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481 commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Linus Torvalds
|
35277995e1 |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull spectre/meltdown updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The next round of updates related to melted spectrum:
- The initial set of spectre V1 mitigations:
- Array index speculation blocker and its usage for syscall,
fdtable and the n180211 driver.
- Speculation barrier and its usage in user access functions
- Make indirect calls in KVM speculation safe
- Blacklisting of known to be broken microcodes so IPBP/IBSR are not
touched.
- The initial IBPB support and its usage in context switch
- The exposure of the new speculation MSRs to KVM guests.
- A fix for a regression in x86/32 related to the cpu entry area
- Proper whitelisting for known to be safe CPUs from the mitigations.
- objtool fixes to deal proper with retpolines and alternatives
- Exclude __init functions from retpolines which speeds up the boot
process.
- Removal of the syscall64 fast path and related cleanups and
simplifications
- Removal of the unpatched paravirt mode which is yet another source
of indirect unproteced calls.
- A new and undisputed version of the module mismatch warning
- A couple of cleanup and correctness fixes all over the place
Yet another step towards full mitigation. There are a few things still
missing like the RBS underflow mitigation for Skylake and other small
details, but that's being worked on.
That said, I'm taking a belated christmas vacation for a week and hope
that everything is magically solved when I'm back on Feb 12th"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
KVM/x86: Add IBPB support
KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX
x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst
x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing
x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions
x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU
x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option
x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
...
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Linus Torvalds
|
b2fe5fa686 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Significantly shrink the core networking routing structures. Result
of http://vger.kernel.org/~davem/seoul2017_netdev_keynote.pdf
2) Add netdevsim driver for testing various offloads, from Jakub
Kicinski.
3) Support cross-chip FDB operations in DSA, from Vivien Didelot.
4) Add a 2nd listener hash table for TCP, similar to what was done for
UDP. From Martin KaFai Lau.
5) Add eBPF based queue selection to tun, from Jason Wang.
6) Lockless qdisc support, from John Fastabend.
7) SCTP stream interleave support, from Xin Long.
8) Smoother TCP receive autotuning, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Lots of erspan tunneling enhancements, from William Tu.
10) Add true function call support to BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Add explicit support for GRO HW offloading, from Michael Chan.
12) Support extack generation in more netlink subsystems. From Alexander
Aring, Quentin Monnet, and Jakub Kicinski.
13) Add 1000BaseX, flow control, and EEE support to mvneta driver. From
Russell King.
14) Add flow table abstraction to netfilter, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
15) Many improvements and simplifications to the NFP driver bpf JIT,
from Jakub Kicinski.
16) Support for ipv6 non-equal cost multipath routing, from Ido
Schimmel.
17) Add resource abstration to devlink, from Arkadi Sharshevsky.
18) Packet scheduler classifier shared filter block support, from Jiri
Pirko.
19) Avoid locking in act_csum, from Davide Caratti.
20) devinet_ioctl() simplifications from Al viro.
21) More TCP bpf improvements from Lawrence Brakmo.
22) Add support for onlink ipv6 route flag, similar to ipv4, from David
Ahern.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1925 commits)
tls: Add support for encryption using async offload accelerator
ip6mr: fix stale iterator
net/sched: kconfig: Remove blank help texts
openvswitch: meter: Use 64-bit arithmetic instead of 32-bit
tcp_nv: fix potential integer overflow in tcpnv_acked
r8169: fix RTL8168EP take too long to complete driver initialization.
qmi_wwan: Add support for Quectel EP06
rtnetlink: enable IFLA_IF_NETNSID for RTM_NEWLINK
ipmr: Fix ptrdiff_t print formatting
ibmvnic: Wait for device response when changing MAC
qlcnic: fix deadlock bug
tcp: release sk_frag.page in tcp_disconnect
ipv4: Get the address of interface correctly.
net_sched: gen_estimator: fix lockdep splat
net: macb: Handle HRESP error
net/mlx5e: IPoIB, Fix copy-paste bug in flow steering refactoring
ipv6: addrconf: break critical section in addrconf_verify_rtnl()
ipv6: change route cache aging logic
i40e/i40evf: Update DESC_NEEDED value to reflect larger value
bnxt_en: cleanup DIM work on device shutdown
...
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Linus Torvalds
|
3ccabd6d9d |
Merge branch 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar: "Misc cleanups" * 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86: Remove unused IOMMU_STRESS Kconfig x86/extable: Mark exception handler functions visible x86/timer: Don't inline __const_udelay x86/headers: Remove duplicate #includes |
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Dan Williams
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c7f631cb07 |
x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check
near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be
mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e.
array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by:
cmp %limit, %ptr
sbb %mask, %mask
and %mask, %ptr
With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit
or NULL.
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727417469.33451.11804043010080838495.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Dan Williams
|
304ec1b050 |
x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Dan Williams
|
b5c4ae4f35 |
x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to __uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and clac(). No functional changes. Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416438.33451.17309465232057176966.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com |
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Ingo Molnar
|
7e86548e2c |
Linux 4.15
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEcBAABAgAGBQJabj6pAAoJEHm+PkMAQRiGs8cIAJQFkCWnbz86e3vG4DuWhyA8 CMGHCQdUOxxFGa/ixhIiuetbC0x+JVHAjV2FwVYbAQfaZB3pfw2iR1ncQxpAP1AI oLU9vBEqTmwKMPc9CM5rRfnLFWpGcGwUNzgPdxD5yYqGDtcM8K840mF6NdkYe5AN xU8rv1wlcFPF4A5pvHCH0pvVmK4VxlVFk/2H67TFdxBs4PyJOnSBnf+bcGWgsKO6 hC8XIVtcKCH2GfFxt5d0Vgc5QXJEpX1zn2mtCa1MwYRjN2plgYfD84ha0xE7J0B0 oqV/wnjKXDsmrgVpncr3txd4+zKJFNkdNRE4eLAIupHo2XHTG4HvDJ5dBY2NhGU= =sOml -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'v4.15' into x86/pti, to be able to merge dependent changes Time has come to switch PTI development over to a v4.15 base - we'll still try to make sure that all PTI fixes backport cleanly to v4.14 and earlier. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
|
6304672b7f |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86/pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Another set of melted spectrum related changes:
- Code simplifications and cleanups for RSB and retpolines.
- Make the indirect calls in KVM speculation safe.
- Whitelist CPUs which are known not to speculate from Meltdown and
prepare for the new CPUID flag which tells the kernel that a CPU is
not affected.
- A less rigorous variant of the module retpoline check which merily
warns when a non-retpoline protected module is loaded and reflects
that fact in the sysfs file.
- Prepare for Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier support.
- Prepare for exposure of the Speculation Control MSRs to guests, so
guest OSes which depend on those "features" can use them. Includes
a blacklist of the broken microcodes. The actual exposure of the
MSRs through KVM is still being worked on"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
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Linus Torvalds
|
24b1cccf92 |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 retpoline fixlet from Thomas Gleixner: "Remove the ESP/RSP thunks for retpoline as they cannot ever work. Get rid of them before they show up in a release" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk |
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Borislav Petkov
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1dde7415e9 |
x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
Simplify it to call an asm-function instead of pasting 41 insn bytes at every call site. Also, add alignment to the macro as suggested here: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886 [dwmw2: Clean up comments, let it clobber %ebx and just tell the compiler] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ak@linux.intel.com Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com Cc: karahmed@amazon.de Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com Cc: gregkh@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517070274-12128-3-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk |
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Waiman Long
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1df37383a8 |
x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk
It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as
retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register.
Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such
a thunk call is emitted incorrectly.
Fixes:
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David S. Miller
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5ca114400d |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
en_rx_am.c was deleted in 'net-next' but had a bug fixed in it in
'net'.
The esp{4,6}_offload.c conflicts were overlapping changes.
The 'out' label is removed so we just return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
directly.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Linus Torvalds
|
5515114211 |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of fixes for the meltdown/spectre mitigations:
- Make kprobes aware of retpolines to prevent probes in the retpoline
thunks.
- Make the machine check exception speculation protected. MCE used to
issue an indirect call directly from the ASM entry code. Convert
that to a direct call into a C-function and issue the indirect call
from there so the compiler can add the retpoline protection,
- Make the vmexit_fill_RSB() assembly less stupid
- Fix a typo in the PTI documentation"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
x86/pti: Document fix wrong index
kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
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Masami Hiramatsu
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c1804a2368 |
kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
Mark __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions as blacklist for kprobes because those functions can be called from anywhere in the kernel including blacklist functions of kprobes. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629209111.10241.5444852823378068683.stgit@devbox |
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Masami Hiramatsu
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736e80a421 |
retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
Introduce start/end markers of __x86_indirect_thunk_* functions. To make it easy, consolidate .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.* sections to one .text.__x86.indirect_thunk section and put it in the end of kernel text section and adds __indirect_thunk_start/end so that other subsystem (e.g. kprobes) can identify it. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151629206178.10241.6828804696410044771.stgit@devbox |
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David S. Miller
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c02b3741eb |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Overlapping changes all over. The mini-qdisc bits were a little bit tricky, however. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Andi Kleen
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7cf1aaa2ad |
x86/timer: Don't inline __const_udelay
__const_udelay is marked inline, and LTO will happily inline it everywhere
Dropping the inline saves ~44k text in a LTO build.
13999560
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Linus Torvalds
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40548c6b6c |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This contains:
- a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.
- a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
be worked on.
- PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared
- removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions
- add PTI documentation
- add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
implements what it advertises.
- a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
status.
- the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:
+ The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support
+ The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
code
+ Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
trap
+ The RSB fill after vmexit
- initial objtool support for retpoline
As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
hold:
- the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs
- the RSB fill after context switch
Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
...
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Masami Hiramatsu
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540adea380 |
error-injection: Separate error-injection from kprobe
Since error-injection framework is not limited to be used by kprobes, nor bpf. Other kernel subsystems can use it freely for checking safeness of error-injection, e.g. livepatch, ftrace etc. So this separate error-injection framework from kprobes. Some differences has been made: - "kprobe" word is removed from any APIs/structures. - BPF_ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() is renamed to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION() since it is not limited for BPF too. - CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION is the config item of this feature. It is automatically enabled if the arch supports error injection feature for kprobe or ftrace etc. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
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David Woodhouse
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5096732f6f |
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
Convert all indirect jumps in 32bit checksum assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-11-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk |
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David Woodhouse
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76b043848f |
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
Enable the use of -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern in newer GCC, and provide the corresponding thunks. Provide assembler macros for invoking the thunks in the same way that GCC does, from native and inline assembler. This adds X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE and sets it by default on all CPUs. In some circumstances, IBRS microcode features may be used instead, and the retpoline can be disabled. On AMD CPUs if lfence is serialising, the retpoline can be dramatically simplified to a simple "lfence; jmp *\reg". A future patch, after it has been verified that lfence really is serialising in all circumstances, can enable this by setting the X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD feature bit in addition to X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE. Do not align the retpoline in the altinstr section, because there is no guarantee that it stays aligned when it's copied over the oldinstr during alternative patching. [ Andi Kleen: Rename the macros, add CONFIG_RETPOLINE option, export thunks] [ tglx: Put actual function CALL/JMP in front of the macros, convert to symbolic labels ] [ dwmw2: Convert back to numeric labels, merge objtool fixes ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-4-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk |
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Linus Torvalds
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64a48099b3 |
Merge branch 'WIP.x86-pti.entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 syscall entry code changes for PTI from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes here are Andy Lutomirski's changes to switch the x86-64 entry code to use the 'per CPU entry trampoline stack'. This, besides helping fix KASLR leaks (the pending Page Table Isolation (PTI) work), also robustifies the x86 entry code" * 'WIP.x86-pti.entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits) x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky x86/paravirt: Provide a way to check for hypervisors x86/paravirt: Dont patch flush_tlb_single x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only x86/entry: Clean up the SYSENTER_stack code x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary x86/entry/64: Move the IST stacks into struct cpu_entry_area x86/entry/64: Create a per-CPU SYSCALL entry trampoline x86/entry/64: Return to userspace from the trampoline stack x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries x86/espfix/64: Stop assuming that pt_regs is on the entry stack x86/entry/64: Separate cpu_current_top_of_stack from TSS.sp0 x86/entry: Remap the TSS into the CPU entry area x86/entry: Move SYSENTER_stack to the beginning of struct tss_struct x86/dumpstack: Handle stack overflow on all stacks x86/entry: Fix assumptions that the HW TSS is at the beginning of cpu_tss x86/kasan/64: Teach KASAN about the cpu_entry_area x86/mm/fixmap: Generalize the GDT fixmap mechanism, introduce struct cpu_entry_area x86/entry/gdt: Put per-CPU GDT remaps in ascending order x86/dumpstack: Add get_stack_info() support for the SYSENTER stack ... |
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Andy Lutomirski
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c482feefe1 |
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Randy Dunlap
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f5b5fab178 |
x86/decoder: Fix and update the opcodes map
Update x86-opcode-map.txt based on the October 2017 Intel SDM publication. Fix INVPID to INVVPID. Add UD0 and UD1 instruction opcodes. Also sync the objtool and perf tooling copies of this file. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aac062d7-c0f6-96e3-5c92-ed299e2bd3da@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Masami Hiramatsu
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12a78d43de |
x86/decoder: Add new TEST instruction pattern
The kbuild test robot reported this build warning: Warning: arch/x86/tools/test_get_len found difference at <jump_table>:ffffffff8103dd2c Warning: ffffffff8103dd82: f6 09 d8 testb $0xd8,(%rcx) Warning: objdump says 3 bytes, but insn_get_length() says 2 Warning: decoded and checked 1569014 instructions with 1 warnings This sequence seems to be a new instruction not in the opcode map in the Intel SDM. The instruction sequence is "F6 09 d8", means Group3(F6), MOD(00)REG(001)RM(001), and 0xd8. Intel SDM vol2 A.4 Table A-6 said the table index in the group is "Encoding of Bits 5,4,3 of the ModR/M Byte (bits 2,1,0 in parenthesis)" In that table, opcodes listed by the index REG bits as: 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111 TEST Ib/Iz,(undefined),NOT,NEG,MUL AL/rAX,IMUL AL/rAX,DIV AL/rAX,IDIV AL/rAX So, it seems TEST Ib is assigned to 001. Add the new pattern. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Borislav Petkov
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e2a5dca753 |
x86/umip: Fix insn_get_code_seg_params()'s return value
In order to save on redundant structs definitions
insn_get_code_seg_params() was made to return two 4-bit values in a char
but clang complains:
arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c:780:10: warning: implicit conversion from 'int' to 'char'
changes value from 132 to -124 [-Wconstant-conversion]
return INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(4, 8);
~~~~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/insn-eval.h:16:57: note: expanded from macro 'INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS'
#define INSN_CODE_SEG_PARAMS(oper_sz, addr_sz) (oper_sz | (addr_sz << 4))
Those two values do get picked apart afterwards the opposite way of how
they were ORed so wrt to the LSByte, the return value is the same.
But this function returns -EINVAL in the error case, which is an int. So
make it return an int which is the native word size anyway and thus fix
the clang warning.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171123091951.1462-1-bp@alien8.de
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Linus Torvalds
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d6ec9d9a4d |
Merge branch 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Note that in this cycle most of the x86 topics interacted at a level
that caused them to be merged into tip:x86/asm - but this should be a
temporary phenomenon, hopefully we'll back to the usual patterns in
the next merge window.
The main changes in this cycle were:
Hardware enablement:
- Add support for the Intel UMIP (User Mode Instruction Prevention)
CPU feature. This is a security feature that disables certain
instructions such as SGDT, SLDT, SIDT, SMSW and STR. (Ricardo Neri)
[ Note that this is disabled by default for now, there are some
smaller enhancements in the pipeline that I'll follow up with in
the next 1-2 days, which allows this to be enabled by default.]
- Add support for the AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization) CPU
feature, on top of SME (Secure Memory Encryption) support that was
added in v4.14. (Tom Lendacky, Brijesh Singh)
- Enable new SSE/AVX/AVX512 CPU features: AVX512_VBMI2, GFNI, VAES,
VPCLMULQDQ, AVX512_VNNI, AVX512_BITALG. (Gayatri Kammela)
Other changes:
- A big series of entry code simplifications and enhancements (Andy
Lutomirski)
- Make the ORC unwinder default on x86 and various objtool
enhancements. (Josh Poimboeuf)
- 5-level paging enhancements (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Micro-optimize the entry code a bit (Borislav Petkov)
- Improve the handling of interdependent CPU features in the early
FPU init code (Andi Kleen)
- Build system enhancements (Changbin Du, Masahiro Yamada)
- ... plus misc enhancements, fixes and cleanups"
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (118 commits)
x86/build: Make the boot image generation less verbose
selftests/x86: Add tests for the STR and SLDT instructions
selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention
x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP
x86/umip: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention at runtime
x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user
x86/umip: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions
x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings
x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode
x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings
x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions
resource: Fix resource_size.cocci warnings
X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active
X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active
percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED
x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot
x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active
...
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Ricardo Neri
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9c6c799fae |
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings
Tasks running in virtual-8086 mode, in protected mode with code segment descriptors that specify 16-bit default address sizes via the D bit, or via an address override prefix will use 16-bit addressing form encodings as described in the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architecture Software Developer's Manual Volume 2A Section 2.1.5, Table 2-1. 16-bit addressing encodings differ in several ways from the 32-bit/64-bit addressing form encodings: ModRM.rm points to different registers and, in some cases, effective addresses are indicated by the addition of the value of two registers. Also, there is no support for SIB bytes. Thus, a separate function is needed to parse this form of addressing. Three functions are introduced. get_reg_offset_16() obtains the offset from the base of pt_regs of the registers indicated by the ModRM byte of the address encoding. get_eff_addr_modrm_16() computes the effective address from the value of the register operands. get_addr_ref_16() computes the linear address using the obtained effective address and the base address of the segment. Segment limits are enforced when running in protected mode. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-6-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
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86cc351090 |
x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode
It is possible to utilize 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode via an address override instruction prefix. However, the range of the effective address is still limited to [0x-0xffff]. In such a case, return error. Also, linear addresses in virtual-8086 mode are limited to 20 bits. Enforce such limit by truncating the most significant bytes of the computed linear address. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-5-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
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cd9b594a9e |
x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses
The function insn_get_addr_ref() is capable of handling only 64-bit addresses. A previous commit introduced a function to handle 32-bit addresses. Invoke these two functions from a third wrapper function that calls the appropriate routine based on the address size specified in the instruction structure (obtained by looking at the code segment default address size and the address override prefix, if present). While doing this, rename the original function insn_get_addr_ref() with the more appropriate name get_addr_ref_64(), ensure it is only used for 64-bit addresses. Also, since 64-bit addresses are not possible in 32-bit builds, provide a dummy function such case. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-4-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
|
7a6daf7912 |
x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings
32-bit and 64-bit address encodings are identical. Thus, the same logic could be used to resolve the effective address. However, there are two key differences: address size and enforcement of segment limits. If running a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel, it is best to perform the address calculation using 32-bit data types. In this manner hardware is used for the arithmetic, including handling of signs and overflows. 32-bit addresses are generally used in protected mode; segment limits are enforced in this mode. This implementation obtains the limit of the segment associated with the instruction operands and prefixes. If the computed address is outside the segment limits, an error is returned. It is also possible to use 32-bit address in long mode and virtual-8086 mode by using an address override prefix. In such cases, segment limits are not enforced. Support to use 32-bit arithmetic is added to the utility functions that compute effective addresses. However, the end result is stored in a variable of type long (which has a width of 8 bytes in 64-bit builds). Hence, once a 32-bit effective address is computed, the 4 most significant bytes are masked out to avoid sign extension. The newly added function get_addr_ref_32() is almost identical to the existing function insn_get_addr_ref() (used for 64-bit addresses). The only difference is that it verifies that the effective address is within the limits of the segment. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-3-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
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70e57c0f4b |
x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions
Computing a linear address involves several steps. The first step is to compute the effective address. This requires determining the addressing mode in use and perform arithmetic operations on the operands. Plus, each addressing mode has special cases that must be handled. Once the effective address is known, the base address of the applicable segment is added to obtain the linear address. Clearly, this is too much work for a single function. Instead, handle each addressing mode in a separate utility function. This improves readability and gives us the opportunity to handler errors better. At the moment, arithmetic to compute the effective address uses 64-byte variables. Thus, limit support to 64-bit addresses. While reworking the function insn_get_addr_ref(), the variable addr_offset is renamed as regoff to reflect its actual use (i.e., offset, from the base of pt_regs, of the register used as operand). Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar
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93c08089c0 |
Merge branch 'x86/mpx' into x86/asm, to pick up dependent commits
The UMIP series is based on top of changes already queued up in the x86/mpx branch, so merge it. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar
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8c5db92a70 |
Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts: include/linux/compiler-clang.h include/linux/compiler-gcc.h include/linux/compiler-intel.h include/uapi/linux/stddef.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
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b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
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71271269ef |
x86/insn-eval: Extend get_seg_base_addr() to also obtain segment limit
In protected mode, it is common to want to obtain the limit of a segment along with its base address. This is useful, for instance, to verify that an effective address lies within a segment before computing a linear address. Up to this point, this library only computes linear addresses in long mode. Subsequent patches will include support for protected mode. Support to verify the segment limit will be needed. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509148310-30862-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ricardo Neri
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1089044428 |
x86/insn-eval: Incorporate segment base in linear address computation
insn_get_addr_ref() returns the effective address as defined by the section 3.7.5.1 Vol 1 of the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual. In order to compute the linear address, we must add to the effective address the segment base address as set in the segment descriptor. The segment descriptor to use depends on the register used as operand and segment override prefixes, if any. In most cases, the segment base address will be 0 if the USER_DS/USER32_DS segment is used or if segmentation is not used. However, the base address is not necessarily zero if a user programs defines its own segments. This is possible by using a local descriptor table. Since the effective address is a signed quantity, the unsigned segment base address is saved in a separate variable and added to the final, unsigned, effective address. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-19-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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e526a302e4 |
x86/insn-eval: Indicate a 32-bit displacement if ModRM.mod is 0 and ModRM.rm is 101b
Section 2.2.1.3 of the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual volume 2A states that when ModRM.mod is zero and ModRM.rm is 101b, a 32-bit displacement follows the ModRM byte. This means that none of the registers are used in the computation of the effective address. A return value of -EDOM indicates callers that they should not use the value of registers when computing the effective address for the instruction. In long mode, the effective address is given by the 32-bit displacement plus the location of the next instruction. In protected mode, only the displacement is used. The instruction decoder takes care of obtaining the displacement. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-18-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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4efea85fb5 |
x86/insn-eval: Add function to get default params of code segment
Obtain the default values of the address and operand sizes as specified in the D and L bits of the the segment descriptor selected by the register CS. The function can be used for both protected and long modes. For virtual-8086 mode, the default address and operand sizes are always 2 bytes. The returned parameters are encoded in a signed 8-bit data type. Auxiliar macros are provided to encode and decode such values. Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-17-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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bd5a410a5d |
x86/insn-eval: Add utility functions to get segment descriptor base address and limit
With segmentation, the base address of the segment is needed to compute a linear address. This base address is obtained from the applicable segment descriptor. Such segment descriptor is referenced from a segment selector. These new functions obtain the segment base and limit of the segment selector indicated by segment register index given as argument. This index is any of the INAT_SEG_REG_* family of #define's. The logic to obtain the segment selector is wrapped in the function get_segment_selector() with the inputs described above. Once the selector is known, the base address is determined. In protected mode, the selector is used to obtain the segment descriptor and then its base address. In long mode, the segment base address is zero except when FS or GS are used. In virtual-8086 mode, the base address is computed as the value of the segment selector shifted 4 positions to the left. In protected mode, segment limits are enforced. Thus, a function to determine the limit of the segment is added. Segment limits are not enforced in long or virtual-8086. For the latter, addresses are limited to 20 bits; address size will be handled when computing the linear address. Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-16-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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670f928ba0 |
x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor
The segment descriptor contains information that is relevant to how linear addresses need to be computed. It contains the default size of addresses as well as the base address of the segment. Thus, given a segment selector, we ought to look at segment descriptor to correctly calculate the linear address. In protected mode, the segment selector might indicate a segment descriptor from either the global descriptor table or a local descriptor table. Both cases are considered in this function. This function is a prerequisite for functions in subsequent commits that will obtain the aforementioned attributes of the segment descriptor. Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-15-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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32d0b95300 |
x86/insn-eval: Add utility functions to get segment selector
When computing a linear address and segmentation is used, we need to know the base address of the segment involved in the computation. In most of the cases, the segment base address will be zero as in USER_DS/USER32_DS. However, it may be possible that a user space program defines its own segments via a local descriptor table. In such a case, the segment base address may not be zero. Thus, the segment base address is needed to calculate correctly the linear address. If running in protected mode, the segment selector to be used when computing a linear address is determined by either any of segment override prefixes in the instruction or inferred from the registers involved in the computation of the effective address; in that order. Also, there are cases when the segment override prefixes shall be ignored (i.e., code segments are always selected by the CS segment register; string instructions always use the ES segment register when using rDI register as operand). In long mode, segment registers are ignored, except for FS and GS. In these two cases, base addresses are obtained from the respective MSRs. For clarity, this process can be split into four steps (and an equal number of functions): determine if segment prefixes overrides can be used; parse the segment override prefixes, and use them if found; if not found or cannot be used, use the default segment registers associated with the operand registers. Once the segment register to use has been identified, read its value to obtain the segment selector. The method to obtain the segment selector depends on several factors. In 32-bit builds, segment selectors are saved into a pt_regs structure when switching to kernel mode. The same is also true for virtual-8086 mode. In 64-bit builds, segmentation is mostly ignored, except when running a program in 32-bit legacy mode. In this case, CS and SS can be obtained from pt_regs. DS, ES, FS and GS can be read directly from the respective segment registers. In order to identify the segment registers, a new set of #defines is introduced. It also includes two special identifiers. One of them indicates when the default segment register associated with instruction operands shall be used. Another one indicates that the contents of the segment register shall be ignored; this identifier is used when in long mode. Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-14-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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536b815388 |
x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to identify string instructions
String instructions are special because, in protected mode, the linear address is always obtained via the ES segment register in operands that use the (E)DI register; the DS segment register in operands that use the (E)SI register. Furthermore, segment override prefixes are ignored when calculating a linear address involving the (E)DI register; segment override prefixes can be used when calculating linear addresses involving the (E)SI register. It follows that linear addresses are calculated differently for the case of string instructions. The purpose of this utility function is to identify such instructions for callers to determine a linear address correctly. Note that this function only identifies string instructions; it does not determine what segment register to use in the address computation. That is left to callers. A subsequent commmit introduces a function to determine the segment register to use given the instruction, operands and segment override prefixes. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-13-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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e5e45f1111 |
x86/insn-eval: Add a utility function to get register offsets
The function get_reg_offset() returns the offset to the register the argument specifies as indicated in an enumeration of type offset. Callers of this function would need the definition of such enumeration. This is not needed. Instead, add helper functions for this purpose. These functions are useful in cases when, for instance, the caller needs to decide whether the operand is a register or a memory location by looking at the rm part of the ModRM byte. As of now, this is the only helper function that is needed. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-12-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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ed594e4ba5 |
x86/insn-eval: Do not BUG on invalid register type
We are not in a critical failure path. The invalid register type is caused when trying to decode invalid instruction bytes from a user-space program. Thus, simply print an error message. To prevent this warning from being abused from user space programs, use the rate-limited variant of pr_err(). along with a descriptive prefix. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-11-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Ricardo Neri
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32542ee295 |
x86/mpx, x86/insn: Relocate insn util functions to a new insn-eval file
Other kernel submodules can benefit from using the utility functions defined in mpx.c to obtain the addresses and values of operands contained in the general purpose registers. An instance of this is the emulation code used for instructions protected by the Intel User-Mode Instruction Prevention feature. Thus, these functions are relocated to a new insn-eval.c file. The reason to not relocate these utilities into insn.c is that the latter solely analyses instructions given by a struct insn without any knowledge of the meaning of the values of instruction operands. This new utility insn- eval.c aims to be used to resolve userspace linear addresses based on the contents of the instruction operands as well as the contents of pt_regs structure. These utilities come with a separate header. This is to avoid taking insn.c out of sync from the instructions decoders under tools/obj and tools/perf. This also avoids adding cumbersome #ifdef's for the #include'd files required to decode instructions in a kernel context. Functions are simply relocated. There are not functional or indentation changes. Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-10-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com |
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Kirill Tkhai
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19c6092301 |
locking/arch, x86: Add __down_read_killable()
Similar to __down_write_killable(), add read killable primitive: extract current __down_read() code to macros and teach it to get different functions as slow_path argument: store ax register to ret, and add sp register and preserve its value. Add call_rwsem_down_read_failed_killable() assembly entry similar to call_rwsem_down_read_failed(): push dx register to stack in additional to common registers, as it's not declarated as modifiable in ____down_read(). Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arnd@arndb.de Cc: avagin@virtuozzo.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: gorcunov@virtuozzo.com Cc: heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru Cc: mattst88@gmail.com Cc: rientjes@google.com Cc: rth@twiddle.net Cc: schwidefsky@de.ibm.com Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/150670118802.23930.1316107715255410256.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Tom Lendacky
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e505371dd8 |
x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
Add a cmdline_find_option() function to look for cmdline options that take arguments. The argument is returned in a supplied buffer and the argument length (regardless of whether it fits in the supplied buffer) is returned, with -1 indicating not found. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/36b5f97492a9745dce27682305f990fc20e5cf8a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Daniel Micay
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6974f0c455 |
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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b6ffe9ba46 |
libnvdimm for 4.13
* Introduce the _flushcache() family of memory copy helpers and use them
for persistent memory write operations on x86. The _flushcache()
semantic indicates that the cache is either bypassed for the copy
operation (movnt) or any lines dirtied by the copy operation are
written back (clwb, clflushopt, or clflush).
* Extend dax_operations with ->copy_from_iter() and ->flush()
operations. These operations and other infrastructure updates allow
all persistent memory specific dax functionality to be pushed into
libnvdimm and the pmem driver directly. It also allows dax-specific
sysfs attributes to be linked to a host device, for example:
/sys/block/pmem0/dax/write_cache
* Add support for the new NVDIMM platform/firmware mechanisms introduced
in ACPI 6.2 and UEFI 2.7. This support includes the v1.2 namespace
label format, extensions to the address-range-scrub command set, new
error injection commands, and a new BTT (block-translation-table)
layout. These updates support inter-OS and pre-OS compatibility.
* Fix a longstanding memory corruption bug in nfit_test.
* Make the pmem and nvdimm-region 'badblocks' sysfs files poll(2)
capable.
* Miscellaneous fixes and small updates across libnvdimm and the nfit
driver.
Acknowledgements that came after the branch was pushed:
commit
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