Commit graph

49 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Christoph Hellwig
fb2da16cd7 fs: remove ksys_getdents64
Just open code it in the only caller.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-07-31 08:16:00 +02:00
Al Viro
5fb1514164 readdir.c: get rid of the last __put_user(), drop now-useless access_ok()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-05-01 20:29:54 -04:00
Al Viro
82af599b70 readdir.c: get compat_filldir() more or less in sync with filldir()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-05-01 20:29:47 -04:00
Al Viro
391b7461d4 switch readdir(2) to unsafe_copy_dirent_name()
... and the same for its compat counterpart

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-05-01 20:29:06 -04:00
Christophe Leroy
41cd780524 uaccess: Selectively open read or write user access
When opening user access to only perform reads, only open read access.
When opening user access to only perform writes, only open write
access.

Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2e73bc57125c2c6ab12a587586a4eed3a47105fc.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
2020-05-01 12:35:21 +10:00
Linus Torvalds
3c2659bd1d readdir: make user_access_begin() use the real access range
In commit 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I changed filldir to not do individual __put_user()
accesses, but instead use unsafe_put_user() surrounded by the proper
user_access_begin/end() pair.

That make them enormously faster on modern x86, where the STAC/CLAC
games make individual user accesses fairly heavy-weight.

However, the user_access_begin() range was not really the exact right
one, since filldir() has the unfortunate problem that it needs to not
only fill out the new directory entry, it also needs to fix up the
previous one to contain the proper file offset.

It's unfortunate, but the "d_off" field in "struct dirent" is _not_ the
file offset of the directory entry itself - it's the offset of the next
one.  So we end up backfilling the offset in the previous entry as we
walk along.

But since x86 didn't really care about the exact range, and used to be
the only architecture that did anything fancy in user_access_begin() to
begin with, the filldir[64]() changes did something lazy, and even
commented on it:

	/*
	 * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
	 * The real range was checked in getdents
	 */
	if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
		goto efault;

and it all worked fine.

But now 32-bit ppc is starting to also implement user_access_begin(),
and the fact that we faked the range to only be the (possibly not even
valid) previous directory entry becomes a problem, because ppc32 will
actually be using the range that is passed in for more than just "check
that it's user space".

This is a complete rewrite of Christophe's original patch.

By saving off the record length of the previous entry instead of a
pointer to it in the filldir data structures, we can simplify the range
check and the writing of the previous entry d_off field.  No need for
any conditionals in the user accesses themselves, although we retain the
conditional EINTR checking for the "was this the first directory entry"
signal handling latency logic.

Fixes: 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a02d3426f93f7eb04960a4d9140902d278cab0bb.1579697910.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/408c90c4068b00ea8f1c41cca45b84ec23d4946b.1579783936.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr/
Reported-and-tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-01-23 10:15:28 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
2c6b7bcd74 readdir: be more conservative with directory entry names
Commit 8a23eb804c ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry
filename is valid") added some minimal validity checks on the directory
entries passed to filldir[64]().  But they really were pretty minimal.

This fleshes out at least the name length check: we used to disallow
zero-length names, but really, negative lengths or oevr-long names
aren't ok either.  Both could happen if there is some filesystem
corruption going on.

Now, most filesystems tend to use just an "unsigned char" or similar for
the length of a directory entry name, so even with a corrupt filesystem
you should never see anything odd like that.  But since we then use the
name length to create the directory entry record length, let's make sure
it actually is half-way sensible.

Note how POSIX states that the size of a path component is limited by
NAME_MAX, but we actually use PATH_MAX for the check here.  That's
because while NAME_MAX is generally the correct maximum name length
(it's 255, for the same old "name length is usually just a byte on
disk"), there's nothing in the VFS layer that really cares.

So the real limitation at a VFS layer is the total pathname length you
can pass as a filename: PATH_MAX.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-01-23 10:05:05 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
b9959c7a34 filldir[64]: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() for bad directory entries
This was always meant to be a temporary thing, just for testing and to
see if it actually ever triggered.

The only thing that reported it was syzbot doing disk image fuzzing, and
then that warning is expected.  So let's just remove it before -rc4,
because the extra sanity testing should probably go to -stable, but we
don't want the warning to do so.

Reported-by: syzbot+3031f712c7ad5dd4d926@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 8a23eb804c ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry filename is valid")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-18 18:41:16 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
c512c69187 uaccess: implement a proper unsafe_copy_to_user() and switch filldir over to it
In commit 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.

But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.

Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally.  Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.

I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.

So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).

Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().

That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).

It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.

Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.

Fixes: 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 12:56:48 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
8a23eb804c Make filldir[64]() verify the directory entry filename is valid
This has been discussed several times, and now filesystem people are
talking about doing it individually at the filesystem layer, so head
that off at the pass and just do it in getdents{64}().

This is partially based on a patch by Jann Horn, but checks for NUL
bytes as well, and somewhat simplified.

There's also commentary about how it might be better if invalid names
due to filesystem corruption don't cause an immediate failure, but only
an error at the end of the readdir(), so that people can still see the
filenames that are ok.

There's also been discussion about just how much POSIX strictly speaking
requires this since it's about filesystem corruption.  It's really more
"protect user space from bad behavior" as pointed out by Jann.  But
since Eric Biederman looked up the POSIX wording, here it is for context:

 "From readdir:

   The readdir() function shall return a pointer to a structure
   representing the directory entry at the current position in the
   directory stream specified by the argument dirp, and position the
   directory stream at the next entry. It shall return a null pointer
   upon reaching the end of the directory stream. The structure dirent
   defined in the <dirent.h> header describes a directory entry.

  From definitions:

   3.129 Directory Entry (or Link)

   An object that associates a filename with a file. Several directory
   entries can associate names with the same file.

  ...

   3.169 Filename

   A name consisting of 1 to {NAME_MAX} bytes used to name a file. The
   characters composing the name may be selected from the set of all
   character values excluding the slash character and the null byte. The
   filenames dot and dot-dot have special meaning. A filename is
   sometimes referred to as a 'pathname component'."

Note that I didn't bother adding the checks to any legacy interfaces
that nobody uses.

Also note that if this ends up being noticeable as a performance
regression, we can fix that to do a much more optimized model that
checks for both NUL and '/' at the same time one word at a time.

We haven't really tended to optimize 'memchr()', and it only checks for
one pattern at a time anyway, and we really _should_ check for NUL too
(but see the comment about "soft errors" in the code about why it
currently only checks for '/')

See the CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS case of hash_name() for how the name
lookup code looks for pathname terminating characters in parallel.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190118161440.220134-2-jannh@google.com/
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-05 12:00:36 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
9f79b78ef7 Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
We really should avoid the "__{get,put}_user()" functions entirely,
because they can easily be mis-used and the original intent of being
used for simple direct user accesses no longer holds in a post-SMAP/PAN
world.

Manually optimizing away the user access range check makes no sense any
more, when the range check is generally much cheaper than the "enable
user accesses" code that the __{get,put}_user() functions still need.

So instead of __put_user(), use the unsafe_put_user() interface with
user_access_{begin,end}() that really does generate better code these
days, and which is generally a nicer interface.  Under some loads, the
multiple user writes that filldir() does are actually quite noticeable.

This also makes the dirent name copy use unsafe_put_user() with a couple
of macros.  We do not want to make function calls with SMAP/PAN
disabled, and the code this generates is quite good when the
architecture uses "asm goto" for unsafe_put_user() like x86 does.

Note that this doesn't bother with the legacy cases.  Nobody should use
them anyway, so performance doesn't really matter there.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-05 12:00:36 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
96d4f267e4 Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.

It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access.  But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.

A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model.  And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.

This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.

There were a couple of notable cases:

 - csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.

 - the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
   values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
   really used it)

 - microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout

but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.

I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something.  Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-03 18:57:57 -08:00
Dominik Brodowski
454dab3f96 fs: add ksys_getdents64() helper; remove in-kernel calls to sys_getdents64()
Using this helper allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to the
sys_getdents64() syscall. The ksys_ prefix denotes that this function
is meant as a drop-in replacement for the syscall. In particular, it
uses the same calling convention as sys_getdents64().

This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net

Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-04-02 20:16:02 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
8c5db92a70 Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts:
	include/linux/compiler-clang.h
	include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
	include/linux/compiler-intel.h
	include/uapi/linux/stddef.h

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-11-07 10:32:44 +01:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Kirill Tkhai
0dc208b5d5 locking/rwsem, fs: Use killable down_read() in iterate_dir()
There was mutex_lock_interruptible() initially, and it was changed
to rwsem, but there were not killable rwsem primitives that time.
>From commit 9902af79c0:

    "The main issue is the lack of down_write_killable(), so the places
     like readdir.c switched to plain inode_lock(); once killable
     variants of rwsem primitives appear, that'll be dealt with"

Use down_read_killable() same as down_write_killable() in !shared
case, as concurrent inode_lock() may take much time, that may be
wanted to be interrupted by user.

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arnd@arndb.de
Cc: avagin@virtuozzo.com
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: gorcunov@virtuozzo.com
Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru
Cc: mattst88@gmail.com
Cc: rientjes@google.com
Cc: rth@twiddle.net
Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150670120820.23930.5455667921545937220.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-10 11:50:16 +02:00
Al Viro
0460b2a28b readdir: move compat syscalls from compat.c
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-04-17 12:52:24 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
7c0f6ba682 Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globally
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al:

  PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>'
  sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \
        $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h)

to do the replacement at the end of the merge window.

Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-12-24 11:46:01 -08:00
Al Viro
002354112f restore killability of old mutex_lock_killable(&inode->i_mutex) users
The ones that are taking it exclusive, that is...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-26 00:13:25 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
0e01df100b Fix a number of bugs, most notably a potential stale data exposure
after a crash and a potential BUG_ON crash if a file has the data
 journalling flag enabled while it has dirty delayed allocation blocks
 that haven't been written yet.  Also fix a potential crash in the new
 project quota code and a maliciously corrupted file system.
 
 In addition, fix some DAX-specific bugs, including when there is a
 transient ENOSPC situation and races between writes via direct I/O and
 an mmap'ed segment that could lead to lost I/O.
 
 Finally the usual set of miscellaneous cleanups.
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Merge tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4

Pull ext4 updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "Fix a number of bugs, most notably a potential stale data exposure
  after a crash and a potential BUG_ON crash if a file has the data
  journalling flag enabled while it has dirty delayed allocation blocks
  that haven't been written yet.  Also fix a potential crash in the new
  project quota code and a maliciously corrupted file system.

  In addition, fix some DAX-specific bugs, including when there is a
  transient ENOSPC situation and races between writes via direct I/O and
  an mmap'ed segment that could lead to lost I/O.

  Finally the usual set of miscellaneous cleanups"

* tag 'ext4_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: (23 commits)
  ext4: pre-zero allocated blocks for DAX IO
  ext4: refactor direct IO code
  ext4: fix race in transient ENOSPC detection
  ext4: handle transient ENOSPC properly for DAX
  dax: call get_blocks() with create == 1 for write faults to unwritten extents
  ext4: remove unmeetable inconsisteny check from ext4_find_extent()
  jbd2: remove excess descriptions for handle_s
  ext4: remove unnecessary bio get/put
  ext4: silence UBSAN in ext4_mb_init()
  ext4: address UBSAN warning in mb_find_order_for_block()
  ext4: fix oops on corrupted filesystem
  ext4: fix check of dqget() return value in ext4_ioctl_setproject()
  ext4: clean up error handling when orphan list is corrupted
  ext4: fix hang when processing corrupted orphaned inode list
  ext4: remove trailing \n from ext4_warning/ext4_error calls
  ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages
  ext4: handle unwritten or delalloc buffers before enabling data journaling
  ext4: fix jbd2 handle extension in ext4_ext_truncate_extend_restart()
  ext4: do not ask jbd2 to write data for delalloc buffers
  jbd2: add support for avoiding data writes during transaction commits
  ...
2016-05-24 12:55:26 -07:00
Al Viro
6192269444 introduce a parallel variant of ->iterate()
New method: ->iterate_shared().  Same arguments as in ->iterate(),
called with the directory locked only shared.  Once all filesystems
switch, the old one will be gone.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-02 19:49:29 -04:00
Al Viro
63b6df1413 give readdir(2)/getdents(2)/etc. uniform exclusion with lseek()
same as read() on regular files has, and for the same reason.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-02 19:49:28 -04:00
Al Viro
9902af79c0 parallel lookups: actual switch to rwsem
ta-da!

The main issue is the lack of down_write_killable(), so the places
like readdir.c switched to plain inode_lock(); once killable
variants of rwsem primitives appear, that'll be dealt with.

lockdep side also might need more work

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-05-02 19:49:28 -04:00
Theodore Ts'o
1f60fbe727 ext4: allow readdir()'s of large empty directories to be interrupted
If a directory has a large number of empty blocks, iterating over all
of them can take a long time, leading to scheduler warnings and users
getting irritated when they can't kill a process in the middle of one
of these long-running readdir operations.  Fix this by adding checks to
ext4_readdir() and ext4_htree_fill_tree().

This was reverted earlier due to a typo in the original commit where I
experimented with using signal_pending() instead of
fatal_signal_pending().  The test was in the wrong place if we were
going to return signal_pending() since we would end up returning
duplicant entries.  See 9f2394c9be for a more detailed explanation.

Added fix as suggested by Linus to check for signal_pending() in
in the filldir() functions.

Reported-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Google-Bug-Id: 27880676
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
2016-04-23 22:50:07 -04:00
Al Viro
5955102c99 wrappers for ->i_mutex access
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).

Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-01-22 18:04:28 -05:00
Miklos Szeredi
ac7576f4b1 vfs: make first argument of dir_context.actor typed
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2014-10-31 17:48:54 -04:00
Heinrich Schuchardt
d4c7cf6cff fanotify: create FAN_ACCESS event for readdir
Before the patch, read creates FAN_ACCESS_PERM and FAN_ACCESS events,
readdir creates only FAN_ACCESS_PERM events.

This is inconsistent.

After the patch, readdir creates FAN_ACCESS_PERM and FAN_ACCESS events.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 16:53:52 -07:00
Al Viro
72c2d53192 file->f_op is never NULL...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-10-24 23:34:54 -04:00
Al Viro
ac6614b764 [readdir] constify ->actor
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-06-29 12:57:05 +04:00
Al Viro
2233f31aad [readdir] ->readdir() is gone
everything's converted to ->iterate()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-06-29 12:57:04 +04:00
Al Viro
bb6f619b3a [readdir] introduce ->iterate(), ctx->pos, dir_emit()
New method - ->iterate(file, ctx).  That's the replacement for ->readdir();
it takes callback from ctx->actor, uses ctx->pos instead of file->f_pos and
calls dir_emit(ctx, ...) instead of filldir(data, ...).  It does *not*
update file->f_pos (or look at it, for that matter); iterate_dir() does the
update.

Note that dir_emit() takes the offset from ctx->pos (and eventually
filldir_t will lose that argument).

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-06-29 12:46:47 +04:00
Al Viro
5c0ba4e076 [readdir] introduce iterate_dir() and dir_context
iterate_dir(): new helper, replacing vfs_readdir().

struct dir_context: contains the readdir callback (and will get more stuff
in it), embedded into whatever data that callback wants to deal with;
eventually, we'll be passing it to ->readdir() replacement instead of
(data,filldir) pair.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-06-29 12:46:46 +04:00
Al Viro
496ad9aa8e new helper: file_inode(file)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2013-02-22 23:31:31 -05:00
Al Viro
2903ff019b switch simple cases of fget_light to fdget
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-09-26 22:20:08 -04:00
Al Viro
863ced7fe7 switch readdir/getdents to fget_light/fput_light
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-05-29 23:28:29 -04:00
Paul Gortmaker
630d9c4727 fs: reduce the use of module.h wherever possible
For files only using THIS_MODULE and/or EXPORT_SYMBOL, map
them onto including export.h -- or if the file isn't even
using those, then just delete the include.  Fix up any implicit
include dependencies that were being masked by module.h along
the way.

Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2012-02-28 19:31:58 -05:00
Kevin Winchester
85c9fe8fca vfs: fix warning: 'dirent' is used uninitialized in this function
Using:

	gcc (GCC) 4.5.0 20100610 (prerelease)

The following warnings appear:

	fs/readdir.c: In function `filldir64':
	fs/readdir.c:240:15: warning: `dirent' is used uninitialized in this function
	fs/readdir.c: In function `filldir':
	fs/readdir.c:155:15: warning: `dirent' is used uninitialized in this function
	fs/compat.c: In function `compat_filldir64':
	fs/compat.c:1071:11: warning: `dirent' is used uninitialized in this function
	fs/compat.c: In function `compat_filldir':
	fs/compat.c:984:15: warning: `dirent' is used uninitialized in this function

The warnings are related to the use of the NAME_OFFSET() macro.  Luckily,
it appears as though the standard offsetof() macro is what is being
implemented by NAME_OFFSET(), thus we can fix the warning and use a more
standard code construct at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Winchester <kjwinchester@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-09 20:45:05 -07:00
Heiko Carstens
d4e82042c4 [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 32
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:31 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
20f37034fb [CVE-2009-0029] System call wrappers part 21
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:26 +01:00
Heiko Carstens
e55380edf6 [CVE-2009-0029] Rename old_readdir to sys_old_readdir
This way it matches the generic system call name convention.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2009-01-14 14:15:15 +01:00
Al Viro
53c9c5c0e3 [PATCH] prepare vfs_readdir() callers to returning filldir result
It's not the final state, but it allows moving ->readdir() instances
to passing filldir return value to caller of vfs_readdir().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-10-23 05:13:10 -04:00
Al Viro
8f3f655da7 [PATCH] fix regular readdir() and friends
Handling of -EOVERFLOW.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2008-08-25 01:18:08 -04:00
Liam R. Howlett
da78451190 Use mutex_lock_killable in vfs_readdir
Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <howlett@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
2007-12-06 17:39:54 -05:00
Milind Arun Choudhary
022a169244 ROUND_UP macro cleanup in fs/(select|compat|readdir).c
ROUND_UP macro cleanup use,ALIGN or DIV_ROUND_UP where ever appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Milind Arun Choudhary <milindchoudhary@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:09 -07:00
Randy Dunlap
e63340ae6b header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not used
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.

Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:07 -07:00
Josef "Jeff" Sipek
0f7fc9e4d0 [PATCH] VFS: change struct file to use struct path
This patch changes struct file to use struct path instead of having
independent pointers to struct dentry and struct vfsmount, and converts all
users of f_{dentry,vfsmnt} in fs/ to use f_path.{dentry,mnt}.

Additionally, it adds two #define's to make the transition easier for users of
the f_dentry and f_vfsmnt.

Signed-off-by: Josef "Jeff" Sipek <jsipek@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 08:28:41 -08:00
David Howells
afefdbb28a [PATCH] VFS: Make filldir_t and struct kstat deal in 64-bit inode numbers
These patches make the kernel pass 64-bit inode numbers internally when
communicating to userspace, even on a 32-bit system.  They are required
because some filesystems have intrinsic 64-bit inode numbers: NFS3+ and XFS
for example.  The 64-bit inode numbers are then propagated to userspace
automatically where the arch supports it.

Problems have been seen with userspace (eg: ld.so) using the 64-bit inode
number returned by stat64() or getdents64() to differentiate files, and
failing because the 64-bit inode number space was compressed to 32-bits, and
so overlaps occur.

This patch:

Make filldir_t take a 64-bit inode number and struct kstat carry a 64-bit
inode number so that 64-bit inode numbers can be passed back to userspace.

The stat functions then returns the full 64-bit inode number where
available and where possible.  If it is not possible to represent the inode
number supplied by the filesystem in the field provided by userspace, then
error EOVERFLOW will be issued.

Similarly, the getdents/readdir functions now pass the full 64-bit inode
number to userspace where possible, returning EOVERFLOW instead when a
directory entry is encountered that can't be properly represented.

Note that this means that some inodes will not be stat'able on a 32-bit
system with old libraries where they were before - but it does mean that
there will be no ambiguity over what a 32-bit inode number refers to.

Note similarly that directory scans may be cut short with an error on a
32-bit system with old libraries where the scan would work before for the
same reasons.

It is judged unlikely that this situation will occur because modern glibc
uses 64-bit capable versions of stat and getdents class functions
exclusively, and that older systems are unlikely to encounter
unrepresentable inode numbers anyway.

[akpm: alpha build fix]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-03 08:03:40 -07:00
Jes Sorensen
1b1dcc1b57 [PATCH] mutex subsystem, semaphore to mutex: VFS, ->i_sem
This patch converts the inode semaphore to a mutex. I have tested it on
XFS and compiled as much as one can consider on an ia64. Anyway your
luck with it might be different.

Modified-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>

(finished the conversion)

Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2006-01-09 15:59:24 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00