Commit graph

145 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alan Cox
3b9fc37280 smack: off by one error
Consider the input case of a rule that consists entirely of non space
symbols followed by a \0. Say 64 + \0

In this case strlen(data) = 64
kzalloc of subject and object are 64 byte objects
sscanfdata, "%s %s %s", subject, ...)

will put 65 bytes into subject.

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-07-30 15:04:17 +10:00
Rafal Krypa
65ee7f45cf Smack: don't show empty rules when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is read
This patch removes empty rules (i.e. with access set to '-') from the
rule list presented to user space.

Smack by design never removes labels nor rules from its lists. Access
for a rule may be set to '-' to effectively disable it. Such rules would
show up in the listing generated when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is
read. This may cause clutter if many rules were disabled.

As a rule with access set to '-' is equivalent to no rule at all, they
may be safely hidden from the listing.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-07-13 15:49:24 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
3518721a89 Smack: user access check bounds
Some of the bounds checking used on the /smack/access
interface was lost when support for long labels was
added. No kernel access checks are affected, however
this is a case where /smack/access could be used
incorrectly and fail to detect the error. This patch
reintroduces the original checks.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-07-13 15:49:24 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
1880eff77e Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
Smack is integrated with the POSIX capabilities scheme,
using the capabilities CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_MAC_ADMIN to
determine if a process is allowed to ignore Smack checks or
change Smack related data respectively. Smack provides an
additional restriction that if an onlycap value is set
by writing to /smack/onlycap only tasks with that Smack
label are allowed to use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE.

This change adds CAP_MAC_ADMIN as a capability that is affected
by the onlycap mechanism.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-07-13 15:49:23 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
eb982cb4cf Smack: fix smack_new_inode bogosities
In January of 2012 Al Viro pointed out three bits of code that
he titled "new_inode_smack bogosities". This patch repairs these
errors.

1. smack_sb_kern_mount() included a NULL check that is impossible.
   The check and NULL case are removed.
2. smack_kb_kern_mount() included pointless locking. The locking is
   removed. Since this is the only place that lock was used the lock
   is removed from the superblock_smack structure.
3. smk_fill_super() incorrectly and unnecessarily set the Smack label
   for the smackfs root inode. The assignment has been removed.

Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-07-13 15:49:23 -07:00
Al Viro
e5467859f7 split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-31 13:11:54 -04:00
Al Viro
d007794a18 split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()
... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-31 13:10:54 -04:00
James Morris
ff2bb047c4 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next
Per pull request, for 3.5.
2012-05-22 11:21:06 +10:00
Casey Schaufler
f7112e6c9a Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4
V4 updated to current linux-security#next
Targeted for git://gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Modern application runtime environments like to use
naming schemes that are structured and generated without
human intervention. Even though the Smack limit of 23
characters for a label name is perfectly rational for
human use there have been complaints that the limit is
a problem in environments where names are composed from
a set or sources, including vendor, author, distribution
channel and application name. Names like

	softwarehouse-pgwodehouse-coolappstore-mellowmuskrats

are becoming harder to avoid. This patch introduces long
label support in Smack. Labels are now limited to 255
characters instead of the old 23.

The primary reason for limiting the labels to 23 characters
was so they could be directly contained in CIPSO category sets.
This is still done were possible, but for labels that are too
large a mapping is required. This is perfectly safe for communication
that stays "on the box" and doesn't require much coordination
between boxes beyond what would have been required to keep label
names consistent.

The bulk of this patch is in smackfs, adding and updating
administrative interfaces. Because existing APIs can't be
changed new ones that do much the same things as old ones
have been introduced.

The Smack specific CIPSO data representation has been removed
and replaced with the data format used by netlabel. The CIPSO
header is now computed when a label is imported rather than
on use. This results in improved IP performance. The smack
label is now allocated separately from the containing structure,
allowing for larger strings.

Four new /smack interfaces have been introduced as four
of the old interfaces strictly required labels be specified
in fixed length arrays.

The access interface is supplemented with the check interface:
	access  "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	access2 "Subject Object rwaxt"

The load interface is supplemented with the rules interface:
	load   "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	load2  "Subject Object rwaxt"

The load-self interface is supplemented with the self-rules interface:
	load-self   "Subject                 Object                  rwxat"
	load-self2  "Subject Object rwaxt"

The cipso interface is supplemented with the wire interface:
	cipso  "Subject                  lvl cnt  c1  c2 ..."
	cipso2 "Subject lvl cnt  c1  c2 ..."

The old interfaces are maintained for compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-05-14 22:48:38 -07:00
Tetsuo Handa
ceffec5541 gfp flags for security_inode_alloc()?
Dave Chinner wrote:
> Yes, because you have no idea what the calling context is except
> for the fact that is from somewhere inside filesystem code and the
> filesystem could be holding locks. Therefore, GFP_NOFS is really the
> only really safe way to allocate memory here.

I see. Thank you.

I'm not sure, but can call trace happen where somewhere inside network
filesystem or stackable filesystem code with locks held invokes operations that
involves GFP_KENREL memory allocation outside that filesystem?
----------
[PATCH] SMACK: Fix incorrect GFP_KERNEL usage.

new_inode_smack() which can be called from smack_inode_alloc_security() needs
to use GFP_NOFS like SELinux's inode_alloc_security() does, for
security_inode_alloc() is called from inode_init_always() and
inode_init_always() is called from xfs_inode_alloc() which is using GFP_NOFS.

smack_inode_init_security() needs to use GFP_NOFS like
selinux_inode_init_security() does, for initxattrs() callback function (e.g.
btrfs_initxattrs()) which is called from security_inode_init_security() is
using GFP_NOFS.

smack_audit_rule_match() needs to use GFP_ATOMIC, for
security_audit_rule_match() can be called from audit_filter_user_rules() and
audit_filter_user_rules() is called from audit_filter_user() with RCU read lock
held.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
2012-05-14 22:47:44 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
2267b13a7c Smack: recursive tramsmute
The transmuting directory feature of Smack requires that
the transmuting attribute be explicitly set in all cases.
It seems the users of this facility would expect that the
transmuting attribute be inherited by subdirectories that
are created in a transmuting directory. This does not seem
to add any additional complexity to the understanding of
how the system works.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2012-05-14 22:45:17 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
86812bb0de Smack: move label list initialization
A kernel with Smack enabled will fail if tmpfs has xattr support.

Move the initialization of predefined Smack label
list entries to the LSM initialization from the
smackfs setup. This became an issue when tmpfs
acquired xattr support, but was never correct.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-18 12:02:28 +10:00
Kees Cook
923e9a1399 Smack: build when CONFIG_AUDIT not defined
This fixes builds where CONFIG_AUDIT is not defined and
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y.

This got introduced by the stack-usage reducation commit 48c62af68a
("LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union").

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-10 16:14:40 -07:00
Eric Paris
50c205f5e5 LSM: do not initialize common_audit_data to 0
It isn't needed.  If you don't set the type of the data associated with
that type it is a pretty obvious programming bug.  So why waste the cycles?

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:23:04 -04:00
Eric Paris
83d498569e SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2012-04-09 12:22:50 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
b61c37f579 lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data'
It just bloats the audit data structure for no good reason, since the
only time those fields are filled are just before calling the
common_lsm_audit() function, which is also the only user of those
fields.

So just make them be the arguments to common_lsm_audit(), rather than
bloating that structure that is passed around everywhere, and is
initialized in hot paths.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:59 -07:00
Eric Paris
48c62af68a LSM: shrink the common_audit_data data union
After shrinking the common_audit_data stack usage for private LSM data I'm
not going to shrink the data union.  To do this I'm going to move anything
larger than 2 void * ptrs to it's own structure and require it to be declared
separately on the calling stack.  Thus hot paths which don't need more than
a couple pointer don't have to declare space to hold large unneeded
structures.  I could get this down to one void * by dealing with the key
struct and the struct path.  We'll see if that is helpful after taking care of
networking.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:49:10 -07:00
Eric Paris
3b3b0e4fc1 LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data
Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big
perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop.  This patch
requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than
doing it in a union.  Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their
portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a
bigger space requirement.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-04-03 09:48:40 -07:00
Al Viro
4040153087 security: trim security.h
Trim security.h

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2012-02-14 10:45:42 +11:00
Al Viro
d8c9584ea2 vfs: prefer ->dentry->d_sb to ->mnt->mnt_sb
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-01-06 23:16:53 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
40809565ca Smack: smackfs cipso seq read repair
Commit 272cd7a8c6 introduced
a change to the way rule lists are handled and reported in
the smackfs filesystem. One of the issues addressed had to
do with the termination of read requests on /smack/load.
This change introduced a error in /smack/cipso, which shares
some of the same list processing code.

This patch updates all the file access list handling in
smackfs to use the code introduced for /smack/load.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-11-11 11:07:21 -08:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
0e94ae17c8 Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
Allow query access as a normal user removing the need
for CAP_MAC_ADMIN. Give RW access to /smack/access
for UGO. Do not import smack labels in access check.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
2011-10-20 16:07:31 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
d86b2b61d4 Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Forgot to update simple_transaction_set() to take terminator
character into account.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
2011-10-18 09:02:57 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
16014d8750 Smack: compilation fix
On some build configurations PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID symbol was not
found when compiling smack_lsm.c. This patch fixes the issue by
explicitly doing #include <linux/personality.h>.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.j.sakkinen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
2011-10-14 08:56:49 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
f8859d98c1 Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Small fix for the output of access SmackFS file. Use string
is instead of byte. Makes it easier to extend API if it is
needed.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
2011-10-12 14:30:07 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
84088ba239 Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Protections for domain transition:

- BPRM unsafe flags
- Secureexec
- Clear unsafe personality bits.
- Clear parent death signal

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
2011-10-12 14:28:15 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
975d5e55c2 Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.

This patch takes advantage of the recent changes for performance
and points the packet labels on UDS connect at the output label of
the far side. This makes getsockopt(...SO_PEERCRED...) function
properly. Without this change the getsockopt does not provide any
information.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-10-12 14:27:05 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
ce8a432197 Smack: Clean up comments
There are a number of comments in the Smack code that
are either malformed or include code. This patch cleans
them up.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-10-12 14:26:07 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
531f1d453e Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Al Viro pointed out that the processing of fcntl done
by Smack appeared poorly designed. He was right. There
are three things that required change. Most obviously,
the list of commands that really imply writing is limited
to those involving file locking and signal handling.
The initialization if the file security blob was
incomplete, requiring use of a heretofore unused LSM hook.
Finally, the audit information coming from a helper
masked the identity of the LSM hook. This patch corrects
all three of these defects.

This is targeted for the smack-next tree pending comments.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-10-12 14:24:28 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
272cd7a8c6 Smack: Rule list lookup performance
This patch is targeted for the smack-next tree.

Smack access checks suffer from two significant performance
issues. In cases where there are large numbers of rules the
search of the single list of rules is wasteful. Comparing the
string values of the smack labels is less efficient than a
numeric comparison would.

These changes take advantage of the Smack label list, which
maintains the mapping of Smack labels to secids and optional
CIPSO labels. Because the labels are kept perpetually, an
access check can be done strictly based on the address of the
label in the list without ever looking at the label itself.
Rather than keeping one global list of rules the rules with
a particular subject label can be based off of that label
list entry. The access check need never look at entries that
do not use the current subject label.

This requires that packets coming off the network with
CIPSO direct Smack labels that have never been seen before
be treated carefully. The only case where they could be
delivered is where the receiving socket has an IPIN star
label, so that case is explicitly addressed.

On a system with 39,800 rules (200 labels in all permutations)
a system with this patch runs an access speed test in 5% of
the time of the old version. That should be a best case
improvement. If all of the rules are associated with the
same subject label and all of the accesses are for processes
with that label (unlikely) the improvement is about 30%.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-10-12 14:23:13 -07:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
828716c28f Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
Adds a new file into SmackFS called 'access'. Wanted
Smack permission is written into /smack/access.
After that result can be read from the opened file.
If access applies result contains 1 and otherwise
0. File access is protected from race conditions
by using simple_transaction_get()/set() API.

Fixes from the previous version:
- Removed smack.h changes, refactoring left-over
from previous version.
- Removed #include <linux/smack.h>, refactoring
left-over from previous version.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@cschaufler-intel.(none)>
2011-10-12 14:21:32 -07:00
Paul Moore
82c21bfab4 doc: Update the email address for Paul Moore in various source files
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary.  My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-08-01 17:58:33 -07:00
Al Viro
e74f71eb78 ->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()
pass that via mask instead.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2011-07-20 01:43:26 -04:00
James Morris
b7b57551bb Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into for-linus
Conflicts:
	lib/flex_array.c
	security/selinux/avc.c
	security/selinux/hooks.c
	security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
	security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Manually resolve conflicts.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-05-24 23:20:19 +10:00
Eric Paris
92f4250901 SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct path
smack_file_lock has a struct path, so use that instead of only the
dentry.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-04-25 18:14:45 -04:00
Eric Paris
a269434d2f LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
This patch separates and audit message that only contains a dentry from
one that contains a full path.  This allows us to make it harder to
misuse the interfaces or for the interfaces to be implemented wrong.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-04-25 18:14:07 -04:00
Eric Paris
f48b739984 LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE
The lsm common audit code has wacky contortions making sure which pieces
of information are set based on if it was given a path, dentry, or
inode.  Split this into path and inode to get rid of some of the code
complexity.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-04-25 18:13:15 -04:00
Andi Kleen
1c99042974 SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-04-25 10:20:32 -04:00
Andi Kleen
8c9e80ed27 SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.

Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y

Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2011-04-22 16:17:29 -07:00
Lucas De Marchi
25985edced Fix common misspellings
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi>
2011-03-31 11:26:23 -03:00
James Morris
fe3fa43039 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next 2011-03-08 11:38:10 +11:00
Casey Schaufler
75a25637bf Smack: correct final mmap check comparison
The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the
SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly.
The check as written works correctly only if the access
rules involved have the same access. This is the common
case, so initial testing did not find a problem.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-02-09 19:58:42 -08:00
Shan Wei
db904aa814 security:smack: kill unused SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE
Kill unused macros of SMACK_LIST_MAX, MAY_ANY and MAY_ANYWRITE.
v2: As Casey Schaufler's advice, also remove MAY_ANY.

Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-02-09 19:58:11 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
0e0a070d3a Smack: correct behavior in the mmap hook
The mmap policy enforcement was not properly handling the
  interaction between the global and local rule lists.
  Instead of going through one and then the other, which
  missed the important case where a rule specified that
  there should be no access, combine the access limitations
  where there is a rule in each list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-02-09 18:50:23 +11:00
Eric Paris
2a7dba391e fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creation
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes.  We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process.  This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label.  This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.

This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations.  We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly.  This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook.  If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
2011-02-01 11:12:29 -05:00
Casey Schaufler
7898e1f8e9 Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment
In the embedded world there are often situations
  where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
  for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
  security characteristics. These differences
  might include privilege required for a given library
  provided interface to function properly, as occurs
  from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
  also cases where it is important to limit use of
  libraries based on the provider of the library and
  the security aware application may make choices
  based on that criteria.

  These issues are addressed by providing an additional
  Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
  the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
  if there is no such attribute.

  If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
  only if a subject with that label has all of the access
  permitted a subject with the current task label.

  Security aware applications may from time to time
  wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
  of privilege. One case where this arises is the
  environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
  to perform the same functions. An application may know
  that it should eschew services made available from a
  particular vendor, or of a particular version.

  In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
  been added that is local to the task. This list is
  consulted only in the case where the global list has
  approved access. It can only further restrict access.
  Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
  local list access is granted. An application can add
  entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.

  The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
  the list handling to accomodate there being more
  than one rule list.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2011-01-17 08:05:27 -08:00
James Morris
d2e7ad1922 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	security/smack/smack_lsm.c

Verified and added fix by Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Ok'd by Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2011-01-10 09:46:24 +11:00
David S. Miller
3610cda53f af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.

However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().

Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.

Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-01-05 15:38:53 -08:00
Jarkko Sakkinen
5c6d1125f8 Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories
In a situation where Smack access rules allow processes
with multiple labels to write to a directory it is easy
to get into a situation where the directory gets cluttered
with files that the owner can't deal with because while
they could be written to the directory a process at the
label of the directory can't write them. This is generally
the desired behavior, but when it isn't it is a real
issue.

This patch introduces a new attribute SMACK64TRANSMUTE that
instructs Smack to create the file with the label of the directory
under certain circumstances.

A new access mode, "t" for transmute, is made available to
Smack access rules, which are expanded from "rwxa" to "rwxat".
If a file is created in a directory marked as transmutable
and if access was granted to perform the operation by a rule
that included the transmute mode, then the file gets the
Smack label of the directory instead of the Smack label of the
creating process.

Note that this is equivalent to creating an empty file at the
label of the directory and then having the other process write
to it. The transmute scheme requires that both the access rule
allows transmutation and that the directory be explicitly marked.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2010-12-07 14:04:02 -08:00
Casey Schaufler
676dac4b1b This patch adds a new security attribute to Smack called
SMACK64EXEC. It defines label that is used while task is
running.

Exception: in smack_task_wait() child task is checked
for write access to parent task using label inherited
from the task that forked it.

Fixed issues from previous submit:
- SMACK64EXEC was not read when SMACK64 was not set.
- inode security blob was not updated after setting
  SMACK64EXEC
- inode security blob was not updated when removing
  SMACK64EXEC
2010-12-02 06:43:39 -08:00