Use the host save area to save/restore non-volatile (callee-saved)
registers in __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run() to take advantage of hardware loading
all registers from the save area on #VMEXIT. KVM still needs to save the
registers it wants restored, but the loads are handled automatically by
hardware.
Aside from less assembly code, letting hardware do the restoration means
stack frames are preserved for the entirety of __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run().
Opportunistically add a comment to call out why @svm needs to be saved
across VMRUN->#VMEXIT, as it's not easy to decipher that from the macro
hell.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240223204233.3337324-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the
RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
SNP-Active VMs.
If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
hardware, if an in-use page is 2MB-aligned and software accesses any
part of the associated 2MB region with a hugepage, the CPU will
incorrectly treat the entire 2MB region as in-use and signal a an RMP
violation #PF.
To avoid this, the recommendation is to not use a 2MB-aligned page for
the VMCB, VMSA or AVIC pages. Add a generic allocator that will ensure
that the page returned is not 2MB-aligned and is safe to be used when
SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the VMCB/VMSA
pages of nested guests.
[ mdr: Squash in nested guest handling from Ashish, commit msg fixups. ]
Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com> # for nested VMSA case
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-22-michael.roth@amd.com
- Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code.
- Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation"
at build time.
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-hyperv-6.8' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD
KVM x86 Hyper-V changes for 6.8:
- Guard KVM-on-HyperV's range-based TLB flush hooks with an #ifdef on
CONFIG_HYPERV as a minor optimization, and to self-document the code.
- Add CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV to allow disabling KVM support for HyperV "emulation"
at build time.
When intercepts are enabled for MSR_IA32_XSS, the host will swap in/out
the guest-defined values while context-switching to/from guest mode.
However, in the case of SEV-ES, vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected is set,
so the guest-defined value is effectively ignored when switching to
guest mode with the understanding that the VMSA will handle swapping
in/out this register state.
However, SVM is still configured to intercept these accesses for SEV-ES
guests, so the values in the initial MSR_IA32_XSS are effectively
read-only, and a guest will experience undefined behavior if it actually
tries to write to this MSR. Fortunately, only CET/shadowstack makes use
of this register on SEV-ES-capable systems currently, which isn't yet
widely used, but this may become more of an issue in the future.
Additionally, enabling intercepts of MSR_IA32_XSS results in #VC
exceptions in the guest in certain paths that can lead to unexpected #VC
nesting levels. One example is SEV-SNP guests when handling #VC
exceptions for CPUID instructions involving leaf 0xD, subleaf 0x1, since
they will access MSR_IA32_XSS as part of servicing the CPUID #VC, then
generate another #VC when accessing MSR_IA32_XSS, which can lead to
guest crashes if an NMI occurs at that point in time. Running perf on a
guest while it is issuing such a sequence is one example where these can
be problematic.
Address this by disabling intercepts of MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests
if the host/guest configuration allows it. If the host/guest
configuration doesn't allow for MSR_IA32_XSS, leave it intercepted so
that it can be caught by the existing checks in
kvm_{set,get}_msr_common() if the guest still attempts to access it.
Fixes: 376c6d2850 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20231016132819.1002933-4-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
'struct hv_vmcb_enlightenments' in VMCB only make sense when either
CONFIG_KVM_HYPERV or CONFIG_HYPERV is enabled.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205103630.1391318-17-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
The checks for virtualizing TSC_AUX occur during the vCPU reset processing
path. However, at the time of initial vCPU reset processing, when the vCPU
is first created, not all of the guest CPUID information has been set. In
this case the RDTSCP and RDPID feature support for the guest is not in
place and so TSC_AUX virtualization is not established.
This continues for each vCPU created for the guest. On the first boot of
an AP, vCPU reset processing is executed as a result of an APIC INIT
event, this time with all of the guest CPUID information set, resulting
in TSC_AUX virtualization being enabled, but only for the APs. The BSP
always sees a TSC_AUX value of 0 which probably went unnoticed because,
at least for Linux, the BSP TSC_AUX value is 0.
Move the TSC_AUX virtualization enablement out of the init_vmcb() path and
into the vcpu_after_set_cpuid() path to allow for proper initialization of
the support after the guest CPUID information has been set.
With the TSC_AUX virtualization support now in the vcpu_set_after_cpuid()
path, the intercepts must be either cleared or set based on the guest
CPUID input.
Fixes: 296d5a17e7 ("KVM: SEV-ES: Use V_TSC_AUX if available instead of RDTSC/MSR_TSC_AUX intercepts")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <4137fbcb9008951ab5f0befa74a0399d2cce809a.1694811272.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- Misc cleanups
- Retry APIC optimized recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled
- Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the
"emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of
the logic within KVM
- Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC
ratio MSR can diverge from the default iff TSC scaling is enabled, and clean
up related code
- Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if
the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-misc-6.6' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD
KVM x86 changes for 6.6:
- Misc cleanups
- Retry APIC optimized recalculation if a vCPU is added/enabled
- Overhaul emergency reboot code to bring SVM up to par with VMX, tie the
"emergency disabling" behavior to KVM actually being loaded, and move all of
the logic within KVM
- Fix user triggerable WARNs in SVM where KVM incorrectly assumes the TSC
ratio MSR can diverge from the default iff TSC scaling is enabled, and clean
up related code
- Add a framework to allow "caching" feature flags so that KVM can check if
the guest can use a feature without needing to search guest CPUID
- Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, i.e. allow SEV-ES guests to use debug
registers and generate/handle #DBs
- Clean up LBR virtualization code
- Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update
- Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration
- Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject
#BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it)
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Merge tag 'kvm-x86-svm-6.6' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD
KVM: x86: SVM changes for 6.6:
- Add support for SEV-ES DebugSwap, i.e. allow SEV-ES guests to use debug
registers and generate/handle #DBs
- Clean up LBR virtualization code
- Fix a bug where KVM fails to set the target pCPU during an IRTE update
- Fix fatal bugs in SEV-ES intrahost migration
- Fix a bug where the recent (architecturally correct) change to reinject
#BP and skip INT3 broke SEV guests (can't decode INT3 to skip it)
Disallow SEV (and beyond) if nrips is disabled via module param, as KVM
can't read guest memory to partially emulate and skip an instruction. All
CPUs that support SEV support NRIPS, i.e. this is purely stopping the user
from shooting themselves in the foot.
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230825013621.2845700-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual NMI exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "vnmi" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as vnmi_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
gated by nSVM being enabled.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-15-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual GIF exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "vgif" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as vgif_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-14-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "Pause Filtering is exposed to L1" via governed feature flags
instead of using dedicated bits/flags in vcpu_svm.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "LBR virtualization exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag
instead of using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "lbrv" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as lbrv_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
gated by nSVM being enabled.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual VMSAVE/VMLOAD exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag
instead of using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Opportunistically add a comment explaining why KVM disallows virtual
VMLOAD/VMSAVE when the vCPU model is Intel.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "TSC scaling exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, this fixes a benign bug where KVM would mark TSC scaling as exposed
to L1 even if overall nested SVM supported is disabled, i.e. KVM would let
L1 write MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO even when KVM didn't advertise TSCRATEMSR
support to userspace.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "NRIPS exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of using
a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Validation of the GHCB is susceptible to time-of-check/time-of-use vulnerabilities.
To avoid them, we would like to always snapshot the fields that are read in
sev_es_validate_vmgexit(), and not use the GHCB anymore after it returns.
This means:
- invoking sev_es_sync_from_ghcb() before any GHCB access, including before
sev_es_validate_vmgexit()
- snapshotting all fields including the valid bitmap and the sw_scratch field,
which are currently not caching anywhere.
The valid bitmap is the first thing to be copied out of the GHCB; then,
further accesses will use the copy in svm->sev_es.
Fixes: 291bd20d5d ("KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Drop the @offset and @multiplier params from the kvm_x86_ops hooks for
propagating TSC offsets/multipliers into hardware, and instead have the
vendor implementations pull the information directly from the vCPU
structure. The respective vCPU fields _must_ be written at the same
time in order to maintain consistent state, i.e. it's not random luck
that the value passed in by all callers is grabbed from the vCPU.
Explicitly grabbing the value from the vCPU field in SVM's implementation
in particular will allow for additional cleanup without introducing even
more subtle dependencies. Specifically, SVM can skip the WRMSR if guest
state isn't loaded, i.e. svm_prepare_switch_to_guest() will load the
correct value for the vCPU prior to entering the guest.
This also reconciles KVM's handling of related values that are stored in
the vCPU, as svm_write_tsc_offset() already assumes/requires the caller
to have updated l1_tsc_offset.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230729011608.1065019-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
When emulating nested SVM transitions, use the outer helper for writing
the TSC multiplier for L2. Using the inner helper only for one-off cases,
i.e. for paths where KVM is NOT emulating or modifying vCPU state, will
allow for multiple cleanups:
- Explicitly disabling preemption only in the outer helper
- Getting the multiplier from the vCPU field in the outer helper
- Skipping the WRMSR in the outer helper if guest state isn't loaded
Opportunistically delete an extra newline.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230729011608.1065019-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Static functions set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() are only
called from SVM so move them to .c.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615063757.3039121-2-aik@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Allow L1 to use vNMI to accelerate its injection of NMI to L2 by
propagating vNMI int_ctl bits from/to vmcb12 to/from vmcb02.
To handle both the case where vNMI is enabled for L1 and L2, and where
vNMI is enabled for L1 but _not_ L2, move pending L1 vNMIs to nmi_pending
on nested VM-Entry and raise KVM_REQ_EVENT, i.e. rely on existing code to
route the NMI to the correct domain.
On nested VM-Exit, reverse the process and set/clear V_NMI_PENDING for L1
based one whether nmi_pending is zero or non-zero. There is no need to
consider vmcb02 in this case, as V_NMI_PENDING can be set in vmcb02 if
vNMI is disabled for L2, and if vNMI is enabled for L2, then L1 and L2
have different NMI contexts.
Co-developed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <santosh.shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230227084016.3368-12-santosh.shukla@amd.com
[sean: massage changelog to match the code]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add support for SVM's Virtual NMIs implementation, which adds proper
tracking of virtual NMI blocking, and an intr_ctrl flag that software can
set to mark a virtual NMI as pending. Pending virtual NMIs are serviced
by hardware if/when virtual NMIs become unblocked, i.e. act more or less
like real NMIs.
Introduce two new kvm_x86_ops callbacks so to support SVM's vNMI, as KVM
needs to treat a pending vNMI as partially injected. Specifically, if
two NMIs (for L1) arrive concurrently in KVM's software model, KVM's ABI
is to inject one and pend the other. Without vNMI, KVM manually tracks
the pending NMI and uses NMI windows to detect when the NMI should be
injected.
With vNMI, the pending NMI is simply stuffed into the VMCB and handed
off to hardware. This means that KVM needs to be able to set a vNMI
pending on-demand, and also query if a vNMI is pending, e.g. to honor the
"at most one NMI pending" rule and to preserve all NMIs across save and
restore.
Warn if KVM attempts to open an NMI window when vNMI is fully enabled,
as the above logic should prevent KVM from ever getting to
kvm_check_and_inject_events() with two NMIs pending _in software_, and
the "at most one NMI pending" logic should prevent having an NMI pending
in hardware and an NMI pending in software if NMIs are also blocked, i.e.
if KVM can't immediately inject the second NMI.
Signed-off-by: Santosh Shukla <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230227084016.3368-11-santosh.shukla@amd.com
[sean: rewrite shortlog and changelog, massage code comments]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Move HF_NMI_MASK and HF_IRET_MASK (a.k.a. "waiting for IRET") out of the
common "hflags" and into dedicated flags in "struct vcpu_svm". The flags
are used only for the SVM and thus should not be in hflags.
Tracking NMI masking in software isn't SVM specific, e.g. VMX has a
similar flag (soft_vnmi_blocked), but that's much more of a hack as VMX
can't intercept IRET, is useful only for ancient CPUs, i.e. will
hopefully be removed at some point, and again the exact behavior is
vendor specific and shouldn't ever be referenced in common code.
converting VMX
No functional change is intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Santosh Shukla <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221129193717.513824-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: split from HF_GIF_MASK patch]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Move HF_GIF_MASK out of the common "hflags" and into vcpu_svm.guest_gif.
GIF is an SVM-only concept and has should never be consulted outside of
SVM-specific code.
No functional change is intended.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Santosh Shukla <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221129193717.513824-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com
[sean: split to separate patch]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Even in commit 4bdec12aa8 ("KVM: SVM: Detect X2APIC virtualization
(x2AVIC) support"), where avic_hardware_setup() was first introduced,
its only pass-in parameter "struct kvm_x86_ops *ops" is not used at all.
Clean it up a bit to avoid compiler ranting from LLVM toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221109115952.92816-1-likexu@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track the per-vendor required APICv inhibits with a variable instead of
calling into vendor code every time KVM wants to query the set of
required inhibits. The required inhibits are a property of the vendor's
virtualization architecture, i.e. are 100% static.
Using a variable allows the compiler to inline the check, e.g. generate
a single-uop TEST+Jcc, and thus eliminates any desire to avoid checking
inhibits for performance reasons.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230106011306.85230-32-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Replace the "avic_mode" enum with a single bool to track whether or not
x2AVIC is enabled. KVM already has "apicv_enabled" that tracks if any
flavor of AVIC is enabled, i.e. AVIC_MODE_NONE and AVIC_MODE_X1 are
redundant and unnecessary noise.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230106011306.85230-12-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move the VMCB updates from avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl() into
avic_set_virtual_apic_mode() and invert the dependency being said
functions to avoid calling avic_vcpu_{load,put}() and
avic_set_pi_irte_mode() when "only" setting the virtual APIC mode.
avic_set_virtual_apic_mode() is invoked from common x86 with preemption
enabled, which makes avic_vcpu_{load,put}() unhappy. Luckily, calling
those and updating IRTE stuff is unnecessary as the only reason
avic_set_virtual_apic_mode() is called is to handle transitions between
xAPIC and x2APIC that don't also toggle APICv activation. And if
activation doesn't change, there's no need to fiddle with the physical
APIC ID table or update IRTE.
The "full" refresh is guaranteed to be called if activation changes in
this case as the only call to the "set" path is:
kvm_vcpu_update_apicv(vcpu);
static_call_cond(kvm_x86_set_virtual_apic_mode)(vcpu);
and kvm_vcpu_update_apicv() invokes the refresh if activation changes:
if (apic->apicv_active == activate)
goto out;
apic->apicv_active = activate;
kvm_apic_update_apicv(vcpu);
static_call(kvm_x86_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl)(vcpu);
Rename the helper to reflect that it is also called during "refresh".
WARNING: CPU: 183 PID: 49186 at arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c:1081 avic_vcpu_put+0xde/0xf0 [kvm_amd]
CPU: 183 PID: 49186 Comm: stable Tainted: G O 6.0.0-smp--fcddbca45f0a-sink #34
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 10.48.0 01/27/2022
RIP: 0010:avic_vcpu_put+0xde/0xf0 [kvm_amd]
avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl+0x142/0x1c0 [kvm_amd]
avic_set_virtual_apic_mode+0x5a/0x70 [kvm_amd]
kvm_lapic_set_base+0x149/0x1a0 [kvm]
kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xd0 [kvm]
kvm_set_msr_common+0xa3a/0xdc0 [kvm]
svm_set_msr+0x364/0x6b0 [kvm_amd]
__kvm_set_msr+0xb8/0x1c0 [kvm]
kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x58/0x1d0 [kvm]
msr_interception+0x1c/0x30 [kvm_amd]
svm_invoke_exit_handler+0x31/0x100 [kvm_amd]
svm_handle_exit+0xfc/0x160 [kvm_amd]
vcpu_enter_guest+0x21bb/0x23e0 [kvm]
vcpu_run+0x92/0x450 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x43e/0x6e0 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x559/0x620 [kvm]
Fixes: 05c4fe8c1b ("KVM: SVM: Refresh AVIC configuration when changing APIC mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20230106011306.85230-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Now that KVM isn't littered with "struct hv_enlightenments" casts, rename
the struct to "hv_vmcb_enlightenments" to highlight the fact that the
struct is specifically for SVM's VMCB.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-5-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a union to provide hv_enlightenments side-by-side with the sw_reserved
bytes that Hyper-V's enlightenments overlay. Casting sw_reserved
everywhere is messy, confusing, and unnecessarily unsafe.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221101145426.251680-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Restoration of the host IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is probably too late
with respect to the return thunk training sequence.
With respect to the user/kernel boundary, AMD says, "If software chooses
to toggle STIBP (e.g., set STIBP on kernel entry, and clear it on kernel
exit), software should set STIBP to 1 before executing the return thunk
training sequence." I assume the same requirements apply to the guest/host
boundary. The return thunk training sequence is in vmenter.S, quite close
to the VM-exit. On hosts without V_SPEC_CTRL, however, the host's
IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is not restored until much later.
To avoid this, move the restoration of host SPEC_CTRL to assembly and,
for consistency, move the restoration of the guest SPEC_CTRL as well.
This is not particularly difficult, apart from some care to cover both
32- and 64-bit, and to share code between SEV-ES and normal vmentry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allow access to the percpu area via the GS segment base, which is
needed in order to access the saved host spec_ctrl value. In linux-next
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER also needs to access percpu data.
For simplicity, the physical address of the save area is added to struct
svm_cpu_data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Analyzed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The svm_data percpu variable is a pointer, but it is allocated via
svm_hardware_setup() when KVM is loaded. Unlike hardware_enable()
this means that it is never NULL for the whole lifetime of KVM, and
static allocation does not waste any memory compared to the status quo.
It is also more efficient and more easily handled from assembly code,
so do it and don't look back.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The "cpu" field of struct svm_cpu_data has been write-only since commit
4b656b1202 ("KVM: SVM: force new asid on vcpu migration", 2009-08-05).
Remove it.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The pointer to svm_cpu_data in struct vcpu_svm looks interesting from
the point of view of accessing it after vmexit, when the GSBASE is still
containing the guest value. However, despite existing since the very
first commit of drivers/kvm/svm.c (commit 6aa8b732ca, "[PATCH] kvm:
userspace interface", 2006-12-10), it was never set to anything.
Ignore the opportunity to fix a 16 year old "bug" and delete it; doing
things the "harder" way makes it possible to remove more old cruft.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Continue moving accesses to struct vcpu_svm to vmenter.S. Reducing the
number of arguments limits the chance of mistakes due to different
registers used for argument passing in 32- and 64-bit ABIs; pushing the
VMCB argument and almost immediately popping it into a different
register looks pretty weird.
32-bit ABI is not a concern for __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run() which is 64-bit
only; however, it will soon need @svm to save/restore SPEC_CTRL so stay
consistent with __svm_vcpu_run() and let them share the same prototype.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since registers are reachable through vcpu_svm, and we will
need to access more fields of that struct, pass it instead
of the regs[] array.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM/s390, KVM/x86 and common infrastructure changes for 5.20
x86:
* Permit guests to ignore single-bit ECC errors
* Fix races in gfn->pfn cache refresh; do not pin pages tracked by the cache
* Intel IPI virtualization
* Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS
* PEBS virtualization
* Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events
* More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying instructions)
* Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit
* Refuse starting the kvm-intel module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls are inconsistent
* "Notify" VM exit (detect microarchitectural hangs) for Intel
* Cleanups for MCE MSR emulation
s390:
* add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests
* improve selftests to use TAP interface
* enable interpretive execution of zPCI instructions (for PCI passthrough)
* First part of deferred teardown
* CPU Topology
* PV attestation
* Minor fixes
Generic:
* new selftests API using struct kvm_vcpu instead of a (vm, id) tuple
x86:
* Use try_cmpxchg64 instead of cmpxchg64
* Bugfixes
* Ignore benign host accesses to PMU MSRs when PMU is disabled
* Allow disabling KVM's "MONITOR/MWAIT are NOPs!" behavior
* x86/MMU: Allow NX huge pages to be disabled on a per-vm basis
* Port eager page splitting to shadow MMU as well
* Enable CMCI capability by default and handle injected UCNA errors
* Expose pid of vcpu threads in debugfs
* x2AVIC support for AMD
* cleanup PIO emulation
* Fixes for LLDT/LTR emulation
* Don't require refcounted "struct page" to create huge SPTEs
x86 cleanups:
* Use separate namespaces for guest PTEs and shadow PTEs bitmasks
* PIO emulation
* Reorganize rmap API, mostly around rmap destruction
* Do not workaround very old KVM bugs for L0 that runs with nesting enabled
* new selftests API for CPUID
- Avoid toggling the x2apic msr interception if it is already up to date.
- Avoid touching L0 msr bitmap when AVIC is inhibited on entry to
the guest mode, because in this case the guest usually uses its
own msr bitmap.
Later on VM exit, the 1st optimization will allow KVM to skip
touching the L0 msr bitmap as well.
Reviewed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-18-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce logic to (de)activate AVIC, which also allows
switching between AVIC to x2AVIC mode at runtime.
When an AVIC-enabled guest switches from APIC to x2APIC mode,
the SVM driver needs to perform the following steps:
1. Set the x2APIC mode bit for AVIC in VMCB along with the maximum
APIC ID support for each mode accodingly.
2. Disable x2APIC MSRs interception in order to allow the hardware
to virtualize x2APIC MSRs accesses.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-12-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
As a preparation for x2avic, this patch ensures that x2apic msrs
are always intercepted for the nested guest.
Reviewed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-11-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
AMD AVIC can support xAPIC and x2APIC virtualization,
which requires changing x2APIC bit VMCB and MSR intercepton
for x2APIC MSRs. Therefore, call avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl()
to refresh configuration accordingly.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-10-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When enabling x2APIC virtualization (x2AVIC), the interception of
x2APIC MSRs must be disabled to let the hardware virtualize guest
MSR accesses.
Current implementation keeps track of list of MSR interception state
in the svm_direct_access_msrs array. Therefore, extends the array to
include x2APIC MSRs.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-8-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add CPUID check for the x2APIC virtualization (x2AVIC) feature.
If available, the SVM driver can support both AVIC and x2AVIC modes
when load the kvm_amd driver with avic=1. The operating mode will be
determined at runtime depending on the guest APIC mode.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20220519102709.24125-4-suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The target VMCBs during an intra-host migration need to correctly setup
for running SEV and SEV-ES guests. Add sev_init_vmcb() function and make
sev_es_init_vmcb() static. sev_init_vmcb() uses the now private function
to init SEV-ES guests VMCBs when needed.
Fixes: 0b020f5af0 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration")
Fixes: b56639318b ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20220623173406.744645-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Drop a handful of unused AVIC function declarations whose implementations
were removed during the conversion to optional static calls.
No functional change intended.
Fixes: abb6d479e2 ("KVM: x86: make several APIC virtualization callbacks optional")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220614230548.3852141-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
s390:
* add an interface to provide a hypervisor dump for secure guests
* improve selftests to show tests
x86:
* Intel IPI virtualization
* Allow getting/setting pending triple fault with KVM_GET/SET_VCPU_EVENTS
* PEBS virtualization
* Simplify PMU emulation by just using PERF_TYPE_RAW events
* More accurate event reinjection on SVM (avoid retrying instructions)
* Allow getting/setting the state of the speaker port data bit
* Rewrite gfn-pfn cache refresh
* Refuse starting the module if VM-Entry/VM-Exit controls are inconsistent
* "Notify" VM exit
Now that these functions are always called with preemption disabled,
remove the preempt_disable()/preempt_enable() pair inside them.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220606180829.102503-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>