    1 : tunables  120   60    8 : slabdata      1      1      0
kmalloc-rcl-64        25    128     64   64    1 : tunables  120   60    8 : slabdata      2      2      0
kmalloc-rcl-32         0      0     32  124    1 : tunables  120   60    8 : slabdata      0      0      0
kmalloc-4M             0      0 4194304    1 1024 : tunables    1    1    0 : slabdata      0      0      0
kmalloc-2M             0      0 2097152    1  512 : tunables    1    1    0 : slabdata      0      0      0
kmalloc-1M             0      0 1048576    1  256 : tunables    1    1    0 : slabdata      0      0      0
...

/proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter:

...
nr_slab_reclaimable 2817
nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781
...
nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0
...

/proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter:

...
Shmem:               564 kB
KReclaimable:      11260 kB
Slab:              18368 kB
SReclaimable:      11260 kB
SUnreclaim:         7108 kB
KernelStack:        1248 kB
...

This patch (of 6):

The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array
kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations.  There are tests for
__GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths.  We can avoid the branches by
combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single
two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type".  This
will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-26 16:26:31 -07:00
Dmitry Vyukov
61448479a9 mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab
Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE,
instead it falls back to kmalloc_large().

For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls
kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for
over-sized allocations.

This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for
over-sized allocations for slab.  Returning NULL for failed allocations is
the expected behavior.

Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size >
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab().

While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab().  We should check
against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.  It all kinda
worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks
the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab().  But if we
get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will
happen.  For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code.

Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size >
192 case.  This partially compensates for the additional check in slab
code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically).

Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check.  This warning means a bug in
slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it.

Nothing of this affects slob.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927171502.226522-1-dvyukov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+87829a10073277282ad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+ef4e8fc3a06e9019bb40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6e438f4036df52cbb863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+8574471d8734457d98aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+af1504df0807a083dbd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-10-26 16:25:19 -07:00
Kees Cook
6396bb2215 treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kcalloc(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kzalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox
bf68c214df slab,slub: remove rcu_head size checks
rcu_head may now grow larger than list_head without affecting slab or
slub.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518194519.3820-15-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-07 17:34:37 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox
128227e7fe slab: __GFP_ZERO is incompatible with a constructor
__GFP_ZERO requests that the object be initialised to all-zeroes, while
the purpose of a constructor is to initialise an object to a particular
pattern.  We cannot do both.  Add a warning to catch any users who
mistakenly pass a __GFP_ZERO flag when allocating a slab with a
constructor.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180412191322.GA21205@bombadil.infradead.org
Fixes: d07dbea464 ("Slab allocators: support __GFP_ZERO in all allocators")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-07 17:34:34 -07:00
Vlastimil Babka
a9f2a846f0 mm, slab: reschedule cache_reap() on the same CPU
cache_reap() is initially scheduled in start_cpu_timer() via
schedule_delayed_work_on(). But then the next iterations are scheduled
via schedule_delayed_work(), i.e. using WORK_CPU_UNBOUND.

Thus since commit ef55718044 ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND
work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs") there is no guarantee the future
iterations will run on the originally intended cpu, although it's still
preferred.  I was able to demonstrate this with
/sys/module/workqueue/parameters/debug_force_rr_cpu.  IIUC, it may also
happen due to migrating timers in nohz context.  As a result, some cpu's
would be calling cache_reap() more frequently and others never.

This patch uses schedule_delayed_work_on() with the current cpu when
scheduling the next iteration.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180411070007.32225-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Fixes: ef55718044 ("workqueue: schedule WORK_CPU_UNBOUND work on wq_unbound_cpumask CPUs")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-13 17:10:27 -07:00
Shakeel Butt
f9e13c0a5a slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()
The kasan quarantine is designed to delay freeing slab objects to catch
use-after-free.  The quarantine can be large (several percent of machine
memory size).  When kmem_caches are deleted related objects are flushed
from the quarantine but this requires scanning the entire quarantine
which can be very slow.  We have seen the kernel busily working on this
while holding slab_mutex and badly affecting cache_reaper, slabinfo
readers and memcg kmem cache creations.

It can easily reproduced by following script:

	yes . | head -1000000 | xargs stat > /dev/null
	for i in `seq 1 10`; do
		seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs mkdir)
		seq 500 | xargs -I{} sh -c 'echo $BASHPID > \
			/cg/memory/{}/tasks && exec stat .' > /dev/null
		seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs rmdir)
	done

The busy stack:
    kasan_cache_shutdown
    shutdown_cache
    memcg_destroy_kmem_caches
    mem_cgroup_css_free
    css_free_rwork_fn
    process_one_work
    worker_thread
    kthread
    ret_from_fork

This patch is based on the observation that if the kmem_cache to be
destroyed is empty then there should not be any objects of this cache in
the quarantine.

Without the patch the script got stuck for couple of hours.  With the
patch the script completed within a second.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327230603.54721-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:24 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
be4a7988b3 kasan: make kasan_cache_create() work with 32-bit slab cache sizes
If SLAB doesn't support 4GB+ kmem caches (it never did), KASAN should
not do it as well.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-20-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:24 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
0293d1fdd6 slab: make kmem_cache_flags accept 32-bit object size
Now that all sizes are properly typed, propagate "unsigned int" down the
callgraph.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-19-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:24 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
f4957d5bd0 slab: make kmem_cache_create() work with 32-bit sizes
struct kmem_cache::size and ::align were always 32-bit.

Out of curiosity I created 4GB kmem_cache, it oopsed with division by 0.
kmem_cache_create(1UL<<32+1) created 1-byte cache as expected.

size_t doesn't work and never did.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-6-adobriyan@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 21:36:23 -07:00
Shakeel Butt
880cd276df mm, slab: memcg_link the SLAB's kmem_cache
All the root caches are linked into slab_root_caches which was
introduced by the commit 510ded33e0 ("slab: implement slab_root_caches
list") but it missed to add the SLAB's kmem_cache.

While experimenting with opt-in/opt-out kmem accounting, I noticed
system crashes due to NULL dereference inside cache_from_memcg_idx()
while deferencing kmem_cache.memcg_params.memcg_caches.  The upstream
clean kernel will not see these crashes but SLAB should be consistent
with SLUB which does linked its boot caches (kmem_cache_node and
kmem_cache) into slab_root_caches.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180319210020.60289-1-shakeelb@google.com
Fixes: 510ded33e0 ("slab: implement slab_root_caches list")
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-03-28 13:42:05 -10:00
Dmitry Vyukov
ee3ce779b5 kasan: don't use __builtin_return_address(1)
__builtin_return_address(1) is unreliable without frame pointers.
With defconfig on kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free test I am getting:

BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in           (null)

Pass caller PC from callers explicitly.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b01bc2d237a4df74ff8472a3bf6b7635908de01.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-06 18:32:43 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
617aebe6a9 Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
 available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
 restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
 whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
 userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
 that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
 objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
 operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
 sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all
 hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
 
 This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the
 next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
 
 The series has roughly the following sections:
 - remove %p and improve reporting with offset
 - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
 - update VFS subsystem with whitelists
 - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
 - update network subsystem with whitelists
 - update process memory with whitelists
 - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
 - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
 - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
 - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
 
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
 "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
  cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
  available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.

  To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
  a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
  copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
  control.

  Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
  whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
  userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
  whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
  get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
  these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

  This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
  the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.

  The series has roughly the following sections:
   - remove %p and improve reporting with offset
   - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
   - update VFS subsystem with whitelists
   - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
   - update network subsystem with whitelists
   - update process memory with whitelists
   - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
   - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
   - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
   - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
  lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
  usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
  kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
  kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
  arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
  fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
  fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
  fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
  net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
  sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
  sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
  caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
  ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
  net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
  scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
  cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
  vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
  ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
  ...
2018-02-03 16:25:42 -08:00
Oscar Salvador
84ebb5827d mm/slab.c: remove redundant assignments for slab_state
slab_state is being set to "UP" in create_kmalloc_caches(), and later on
we set it again in kmem_cache_init_late(), but slab_state does not
change in the meantime.

Remove the redundant assignment from kmem_cache_init_late().

And unless I overlooked anything, the same goes for "slab_state = FULL".
slab_state is set to "FULL" in kmem_cache_init_late(), but it is later
being set again in cpucache_init(), which gets called from
do_initcall_level().  So remove the assignment from cpucache_init() as
well.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215134452.GA1920@techadventures.net
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@techadventures.net>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-01-31 17:18:35 -08:00
David Windsor
6c0c21adc7 usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches
are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data
to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common,
but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches
as whitelisted.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2018-01-15 12:07:49 -08:00
Kees Cook
2d891fbc3b usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the
behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist
violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy
whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive.

If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with
"slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead
of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists
immediately.

Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:07:48 -08:00
Kees Cook
afcc90f862 usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.

Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:07:48 -08:00
David Windsor
8eb8284b41 usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations
(useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on
my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)

To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size
members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a
new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache
with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields
within the objects that get copied to/from userspace.

In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation
as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained
whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed
to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not
copyable to/from userspace.

After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15%
of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs
after a fresh boot:

Total Slab Memory:           48074720
Usercopyable Memory:          6367532  13.2%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4480/1630720
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%       269760/8740224
         dentry                        11.1%       585984/5273856
         mm_struct                     29.1%         54912/188448
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          81920/81920
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        167936/167936
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        455616/455616
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        812032/812032
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1310720/1310720

After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by
dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%:

Total Slab Memory:           95516184
Usercopyable Memory:          8497452   8.8%
         task_struct                    0.2%         4000/1456000
         RAW                            0.3%            300/96000
         RAWv6                          2.1%           1408/64768
         ext4_inode_cache               3.0%     1217280/39439872
         dentry                        11.1%     1623200/14608800
         mm_struct                     29.1%         73216/251264
         kmalloc-8                    100.0%          24576/24576
         kmalloc-16                   100.0%          28672/28672
         kmalloc-32                   100.0%          94208/94208
         kmalloc-192                  100.0%          96768/96768
         kmalloc-128                  100.0%        143360/143360
         names_cache                  100.0%        163840/163840
         kmalloc-64                   100.0%        245760/245760
         kmalloc-256                  100.0%        339968/339968
         kmalloc-512                  100.0%        350720/350720
         kmalloc-96                   100.0%        563520/563520
         kmalloc-8192                 100.0%        655360/655360
         kmalloc-1024                 100.0%        794624/794624
         kmalloc-4096                 100.0%        819200/819200
         kmalloc-2048                 100.0%      1257472/1257472

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks]
[kees: add field names to function declarations]
[kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed]
[kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
2018-01-15 12:07:47 -08:00
Kees Cook
f4e6e289cb usercopy: Include offset in hardened usercopy report
This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can
happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This
simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets
to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful
in understanding hardened usercopy bugs.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-01-15 12:07:45 -08:00
Geert Uytterhoeven
85c3e4a5a1 mm/slab.c: do not hash pointers when debugging slab
If CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB/CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK are enabled, the slab code
prints extra debug information when e.g.  corruption is detected.  This
includes pointers, which are not very useful when hashed.

Fix this by using %px to print unhashed pointers instead where it makes
sense, and by removing the printing of a last user pointer referring to
code.

[geert+renesas@glider.be: v2]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513179267-2509-1-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512641861-5113-1-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be
Fixes: ad67b74d24 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: "Tobin C . Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-12-14 16:00:48 -08:00
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
75f296d93b kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-15 18:21:04 -08:00
Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin)
4950276672 kmemcheck: remove annotations
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2.

As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck.

KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of
kmemcheck (single CPU, slow).  KASan is already upstream.

We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't
consider KASan as a suitable replacement).

The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC
versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2
years, and try again.

Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports
KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons.

This patch (of 4):

Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel.

[alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-15 18:21:04 -08:00