[ Upstream commit 2809606768 ]
A review of the code showed, that this function which is exposed
within the whole kernel should do a parameter check for the
amount of bytes requested. If this requested bytes is too high
an unsigned int overflow could happen causing this function to
try to memcpy a really big memory chunk.
This is not a security issue as there are only two invocations
of this function from arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h and both
are not exposed to userland.
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
snprintf() returns the number of bytes that would be written,
which may be greater than the the actual length to be written.
show() methods should return the number of bytes printed into the
buffer. This is the return value of scnprintf().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200509085608.41061-2-chenzhou10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Prefix the s390 SHA-1 functions with "s390_sha1_" rather than "sha1_".
This allows us to rename the library function sha_init() to sha1_init()
without causing a naming collision.
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
aes_s390.c has several functions which allocate space for key material on
the stack and leave the used keys there. It is considered good practice
to clean these locations before the function returns.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200221165511.GB6928@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Extend the low level ep11 misc functions implementation by
several functions to support EP11 key objects for paes and pkey:
- EP11 AES secure key generation
- EP11 AES secure key generation from given clear key value
- EP11 AES secure key blob check
- findcard function returns list of apqns based on given criterias
- EP11 AES secure key derive to CPACF protected key
Extend the pkey module to be able to generate and handle EP11
secure keys and also use them as base for deriving protected
keys for CPACF usage. These ioctls are extended to support
EP11 keys: PKEY_GENSECK2, PKEY_CLR2SECK2, PKEY_VERIFYKEY2,
PKEY_APQNS4K, PKEY_APQNS4KT, PKEY_KBLOB2PROTK2.
Additionally the 'clear key' token to protected key now uses
an EP11 card if the other ways (via PCKMO, via CCA) fail.
The PAES cipher implementation needed a new upper limit for
the max key size, but is now also working with EP11 keys.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
With this patch the paes ciphers do accept AES clear key values of
size 16, 24 or 32 byte. The key value is internal rearranged to form a
paes clear key token so that the pkey kernel module recognizes and
handles this key material as source for protected keys.
Using clear key material as a source for protected keys is a security
risc as the raw key material is kept in memory. However, so the AES
selftests provided with the testmanager can be run during registration
of the paes ciphers.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
There have been some findings during Eric Biggers rework of the
paes implementation which this patch tries to address:
A very minor finding within paes ctr where when the cpacf instruction
returns with only partially data en/decrytped the walk_done() was
mistakenly done with the all data counter. Please note this can only
happen when the kmctr returns because the protected key became invalid
in the middle of the operation. And this is only with suspend and
resume on a system with different effective wrapping key.
Eric Biggers mentioned that the context struct within the tfm struct
may be shared among multiple kernel threads. So here now a rework
which uses a spinlock per context to protect the read and write of the
protected key blob value. The en/decrypt functions copy the protected
key(s) at the beginning into a param struct and do not work with the
protected key within the context any more. If the protected key in the
param struct becomes invalid, the key material is again converted to
protected key(s) and the context gets this update protected by the
spinlock. Race conditions are still possible and may result in writing
the very same protected key value more than once. So the spinlock
needs to make sure the protected key(s) within the context are
consistent updated.
The ctr page is now locked by a mutex instead of a spinlock. A similar
patch went into the aes_s390 code as a result of a complain "sleeping
function called from invalid context at ...algapi.h". See
commit 1c2c7029c0 ("s390/crypto: fix possible sleep during spinlock
aquired")' for more.
During testing with instrumented code another issue with the xts
en/decrypt function revealed. The retry cleared the running iv value
and thus let to wrong en/decrypted data.
Tested and verified with additional testcases via AF_ALG interface and
additional selftests within the kernel (which will be made available
as soon as possible).
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway. So they've now been removed.
Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
->setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
s390_crypto_shash_parmsize() return type is int, it
should not be stored in a unsigned variable, which
compared with zero.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 3c2eb6b76c ("s390/crypto: Support for SHA3 via CPACF (MSA6)")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Convert the glue code for the S390 CPACF implementations of DES-ECB,
DES-CBC, DES-CTR, 3DES-ECB, 3DES-CBC, and 3DES-CTR from the deprecated
"blkcipher" API to the "skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the
blkcipher API to be removed.
Note: I made CTR use the same function for encryption and decryption,
since CTR encryption and decryption are identical.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the glue code for the S390 CPACF protected key implementations
of AES-ECB, AES-CBC, AES-XTS, and AES-CTR from the deprecated
"blkcipher" API to the "skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the
blkcipher API to be removed.
Note: I made CTR use the same function for encryption and decryption,
since CTR encryption and decryption are identical.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Convert the glue code for the S390 CPACF implementations of AES-ECB,
AES-CBC, AES-XTS, and AES-CTR from the deprecated "blkcipher" API to the
"skcipher" API. This is needed in order for the blkcipher API to be
removed.
Note: I made CTR use the same function for encryption and decryption,
since CTR encryption and decryption are identical.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add the ability to abort a skcipher walk.
Algorithms:
- Fix XTS to actually do the stealing.
- Add library helpers for AES and DES for single-block users.
- Add library helpers for SHA256.
- Add new DES key verification helper.
- Add surrounding bits for ESSIV generator.
- Add accelerations for aegis128.
- Add test vectors for lzo-rle.
Drivers:
- Add i.MX8MQ support to caam.
- Add gcm/ccm/cfb/ofb aes support in inside-secure.
- Add ofb/cfb aes support in media-tek.
- Add HiSilicon ZIP accelerator support.
Others:
- Fix potential race condition in padata.
- Use unbound workqueues in padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (311 commits)
crypto: caam - Cast to long first before pointer conversion
crypto: ccree - enable CTS support in AES-XTS
crypto: inside-secure - Probe transform record cache RAM sizes
crypto: inside-secure - Base RD fetchcount on actual RD FIFO size
crypto: inside-secure - Base CD fetchcount on actual CD FIFO size
crypto: inside-secure - Enable extended algorithms on newer HW
crypto: inside-secure: Corrected configuration of EIP96_TOKEN_CTRL
crypto: inside-secure - Add EIP97/EIP197 and endianness detection
padata: remove cpu_index from the parallel_queue
padata: unbind parallel jobs from specific CPUs
padata: use separate workqueues for parallel and serial work
padata, pcrypt: take CPU hotplug lock internally in padata_alloc_possible
crypto: pcrypt - remove padata cpumask notifier
padata: make padata_do_parallel find alternate callback CPU
workqueue: require CPU hotplug read exclusion for apply_workqueue_attrs
workqueue: unconfine alloc/apply/free_workqueue_attrs()
padata: allocate workqueue internally
arm64: dts: imx8mq: Add CAAM node
random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
crypto: ux500 - Fix COMPILE_TEST warnings
...
This patch introduces sha3 support for s390.
- Rework the s390-specific SHA1 and SHA2 related code to
provide the basis for SHA3.
- Provide two new kernel modules sha3_256_s390 and
sha3_512_s390 together with new kernel options.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
With 'extra run-time crypto self tests' enabled, the selftest
for s390-xts fails with
alg: skcipher: xts-aes-s390 encryption unexpectedly succeeded on
test vector "random: len=0 klen=64"; expected_error=-22,
cfg="random: inplace use_digest nosimd src_divs=[2.61%@+4006,
84.44%@+21, 1.55%@+13, 4.50%@+344, 4.26%@+21, 2.64%@+27]"
This special case with nbytes=0 is not handled correctly and this
fix now makes sure that -EINVAL is returned when there is en/decrypt
called with 0 bytes to en/decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Rename static / file-local functions so that they do not conflict with
the functions declared in crypto/sha256.h.
This is a preparation patch for folding crypto/sha256.h into crypto/sha.h.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For correctness and compliance with the XTS-AES specification, we are
adding support for ciphertext stealing to XTS implementations, even
though no use cases are known that will be enabled by this.
Since the s390 implementation already has a fallback skcipher standby
for other purposes, let's use it for this purpose as well. If ciphertext
stealing use cases ever become a bottleneck, we can always revisit this.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Switch to the refactored DES key verification routines. While at it,
rename the DES encrypt/decrypt routines so they will not conflict with
the DES library later on.
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The context used to store the key blob used a fixed 80 bytes
buffer. And all the set_key functions did not even check the given key
size. With CCA variable length AES cipher keys there come key blobs
with about 136 bytes and maybe in the future there will arise the need
to store even bigger key blobs.
This patch reworks the paes set_key functions and the context
buffers to work with small key blobs (<= 128 bytes) directly in the
context buffer and larger blobs by allocating additional memory and
storing the pointer in the context buffer. If there has been memory
allocated for storing a key blob, it also needs to be freed on release
of the tfm. So all the paes ciphers now have a init and exit function
implemented for this job.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
The newly introduced AES library exposes aes_encrypt/aes_decrypt
routines so rename existing occurrences of those identifiers in
the s390 driver.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
To help avoid confusion, add a comment to ghash-generic.c which explains
the convention that the kernel's implementation of GHASH uses.
Also update the Kconfig help text and module descriptions to call GHASH
a "hash function" rather than a "message digest", since the latter
normally means a real cryptographic hash function, which GHASH is not.
Cc: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Pascal Van Leeuwen <pvanleeuwen@verimatrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Let's use the error value that is typically used if HW support is not
available when trying to load a module - this is also what systemd's
systemd-modules-load.service expects.
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
This patch fixes a complain about possible sleep during
spinlock aquired
"BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
include/crypto/algapi.h:426"
for the ctr(aes) and ctr(des) s390 specific ciphers.
Instead of using a spinlock this patch introduces a mutex
which is save to be held in sleeping context. Please note
a deadlock is not possible as mutex_trylock() is used.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
The current kernel uses improved crypto selftests. These
tests showed that the current implementation of gcm-aes-s390
is not able to deal with chunks of output buffers which are
not a multiple of 16 bytes. This patch introduces a rework
of the gcm aes s390 scatter walk handling which now is able
to handle any input and output scatter list chunk sizes
correctly.
Code has been verified by the crypto selftests, the tcrypt
kernel module and additional tests ran via the af_alg interface.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <steuer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add support for AEAD in simd
- Add fuzz testing to testmgr
- Add panic_on_fail module parameter to testmgr
- Use per-CPU struct instead multiple variables in scompress
- Change verify API for akcipher
Algorithms:
- Convert x86 AEAD algorithms over to simd
- Forbid 2-key 3DES in FIPS mode
- Add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm
Drivers:
- Set output IV with ctr-aes in crypto4xx
- Set output IV in rockchip
- Fix potential length overflow with hashing in sun4i-ss
- Fix computation error with ctr in vmx
- Add SM4 protected keys support in ccree
- Remove long-broken mxc-scc driver
- Add rfc4106(gcm(aes)) cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (179 commits)
crypto: ccree - use a proper le32 type for le32 val
crypto: ccree - remove set but not used variable 'du_size'
crypto: ccree - Make cc_sec_disable static
crypto: ccree - fix spelling mistake "protedcted" -> "protected"
crypto: caam/qi2 - generate hash keys in-place
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix DMA mapping of stack memory
crypto: caam/qi2 - fix zero-length buffer DMA mapping
crypto: stm32/cryp - update to return iv_out
crypto: stm32/cryp - remove request mutex protection
crypto: stm32/cryp - add weak key check for DES
crypto: atmel - remove set but not used variable 'alg_name'
crypto: picoxcell - Use dev_get_drvdata()
crypto: crypto4xx - get rid of redundant using_sd variable
crypto: crypto4xx - use sync skcipher for fallback
crypto: crypto4xx - fix cfb and ofb "overran dst buffer" issues
crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV
crypto: ecrdsa - select ASN1 and OID_REGISTRY for EC-RDSA
crypto: ux500 - use ccflags-y instead of CFLAGS_<basename>.o
crypto: ccree - handle tee fips error during power management resume
crypto: ccree - add function to handle cryptocell tee fips error
...
The assembler code in arch/s390 misses proper ENDPROC statements
to properly end functions in a few places. Add them.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
With the z14 machine there came also a CPACF hardware extension
which provides a True Random Number Generator. This TRNG can
be accessed with a new subfunction code within the CPACF prno
instruction and provides random data with very high entropy.
So if there is a TRNG available, let's use it for initial seeding
and reseeding instead of the current implementation which tries
to generate entropy based on stckf (store clock fast) jitters.
For details about the amount of data needed and pulled for
seeding and reseeding there can be explaining comments in the
code found.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Here is a rework of the generate_entropy function of the pseudo random
device driver exploiting the prno CPACF instruction.
George Spelvin pointed out some issues with the existing
implementation. One point was, that the buffer used to store the stckf
values is 2 pages which are initially filled with get_random_bytes()
for each 64 byte junk produced by the function. Another point was that
the stckf values only carry entropy in the LSB and thus a buffer of
2 pages is not really needed. Then there was a comment about the use
of the kimd cpacf function without proper initialization.
The rework addresses these points and now one page is used and only
one half of this is filled with get_random_bytes() on each chunk of 64
bytes requested data. The other half of the page is filled with stckf
values exored into with an overlap of 4 bytes. This can be done due to
the fact that only the lower 4 bytes carry entropy we need. For more
details about the algorithm used, see the header of the function.
The generate_entropy() function now uses the cpacf function klmd with
proper initialization of the parameter block to perform the sha512
hash.
George also pointed out some issues with the internal buffers used for
seeding and reads. These buffers are now zeroed with memzero_implicit
after use.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Suggested-by: George Spelvin <lkml@sdf.org>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <steuer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it
sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting
that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of
"weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do).
Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which
it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver,
though just in some debugging messages.)
Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
'cipher' algorithms (single block ciphers) are always synchronous, so
passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in the mask to crypto_alloc_cipher() has no
effect. Many users therefore already don't pass it, but some still do.
This inconsistency can cause confusion, especially since the way the
'mask' argument works is somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Enhance the paes_s390 kernel module to allow the paes cipher to
accept variable length key material. The key material accepted by
the paes cipher is a key blob of various types. As of today, two
key blob types are supported: CCA secure key blobs and protected
key blobs.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
In the quest to remove all stack VLA usage from the kernel[1], this
replaces struct crypto_skcipher and SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() usage
with struct crypto_sync_skcipher and SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(),
which uses a fixed stack size.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The return code of cpacf_kmc() is less than the number of
bytes to process in case of an error, not greater.
The crypt routines for the other cipher modes already have
this correctly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11+
Fixes: 2793784307 ("s390/crypt: Add protected key AES module")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Some aead algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD. But this is
redundant with the C structure type ('struct aead_alg'), and
crypto_register_aead() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the aead algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The arch_get_random_seed_long() invocation done by the random device
driver is done in interrupt context and may be invoked very very
frequently. The existing s390 arch_get_random_seed*() implementation
uses the PRNO(TRNG) instruction which produces excellent high quality
entropy but is relatively slow and thus expensive.
This fix reworks the arch_get_random_seed* implementation. It
introduces a buffer concept to decouple the delivery of random data
via arch_get_random_seed*() from the generation of new random
bytes. The buffer of random data is filled asynchronously by a
workqueue thread.
If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the worker
thread refills the buffer.
The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator.
As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy
contained in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte
entropy and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the
buffer will contain 1 bit of entropy.
The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much cpu consumption.
So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
limited to 4Kb per second.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
The return from the crc32_le_vgfm_16/crc32c_le_vgfm_16 and the
crc32_be_vgfm_16 functions are done with "br %r14". These are indirect
branches as well and need to use execute trampolines for CONFIG_EXPOLINE=y.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16
Fixes: f19fbd5ed6 ("s390: introduce execute-trampolines for branches")
Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <brueckner@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Tests with paes-xts and debugging investigations showed
that the ciphers are not always correctly resolved.
The rules for cipher priorities seem to be:
- Ecb-aes should have a prio greater than the
generic ecb-aes.
- The mode specialized ciphers (like cbc-aes-s390)
should have a prio greater than the sum of the
more generic combinations (like cbs(aes)).
This patch adjusts the cipher priorities for the
s390 aes and paes in kernel crypto implementations.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
A kernel crash occurs when the aes_s390 kernel module is
removed on machines < z14. This only happens on kernel
version 4.15 and higher on machines not supporting MSA 8.
The reason for the crash is a unconditional
crypto_unregister_aead() invocation where no previous
crypto_register_aead() had been called. The fix now
remembers if there has been a successful registration and
only then calls the unregister function upon kernel module
remove.
The code now crashing has been introduced with
"bf7fa03 s390/crypto: add s390 platform specific aes gcm support."
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)
Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.
The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.
Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
More files under arch/s390 have been tagged with the SPDX identifier,
a few of those files have a GPL license text. Remove the GPL text
as it is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Add the correct SPDX license to a few more files under arch/s390 and
drivers/s390 which have been missed to far.
The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used
instead of the full boiler plate text.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
