commit 343f4c49f2 upstream.
If kthread_is_per_cpu runs concurrently with free_kthread_struct the
kthread_struct that was just freed may be read from.
This bug was introduced by commit 40966e316f ("kthread: Ensure
struct kthread is present for all kthreads"). When kthread_struct
started to be allocated for all tasks that have PF_KTHREAD set. This
in turn required the kthread_struct to be freed in kernel_execve and
violated the assumption that kthread_struct will have the same
lifetime as the task.
Looking a bit deeper this only applies to callers of kernel_execve
which is just the init process and the user mode helper processes.
These processes really don't want to be kernel threads but are for
historical reasons. Mostly that copy_thread does not know how to take
a kernel mode function to the process with for processes without
PF_KTHREAD or PF_IO_WORKER set.
Solve this by not allocating kthread_struct for the init process and
the user mode helper processes.
This is done by adding a kthread member to struct kernel_clone_args.
Setting kthread in fork_idle and kernel_thread. Adding
user_mode_thread that works like kernel_thread except it does not set
kthread. In fork only allocating the kthread_struct if .kthread is set.
I have looked at kernel/kthread.c and since commit 40966e316f
("kthread: Ensure struct kthread is present for all kthreads") there
have been no assumptions added that to_kthread or __to_kthread will
not return NULL.
There are a few callers of to_kthread or __to_kthread that assume a
non-NULL struct kthread pointer will be returned. These functions are
kthread_data(), kthread_parmme(), kthread_exit(), kthread(),
kthread_park(), kthread_unpark(), kthread_stop(). All of those functions
can reasonably expected to be called when it is know that a task is a
kthread so that assumption seems reasonable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 40966e316f ("kthread: Ensure struct kthread is present for all kthreads")
Reported-by: Максим Кутявин <maximkabox13@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220506141512.516114-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dcd46d897a upstream.
Quoting[1] Ariadne Conill:
"In several other operating systems, it is a hard requirement that the
second argument to execve(2) be the name of a program, thus prohibiting
a scenario where argc < 1. POSIX 2017 also recommends this behaviour,
but it is not an explicit requirement[2]:
The argument arg0 should point to a filename string that is
associated with the process being started by one of the exec
functions.
...
Interestingly, Michael Kerrisk opened an issue about this in 2008[3],
but there was no consensus to support fixing this issue then.
Hopefully now that CVE-2021-4034 shows practical exploitative use[4]
of this bug in a shellcode, we can reconsider.
This issue is being tracked in the KSPP issue tracker[5]."
While the initial code searches[6][7] turned up what appeared to be
mostly corner case tests, trying to that just reject argv == NULL
(or an immediately terminated pointer list) quickly started tripping[8]
existing userspace programs.
The next best approach is forcing a single empty string into argv and
adjusting argc to match. The number of programs depending on argc == 0
seems a smaller set than those calling execve with a NULL argv.
Account for the additional stack space in bprm_stack_limits(). Inject an
empty string when argc == 0 (and set argc = 1). Warn about the case so
userspace has some notice about the change:
process './argc0' launched './argc0' with NULL argv: empty string added
Additionally WARN() and reject NULL argv usage for kernel threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220127000724.15106-1-ariadne@dereferenced.org/
[2] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html
[3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=8408
[4] https://www.qualys.com/2022/01/25/cve-2021-4034/pwnkit.txt
[5] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/176
[6] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execve%5C+*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C+*NULL&literal=0
[7] https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=execlp%3F%5Cs*%5C%28%5B%5E%2C%5D%2B%2C%5Cs*NULL&literal=0
[8] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220131144352.GE16385@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Reported-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
Reported-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201000947.2453721-1-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This moves the fs/coredump.c respective sysctls to its own file.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211129211943.640266-6-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty
dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.
To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places
where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to
know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we
just care about the core logic.
So move the fs/exec.c respective sysctls to its own file.
Since checkpatch complains about style issues with the old code, this
move also fixes a few of those minor style issues:
* Use pr_warn() instead of prink(WARNING
* New empty lines are wanted at the beginning of routines
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211129205548.605569-9-mcgrof@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope@iki.fi>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel@tuxforce.de>
Cc: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Cc: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"55 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: percpu, procfs, sysctl,
misc, core-kernel, get_maintainer, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, nilfs2,
hfs, fat, adfs, panic, delayacct, kconfig, kcov, and ubsan"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (55 commits)
lib: remove redundant assignment to variable ret
ubsan: remove CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
kcov: fix generic Kconfig dependencies if ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR
lib/Kconfig.debug: make TEST_KMOD depend on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
btrfs: use generic Kconfig option for 256kB page size limit
arch/Kconfig: split PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB from PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB
configs: introduce debug.config for CI-like setup
delayacct: track delays from memory compact
Documentation/accounting/delay-accounting.rst: add thrashing page cache and direct compact
delayacct: cleanup flags in struct task_delay_info and functions use it
delayacct: fix incomplete disable operation when switch enable to disable
delayacct: support swapin delay accounting for swapping without blkio
panic: remove oops_id
panic: use error_report_end tracepoint on warnings
fs/adfs: remove unneeded variable make code cleaner
FAT: use io_schedule_timeout() instead of congestion_wait()
hfsplus: use struct_group_attr() for memcpy() region
nilfs2: remove redundant pointer sbufs
fs/binfmt_elf: use PT_LOAD p_align values for static PIE
const_structs.checkpatch: add frequently used ops structs
...
If the dest buffer size is smaller than sizeof(tsk->comm), the buffer
will be without null ternimator, that may cause problem. Using
strscpy_pad() instead of strncpy() in __get_task_comm() can make the
string always nul ternimated and zero padded.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211120112738.45980-3-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Miroslaw <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "task comm cleanups", v2.
This patchset is part of the patchset "extend task comm from 16 to
24"[1]. Now we have different opinion that dynamically allocates memory
to store kthread's long name into a separate pointer, so I decide to
take the useful cleanups apart from the original patchset and send it
separately[2].
These useful cleanups can make the usage around task comm less
error-prone. Furthermore, it will be useful if we want to extend task
comm in the future.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211101060419.4682-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com/
[2]. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CALOAHbAx55AUo3bm8ZepZSZnw7A08cvKPdPyNTf=E_tPqmw5hw@mail.gmail.com/
This patch (of 7):
strlcpy() can trigger out-of-bound reads on the source string[1], we'd
better use strscpy() instead. To make it be robust against full tsk->comm
copies that got noticed in other places, we should make sure it's zero
padded.
[1] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211120112738.45980-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211120112738.45980-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <arnaldo.melo@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Miroslaw <mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@cornelisnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This helper is misleading. It tests for an ongoing exec as well as
the process having received a fatal signal.
Sometimes it is appropriate to treat an on-going exec differently than
a process that is shutting down due to a fatal signal. In particular
taking the fast path out of exit_signals instead of retargeting
signals is not appropriate during exec, and not changing the the exit
code in do_group_exit during exec.
Removing the helper makes it more obvious what is going on as both
cases must be coded for explicitly.
While removing the helper fix the two cases where I have observed
using signal_group_exit resulted in the wrong result.
In exit_signals only test for SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT so that signals are
retargetted during an exec.
In do_group_exit use 0 as the exit code during an exec as de_thread
does not set group_exit_code. As best as I can determine
group_exit_code has been is set to 0 most of the time during
de_thread. During a thread group stop group_exit_code is set to the
stop signal and when the thread group receives SIGCONT group_exit_code
is reset to 0.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211213225350.27481-8-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The only remaining user of group_exit_task is exec. Rename the field
so that it is clear which part of the code uses it.
Update the comment above the definition of group_exec_task to document
how it is currently used.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211213225350.27481-7-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Today the rules are a bit iffy and arbitrary about which kernel
threads have struct kthread present. Both idle threads and thread
started with create_kthread want struct kthread present so that is
effectively all kernel threads. Make the rule that if PF_KTHREAD
and the task is running then struct kthread is present.
This will allow the kernel thread code to using tsk->exit_code
with different semantics from ordinary processes.
To make ensure that struct kthread is present for all
kernel threads move it's allocation into copy_process.
Add a deallocation of struct kthread in exec for processes
that were kernel threads.
Move the allocation of struct kthread for the initial thread
earlier so that it is not repeated for each additional idle
thread.
Move the initialization of struct kthread into set_kthread_struct
so that the structure is always and reliably initailized.
Clear set_child_tid in free_kthread_struct to ensure the kthread
struct is reliably freed during exec. The function
free_kthread_struct does not need to clear vfork_done during exec as
exec_mm_release called from exec_mmap has already cleared vfork_done.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull exit cleanups from Eric Biederman:
"While looking at some issues related to the exit path in the kernel I
found several instances where the code is not using the existing
abstractions properly.
This set of changes introduces force_fatal_sig a way of sending a
signal and not allowing it to be caught, and corrects the misuse of
the existing abstractions that I found.
A lot of the misuse of the existing abstractions are silly things such
as doing something after calling a no return function, rolling BUG by
hand, doing more work than necessary to terminate a kernel thread, or
calling do_exit(SIGKILL) instead of calling force_sig(SIGKILL).
In the review a deficiency in force_fatal_sig and force_sig_seccomp
where ptrace or sigaction could prevent the delivery of the signal was
found. I have added a change that adds SA_IMMUTABLE to change that
makes it impossible to interrupt the delivery of those signals, and
allows backporting to fix force_sig_seccomp
And Arnd found an issue where a function passed to kthread_run had the
wrong prototype, and after my cleanup was failing to build."
* 'exit-cleanups-for-v5.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
soc: ti: fix wkup_m3_rproc_boot_thread return type
signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed
signal: Replace force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) with force_fatal_sig(SIGSEGV)
exit/r8188eu: Replace the macro thread_exit with a simple return 0
exit/rtl8712: Replace the macro thread_exit with a simple return 0
exit/rtl8723bs: Replace the macro thread_exit with a simple return 0
signal/x86: In emulate_vsyscall force a signal instead of calling do_exit
signal/sparc32: In setup_rt_frame and setup_fram use force_fatal_sig
signal/sparc32: Exit with a fatal signal when try_to_clear_window_buffer fails
exit/syscall_user_dispatch: Send ordinary signals on failure
signal: Implement force_fatal_sig
exit/kthread: Have kernel threads return instead of calling do_exit
signal/s390: Use force_sigsegv in default_trap_handler
signal/vm86_32: Properly send SIGSEGV when the vm86 state cannot be saved.
signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON
signal/sparc: In setup_tsb_params convert open coded BUG into BUG
signal/powerpc: On swapcontext failure force SIGSEGV
signal/sh: Use force_sig(SIGKILL) instead of do_group_exit(SIGKILL)
signal/mips: Update (_save|_restore)_fp_context to fail with -EFAULT
signal/sparc32: Remove unreachable do_exit in do_sparc_fault
...
Now that force_fatal_sig exists it is unnecessary and a bit confusing
to use force_sigsegv in cases where the simpler force_fatal_sig is
wanted. So change every instance we can to make the code clearer.
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/877de7jrev.fsf@disp2133
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Prevent exec continuing when a fatal signal is pending by replacing
mmap_read_lock with mmap_read_lock_killable. This is always the right
thing to do as userspace will never observe an exec complete when
there is a fatal signal pending.
With that change it becomes unnecessary to explicitly test for a core
dump in progress. In coredump_wait zap_threads arranges under
mmap_write_lock for all tasks that use a mm to also have SIGKILL
pending, which means mmap_read_lock_killable will always return -EINTR
when old_mm->core_state is present.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87fstux27w.fsf@disp2133
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull MAP_DENYWRITE removal from David Hildenbrand:
"Remove all in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE from the kernel and remove
VM_DENYWRITE.
There are some (minor) user-visible changes:
- We no longer deny write access to shared libaries loaded via legacy
uselib(); this behavior matches modern user space e.g. dlopen().
- We no longer deny write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed, treating it just like shared libraries (which it often
is).
- We always deny write access to the file linked via /proc/pid/exe:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) will fail if write access to the
file cannot be denied, and write access to the file will remain
denied until the link is effectivel gone (exec, termination,
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE)) -- just as if exec'ing the file.
Cross-compiled for a bunch of architectures (alpha, microblaze, i386,
s390x, ...) and verified via ltp that especially the relevant tests
(i.e., creat07 and execve04) continue working as expected"
* tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux:
fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends
mm: ignore MAP_DENYWRITE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
mm: remove VM_DENYWRITE
binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file
binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
find_vma() and variants need protection when used. This patch adds
mmap_assert_lock() calls in the functions.
To make sure the invariant is satisfied, we also need to add a
mmap_read_lock() around the get_user_pages_remote() call in
get_arg_page(). The lock is not strictly necessary because the mm has
been newly created, but the extra cost is limited because the same mutex
was also acquired shortly before in __bprm_mm_init(), so it is hot and
uncontended.
[penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp: TOMOYO needs the same protection which get_arg_page() needs]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/58bb6bf7-a57e-8a40-e74b-39584b415152@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210731175341.3458608-1-lrizzo@google.com
Signed-off-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
flush_kernel_dcache_page is a rather confusing interface that implements a
subset of flush_dcache_page by not being able to properly handle page
cache mapped pages.
The only callers left are in the exec code as all other previous callers
were incorrect as they could have dealt with page cache pages. Replace
the calls to flush_kernel_dcache_page with calls to flush_dcache_page,
which for all architectures does either exactly the same thing, can
contains one or more of the following:
1) an optimization to defer the cache flush for page cache pages not
mapped into userspace
2) additional flushing for mapped page cache pages if cache aliases
are possible
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210712060928.4161649-7-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Geoff Levand <geoff@infradead.org>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.osdn.me>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We want to remove VM_DENYWRITE only currently only used when mapping the
executable during exec. During exec, we already deny_write_access() the
executable, however, after exec completes the VMAs mapped
with VM_DENYWRITE effectively keeps write access denied via
deny_write_access().
Let's deny write access when setting or replacing the MM exe_file. With
this change, we can remove VM_DENYWRITE for mapping executables.
Make set_mm_exe_file() return an error in case deny_write_access()
fails; note that this should never happen, because exec code does a
deny_write_access() early and keeps write access denied when calling
set_mm_exe_file. However, it makes the code easier to read and makes
set_mm_exe_file() and replace_mm_exe_file() look more similar.
This represents a minor user space visible change:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) can now fail if the file is already
opened writable. Also, after sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) the file
cannot be opened writable. Note that we can already fail with -EACCES if
the file doesn't have execute permissions.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
There are a couple of places where we already open-code the (flags &
AT_EMPTY_PATH) check and io_uring will likely add another one in the
future. Let's just add a simple helper getname_uflags() that handles
this directly and use it.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/20210415100815.edrn4a7cy26wkowe@wittgenstein/
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kadashev <dkadashev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210708063447.3556403-7-dkadashev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"190 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (hugetlb, userfaultfd,
vmscan, kconfig, proc, z3fold, zbud, ras, mempolicy, memblock,
migration, thp, nommu, kconfig, madvise, memory-hotplug, zswap,
zsmalloc, zram, cleanups, kfence, and hmm), procfs, sysctl, misc,
core-kernel, lib, lz4, checkpatch, init, kprobes, nilfs2, hfs,
signals, exec, kcov, selftests, compress/decompress, and ipc"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits)
ipc/util.c: use binary search for max_idx
ipc/sem.c: use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for use_global_lock
ipc: use kmalloc for msg_queue and shmid_kernel
ipc sem: use kvmalloc for sem_undo allocation
lib/decompressors: remove set but not used variabled 'level'
selftests/vm/pkeys: exercise x86 XSAVE init state
selftests/vm/pkeys: refill shadow register after implicit kernel write
selftests/vm/pkeys: handle negative sys_pkey_alloc() return code
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really, really random
kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures
exec: remove checks in __register_bimfmt()
x86: signal: don't do sas_ss_reset() until we are certain that sigframe won't be abandoned
hfsplus: report create_date to kstat.btime
hfsplus: remove unnecessary oom message
nilfs2: remove redundant continue statement in a while-loop
kprobes: remove duplicated strong free_insn_page in x86 and s390
init: print out unknown kernel parameters
checkpatch: do not complain about positive return values starting with EPOLL
checkpatch: improve the indented label test
checkpatch: scripts/spdxcheck.py now requires python3
...
Delete NULL check, all callers pass valid pointer.
Delete ->load_binary check -- failure to provide hook in a custom module
will be very noticeable at the very first execve call.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YK1Gy1qXaLAR+tPl@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that
does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in
multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to
set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.
service-A
\- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1)
\- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)
The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1.
When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in
container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.
We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not
allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be
overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.
Changelog
v11:
* Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts.
* Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of
inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.
Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().
Changelog
v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
pointer empty.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Delete duplicate words in fs/*.c.
The doubled words that are being dropped are:
that, be, the, in, and, for
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201224052810.25315-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
The 'start' and 'end' arguments to tlb_gather_mmu() are no longer
needed now that there is a separate function for 'fullmm' flushing.
Remove the unused arguments and update all callers.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjQWa14_4UpfDf=fiineNP+RH74kZeDMo_f1D35xNzq9w@mail.gmail.com
Since commit 7a30df49f6 ("mm: mmu_gather: remove __tlb_reset_range()
for force flush"), the 'start' and 'end' arguments to tlb_finish_mmu()
are no longer used, since we flush the whole mm in case of a nested
invalidation.
Remove the unused arguments and update all callers.
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210127235347.1402-3-will@kernel.org
When executing a setuid binary the kernel will verify in bprm_fill_uid()
that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace before
setting the callers uid and gid. Let bprm_fill_uid() handle idmapped
mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped
according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-24-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When determining whether or not to create a coredump the vfs will verify
that the caller is privileged over the inode. Make the would_dump()
helper handle idmapped mounts by passing down the mount's user namespace
of the exec file. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-23-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Pull parisc updates from Helge Deller:
"A change to increase the default maximum stack size on parisc to 100MB
and the ability to further increase the stack hard limit size at
runtime with ulimit for newly started processes.
The other patches fix compile warnings, utilize the Kbuild logic and
cleanups the parisc arch code"
* 'parisc-5.11-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/deller/parisc-linux:
parisc: pci-dma: fix warning unused-function
parisc/uapi: Use Kbuild logic to provide <asm/types.h>
parisc: Make user stack size configurable
parisc: Use _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK in entry.S
parisc: Drop loops_per_jiffy from per_cpu struct
Pull exec-update-lock update from Eric Biederman:
"The key point of this is to transform exec_update_mutex into a
rw_semaphore so readers can be separated from writers.
This makes it easier to understand what the holders of the lock are
doing, and makes it harder to contend or deadlock on the lock.
The real deadlock fix wound up in perf_event_open"
* 'exec-update-lock-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
exec: Transform exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes ultimately fixes the interaction of posix file
lock and exec. Fundamentally most of the change is just moving where
unshare_files is called during exec, and tweaking the users of
files_struct so that the count of files_struct is not unnecessarily
played with.
Along the way fcheck and related helpers were renamed to more
accurately reflect what they do.
There were also many other small changes that fell out, as this is the
first time in a long time much of this code has been touched.
Benchmarks haven't turned up any practical issues but Al Viro has
observed a possibility for a lot of pounding on task_lock. So I have
some changes in progress to convert put_files_struct to always rcu
free files_struct. That wasn't ready for the merge window so that will
have to wait until next time"
* 'exec-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits)
exec: Move io_uring_task_cancel after the point of no return
coredump: Document coredump code exclusively used by cell spufs
file: Remove get_files_struct
file: Rename __close_fd_get_file close_fd_get_file
file: Replace ksys_close with close_fd
file: Rename __close_fd to close_fd and remove the files parameter
file: Merge __alloc_fd into alloc_fd
file: In f_dupfd read RLIMIT_NOFILE once.
file: Merge __fd_install into fd_install
proc/fd: In fdinfo seq_show don't use get_files_struct
bpf/task_iter: In task_file_seq_get_next use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In proc_readfd_common use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
kcmp: In get_file_raw_ptr use task_lookup_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In tid_fd_mode use task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Rename fcheck lookup_fd_rcu
file: Replace fcheck_files with files_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Factor files_lookup_fd_locked out of fcheck_files
file: Rename __fcheck_files to files_lookup_fd_raw
...
Recently syzbot reported[0] that there is a deadlock amongst the users
of exec_update_mutex. The problematic lock ordering found by lockdep
was:
perf_event_open (exec_update_mutex -> ovl_i_mutex)
chown (ovl_i_mutex -> sb_writes)
sendfile (sb_writes -> p->lock)
by reading from a proc file and writing to overlayfs
proc_pid_syscall (p->lock -> exec_update_mutex)
While looking at possible solutions it occured to me that all of the
users and possible users involved only wanted to state of the given
process to remain the same. They are all readers. The only writer is
exec.
There is no reason for readers to block on each other. So fix
this deadlock by transforming exec_update_mutex into a rw_semaphore
named exec_update_lock that only exec takes for writing.
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Fixes: eea9673250 ("exec: Add exec_update_mutex to replace cred_guard_mutex")
[0] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000063640c05ade8e3de@google.com
Reported-by: syzbot+db9cdf3dd1f64252c6ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ft4mbqen.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that unshare_files happens in begin_new_exec after the point of no
return, io_uring_task_cancel can also happen later.
Effectively this means io_uring activities for a task are only canceled
when exec succeeds.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/878saih2op.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Many moons ago the binfmts were doing some very questionable things
with file descriptors and an unsharing of the file descriptor table
was added to make things better[1][2]. The helper steal_lockss was
added to avoid breaking the userspace programs[3][4][6].
Unfortunately it turned out that steal_locks did not work for network
file systems[5], so it was removed to see if anyone would
complain[7][8]. It was thought at the time that NPTL would not be
affected as the unshare_files happened after the other threads were
killed[8]. Unfortunately because there was an unshare_files in
binfmt_elf.c before the threads were killed this analysis was
incorrect.
This unshare_files in binfmt_elf.c resulted in the unshares_files
happening whenever threads were present. Which led to unshare_files
being moved to the start of do_execve[9].
Later the problems were rediscovered and the suggested approach was to
readd steal_locks under a different name[10]. I happened to be
reviewing patches and I noticed that this approach was a step
backwards[11].
I proposed simply moving unshare_files[12] and it was pointed
out that moving unshare_files without auditing the code was
also unsafe[13].
There were then several attempts to solve this[14][15][16] and I even
posted this set of changes[17]. Unfortunately because auditing all of
execve is time consuming this change did not make it in at the time.
Well now that I am cleaning up exec I have made the time to read
through all of the binfmts and the only playing with file descriptors
is either the security modules closing them in
security_bprm_committing_creds or is in the generic code in fs/exec.c.
None of it happens before begin_new_exec is called.
So move unshare_files into begin_new_exec, after the point of no
return. If memory is very very very low and the application calling
exec is sharing file descriptor tables between processes we might fail
past the point of no return. Which is unfortunate but no different
than any of the other places where we allocate memory after the point
of no return.
This movement allows another process that shares the file table, or
another thread of the same process and that closes files or changes
their close on exec behavior and races with execve to cause some
unexpected things to happen. There is only one time of check to time
of use race and it is just there so that execve fails instead of
an interpreter failing when it tries to open the file it is supposed
to be interpreting. Failing later if userspace is being silly is
not a problem.
With this change it the following discription from the removal
of steal_locks[8] finally becomes true.
Apps using NPTL are not affected, since all other threads are killed before
execve.
Apps using LinuxThreads are only affected if they
- have multiple threads during exec (LinuxThreads doesn't kill other
threads, the app may do it with pthread_kill_other_threads_np())
- rely on POSIX locks being inherited across exec
Both conditions are documented, but not their interaction.
Apps using clone() natively are affected if they
- use clone(CLONE_FILES)
- rely on POSIX locks being inherited across exec
I have investigated some paths to make it possible to solve this
without moving unshare_files but they all look more complicated[18].
Reported-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
History-tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
[1] 02cda956de0b ("[PATCH] unshare_files"
[2] 04e9bcb4d106 ("[PATCH] use new unshare_files helper")
[3] 088f5d7244de ("[PATCH] add steal_locks helper")
[4] 02c541ec8ffa ("[PATCH] use new steal_locks helper")
[5] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/E1FLIlF-0007zR-00@dorka.pomaz.szeredi.hu
[6] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0060321191605.GB15997@sorel.sous-sol.org
[7] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/E1FLwjC-0000kJ-00@dorka.pomaz.szeredi.hu
[8] c89681ed7d ("[PATCH] remove steal_locks()")
[9] fd8328be87 ("[PATCH] sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()")
[10] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180317142520.30520-1-jlayton@kernel.org
[11] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r2nwqk73.fsf@xmission.com
[12] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bmfgvg8w.fsf@xmission.com
[13] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180322111424.GE30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
[14] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180827174722.3723-1-jlayton@kernel.org
[15] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180830172423.21964-1-jlayton@kernel.org
[16] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180914105310.6454-1-jlayton@kernel.org
[17] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87a7ohs5ow.fsf@xmission.com
[18] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pn8c1uj6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200817220425.9389-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Al Viro pointed out that using the phrase "close_on_exec(fd,
rcu_dereference_raw(current->files->fdt))" instead of wrapping it in
rcu_read_lock(), rcu_read_unlock() is a very questionable
optimization[1].
Once wrapped with rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock() that phrase
becomes equivalent the helper function get_close_on_exec so
simplify the code and make it more robust by simply using
get_close_on_exec.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207222214.GA4115853@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87k0tqr6zi.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.
The proposed interface looks like this:
prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])
The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.
selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.
The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.
Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.
For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
On parisc we need to initialize the memory layout for the user stack at
process start time to a fixed size, which up until now was limited to
the size as given by CONFIG_MAX_STACK_SIZE_MB at compile time.
This hard limit was too small and showed problems when compiling
ruby2.7, qmlcachegen and some Qt packages.
This patch changes two things:
a) It increases the default maximum stack size to 100MB.
b) Users can modify the stack hard limit size with ulimit and then newly
forked processes will use the given stack size which can even be bigger
than the default 100MB.
Reported-by: John David Anglin <dave.anglin@bell.net>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
- A series from Nick adding ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM & selecting it for
powerpc, as well as a related fix for sparc.
- Remove support for PowerPC 601.
- Some fixes for watchpoints & addition of a new ptrace flag for detecting ISA
v3.1 (Power10) watchpoint features.
- A fix for kernels using 4K pages and the hash MMU on bare metal Power9
systems with > 16TB of RAM, or RAM on the 2nd node.
- A basic idle driver for shallow stop states on Power10.
- Tweaks to our sched domains code to better inform the scheduler about the
hardware topology on Power9/10, where two SMT4 cores can be presented by
firmware as an SMT8 core.
- A series doing further reworks & cleanups of our EEH code.
- Addition of a filter for RTAS (firmware) calls done via sys_rtas(), to
prevent root from overwriting kernel memory.
- Other smaller features, fixes & cleanups.
Thanks to:
Alexey Kardashevskiy, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Athira Rajeev, Biwen
Li, Cameron Berkenpas, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christoph Hellwig,
Colin Ian King, Daniel Axtens, David Dai, Finn Thain, Frederic Barrat, Gautham
R. Shenoy, Greg Kurz, Gustavo Romero, Ira Weiny, Jason Yan, Joel Stanley,
Jordan Niethe, Kajol Jain, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Laurent Dufour, Leonardo
Bras, Liu Shixin, Luca Ceresoli, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar,
Nathan Lynch, Nicholas Mc Guire, Nicholas Piggin, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver
O'Halloran, Pedro Miraglia Franco de Carvalho, Pratik Rajesh Sampat, Qian Cai,
Qinglang Miao, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Satheesh Rajendran, Scott
Cheloha, Segher Boessenkool, Srikar Dronamraju, Stan Johnson, Stephen Kitt,
Stephen Rothwell, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain,
Vaidyanathan Srinivasan, Vasant Hegde, Wang Wensheng, Wolfram Sang, Yang
Yingliang, zhengbin.
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Merge tag 'powerpc-5.10-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
- A series from Nick adding ARCH_WANT_IRQS_OFF_ACTIVATE_MM & selecting
it for powerpc, as well as a related fix for sparc.
- Remove support for PowerPC 601.
- Some fixes for watchpoints & addition of a new ptrace flag for
detecting ISA v3.1 (Power10) watchpoint features.
- A fix for kernels using 4K pages and the hash MMU on bare metal
Power9 systems with > 16TB of RAM, or RAM on the 2nd node.
- A basic idle driver for shallow stop states on Power10.
- Tweaks to our sched domains code to better inform the scheduler about
the hardware topology on Power9/10, where two SMT4 cores can be
presented by firmware as an SMT8 core.
- A series doing further reworks & cleanups of our EEH code.
- Addition of a filter for RTAS (firmware) calls done via sys_rtas(),
to prevent root from overwriting kernel memory.
- Other smaller features, fixes & cleanups.
Thanks to: Alexey Kardashevskiy, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V,
Athira Rajeev, Biwen Li, Cameron Berkenpas, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe
Leroy, Christoph Hellwig, Colin Ian King, Daniel Axtens, David Dai, Finn
Thain, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Greg Kurz, Gustavo Romero,
Ira Weiny, Jason Yan, Joel Stanley, Jordan Niethe, Kajol Jain, Konrad
Rzeszutek Wilk, Laurent Dufour, Leonardo Bras, Liu Shixin, Luca
Ceresoli, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Nathan Lynch, Nicholas
Mc Guire, Nicholas Piggin, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Pedro
Miraglia Franco de Carvalho, Pratik Rajesh Sampat, Qian Cai, Qinglang
Miao, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Satheesh Rajendran, Scott Cheloha,
Segher Boessenkool, Srikar Dronamraju, Stan Johnson, Stephen Kitt,
Stephen Rothwell, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain,
Vaidyanathan Srinivasan, Vasant Hegde, Wang Wensheng, Wolfram Sang, Yang
Yingliang, zhengbin.
* tag 'powerpc-5.10-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (228 commits)
Revert "powerpc/pci: unmap legacy INTx interrupts when a PHB is removed"
selftests/powerpc: Fix eeh-basic.sh exit codes
cpufreq: powernv: Fix frame-size-overflow in powernv_cpufreq_reboot_notifier
powerpc/time: Make get_tb() common to PPC32 and PPC64
powerpc/time: Make get_tbl() common to PPC32 and PPC64
powerpc/time: Remove get_tbu()
powerpc/time: Avoid using get_tbl() and get_tbu() internally
powerpc/time: Make mftb() common to PPC32 and PPC64
powerpc/time: Rename mftbl() to mftb()
powerpc/32s: Remove #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32 in head_book3s_32.S
powerpc/32s: Rename head_32.S to head_book3s_32.S
powerpc/32s: Setup the early hash table at all time.
powerpc/time: Remove ifdef in get_dec() and set_dec()
powerpc: Remove get_tb_or_rtc()
powerpc: Remove __USE_RTC()
powerpc: Tidy up a bit after removal of PowerPC 601.
powerpc: Remove support for PowerPC 601
powerpc: Remove PowerPC 601
powerpc: Drop SYNC_601() ISYNC_601() and SYNC()
powerpc: Remove CONFIG_PPC601_SYNC_FIX
...
Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
These routines are used in places outside of exec(2), so in preparation
for refactoring them, move them into a separate source file,
fs/kernel_read_file.c.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-5-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559b ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ff ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
With that, we can grab proper references to the files table, and no
longer need to rely on stashing away ring_fd and ring_file to check
if the ring_fd may have been closed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reading and modifying current->mm and current->active_mm and switching
mm should be done with irqs off, to prevent races seeing an intermediate
state.
This is similar to commit 38cf307c1f ("mm: fix kthread_use_mm() vs TLB
invalidate"). At exec-time when the new mm is activated, the old one
should usually be single-threaded and no longer used, unless something
else is holding an mm_users reference (which may be possible).
Absent other mm_users, there is also a race with preemption and lazy tlb
switching. Consider the kernel_execve case where the current thread is
using a lazy tlb active mm:
call_usermodehelper()
kernel_execve()
old_mm = current->mm;
active_mm = current->active_mm;
*** preempt *** --------------------> schedule()
prev->active_mm = NULL;
mmdrop(prev active_mm);
...
<-------------------- schedule()
current->mm = mm;
current->active_mm = mm;
if (!old_mm)
mmdrop(active_mm);
If we switch back to the kernel thread from a different mm, there is a
double free of the old active_mm, and a missing free of the new one.
Closing this race only requires interrupts to be disabled while ->mm
and ->active_mm are being switched, but the TLB problem requires also
holding interrupts off over activate_mm. Unfortunately not all archs
can do that yet, e.g., arm defers the switch if irqs are disabled and
expects finish_arch_post_lock_switch() to be called to complete the
flush; um takes a blocking lock in activate_mm().
So as a first step, disable interrupts across the mm/active_mm updates
to close the lazy tlb preempt race, and provide an arch option to
extend that to activate_mm which allows architectures doing IPI based
TLB shootdowns to close the second race.
This is a bit ugly, but in the interest of fixing the bug and backporting
before all architectures are converted this is a compromise.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200914045219.3736466-2-npiggin@gmail.com
After the cleanup of page fault accounting, gup does not need to pass
task_struct around any more. Remove that parameter in the whole gup
stack.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200707225021.200906-26-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s. Check it earlier as well in
may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test under
the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.
My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:
do_open_execat()
struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
...
do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
/* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
vfs_open(path, file)
do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
security_file_open(f)
open()
/* old location of path_noexec() test */
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>