Commit graph

2417 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Herbert Xu
e61efff4ae crypto: user - Disable statistics interface
Since this user-space API is still undergoing significant changes,
this patch disables it for the current merge window.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-12-07 13:56:08 +08:00
Pan Bian
e5bde04ccc crypto: do not free algorithm before using
In multiple functions, the algorithm fields are read after its reference
is dropped through crypto_mod_put. In this case, the algorithm memory
may be freed, resulting in use-after-free bugs. This patch delays the
put operation until the algorithm is never used.

Fixes: 79c65d179a ("crypto: cbc - Convert to skcipher")
Fixes: a7d85e06ed ("crypto: cfb - add support for Cipher FeedBack mode")
Fixes: 043a44001b ("crypto: pcbc - Convert to skcipher")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-29 14:53:59 +08:00
Corentin Labbe
9f4debe384 crypto: user - Zeroize whole structure given to user space
For preventing uninitialized data to be given to user-space (and so leak
potential useful data), the crypto_stat structure must be correctly
initialized.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: cac5818c25 ("crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics")
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
[EB: also fix it in crypto_reportstat_one()]
[EB: use sizeof(var) rather than sizeof(type)]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-09 17:35:43 +08:00
Eric Biggers
f43f39958b crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace.  The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this.  As a minimal fix, change it back.

Fixes: 4473710df1 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-09 17:35:43 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
508a1c4df0 crypto: simd - correctly take reqsize of wrapped skcipher into account
The simd wrapper's skcipher request context structure consists
of a single subrequest whose size is taken from the subordinate
skcipher. However, in simd_skcipher_init(), the reqsize that is
retrieved is not from the subordinate skcipher but from the
cryptd request structure, whose size is completely unrelated to
the actual wrapped skcipher.

Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-11-09 17:35:43 +08:00
Denis Kenzior
64ae16dfee KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2]
The sign operation can operate in a non-hashed mode by running the RSA
sign operation directly on the input.  This assumes that the input is
less than key_size_in_bytes - 11.  Since the TPM performs its own PKCS1
padding, it isn't possible to support 'raw' mode, only 'pkcs1'.

Alternatively, a hashed version is also possible.  In this variant the
input is hashed (by userspace) via the selected hash function first.
Then this implementation takes care of converting the hash to ASN.1
format and the sign operation is performed on the result.  This is
similar to the implementation inside crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.

ASN1 templates were copied from crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c.  There seems to
be no easy way to expose that functionality, but likely the templates
should be shared somehow.

The sign operation is implemented via TPM_Sign operation on the TPM.
It is assumed that the TPM wrapped key provided uses
TPM_SS_RSASSAPKCS1v15_DER signature scheme.  This allows the TPM_Sign
operation to work on data up to key_len_in_bytes - 11 bytes long.

In theory, we could also use TPM_Unbind instead of TPM_Sign, but we would
have to manually pkcs1 pad the digest first.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
e73d170f6c KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2]
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
e08e689123 KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]
This patch implements the verify_signature operation.  The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used.  The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
a335974ae0 KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2]
This patch implements the pkey_decrypt operation using the private key
blob.  The blob is first loaded into the TPM via tpm_loadkey2.  Once the
handle is obtained, tpm_unbind operation is used to decrypt the data on
the TPM and the result is returned.  The key loaded by tpm_loadkey2 is
then evicted via tpm_flushspecific operation.

This patch assumes that the SRK authorization is a well known 20-byte of
zeros and the same holds for the key authorization of the provided key.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
f884fe5a15 KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2]
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
0c36264aa1 KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
This commit adds TPM_LoadKey2 and TPM_FlushSpecific operations.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
e1ea9f8602 KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2]
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.

In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
ad4b1eb5fb KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2]
This patch impelements the pkey_encrypt operation.  The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used.  The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:47 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
dff5a61a59 KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2]
This commit implements the pkey_query operation.  This is accomplished
by utilizing the public key portion to obtain max encryption size
information for the operations that utilize the public key (encrypt,
verify).  The private key size extracted from the TPM_Key data structure
is used to fill the information where the private key is used (decrypt,
sign).

The kernel uses a DER/BER format for public keys and does not support
setting the key via the raw binary form.  To get around this a simple
DER/BER formatter is implemented which stores the DER/BER formatted key
and exponent in a temporary buffer for use by the crypto API.

The only exponent supported currently is 65537.  This holds true for
other Linux TPM tools such as 'create_tpm_key' and
trousers-openssl_tpm_engine.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
d5e72745ca KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2]
For TPM based keys, the only standard seems to be described here:
http://david.woodhou.se/draft-woodhouse-cert-best-practice.html#rfc.section.4.4

Quote from the relevant section:
"Rather, a common form of storage for "wrapped" keys is to encode the
binary TCPA_KEY structure in a single ASN.1 OCTET-STRING, and store the
result in PEM format with the tag "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----". "

This patch implements the above behavior.  It is assumed that the PEM
encoding is stripped out by userspace and only the raw DER/BER format is
provided.  This is similar to how PKCS7, PKCS8 and X.509 keys are
handled.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
f8c54e1ac4 KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2]
The parsed BER/DER blob obtained from user space contains a TPM_Key
structure.  This structure has some information about the key as well as
the public key portion.

This patch extracts this information for future use.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
903be6bb84 KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2]
This patch adds the basic skeleton for the asym_tpm asymmetric key
subtype.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Denis Kenzior
b3a8c8a5eb crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]
The original pkcs1pad implementation allowed to pad/unpad raw RSA
output.  However, this has been taken out in commit:
commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present")

This patch restored this ability as it is needed by the asymmetric key
implementation.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
3c58b2362b KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2]
Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key format [RFC 5208] parser for the
asymmetric key type.  For the moment, this will only support unencrypted
DER blobs.  PEM and decryption can be added later.

PKCS#8 keys can be loaded like this:

	openssl pkcs8 -in private_key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | \
	  keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
c08fed7371 KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2]
Implement the encrypt, decrypt and sign operations for the software
asymmetric key subtype.  This mostly involves offloading the call to the
crypto layer.

Note that the decrypt and sign operations require a private key to be
supplied.  Encrypt (and also verify) will work with either a public or a
private key.  A public key can be supplied with an X.509 certificate and a
private key can be supplied using a PKCS#8 blob:

	# j=`openssl pkcs8 -in ~/pkcs7/firmwarekey2.priv -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl padd asymmetric foo @s`
	# keyctl pkey_query $j - enc=pkcs1
	key_size=4096
	max_data_size=512
	max_sig_size=512
	max_enc_size=512
	max_dec_size=512
	encrypt=y
	decrypt=y
	sign=y
	verify=y
	# keyctl pkey_encrypt $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/enc
	# keyctl pkey_decrypt $j 0 /tmp/enc enc=pkcs1 >/tmp/dec
	# cmp data /tmp/dec
	# keyctl pkey_sign $j 0 data enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 >/tmp/sig
	# keyctl pkey_verify $j 0 data /tmp/sig enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
	#

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
f7c4e06e06 KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2]
Put a flag in the public_key struct to indicate if the structure is holding
a private key.  The private key must be held ASN.1 encoded in the format
specified in RFC 3447 A.1.2.  This is the form required by crypto/rsa.c.

The software encryption subtype's verification and query functions then
need to select the appropriate crypto function to set the key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
82f94f2447 KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]
Provide a query function for the software public key implementation.  This
permits information about such a key to be obtained using
query_asymmetric_key() or KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
0398849077 KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2]
Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers fill in the signature encoding type field
recently added to the public_key_signature struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells
5a30771832 KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]
Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops.  This
include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature.  Verify signature
already exists.  Also provided are accessor functions for this:

	int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key,
				 struct kernel_pkey_query *info);

	int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			 const void *data, void *enc);
	int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			 const void *enc, void *data);
	int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			     const void *data, void *enc);

The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the
encoding for verify_signature().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
62606c224d Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Remove VLA usage
   - Add cryptostat user-space interface
   - Add notifier for new crypto algorithms

  Algorithms:
   - Add OFB mode
   - Remove speck

  Drivers:
   - Remove x86/sha*-mb as they are buggy
   - Remove pcbc(aes) from x86/aesni
   - Improve performance of arm/ghash-ce by up to 85%
   - Implement CTS-CBC in arm64/aes-blk, faster by up to 50%
   - Remove PMULL based arm64/crc32 driver
   - Use PMULL in arm64/crct10dif
   - Add aes-ctr support in s5p-sss
   - Add caam/qi2 driver

  Others:
   - Pick better transform if one becomes available in crc-t10dif"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (124 commits)
  crypto: chelsio - Update ntx queue received from cxgb4
  crypto: ccree - avoid implicit enum conversion
  crypto: caam - add SPDX license identifier to all files
  crypto: caam/qi - simplify CGR allocation, freeing
  crypto: mxs-dcp - make symbols 'sha1_null_hash' and 'sha256_null_hash' static
  crypto: arm64/aes-blk - ensure XTS mask is always loaded
  crypto: testmgr - fix sizeof() on COMP_BUF_SIZE
  crypto: chtls - remove set but not used variable 'csk'
  crypto: axis - fix platform_no_drv_owner.cocci warnings
  crypto: x86/aes-ni - fix build error following fpu template removal
  crypto: arm64/aes - fix handling sub-block CTS-CBC inputs
  crypto: caam/qi2 - avoid double export
  crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix AES issues
  crypto: mxs-dcp - Fix SHA null hashes and output length
  crypto: mxs-dcp - Implement sha import/export
  crypto: aegis/generic - fix for big endian systems
  crypto: morus/generic - fix for big endian systems
  crypto: lrw - fix rebase error after out of bounds fix
  crypto: cavium/nitrox - use pci_alloc_irq_vectors() while enabling MSI-X.
  crypto: cavium/nitrox - NITROX command queue changes.
  ...
2018-10-25 16:43:35 -07:00
Karsten Graul
89ab066d42 Revert "net: simplify sock_poll_wait"
This reverts commit dd979b4df8.

This broke tcp_poll for SMC fallback: An AF_SMC socket establishes an
internal TCP socket for the initial handshake with the remote peer.
Whenever the SMC connection can not be established this TCP socket is
used as a fallback. All socket operations on the SMC socket are then
forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of poll, the file->private_data
pointer references the SMC socket because the TCP socket has no file
assigned. This causes tcp_poll to wait on the wrong socket.

Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-23 10:57:06 -07:00
Michael Schupikov
22a8118d32 crypto: testmgr - fix sizeof() on COMP_BUF_SIZE
After allocation, output and decomp_output both point to memory chunks of
size COMP_BUF_SIZE. Then, only the first bytes are zeroed out using
sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) as parameter to memset(), because
sizeof(COMP_BUF_SIZE) provides the size of the constant and not the size of
allocated memory.

Instead, the whole allocated memory is meant to be zeroed out. Use
COMP_BUF_SIZE as parameter to memset() directly in order to accomplish
this.

Fixes: 336073840a ("crypto: testmgr - Allow different compression results")

Signed-off-by: Michael Schupikov <michael@schupikov.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-12 14:20:45 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
4a34e3c2f2 crypto: aegis/generic - fix for big endian systems
Use the correct __le32 annotation and accessors to perform the
single round of AES encryption performed inside the AEGIS transform.
Otherwise, tcrypt reports:

  alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128-generic
  00000000: 6c 25 25 4a 3c 10 1d 27 2b c1 d4 84 9a ef 7f 6e
  alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis128l-generic
  00000000: cd c6 e3 b8 a0 70 9d 8e c2 4f 6f fe 71 42 df 28
  alg: aead: Test 1 failed on encryption for aegis256-generic
  00000000: aa ed 07 b1 96 1d e9 e6 f2 ed b5 8e 1c 5f dc 1c

Fixes: f606a88e58 ("crypto: aegis - Add generic AEGIS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-08 13:44:53 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
5a8dedfa32 crypto: morus/generic - fix for big endian systems
Omit the endian swabbing when folding the lengths of the assoc and
crypt input buffers into the state to finalize the tag. This is not
necessary given that the memory representation of the state is in
machine native endianness already.

This fixes an error reported by tcrypt running on a big endian system:

  alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus640-generic
  00000000: a8 30 ef fb e6 26 eb 23 b0 87 dd 98 57 f3 e1 4b
  00000010: 21
  alg: aead: Test 2 failed on encryption for morus1280-generic
  00000000: 88 19 1b fb 1c 29 49 0e ee 82 2f cb 97 a6 a5 ee
  00000010: 5f

Fixes: 396be41f16 ("crypto: morus - Add generic MORUS AEAD implementations")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.18+
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-08 13:44:53 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
fd27b571c9 crypto: lrw - fix rebase error after out of bounds fix
Due to an unfortunate interaction between commit fbe1a850b3
("crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow") and
commit c778f96bf3 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation"),
we ended up with a version of next_index() that always returns 127.

Fixes: c778f96bf3 ("crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-05 10:22:48 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
944585a64f crypto: x86/aes-ni - remove special handling of AES in PCBC mode
For historical reasons, the AES-NI based implementation of the PCBC
chaining mode uses a special FPU chaining mode wrapper template to
amortize the FPU start/stop overhead over multiple blocks.

When this FPU wrapper was introduced, it supported widely used
chaining modes such as XTS and CTR (as well as LRW), but currently,
PCBC is the only remaining user.

Since there are no known users of pcbc(aes) in the kernel, let's remove
this special driver, and rely on the generic pcbc driver to encapsulate
the AES-NI core cipher.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-10-05 10:16:56 +08:00
Gilad Ben-Yossef
dfb89ab3f0 crypto: tcrypt - add OFB functional tests
We already have OFB test vectors and tcrypt OFB speed tests.
Add OFB functional tests to tcrypt as well.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:26 +08:00
Gilad Ben-Yossef
e497c51896 crypto: ofb - add output feedback mode
Add a generic version of output feedback mode. We already have support of
several hardware based transformations of this mode and the needed test
vectors but we somehow missed adding a generic software one. Fix this now.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:26 +08:00
Gilad Ben-Yossef
95ba597367 crypto: testmgr - update sm4 test vectors
Add additional test vectors from "The SM4 Blockcipher Algorithm And Its
Modes Of Operations" draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10 and register cipher speed
tests for sm4.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:26 +08:00
Horia Geantă
4d407b04d4 crypto: tcrypt - remove remnants of pcomp-based zlib
Commit 110492183c ("crypto: compress - remove unused pcomp interface")
removed pcomp interface but missed cleaning up tcrypt.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:26 +08:00
Corentin Labbe
cac5818c25 crypto: user - Implement a generic crypto statistics
This patch implement a generic way to get statistics about all crypto
usages.

Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:25 +08:00
Kees Cook
36b3875a97 crypto: cryptd - Remove VLA usage of skcipher
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:08 +08:00
Kees Cook
8d60539842 crypto: null - Remove VLA usage of skcipher
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:08 +08:00
Kees Cook
b350bee5ea crypto: skcipher - Introduce crypto_sync_skcipher
In preparation for removal of VLAs due to skcipher requests on the stack
via SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage, this introduces the infrastructure
for the "sync skcipher" tfm, which is for handling the on-stack cases of
skcipher, which are always non-ASYNC and have a known limited request
size.

The crypto API additions:

	struct crypto_sync_skcipher (wrapper for struct crypto_skcipher)
	crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher()
	crypto_free_sync_skcipher()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_get_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_blocksize()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize()
	crypto_sync_skcipher_reqtfm()
	skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm()
	SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() (with tfm type check)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:06 +08:00
Dan Aloni
3944f139d5 crypto: fix a memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad's encryption mode
The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so
there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even
being freed.

CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:06 +08:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
ac3c8f36c3 crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer
This patch simplifies the LRW template to recompute the LRW tweaks from
scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a
dynamic buffer using kmalloc().

As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

The results show that the new code has about the same performance as the
old code. For 512-byte message it seems to be even slightly faster, but
that might be just noise.

Before:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293

After:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             197             196
        lrw(aes)     320              64             200             197
        lrw(aes)     384              64             203             199
        lrw(aes)     256             512             385             380
        lrw(aes)     320             512             401             395
        lrw(aes)     384             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1869            1846
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2080            1981
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2160            2109
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7077            7127
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7807            7766
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8108            8357
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14111           14454
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15268           15082
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16581           16250

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:52 +08:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
c778f96bf3 crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation
This patch rewrites the tweak computation to a slightly simpler method
that performs less bswaps. Based on performance measurements the new
code seems to provide slightly better performance than the old one.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

Before:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             204             286
        lrw(aes)     320              64             227             203
        lrw(aes)     384              64             208             204
        lrw(aes)     256             512             441             439
        lrw(aes)     320             512             456             455
        lrw(aes)     384             512             469             483
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            2136            2190
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2161            2213
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2295            2369
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7692            7868
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            8230            8691
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8971            8813
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           15336           15560
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           16410           16346
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           18023           17465

After:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:52 +08:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
dc6d6d5a58 crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around
This patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that triggers wrap-around of
the counter, which is a tricky corner case.

Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:52 +08:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
fbe1a850b3 crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow
When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns
128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128
entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127).

Fixes: 64470f1b85 ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.20+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:51 +08:00
Horia Geantă
331351f89c crypto: tcrypt - fix ghash-generic speed test
ghash is a keyed hash algorithm, thus setkey needs to be called.
Otherwise the following error occurs:
$ modprobe tcrypt mode=318 sec=1
testing speed of async ghash-generic (ghash-generic)
tcrypt: test  0 (   16 byte blocks,   16 bytes per update,   1 updates):
tcrypt: hashing failed ret=-126

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.6+
Fixes: 0660511c0b ("crypto: tcrypt - Use ahash")
Tested-by: Franck Lenormand <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:51 +08:00
Eric Biggers
a5e9f55709 crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)
In commit 9f480faec5 ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment.  So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.

Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.

But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.

Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:50 +08:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
78105c7e76 crypto: xts - Drop use of auxiliary buffer
Since commit acb9b159c7 ("crypto: gf128mul - define gf128mul_x_* in
gf128mul.h"), the gf128mul_x_*() functions are very fast and therefore
caching the computed XTS tweaks has only negligible advantage over
computing them twice.

In fact, since the current caching implementation limits the size of
the calls to the child ecb(...) algorithm to PAGE_SIZE (usually 4096 B),
it is often actually slower than the simple recomputing implementation.

This patch simplifies the XTS template to recompute the XTS tweaks from
scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a
dynamic buffer using kmalloc().

As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.

PERFORMANCE RESULTS
I measured time to encrypt/decrypt a memory buffer of varying sizes with
xts(ecb-aes-aesni) using a tool I wrote ([2]) and the results suggest
that after this patch the performance is either better or comparable for
both small and large buffers. Note that there is a lot of noise in the
measurements, but the overall difference is easy to see.

Old code:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        xts(aes)     256              64             331             328
        xts(aes)     384              64             332             333
        xts(aes)     512              64             338             348
        xts(aes)     256             512             889             920
        xts(aes)     384             512            1019             993
        xts(aes)     512             512            1032             990
        xts(aes)     256            4096            2152            2292
        xts(aes)     384            4096            2453            2597
        xts(aes)     512            4096            3041            2641
        xts(aes)     256           16384            9443            8027
        xts(aes)     384           16384            8536            8925
        xts(aes)     512           16384            9232            9417
        xts(aes)     256           32768           16383           14897
        xts(aes)     384           32768           17527           16102
        xts(aes)     512           32768           18483           17322

New code:
       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        xts(aes)     256              64             328             324
        xts(aes)     384              64             324             319
        xts(aes)     512              64             320             322
        xts(aes)     256             512             476             473
        xts(aes)     384             512             509             492
        xts(aes)     512             512             531             514
        xts(aes)     256            4096            2132            1829
        xts(aes)     384            4096            2357            2055
        xts(aes)     512            4096            2178            2027
        xts(aes)     256           16384            6920            6983
        xts(aes)     384           16384            8597            7505
        xts(aes)     512           16384            7841            8164
        xts(aes)     256           32768           13468           12307
        xts(aes)     384           32768           14808           13402
        xts(aes)     512           32768           15753           14636

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315
[2] https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-21 13:24:50 +08:00
Martin K. Petersen
dd8b083f9a crypto: api - Introduce notifier for new crypto algorithms
Introduce a facility that can be used to receive a notification
callback when a new algorithm becomes available. This can be used by
existing crypto registrations to trigger a switch from a software-only
algorithm to a hardware-accelerated version.

A new CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED state is introduced to the existing crypto
notification chain, and the register/unregister functions are exported
so they can be called by subsystems outside of crypto.

Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04 11:37:04 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
ab8085c130 crypto: x86 - remove SHA multibuffer routines and mcryptd
As it turns out, the AVX2 multibuffer SHA routines are currently
broken [0], in a way that would have likely been noticed if this
code were in wide use. Since the code is too complicated to be
maintained by anyone except the original authors, and since the
performance benefits for real-world use cases are debatable to
begin with, it is better to drop it entirely for the moment.

[0] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153476243825350&w=2

Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04 11:37:04 +08:00
Kees Cook
f3569fd613 crypto: shash - Remove VLA usage in unaligned hashing
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this uses
the newly defined max alignment to perform unaligned hashing to avoid
VLAs, and drops the helper function while adding sanity checks on the
resulting buffer sizes. Additionally, the __aligned_largest macro is
removed since this helper was the only user.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-04 11:37:03 +08:00