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17600 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Sultan Alsawaf
8ba7b7c1da zsmalloc: fix races between asynchronous zspage free and page migration
commit 2505a98111 upstream.

The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page
list without defending against page migration.  Since pages which haven't
yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while
lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different
lethal races.

It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely
dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to
the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious
NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages
(since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and
create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the
process).

Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize
with page migration.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509024703.243847-1-sultan@kerneltoast.com
Fixes: 77ff465799 ("zsmalloc: zs_page_migrate: skip unnecessary loops but not return -EBUSY if zspage is not inuse")
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@kerneltoast.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-06-06 08:47:53 +02:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
817191b4c3 random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs
commit 5ad7dd882e upstream.

randomize_page is an mm function. It is documented like one. It contains
the history of one. It has the naming convention of one. It looks
just like another very similar function in mm, randomize_stack_top().
And it has always been maintained and updated by mm people. There is no
need for it to be in random.c. In the "which shape does not look like
the other ones" test, pointing to randomize_page() is correct.

So move randomize_page() into mm/util.c, right next to the similar
randomize_stack_top() function.

This commit contains no actual code changes.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-30 09:27:18 +02:00
Hyeonggon Yoo
25d8511ed7 mm/kfence: reset PG_slab and memcg_data before freeing __kfence_pool
commit 2839b0999c upstream.

When kfence fails to initialize kfence pool, it frees the pool.  But it
does not reset memcg_data and PG_slab flag.

Below is a BUG because of this. Let's fix it by resetting memcg_data
and PG_slab flag before free.

[    0.089149] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0  pfn:3d8e06
[    0.089149] page:ffffea46cf638180 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3d8e06
[    0.089150] memcg:ffffffff94a475d1
[    0.089150] flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
[    0.089151] raw: 0017ffffc0000200 ffffea46cf638188 ffffea46cf638188 0000000000000000
[    0.089152] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff ffffffff94a475d1
[    0.089152] page dumped because: page still charged to cgroup
[    0.089153] Modules linked in:
[    0.089153] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G    B   W         5.18.0-rc1+ #965
[    0.089154] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
[    0.089154] Call Trace:
[    0.089155]  <TASK>
[    0.089155]  dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f
[    0.089157]  dump_stack+0x10/0x12
[    0.089158]  bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94
[    0.089159]  check_free_page_bad+0x66/0x70
[    0.089160]  __free_pages_ok+0x423/0x530
[    0.089161]  __free_pages_core+0x8e/0xa0
[    0.089162]  memblock_free_pages+0x10/0x12
[    0.089164]  memblock_free_late+0x8f/0xb9
[    0.089165]  kfence_init+0x68/0x92
[    0.089166]  start_kernel+0x789/0x992
[    0.089167]  x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x26
[    0.089168]  x86_64_start_kernel+0xa9/0xaf
[    0.089170]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb
[    0.089171]  </TASK>

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YnPG3pQrqfcgOlVa@hyeyoo
Fixes: 0ce20dd840 ("mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure")
Fixes: 8f0b364973 ("mm: kfence: fix objcgs vector allocation")
Signed-off-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-18 10:28:23 +02:00
Naoya Horiguchi
4f6d1d30ce mm/hwpoison: use pr_err() instead of dump_page() in get_any_page()
commit 1825b93b62 upstream.

The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event
happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed:

  [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000
  [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000
  [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
  [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
  [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio))
  [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788!
  [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G            E     5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3
  [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014
  [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd
  [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00
  [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292
  [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
  [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff
  [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000
  [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000
  [ 1160.286641] FS:  00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [ 1160.289498] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
  [ 1160.293031] Call Trace:
  [ 1160.293724]  <TASK>
  [ 1160.294334]  get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570
  [ 1160.295474]  memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0
  [ 1160.296474]  ? security_capable+0x36/0x50
  [ 1160.297524]  hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80
  [ 1160.298684]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
  [ 1160.299829]  new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160
  [ 1160.300810]  vfs_write+0x209/0x290
  [ 1160.301835]  ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0
  [ 1160.302718]  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  [ 1160.303664]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7

As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is
called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page().
The below explains the mechanism of the race:

  CPU 0                                       CPU 1

    memory_failure
      get_hwpoison_page
        get_any_page
          dump_page
            compound = PageCompound
                                                free_pages_prepare
                                                  page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP
            folio_entire_mapcount
              VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio))

So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220427053220.719866-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: 74e8ee4708 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-18 10:28:23 +02:00
Niels Dossche
f6fd9552ef mm: mremap: fix sign for EFAULT error return value
commit 7d1e649661 upstream.

The mremap syscall is supposed to return a pointer to the new virtual
memory area on success, and a negative value of the error code in case of
failure.  Currently, EFAULT is returned when the VMA is not found, instead
of -EFAULT.  The users of this syscall will therefore believe the syscall
succeeded in case the VMA didn't exist, as it returns a pointer to address
0xe (0xe being the value of EFAULT).  Fix the sign of the error value.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220427224439.23828-2-dossche.niels@gmail.com
Fixes: 550a7d60bd ("mm, hugepages: add mremap() support for hugepage backed vma")
Signed-off-by: Niels Dossche <dossche.niels@gmail.com>
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-18 10:28:21 +02:00
Xu Yu
13d9b8cd12 mm/huge_memory: do not overkill when splitting huge_zero_page
commit 478d134e95 upstream.

Kernel panic when injecting memory_failure for the global huge_zero_page,
when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled, as follows.

  Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x109ff9 at process virtual address 0x20ff9000
  page:00000000fb053fc3 refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x109e00
  head:00000000fb053fc3 order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0x17fffc000010001(locked|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
  raw: 017fffc000010001 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(is_huge_zero_page(head))
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:2499!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 6 PID: 553 Comm: split_bug Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ #11
  Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 3288b3c 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:split_huge_page_to_list+0x66a/0x880
  Code: 84 9b fb ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 31 f6 e8 9f 5d 2a 00 b8 b8 02 00 00 e9 e8 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 e8 47 3c 82 4c b
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90000dcbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff823e4c4f RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff88843fffdb40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000fffeffff
  R10: ffffc90000dcbc48 R11: ffffffff82d68448 R12: ffffea0004278000
  R13: ffffffff823c6203 R14: 0000000000109ff9 R15: ffffea000427fe40
  FS:  00007fc375a26740(0000) GS:ffff88842fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fc3757c9290 CR3: 0000000102174006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
  try_to_split_thp_page+0x3a/0x130
  memory_failure+0x128/0x800
  madvise_inject_error.cold+0x8b/0xa1
  __x64_sys_madvise+0x54/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x7fc3754f8bf9
  Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
  RSP: 002b:00007ffeda93a1d8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001c
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc3754f8bf9
  RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 0000000000003000 RDI: 0000000020ff9000
  RBP: 00007ffeda93a200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400490
  R13: 00007ffeda93a2e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

We think that raising BUG is overkilling for splitting huge_zero_page, the
huge_zero_page can't be met from normal paths other than memory failure,
but memory failure is a valid caller.  So we tend to replace the BUG to
WARN + returning -EBUSY, and thus the panic above won't happen again.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f35f8b97377d5d3ede1bc5ac3114da888c57cbce.1651052574.git.xuyu@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: d173d5417f ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()")
Fixes: 6a46079cf5 ("HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-18 10:28:21 +02:00
Xu Yu
86079983c0 Revert "mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()"
commit b4e61fc031 upstream.

Patch series "mm/memory-failure: rework fix on huge_zero_page splitting".


This patch (of 2):

This reverts commit d173d5417f.

The commit d173d5417f ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in
memory_failure()") explicitly skips huge_zero_page in memory_failure(), in
order to avoid triggering VM_BUG_ON_PAGE on huge_zero_page in
split_huge_page_to_list().

This works, but Yang Shi thinks that,

    Raising BUG is overkilling for splitting huge_zero_page. The
    huge_zero_page can't be met from normal paths other than memory
    failure, but memory failure is a valid caller. So I tend to replace
    the BUG to WARN + returning -EBUSY. If we don't care about the
    reason code in memory failure, we don't have to touch memory
    failure.

And for the issue that huge_zero_page will be set PG_has_hwpoisoned,
Yang Shi comments that,

    The anonymous page fault doesn't check if the page is poisoned or
    not since it typically gets a fresh allocated page and assumes the
    poisoned page (isolated successfully) can't be reallocated again.
    But huge zero page and base zero page are reused every time. So no
    matter what fix we pick, the issue is always there.

Finally, Yang, David, Anshuman and Naoya all agree to fix the bug, i.e.,
to split huge_zero_page, in split_huge_page_to_list().

This reverts the commit d173d5417f ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip
huge_zero_page in memory_failure()"), and the original bug will be fixed
by the next patch.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/872cefb182ba1dd686b0e7db1e6b2ebe5a4fff87.1651039624.git.xuyu@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: d173d5417f ("mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()")
Fixes: 6a46079cf5 ("HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-18 10:28:21 +02:00
Peter Xu
e4fce49015 mm: fix invalid page pointer returned with FOLL_PIN gups
commit 7196040e19 upstream.

Patch series "mm/gup: some cleanups", v5.

This patch (of 5):

Alex reported invalid page pointer returned with pin_user_pages_remote()
from vfio after upstream commit 4b6c33b322 ("vfio/type1: Prepare for
batched pinning with struct vfio_batch").

It turns out that it's not the fault of the vfio commit; however after
vfio switches to a full page buffer to store the page pointers it starts
to expose the problem easier.

The problem is for VM_PFNMAP vmas we should normally fail with an
-EFAULT then vfio will carry on to handle the MMIO regions.  However
when the bug triggered, follow_page_mask() returned -EEXIST for such a
page, which will jump over the current page, leaving that entry in
**pages untouched.  However the caller is not aware of it, hence the
caller will reference the page as usual even if the pointer data can be
anything.

We had that -EEXIST logic since commit 1027e4436b ("mm: make GUP
handle pfn mapping unless FOLL_GET is requested") which seems very
reasonable.  It could be that when we reworked GUP with FOLL_PIN we
could have overlooked that special path in commit 3faa52c03f ("mm/gup:
track FOLL_PIN pages"), even if that commit rightfully touched up
follow_devmap_pud() on checking FOLL_PIN when it needs to return an
-EEXIST.

Attaching the Fixes to the FOLL_PIN rework commit, as it happened later
than 1027e4436b.

[jhubbard@nvidia.com: added some tags, removed a reference to an out of tree module.]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220207062213.235127-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220204020010.68930-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220204020010.68930-2-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Fixes: 3faa52c03f ("mm/gup: track FOLL_PIN pages")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Debugged-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:54 +02:00
Huang Ying
dac34fc6c1 mm,migrate: fix establishing demotion target
commit fc89213a63 upstream.

In commit ac16ec8353 ("mm: migrate: support multiple target nodes
demotion"), after the first demotion target node is found, we will
continue to check the next candidate obtained via find_next_best_node().
This is to find all demotion target nodes with same NUMA distance.  But
one side effect of find_next_best_node() is that the candidate node
returned will be set in "used" parameter, even if the candidate node isn't
passed in the following NUMA distance checking, the candidate node will
not be used as demotion target node for the following nodes.  For example,
for system as follows,

node distances:
node   0   1   2   3
  0:  10  21  17  28
  1:  21  10  28  17
  2:  17  28  10  28
  3:  28  17  28  10

when we establish demotion target node for node 0, in the first round node
2 is added to the demotion target node set.  Then in the second round,
node 3 is checked and failed because distance(0, 3) > distance(0, 2).  But
node 3 is set in "used" nodemask too.  When we establish demotion target
node for node 1, there is no available node.  This is wrong, node 3 should
be set as the demotion target of node 1.

To fix this, if the candidate node is failed to pass the distance
checking, it will be cleared in "used" nodemask.  So that it can be used
for the following node.

The bug can be reproduced and fixed with this patch on a 2 socket server
machine with DRAM and PMEM.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220128055940.1792614-1-ying.huang@intel.com
Fixes: ac16ec8353 ("mm: migrate: support multiple target nodes demotion")
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: zhongjiang-ali <zhongjiang-ali@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:53 +02:00
Miaohe Lin
ce9fe70d31 mm/mlock: fix potential imbalanced rlimit ucounts adjustment
commit 5c2a956c3e upstream.

user_shm_lock forgets to set allowed to 0 when get_ucounts fails.  So
the later user_shm_unlock might do the extra dec_rlimit_ucounts.  Fix
this by resetting allowed to 0.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220310132417.41189-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: d7c9e99aee ("Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Herbert van den Bergh <herbert.van.den.bergh@oracle.com>
Cc: Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:53 +02:00
Naoya Horiguchi
db3e489eeb mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not recovered"
commit 046545a661 upstream.

When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the
CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a
UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check
when the data is about to be consumed.

If the CMCI wins that race, the page is marked poisoned when
uc_decode_notifier() calls memory_failure() and the machine check
processing code finds the page already poisoned.  It calls
kill_accessing_process() to make sure a SIGBUS is sent.  But returns the
wrong error code.

Console log looks like this:

  mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at 3710b3400
  Memory failure: 0x3710b3: recovery action for dirty LRU page: Recovered
  Memory failure: 0x3710b3: already hardware poisoned
  Memory failure: 0x3710b3: Sending SIGBUS to einj_mem_uc:361438 due to hardware memory corruption
  mce: Memory error not recovered

kill_accessing_process() is supposed to return -EHWPOISON to notify that
SIGBUS is already set to the process and kill_me_maybe() doesn't have to
send it again.  But current code simply fails to do this, so fix it to
make sure to work as intended.  This change avoids the noise message
"Memory error not recovered" and skips duplicate SIGBUSs.

[tony.luck@intel.com: reword some parts of commit message]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220113231117.1021405-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev
Fixes: a3f5d80ea4 ("mm,hwpoison: send SIGBUS with error virutal address")
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reported-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:53 +02:00
Muchun Song
01225d4fe8 mm: userfaultfd: fix missing cache flush in mcopy_atomic_pte() and __mcopy_atomic()
commit 7c25a0b89a upstream.

userfaultfd calls mcopy_atomic_pte() and __mcopy_atomic() which do not
do any cache flushing for the target page.  Then the target page will be
mapped to the user space with a different address (user address), which
might have an alias issue with the kernel address used to copy the data
from the user to.  Fix this by insert flush_dcache_page() after
copy_from_user() succeeds.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220210123058.79206-7-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: b6ebaedb4c ("userfaultfd: avoid mmap_sem read recursion in mcopy_atomic")
Fixes: c1a4de99fa ("userfaultfd: mcopy_atomic|mfill_zeropage: UFFDIO_COPY|UFFDIO_ZEROPAGE preparation")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:53 +02:00
Muchun Song
3ad68320fa mm: shmem: fix missing cache flush in shmem_mfill_atomic_pte()
commit 19b482c29b upstream.

userfaultfd calls shmem_mfill_atomic_pte() which does not do any cache
flushing for the target page.  Then the target page will be mapped to
the user space with a different address (user address), which might have
an alias issue with the kernel address used to copy the data from the
user to.  Insert flush_dcache_page() in non-zero-page case.  And replace
clear_highpage() with clear_user_highpage() which already considers the
cache maintenance.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220210123058.79206-6-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 8d10396342 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mfill_zeropage_pte for userfaultfd support")
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:52 +02:00
Muchun Song
86130a8737 mm: hugetlb: fix missing cache flush in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte()
commit 348923665a upstream.

folio_copy() will copy the data from one page to the target page, then
the target page will be mapped to the user space address, which might
have an alias issue with the kernel address used to copy the data from
the page to.  There are 2 ways to fix this issue.

 1) insert flush_dcache_page() after folio_copy().

 2) replace folio_copy() with copy_user_huge_page() which already
    considers the cache maintenance.

We chose 2) way to fix the issue since architectures can optimize this
situation.  It is also make backports easier.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220210123058.79206-5-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 8cc5fcbb5b ("mm, hugetlb: fix racy resv_huge_pages underflow on UFFDIO_COPY")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:52 +02:00
Muchun Song
0242589c35 mm: hugetlb: fix missing cache flush in copy_huge_page_from_user()
commit e763243cc6 upstream.

userfaultfd calls copy_huge_page_from_user() which does not do any cache
flushing for the target page.  Then the target page will be mapped to
the user space with a different address (user address), which might have
an alias issue with the kernel address used to copy the data from the
user to.

Fix this issue by flushing dcache in copy_huge_page_from_user().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220210123058.79206-4-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: fa4d75c1de ("userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: add copy_huge_page_from_user for hugetlb userfaultfd support")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:52 +02:00
Muchun Song
58ef5d76e0 mm: fix missing cache flush for all tail pages of compound page
commit 2771739a71 upstream.

The D-cache maintenance inside move_to_new_page() only consider one
page, there is still D-cache maintenance issue for tail pages of
compound page (e.g. THP or HugeTLB).

THP migration is only enabled on x86_64, ARM64 and powerpc, while
powerpc and arm64 need to maintain the consistency between I-Cache and
D-Cache, which depends on flush_dcache_page() to maintain the
consistency between I-Cache and D-Cache.

But there is no issues on arm64 and powerpc since they already considers
the compound page cache flushing in their icache flush function.
HugeTLB migration is enabled on arm, arm64, mips, parisc, powerpc,
riscv, s390 and sh, while arm has handled the compound page cache flush
in flush_dcache_page(), but most others do not.

In theory, the issue exists on many architectures.  Fix this by not
using flush_dcache_folio() since it is not backportable.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220210123058.79206-3-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: 290408d4a2 ("hugetlb: hugepage migration core")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng@bytedance.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-15 20:20:52 +02:00
Zqiang
802282dc66 kasan: prevent cpu_quarantine corruption when CPU offline and cache shrink occur at same time
commit 31fa985b41 upstream.

kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() is called in kmem_cache_shrink()/
destroy().  The kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_destroy() to ensure serialization with
kasan_cpu_offline().

However the kasan_quarantine_remove_cache() call is not protected by
cpuslock in kmem_cache_shrink().  When a CPU is going offline and cache
shrink occurs at same time, the cpu_quarantine may be corrupted by
interrupt (per_cpu_remove_cache operation).

So add a cpu_quarantine offline flags check in per_cpu_remove_cache().

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment, per Zqiang]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414025925.2423818-1-qiang1.zhang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang1.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-05-09 09:16:29 +02:00
Alistair Popple
74da51076e mm/mmu_notifier.c: fix race in mmu_interval_notifier_remove()
commit 319561669a upstream.

In some cases it is possible for mmu_interval_notifier_remove() to race
with mn_tree_inv_end() allowing it to return while the notifier data
structure is still in use.  Consider the following sequence:

  CPU0 - mn_tree_inv_end()            CPU1 - mmu_interval_notifier_remove()
  ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------
                                      spin_lock(subscriptions->lock);
                                      seq = subscriptions->invalidate_seq;
  spin_lock(subscriptions->lock);     spin_unlock(subscriptions->lock);
  subscriptions->invalidate_seq++;
                                      wait_event(invalidate_seq != seq);
                                      return;
  interval_tree_remove(interval_sub); kfree(interval_sub);
  spin_unlock(subscriptions->lock);
  wake_up_all();

As the wait_event() condition is true it will return immediately.  This
can lead to use-after-free type errors if the caller frees the data
structure containing the interval notifier subscription while it is
still on a deferred list.  Fix this by taking the appropriate lock when
reading invalidate_seq to ensure proper synchronisation.

I observed this whilst running stress testing during some development.
You do have to be pretty unlucky, but it leads to the usual problems of
use-after-free (memory corruption, kernel crash, difficult to diagnose
WARN_ON, etc).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220420043734.476348-1-apopple@nvidia.com
Fixes: 99cb252f5e ("mm/mmu_notifier: add an interval tree notifier")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:11 +02:00
Nico Pache
4fbac33deb oom_kill.c: futex: delay the OOM reaper to allow time for proper futex cleanup
commit e4a38402c3 upstream.

The pthread struct is allocated on PRIVATE|ANONYMOUS memory [1] which
can be targeted by the oom reaper.  This mapping is used to store the
futex robust list head; the kernel does not keep a copy of the robust
list and instead references a userspace address to maintain the
robustness during a process death.

A race can occur between exit_mm and the oom reaper that allows the oom
reaper to free the memory of the futex robust list before the exit path
has handled the futex death:

    CPU1                               CPU2
    --------------------------------------------------------------------
    page_fault
    do_exit "signal"
    wake_oom_reaper
                                        oom_reaper
                                        oom_reap_task_mm (invalidates mm)
    exit_mm
    exit_mm_release
    futex_exit_release
    futex_cleanup
    exit_robust_list
    get_user (EFAULT- can't access memory)

If the get_user EFAULT's, the kernel will be unable to recover the
waiters on the robust_list, leaving userspace mutexes hung indefinitely.

Delay the OOM reaper, allowing more time for the exit path to perform
the futex cleanup.

Reproducer: https://gitlab.com/jsavitz/oom_futex_reproducer

Based on a patch by Michal Hocko.

Link: https://elixir.bootlin.com/glibc/glibc-2.35/source/nptl/allocatestack.c#L370 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414144042.677008-1-npache@redhat.com
Fixes: 2129258024 ("mm: oom: let oom_reap_task and exit_mmap run concurrently")
Signed-off-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nico Pache <npache@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joel Savitz <jsavitz@redhat.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:11 +02:00
Christophe Leroy
cef695c364 mm, hugetlb: allow for "high" userspace addresses
commit 5f24d5a579 upstream.

This is a fix for commit f6795053da ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high"
userspace addresses") for hugetlb.

This patch adds support for "high" userspace addresses that are
optionally supported on the system and have to be requested via a hint
mechanism ("high" addr parameter to mmap).

Architectures such as powerpc and x86 achieve this by making changes to
their architectural versions of hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() function.
However, arm64 uses the generic version of that function.

So take into account arch_get_mmap_base() and arch_get_mmap_end() in
hugetlb_get_unmapped_area().  To allow that, move those two macros out
of mm/mmap.c into include/linux/sched/mm.h

If these macros are not defined in architectural code then they default
to (TASK_SIZE) and (base) so should not introduce any behavioural
changes to architectures that do not define them.

For the time being, only ARM64 is affected by this change.

Catalin (ARM64) said
 "We should have fixed hugetlb_get_unmapped_area() as well when we added
  support for 52-bit VA. The reason for commit f6795053da was to
  prevent normal mmap() from returning addresses above 48-bit by default
  as some user-space had hard assumptions about this.

  It's a slight ABI change if you do this for hugetlb_get_unmapped_area()
  but I doubt anyone would notice. It's more likely that the current
  behaviour would cause issues, so I'd rather have them consistent.

  Basically when arm64 gained support for 52-bit addresses we did not
  want user-space calling mmap() to suddenly get such high addresses,
  otherwise we could have inadvertently broken some programs (similar
  behaviour to x86 here). Hence we added commit f6795053da. But we
  missed hugetlbfs which could still get such high mmap() addresses. So
  in theory that's a potential regression that should have bee addressed
  at the same time as commit f6795053da (and before arm64 enabled
  52-bit addresses)"

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ab847b6edb197bffdfe189e70fb4ac76bfe79e0d.1650033747.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Fixes: f6795053da ("mm: mmap: Allow for "high" userspace addresses")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.0.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:11 +02:00
Shakeel Butt
ecda17904b memcg: sync flush only if periodic flush is delayed
commit 9b3016154c upstream.

Daniel Dao has reported [1] a regression on workloads that may trigger a
lot of refaults (anon and file).  The underlying issue is that flushing
rstat is expensive.  Although rstat flush are batched with (nr_cpus *
MEMCG_BATCH) stat updates, it seems like there are workloads which
genuinely do stat updates larger than batch value within short amount of
time.  Since the rstat flush can happen in the performance critical
codepaths like page faults, such workload can suffer greatly.

This patch fixes this regression by making the rstat flushing
conditional in the performance critical codepaths.  More specifically,
the kernel relies on the async periodic rstat flusher to flush the stats
and only if the periodic flusher is delayed by more than twice the
amount of its normal time window then the kernel allows rstat flushing
from the performance critical codepaths.

Now the question: what are the side-effects of this change? The worst
that can happen is the refault codepath will see 4sec old lruvec stats
and may cause false (or missed) activations of the refaulted page which
may under-or-overestimate the workingset size.  Though that is not very
concerning as the kernel can already miss or do false activations.

There are two more codepaths whose flushing behavior is not changed by
this patch and we may need to come to them in future.  One is the
writeback stats used by dirty throttling and second is the deactivation
heuristic in the reclaim.  For now keeping an eye on them and if there
is report of regression due to these codepaths, we will reevaluate then.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CA+wXwBSyO87ZX5PVwdHm-=dBjZYECGmfnydUicUyrQqndgX2MQ@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220304184040.1304781-1-shakeelb@google.com
Fixes: 1f828223b7 ("memcg: flush lruvec stats in the refault")
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Dao <dqminh@cloudflare.com>
Tested-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Frank Hofmann <fhofmann@cloudflare.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:11 +02:00
Xu Yu
9bf52fe6a1 mm/memory-failure.c: skip huge_zero_page in memory_failure()
commit d173d5417f upstream.

Kernel panic when injecting memory_failure for the global
huge_zero_page, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is enabled, as follows.

  Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x109ff9 at process virtual address 0x20ff9000
  page:00000000fb053fc3 refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x109e00
  head:00000000fb053fc3 order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
  flags: 0x17fffc000010001(locked|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
  raw: 017fffc000010001 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(is_huge_zero_page(head))
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:2499!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 6 PID: 553 Comm: split_bug Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1+ #11
  Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 3288b3c 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:split_huge_page_to_list+0x66a/0x880
  Code: 84 9b fb ff ff 48 8b 7c 24 08 31 f6 e8 9f 5d 2a 00 b8 b8 02 00 00 e9 e8 fb ff ff 48 c7 c6 e8 47 3c 82 4c b
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90000dcbdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 000000000000003c RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff823e4c4f RDI: 00000000ffffffff
  RBP: ffff88843fffdb40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000fffeffff
  R10: ffffc90000dcbc48 R11: ffffffff82d68448 R12: ffffea0004278000
  R13: ffffffff823c6203 R14: 0000000000109ff9 R15: ffffea000427fe40
  FS:  00007fc375a26740(0000) GS:ffff88842fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007fc3757c9290 CR3: 0000000102174006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   try_to_split_thp_page+0x3a/0x130
   memory_failure+0x128/0x800
   madvise_inject_error.cold+0x8b/0xa1
   __x64_sys_madvise+0x54/0x60
   do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x7fc3754f8bf9
  Code: 01 00 48 81 c4 80 00 00 00 e9 f1 fe ff ff 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
  RSP: 002b:00007ffeda93a1d8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001c
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc3754f8bf9
  RDX: 0000000000000064 RSI: 0000000000003000 RDI: 0000000020ff9000
  RBP: 00007ffeda93a200 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000400490
  R13: 00007ffeda93a2e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

This makes huge_zero_page bail out explicitly before split in
memory_failure(), thus the panic above won't happen again.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/497d3835612610e370c74e697ea3c721d1d55b9c.1649775850.git.xuyu@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: 6a46079cf5 ("HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:11 +02:00
Nadav Amit
97f6d15949 userfaultfd: mark uffd_wp regardless of VM_WRITE flag
[ Upstream commit 0e88904cb7 ]

When a PTE is set by UFFD operations such as UFFDIO_COPY, the PTE is
currently only marked as write-protected if the VMA has VM_WRITE flag
set.  This seems incorrect or at least would be unexpected by the users.

Consider the following sequence of operations that are being performed
on a certain page:

	mprotect(PROT_READ)
	UFFDIO_COPY(UFFDIO_COPY_MODE_WP)
	mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)

At this point the user would expect to still get UFFD notification when
the page is accessed for write, but the user would not get one, since
the PTE was not marked as UFFD_WP during UFFDIO_COPY.

Fix it by always marking PTEs as UFFD_WP regardless on the
write-permission in the VMA flags.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220217211602.2769-1-namit@vmware.com
Fixes: 292924b260 ("userfaultfd: wp: apply _PAGE_UFFD_WP bit")
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-27 14:41:05 +02:00
Marco Elver
c92d432a4f mm, kfence: support kmem_dump_obj() for KFENCE objects
commit 2dfe63e61c upstream.

Calling kmem_obj_info() via kmem_dump_obj() on KFENCE objects has been
producing garbage data due to the object not actually being maintained
by SLAB or SLUB.

Fix this by implementing __kfence_obj_info() that copies relevant
information to struct kmem_obj_info when the object was allocated by
KFENCE; this is called by a common kmem_obj_info(), which also calls the
slab/slub/slob specific variant now called __kmem_obj_info().

For completeness, kmem_dump_obj() now displays if the object was
allocated by KFENCE.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220323090520.GG16885@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220406131558.3558585-1-elver@google.com
Fixes: b89fb5ef0c ("mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLUB")
Fixes: d3fb45f370 ("mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>	[slab]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:27 +02:00
Mike Kravetz
dff230c874 hugetlb: do not demote poisoned hugetlb pages
commit 5a317412ef upstream.

It is possible for poisoned hugetlb pages to reside on the free lists.
The huge page allocation routines which dequeue entries from the free
lists make a point of avoiding poisoned pages.  There is no such check
and avoidance in the demote code path.

If a hugetlb page on the is on a free list, poison will only be set in
the head page rather then the page with the actual error.  If such a
page is demoted, then the poison flag may follow the wrong page.  A page
without error could have poison set, and a page with poison could not
have the flag set.

Check for poison before attempting to demote a hugetlb page.  Also,
return -EBUSY to the caller if only poisoned pages are on the free list.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220307215707.50916-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Fixes: 8531fc6f52 ("hugetlb: add hugetlb demote page support")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:24 +02:00
Patrick Wang
0d2e07c04c mm: kmemleak: take a full lowmem check in kmemleak_*_phys()
commit 23c2d497de upstream.

The kmemleak_*_phys() apis do not check the address for lowmem's min
boundary, while the caller may pass an address below lowmem, which will
trigger an oops:

  # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ff5fffffffe00000
  Oops [#1]
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 2 PID: 134 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-next-20220407 #33
  Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
  epc : scan_block+0x74/0x15c
   ra : scan_block+0x72/0x15c
  epc : ffffffff801e5806 ra : ffffffff801e5804 sp : ff200000104abc30
   gp : ffffffff815cd4e8 tp : ff60000004cfa340 t0 : 0000000000000200
   t1 : 00aaaaaac23954cc t2 : 00000000000003ff s0 : ff200000104abc90
   s1 : ffffffff81b0ff28 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff5fffffffe01000
   a2 : ffffffff81b0ff28 a3 : 0000000000000002 a4 : 0000000000000001
   a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : ff200000104abd7c a7 : 0000000000000005
   s2 : ff5fffffffe00ff9 s3 : ffffffff815cd998 s4 : ffffffff815d0e90
   s5 : ffffffff81b0ff28 s6 : 0000000000000020 s7 : ffffffff815d0eb0
   s8 : ffffffffffffffff s9 : ff5fffffffe00000 s10: ff5fffffffe01000
   s11: 0000000000000022 t3 : 00ffffffaa17db4c t4 : 000000000000000f
   t5 : 0000000000000001 t6 : 0000000000000000
  status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ff5fffffffe00000 cause: 000000000000000d
    scan_gray_list+0x12e/0x1a6
    kmemleak_scan+0x2aa/0x57e
    kmemleak_write+0x32a/0x40c
    full_proxy_write+0x56/0x82
    vfs_write+0xa6/0x2a6
    ksys_write+0x6c/0xe2
    sys_write+0x22/0x2a
    ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2

The callers may not quite know the actual address they pass(e.g. from
devicetree).  So the kmemleak_*_phys() apis should guarantee the address
they finally use is in lowmem range, so check the address for lowmem's
min boundary.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220413122925.33856-1-patrick.wang.shcn@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Patrick Wang <patrick.wang.shcn@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:24 +02:00
Minchan Kim
afac4b8869 mm: fix unexpected zeroed page mapping with zram swap
commit e914d8f003 upstream.

Two processes under CLONE_VM cloning, user process can be corrupted by
seeing zeroed page unexpectedly.

      CPU A                        CPU B

  do_swap_page                do_swap_page
  SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path     SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
  swap_readpage valid data
    swap_slot_free_notify
      delete zram entry
                              swap_readpage zeroed(invalid) data
                              pte_lock
                              map the *zero data* to userspace
                              pte_unlock
  pte_lock
  if (!pte_same)
    goto out_nomap;
  pte_unlock
  return and next refault will
  read zeroed data

The swap_slot_free_notify is bogus for CLONE_VM case since it doesn't
increase the refcount of swap slot at copy_mm so it couldn't catch up
whether it's safe or not to discard data from backing device.  In the
case, only the lock it could rely on to synchronize swap slot freeing is
page table lock.  Thus, this patch gets rid of the swap_slot_free_notify
function.  With this patch, CPU A will see correct data.

      CPU A                        CPU B

  do_swap_page                do_swap_page
  SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path     SWP_SYNCHRONOUS_IO path
                              swap_readpage original data
                              pte_lock
                              map the original data
                              swap_free
                                swap_range_free
                                  bd_disk->fops->swap_slot_free_notify
  swap_readpage read zeroed data
                              pte_unlock
  pte_lock
  if (!pte_same)
    goto out_nomap;
  pte_unlock
  return
  on next refault will see mapped data by CPU B

The concern of the patch would increase memory consumption since it
could keep wasted memory with compressed form in zram as well as
uncompressed form in address space.  However, most of cases of zram uses
no readahead and do_swap_page is followed by swap_free so it will free
the compressed form from in zram quickly.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YjTVVxIAsnKAXjTd@google.com
Fixes: 0bcac06f27 ("mm, swap: skip swapcache for swapin of synchronous device")
Reported-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com>
Tested-by: Ivan Babrou <ivan@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <ngupta@vflare.org>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[4.14+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:23 +02:00
Juergen Gross
41df4d4812 mm, page_alloc: fix build_zonerefs_node()
commit e553f62f10 upstream.

Since commit 6aa303defb ("mm, vmscan: only allocate and reclaim from
zones with pages managed by the buddy allocator") only zones with free
memory are included in a built zonelist.  This is problematic when e.g.
all memory of a zone has been ballooned out when zonelists are being
rebuilt.

The decision whether to rebuild the zonelists when onlining new memory
is done based on populated_zone() returning 0 for the zone the memory
will be added to.  The new zone is added to the zonelists only, if it
has free memory pages (managed_zone() returns a non-zero value) after
the memory has been onlined.  This implies, that onlining memory will
always free the added pages to the allocator immediately, but this is
not true in all cases: when e.g. running as a Xen guest the onlined new
memory will be added only to the ballooned memory list, it will be freed
only when the guest is being ballooned up afterwards.

Another problem with using managed_zone() for the decision whether a
zone is being added to the zonelists is, that a zone with all memory
used will in fact be removed from all zonelists in case the zonelists
happen to be rebuilt.

Use populated_zone() when building a zonelist as it has been done before
that commit.

There was a report that QubesOS (based on Xen) is hitting this problem.
Xen has switched to use the zone device functionality in kernel 5.9 and
QubesOS wants to use memory hotplugging for guests in order to be able
to start a guest with minimal memory and expand it as needed.  This was
the report leading to the patch.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220407120637.9035-1-jgross@suse.com
Fixes: 6aa303defb ("mm, vmscan: only allocate and reclaim from zones with pages managed by the buddy allocator")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:23 +02:00
Axel Rasmussen
9d3b877daf mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret
commit f9b141f936 upstream.

When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets
a panic [1].  For example, doing the following reliably induces the
panic:

    fd = memfd_secret();

    ftruncate(fd, 10);
    ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
    strcpy(ptr, "123456789");

    munmap(ptr, 10);
    ftruncate(fd, 20);

The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down
into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually
we try to zero part of the memory.  The normal truncation code does this
via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to
memset()).

For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the
direct map (i.e.  we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every
fault).  So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and
when we try to memset() with it we panic.

This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for
memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for
the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try
to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.

One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will
require a significantly more lengthy change.  So, I propose a minimal
fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend
memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.

[1]:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10
  Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
  RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8
  RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028
  RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028
  R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0
  R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8
  FS:  00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190
   truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0
   truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830
   truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80
   simple_setattr+0x37/0x60
   notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0
   do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0
   __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet
  CR2: ffffa0a889277028

[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static]
  Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
[axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-20 09:36:23 +02:00
Miaohe Lin
fe39ac59db mm/mempolicy: fix mpol_new leak in shared_policy_replace
commit 4ad099559b upstream.

If mpol_new is allocated but not used in restart loop, mpol_new will be
freed via mpol_put before returning to the caller.  But refcnt is not
initialized yet, so mpol_put could not do the right things and might
leak the unused mpol_new.  This would happen if mempolicy was updated on
the shared shmem file while the sp->lock has been dropped during the
memory allocation.

This issue could be triggered easily with the below code snippet if
there are many processes doing the below work at the same time:

  shmid = shmget((key_t)5566, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, 0666|IPC_CREAT);
  shm = shmat(shmid, 0, 0);
  loop many times {
    mbind(shm, 1024 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_LOCAL, mask, maxnode, 0);
    mbind(shm + 128 * PAGE_SIZE, 128 * PAGE_SIZE, MPOL_DEFAULT, mask,
          maxnode, 0);
  }

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220329111416.27954-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 42288fe366 ("mm: mempolicy: Convert shared_policy mutex to spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[3.8]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-13 19:27:36 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
04bc13dae4 mmmremap.c: avoid pointless invalidate_range_start/end on mremap(old_size=0)
commit 01e67e04c2 upstream.

If an mremap() syscall with old_size=0 ends up in move_page_tables(), it
will call invalidate_range_start()/invalidate_range_end() unnecessarily,
i.e.  with an empty range.

This causes a WARN in KVM's mmu_notifier.  In the past, empty ranges
have been diagnosed to be off-by-one bugs, hence the WARNing.  Given the
low (so far) number of unique reports, the benefits of detecting more
buggy callers seem to outweigh the cost of having to fix cases such as
this one, where userspace is doing something silly.  In this particular
case, an early return from move_page_tables() is enough to fix the
issue.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220329173155.172439-1-pbonzini@redhat.com
Reported-by: syzbot+6bde52d89cfdf9f61425@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-13 19:27:35 +02:00
Max Filippov
7dd5b3b977 highmem: fix checks in __kmap_local_sched_{in,out}
commit 66f133ceab upstream.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check
that even slots in the tsk->kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped.  The slots are
initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none.  0 pte
however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true.  e.g.
on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
   __schedule+0x71a/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G        W         5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
   finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8
   __schedule+0x86e/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220403235159.3498065-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Fixes: 5fbda3ecd1 ("sched: highmem: Store local kmaps in task struct")
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-13 19:27:35 +02:00
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira
b56e43436e mm: fix race between MADV_FREE reclaim and blkdev direct IO read
commit 6c8e2a2569 upstream.

Problem:
=======

Userspace might read the zero-page instead of actual data from a direct IO
read on a block device if the buffers have been called madvise(MADV_FREE)
on earlier (this is discussed below) due to a race between page reclaim on
MADV_FREE and blkdev direct IO read.

- Race condition:
  ==============

During page reclaim, the MADV_FREE page check in try_to_unmap_one() checks
if the page is not dirty, then discards its rmap PTE(s) (vs.  remap back
if the page is dirty).

However, after try_to_unmap_one() returns to shrink_page_list(), it might
keep the page _anyway_ if page_ref_freeze() fails (it expects exactly
_one_ page reference, from the isolation for page reclaim).

Well, blkdev_direct_IO() gets references for all pages, and on READ
operations it only sets them dirty _later_.

So, if MADV_FREE'd pages (i.e., not dirty) are used as buffers for direct
IO read from block devices, and page reclaim happens during
__blkdev_direct_IO[_simple]() exactly AFTER bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
returns, but BEFORE the pages are set dirty, the situation happens.

The direct IO read eventually completes.  Now, when userspace reads the
buffers, the PTE is no longer there and the page fault handler
do_anonymous_page() services that with the zero-page, NOT the data!

A synthetic reproducer is provided.

- Page faults:
  ===========

If page reclaim happens BEFORE bio_iov_iter_get_pages() the issue doesn't
happen, because that faults-in all pages as writeable, so
do_anonymous_page() sets up a new page/rmap/PTE, and that is used by
direct IO.  The userspace reads don't fault as the PTE is there (thus
zero-page is not used/setup).

But if page reclaim happens AFTER it / BEFORE setting pages dirty, the PTE
is no longer there; the subsequent page faults can't help:

The data-read from the block device probably won't generate faults due to
DMA (no MMU) but even in the case it wouldn't use DMA, that happens on
different virtual addresses (not user-mapped addresses) because `struct
bio_vec` stores `struct page` to figure addresses out (which are different
from user-mapped addresses) for the read.

Thus userspace reads (to user-mapped addresses) still fault, then
do_anonymous_page() gets another `struct page` that would address/ map to
other memory than the `struct page` used by `struct bio_vec` for the read.
(The original `struct page` is not available, since it wasn't freed, as
page_ref_freeze() failed due to more page refs.  And even if it were
available, its data cannot be trusted anymore.)

Solution:
========

One solution is to check for the expected page reference count in
try_to_unmap_one().

There should be one reference from the isolation (that is also checked in
shrink_page_list() with page_ref_freeze()) plus one or more references
from page mapping(s) (put in discard: label).  Further references mean
that rmap/PTE cannot be unmapped/nuked.

(Note: there might be more than one reference from mapping due to
fork()/clone() without CLONE_VM, which use the same `struct page` for
references, until the copy-on-write page gets copied.)

So, additional page references (e.g., from direct IO read) now prevent the
rmap/PTE from being unmapped/dropped; similarly to the page is not freed
per shrink_page_list()/page_ref_freeze()).

- Races and Barriers:
  ==================

The new check in try_to_unmap_one() should be safe in races with
bio_iov_iter_get_pages() in get_user_pages() fast and slow paths, as it's
done under the PTE lock.

The fast path doesn't take the lock, but it checks if the PTE has changed
and if so, it drops the reference and leaves the page for the slow path
(which does take that lock).

The fast path requires synchronization w/ full memory barrier: it writes
the page reference count first then it reads the PTE later, while
try_to_unmap() writes PTE first then it reads page refcount.

And a second barrier is needed, as the page dirty flag should not be read
before the page reference count (as in __remove_mapping()).  (This can be
a load memory barrier only; no writes are involved.)

Call stack/comments:

- try_to_unmap_one()
  - page_vma_mapped_walk()
    - map_pte()			# see pte_offset_map_lock():
        pte_offset_map()
        spin_lock()

  - ptep_get_and_clear()	# write PTE
  - smp_mb()			# (new barrier) GUP fast path
  - page_ref_count()		# (new check) read refcount

  - page_vma_mapped_walk_done()	# see pte_unmap_unlock():
      pte_unmap()
      spin_unlock()

- bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
  - __bio_iov_iter_get_pages()
    - iov_iter_get_pages()
      - get_user_pages_fast()
        - internal_get_user_pages_fast()

          # fast path
          - lockless_pages_from_mm()
            - gup_{pgd,p4d,pud,pmd,pte}_range()
                ptep = pte_offset_map()		# not _lock()
                pte = ptep_get_lockless(ptep)

                page = pte_page(pte)
                try_grab_compound_head(page)	# inc refcount
                                            	# (RMW/barrier
                                             	#  on success)

                if (pte_val(pte) != pte_val(*ptep)) # read PTE
                        put_compound_head(page) # dec refcount
                        			# go slow path

          # slow path
          - __gup_longterm_unlocked()
            - get_user_pages_unlocked()
              - __get_user_pages_locked()
                - __get_user_pages()
                  - follow_{page,p4d,pud,pmd}_mask()
                    - follow_page_pte()
                        ptep = pte_offset_map_lock()
                        pte = *ptep
                        page = vm_normal_page(pte)
                        try_grab_page(page)	# inc refcount
                        pte_unmap_unlock()

- Huge Pages:
  ==========

Regarding transparent hugepages, that logic shouldn't change, as MADV_FREE
(aka lazyfree) pages are PageAnon() && !PageSwapBacked()
(madvise_free_pte_range() -> mark_page_lazyfree() -> lru_lazyfree_fn())
thus should reach shrink_page_list() -> split_huge_page_to_list() before
try_to_unmap[_one](), so it deals with normal pages only.

(And in case unlikely/TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD/split_huge_pmd_address() happens,
which should not or be rare, the page refcount should be greater than
mapcount: the head page is referenced by tail pages.  That also prevents
checking the head `page` then incorrectly call page_remove_rmap(subpage)
for a tail page, that isn't even in the shrink_page_list()'s page_list (an
effect of split huge pmd/pmvw), as it might happen today in this unlikely
scenario.)

MADV_FREE'd buffers:
===================

So, back to the "if MADV_FREE pages are used as buffers" note.  The case
is arguable, and subject to multiple interpretations.

The madvise(2) manual page on the MADV_FREE advice value says:

1) 'After a successful MADV_FREE ... data will be lost when
   the kernel frees the pages.'
2) 'the free operation will be canceled if the caller writes
   into the page' / 'subsequent writes ... will succeed and
   then [the] kernel cannot free those dirtied pages'
3) 'If there is no subsequent write, the kernel can free the
   pages at any time.'

Thoughts, questions, considerations... respectively:

1) Since the kernel didn't actually free the page (page_ref_freeze()
   failed), should the data not have been lost? (on userspace read.)
2) Should writes performed by the direct IO read be able to cancel
   the free operation?
   - Should the direct IO read be considered as 'the caller' too,
     as it's been requested by 'the caller'?
   - Should the bio technique to dirty pages on return to userspace
     (bio_check_pages_dirty() is called/used by __blkdev_direct_IO())
     be considered in another/special way here?
3) Should an upcoming write from a previously requested direct IO
   read be considered as a subsequent write, so the kernel should
   not free the pages? (as it's known at the time of page reclaim.)

And lastly:

Technically, the last point would seem a reasonable consideration and
balance, as the madvise(2) manual page apparently (and fairly) seem to
assume that 'writes' are memory access from the userspace process (not
explicitly considering writes from the kernel or its corner cases; again,
fairly)..  plus the kernel fix implementation for the corner case of the
largely 'non-atomic write' encompassed by a direct IO read operation, is
relatively simple; and it helps.

Reproducer:
==========

@ test.c (simplified, but works)

	#define _GNU_SOURCE
	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <unistd.h>
	#include <sys/mman.h>

	int main() {
		int fd, i;
		char *buf;

		fd = open(DEV, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECT);

		buf = mmap(NULL, BUF_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                	   MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);

		for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
			buf[i] = 1; // init to non-zero

		madvise(buf, BUF_SIZE, MADV_FREE);

		read(fd, buf, BUF_SIZE);

		for (i = 0; i < BUF_SIZE; i += PAGE_SIZE)
			printf("%p: 0x%x\n", &buf[i], buf[i]);

		return 0;
	}

@ block/fops.c (formerly fs/block_dev.c)

	+#include <linux/swap.h>
	...
	... __blkdev_direct_IO[_simple](...)
	{
	...
	+	if (!strcmp(current->comm, "good"))
	+		shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
	+
         	ret = bio_iov_iter_get_pages(...);
	+
	+	if (!strcmp(current->comm, "bad"))
	+		shrink_all_memory(ULONG_MAX);
	...
	}

@ shell

        # NUM_PAGES=4
        # PAGE_SIZE=$(getconf PAGE_SIZE)

        # yes | dd of=test.img bs=${PAGE_SIZE} count=${NUM_PAGES}
        # DEV=$(losetup -f --show test.img)

        # gcc -DDEV=\"$DEV\" \
              -DBUF_SIZE=$((PAGE_SIZE * NUM_PAGES)) \
              -DPAGE_SIZE=${PAGE_SIZE} \
               test.c -o test

        # od -tx1 $DEV
        0000000 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a 79 0a
        *
        0040000

        # mv test good
        # ./good
        0x7f7c10418000: 0x79
        0x7f7c10419000: 0x79
        0x7f7c1041a000: 0x79
        0x7f7c1041b000: 0x79

        # mv good bad
        # ./bad
        0x7fa1b8050000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8051000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8052000: 0x0
        0x7fa1b8053000: 0x0

Note: the issue is consistent on v5.17-rc3, but it's intermittent with the
support of MADV_FREE on v4.5 (60%-70% error; needs swap).  [wrap
do_direct_IO() in do_blockdev_direct_IO() @ fs/direct-io.c].

- v5.17-rc3:

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

        # mv good bad
        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x0

        # free | grep Swap
        Swap:             0           0           0

- v4.5:

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./good; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

        # mv good bad
        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           2702  0x0
           1298  0x79

        # swapoff -av
        swapoff /swap

        # for i in {1..1000}; do ./bad; done \
            | cut -d: -f2 | sort | uniq -c
           4000  0x79

Ceph/TCMalloc:
=============

For documentation purposes, the use case driving the analysis/fix is Ceph
on Ubuntu 18.04, as the TCMalloc library there still uses MADV_FREE to
release unused memory to the system from the mmap'ed page heap (might be
committed back/used again; it's not munmap'ed.) - PageHeap::DecommitSpan()
-> TCMalloc_SystemRelease() -> madvise() - PageHeap::CommitSpan() ->
TCMalloc_SystemCommit() -> do nothing.

Note: TCMalloc switched back to MADV_DONTNEED a few commits after the
release in Ubuntu 18.04 (google-perftools/gperftools 2.5), so the issue
just 'disappeared' on Ceph on later Ubuntu releases but is still present
in the kernel, and can be hit by other use cases.

The observed issue seems to be the old Ceph bug #22464 [1], where checksum
mismatches are observed (and instrumentation with buffer dumps shows
zero-pages read from mmap'ed/MADV_FREE'd page ranges).

The issue in Ceph was reasonably deemed a kernel bug (comment #50) and
mostly worked around with a retry mechanism, but other parts of Ceph could
still hit that (rocksdb).  Anyway, it's less likely to be hit again as
TCMalloc switched out of MADV_FREE by default.

(Some kernel versions/reports from the Ceph bug, and relation with
the MADV_FREE introduction/changes; TCMalloc versions not checked.)
- 4.4 good
- 4.5 (madv_free: introduction)
- 4.9 bad
- 4.10 good? maybe a swapless system
- 4.12 (madv_free: no longer free instantly on swapless systems)
- 4.13 bad

[1] https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/22464

Thanks:
======

Several people contributed to analysis/discussions/tests/reproducers in
the first stages when drilling down on ceph/tcmalloc/linux kernel:

- Dan Hill
- Dan Streetman
- Dongdong Tao
- Gavin Guo
- Gerald Yang
- Heitor Alves de Siqueira
- Ioanna Alifieraki
- Jay Vosburgh
- Matthew Ruffell
- Ponnuvel Palaniyappan

Reviews, suggestions, corrections, comments:

- Minchan Kim
- Yu Zhao
- Huang, Ying
- John Hubbard
- Christoph Hellwig

[mfo@canonical.com: v4]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220209202659.183418-1-mfo@canonical.comLink: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220131230255.789059-1-mfo@canonical.com

Fixes: 802a3a92ad ("mm: reclaim MADV_FREE pages")
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Dan Hill <daniel.hill@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com>
Cc: Dongdong Tao <dongdong.tao@canonical.com>
Cc: Gavin Guo <gavin.guo@canonical.com>
Cc: Gerald Yang <gerald.yang@canonical.com>
Cc: Heitor Alves de Siqueira <halves@canonical.com>
Cc: Ioanna Alifieraki <ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Cc: Matthew Ruffell <matthew.ruffell@canonical.com>
Cc: Ponnuvel Palaniyappan <ponnuvel.palaniyappan@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[mfo: backport: replace folio/test_flag with page/flag equivalents;
 real Fixes: 854e9ed09d ("mm: support madvise(MADV_FREE)") in v4.]
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-13 19:27:27 +02:00
Muchun Song
99144b9a46 mm: kfence: fix objcgs vector allocation
[ Upstream commit 8f0b364973 ]

If the kfence object is allocated to be used for objects vector, then
this slot of the pool eventually being occupied permanently since the
vector is never freed.  The solutions could be (1) freeing vector when
the kfence object is freed or (2) allocating all vectors statically.

Since the memory consumption of object vectors is low, it is better to
chose (2) to fix the issue and it is also can reduce overhead of vectors
allocating in the future.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220328132843.16624-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Fixes: d3fb45f370 ("mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-04-13 19:27:07 +02:00
Randy Dunlap
9d4c859d84 mm/usercopy: return 1 from hardened_usercopy __setup() handler
commit 05fe3c103f upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).  This prevents:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters \
  "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 hardened_usercopy=off", will be \
  passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     hardened_usercopy=off
or
     hardened_usercopy=on
but when "hardened_usercopy=foo" is used, there is no Unknown kernel
command line parameter.

Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.
Print a warning if strtobool() returns an error on the option string,
but do not mark this as in unknown command line option and do not cause
init's environment to be polluted with this string.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222034249.14795-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: b5cb15d937 ("usercopy: Allow boot cmdline disabling of hardening")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Acked-by: Chris von Recklinghausen <crecklin@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:59:00 +02:00
Randy Dunlap
070e4b2cdd mm/memcontrol: return 1 from cgroup.memory __setup() handler
commit 460a79e188 upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).

The only reason that this particular __setup handler does not pollute
init's environment is that the setup string contains a '.', as in
"cgroup.memory".  This causes init/main.c::unknown_boottoption() to
consider it to be an "Unused module parameter" and ignore it.  (This is
for parsing of loadable module parameters any time after kernel init.)
Otherwise the string "cgroup.memory=whatever" would be added to init's
environment strings.

Instead of relying on this '.' quirk, just return 1 to indicate that the
boot option has been handled.

Note that there is no warning message if someone enters:
	cgroup.memory=anything_invalid

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222005811.10672-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: f7e1cb6ec5 ("mm: memcontrol: account socket memory in unified hierarchy memory controller")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:59:00 +02:00
Randy Dunlap
aaa0d690d4 mm/mmap: return 1 from stack_guard_gap __setup() handler
commit e6d0949369 upstream.

__setup() handlers should return 1 if the command line option is handled
and 0 if not (or maybe never return 0; it just pollutes init's
environment).  This prevents:

  Unknown kernel command line parameters \
  "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5 stack_guard_gap=100", will be \
  passed to user space.

  Run /sbin/init as init process
   with arguments:
     /sbin/init
   with environment:
     HOME=/
     TERM=linux
     BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc5
     stack_guard_gap=100

Return 1 to indicate that the boot option has been handled.

Note that there is no warning message if someone enters:
	stack_guard_gap=anything_invalid
and 'val' and stack_guard_gap are both set to 0 due to the use of
simple_strtoul(). This could be improved by using kstrtoxxx() and
checking for an error.

It appears that having stack_guard_gap == 0 is valid (if unexpected) since
using "stack_guard_gap=0" on the kernel command line does that.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220222005817.11087-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Fixes: 1be7107fbe ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:59:00 +02:00
Kuan-Ying Lee
cf67c97a30 mm/kmemleak: reset tag when compare object pointer
commit bfc8089f00 upstream.

When we use HW-tag based kasan and enable vmalloc support, we hit the
following bug.  It is due to comparison between tagged object and
non-tagged pointer.

We need to reset the kasan tag when we need to compare tagged object and
non-tagged pointer.

  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]Scan area larger than object 0xffffffe77076f440
  CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: init Tainted: G S      W         5.15.25-android13-0-g5cacf919c2bc #1
  Hardware name: MT6983(ENG) (DT)
  Call trace:
   add_scan_area+0xc4/0x244
   kmemleak_scan_area+0x40/0x9c
   layout_and_allocate+0x1e8/0x288
   load_module+0x2c8/0xf00
   __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0
   __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30
   invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170
   el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114
   do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
   el0_svc+0x60/0xf8
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
   el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]Object 0xf5ffffe77076b000 (size 32768):
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294894197
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  min_count = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  count = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  flags = 0x1
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  checksum = 0
  kmemleak: [name:kmemleak&]  backtrace:
       module_alloc+0x9c/0x120
       move_module+0x34/0x19c
       layout_and_allocate+0x1c4/0x288
       load_module+0x2c8/0xf00
       __se_sys_finit_module+0x190/0x1d0
       __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x20/0x30
       invoke_syscall+0x60/0x170
       el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x114
       do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
       el0_svc+0x60/0xf8
       el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
       el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220318034051.30687-1-Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Kuan-Ying Lee <Kuan-Ying.Lee@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com>
Cc: Nicholas Tang <nicholas.tang@mediatek.com>
Cc: Yee Lee <yee.lee@mediatek.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:23 +02:00
Oscar Salvador
d3e5ccff71 mm: only re-generate demotion targets when a numa node changes its N_CPU state
commit 734c15700c upstream.

Abhishek reported that after patch [1], hotplug operations are taking
roughly double the expected time.  [2]

The reason behind is that the CPU callbacks that
migrate_on_reclaim_init() sets always call set_migration_target_nodes()
whenever a CPU is brought up/down.

But we only care about numa nodes going from having cpus to become
cpuless, and vice versa, as that influences the demotion_target order.

We do already have two CPU callbacks (vmstat_cpu_online() and
vmstat_cpu_dead()) that check exactly that, so get rid of the CPU
callbacks in migrate_on_reclaim_init() and only call
set_migration_target_nodes() from vmstat_cpu_{dead,online}() whenever a
numa node change its N_CPU state.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210721063926.3024591-2-ying.huang@intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/eb438ddd-2919-73d4-bd9f-b7eecdd9577a@linux.vnet.ibm.com/

[osalvador@suse.de: add feedback from Huang Ying]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220314150945.12694-1-osalvador@suse.de

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220310120749.23077-1-osalvador@suse.de
Fixes: 884a6e5d1f ("mm/migrate: update node demotion order on hotplug events")
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Abhishek Goel <huntbag@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Abhishek Goel <huntbag@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:23 +02:00
Rik van Riel
622012d83e mm,hwpoison: unmap poisoned page before invalidation
commit 3149c79f3c upstream.

In some cases it appears the invalidation of a hwpoisoned page fails
because the page is still mapped in another process.  This can cause a
program to be continuously restarted and die when it page faults on the
page that was not invalidated.  Avoid that problem by unmapping the
hwpoisoned page when we find it.

Another issue is that sometimes we end up oopsing in finish_fault, if
the code tries to do something with the now-NULL vmf->page.  I did not
hit this error when submitting the previous patch because there are
several opportunities for alloc_set_pte to bail out before accessing
vmf->page, and that apparently happened on those systems, and most of
the time on other systems, too.

However, across several million systems that error does occur a handful
of times a day.  It can be avoided by returning VM_FAULT_NOPAGE which
will cause do_read_fault to return before calling finish_fault.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220325161428.5068d97e@imladris.surriel.com
Fixes: e53ac7374e ("mm: invalidate hwpoison page cache page in fault path")
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:23 +02:00
Charan Teja Kalla
1f602f2ab0 Revert "mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise"
commit e6b0a7b357 upstream.

This reverts commit 08095d6310 ("mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes
passed to process_madvise") as process_madvise() fails to return the
exact processed bytes in other cases too.

As an example: if process_madvise() hits mlocked pages after processing
some initial bytes passed in [start, end), it just returns EINVAL
although some bytes are processed.  Thus making an exception only for
ENOMEM is partially fixing the problem of returning the proper advised
bytes.

Thus revert this patch and return proper bytes advised.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e73da1304a88b6a8a11907045117cccf4c2b8374.1648046642.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: 08095d6310 ("mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:22 +02:00
Charan Teja Kalla
0bde340252 mm: madvise: return correct bytes advised with process_madvise
commit 5bd009c7c9 upstream.

Patch series "mm: madvise: return correct bytes processed with
process_madvise", v2.  With the process_madvise(), always choose to return
non zero processed bytes over an error.  This can help the user to know on
which VMA, passed in the 'struct iovec' vector list, is failed to advise
thus can take the decission of retrying/skipping on that VMA.

This patch (of 2):

The process_madvise() system call returns error even after processing some
VMA's passed in the 'struct iovec' vector list which leaves the user
confused to know where to restart the advise next.  It is also against
this syscall man page[1] documentation where it mentions that "return
value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error
occurred after some iovec elements were already processed.".

Consider a user passed 10 VMA's in the 'struct iovec' vector list of which
9 are processed but one.  Then it just returns the error caused on that
failed VMA despite the first 9 VMA's processed, leaving the user confused
about on which VMA it is failed.  Returning the number of bytes processed
here can help the user to know which VMA it is failed on and thus can
retry/skip the advise on that VMA.

[1]https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/process_madvise.2.html.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/125b61a0edcee5c2db8658aed9d06a43a19ccafc.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f14("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:22 +02:00
Charan Teja Kalla
b64382c4c5 mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise
commit 08095d6310 upstream.

The process_madvise() system call is expected to skip holes in vma passed
through 'struct iovec' vector list.  But do_madvise, which
process_madvise() calls for each vma, returns ENOMEM in case of unmapped
holes, despite the VMA is processed.

Thus process_madvise() should treat ENOMEM as expected and consider the
VMA passed to as processed and continue processing other vma's in the
vector list.  Returning -ENOMEM to user, despite the VMA is processed,
will be unable to figure out where to start the next madvise.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f091776142f2ebf7b94018146de72318474e686.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f14("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:22 +02:00
Hugh Dickins
c8c4f48acf mempolicy: mbind_range() set_policy() after vma_merge()
commit 4e0906008c upstream.

v2.6.34 commit 9d8cebd4bc ("mm: fix mbind vma merge problem") introduced
vma_merge() to mbind_range(); but unlike madvise, mlock and mprotect, it
put a "continue" to next vma where its precedents go to update flags on
current vma before advancing: that left vma with the wrong setting in the
infamous vma_merge() case 8.

v3.10 commit 1444f92c84 ("mm: merging memory blocks resets mempolicy")
tried to fix that in vma_adjust(), without fully understanding the issue.

v3.11 commit 3964acd0db ("mm: mempolicy: fix mbind_range() &&
vma_adjust() interaction") reverted that, and went about the fix in the
right way, but chose to optimize out an unnecessary mpol_dup() with a
prior mpol_equal() test.  But on tmpfs, that also pessimized out the vital
call to its ->set_policy(), leaving the new mbind unenforced.

The user visible effect was that the pages got allocated on the local
node (happened to be 0), after the mbind() caller had specifically
asked for them to be allocated on node 1.  There was not any page
migration involved in the case reported: the pages simply got allocated
on the wrong node.

Just delete that optimization now (though it could be made conditional on
vma not having a set_policy).  Also remove the "next" variable: it turned
out to be blameless, but also pointless.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/319e4db9-64ae-4bca-92f0-ade85d342ff@google.com
Fixes: 3964acd0db ("mm: mempolicy: fix mbind_range() && vma_adjust() interaction")
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:20 +02:00
Rik van Riel
6ab5aba503 mm: invalidate hwpoison page cache page in fault path
commit e53ac7374e upstream.

Sometimes the page offlining code can leave behind a hwpoisoned clean
page cache page.  This can lead to programs being killed over and over
and over again as they fault in the hwpoisoned page, get killed, and
then get re-spawned by whatever wanted to run them.

This is particularly embarrassing when the page was offlined due to
having too many corrected memory errors.  Now we are killing tasks due
to them trying to access memory that probably isn't even corrupted.

This problem can be avoided by invalidating the page from the page fault
handler, which already has a branch for dealing with these kinds of
pages.  With this patch we simply pretend the page fault was successful
if the page was invalidated, return to userspace, incur another page
fault, read in the file from disk (to a new memory page), and then
everything works again.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212213740.423efcea@imladris.surriel.com
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:20 +02:00
Alistair Popple
00fd0bbd8c mm/pages_alloc.c: don't create ZONE_MOVABLE beyond the end of a node
commit ddbc84f3f5 upstream.

ZONE_MOVABLE uses the remaining memory in each node.  Its starting pfn
is also aligned to MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES.  It is possible for the remaining
memory in a node to be less than MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES, meaning there is
not enough room for ZONE_MOVABLE on that node.

Unfortunately this condition is not checked for.  This leads to
zone_movable_pfn[] getting set to a pfn greater than the last pfn in a
node.

calculate_node_totalpages() then sets zone->present_pages to be greater
than zone->spanned_pages which is invalid, as spanned_pages represents
the maximum number of pages in a zone assuming no holes.

Subsequently it is possible free_area_init_core() will observe a zone of
size zero with present pages.  In this case it will skip setting up the
zone, including the initialisation of free_lists[].

However populated_zone() checks zone->present_pages to see if a zone has
memory available.  This is used by iterators such as
walk_zones_in_node().  pagetypeinfo_showfree() uses this to walk the
free_list of each zone in each node, which are assumed to be initialised
due to the zone not being empty.

As free_area_init_core() never initialised the free_lists[] this results
in the following kernel crash when trying to read /proc/pagetypeinfo:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 456 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.16.0 #461
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:pagetypeinfo_show+0x163/0x460
  Code: 9e 82 e8 80 57 0e 00 49 8b 06 b9 01 00 00 00 4c 39 f0 75 16 e9 65 02 00 00 48 83 c1 01 48 81 f9 a0 86 01 00 0f 84 48 02 00 00 <48> 8b 00 4c 39 f0 75 e7 48 c7 c2 80 a2 e2 82 48 c7 c6 79 ef e3 82
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c4bd10 EFLAGS: 00010003
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88801105f638 RCX: 0000000000000001
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000068b RDI: ffff8880163dc68b
  RBP: ffffc90001c4bd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880163dc67e
  R10: 656c6261766f6d6e R11: 6c6261766f6d6e55 R12: ffff88807ffb4a00
  R13: ffff88807ffb49f8 R14: ffff88807ffb4580 R15: ffff88807ffb3000
  FS:  00007f9c83eff5c0(0000) GS:ffff88807dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000013c8e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
  Call Trace:
   seq_read_iter+0x128/0x460
   proc_reg_read_iter+0x51/0x80
   new_sync_read+0x113/0x1a0
   vfs_read+0x136/0x1d0
   ksys_read+0x70/0xf0
   __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fix this by checking that the aligned zone_movable_pfn[] does not exceed
the end of the node, and if it does skip creating a movable zone on this
node.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220215025831.2113067-1-apopple@nvidia.com
Fixes: 2a1e274acf ("Create the ZONE_MOVABLE zone")
Signed-off-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:19 +02:00
Peter Xu
75ad79f159 mm: don't skip swap entry even if zap_details specified
commit 5abfd71d93 upstream.

Patch series "mm: Rework zap ptes on swap entries", v5.

Patch 1 should fix a long standing bug for zap_pte_range() on
zap_details usage.  The risk is we could have some swap entries skipped
while we should have zapped them.

Migration entries are not the major concern because file backed memory
always zap in the pattern that "first time without page lock, then
re-zap with page lock" hence the 2nd zap will always make sure all
migration entries are already recovered.

However there can be issues with real swap entries got skipped
errornoously.  There's a reproducer provided in commit message of patch
1 for that.

Patch 2-4 are cleanups that are based on patch 1.  After the whole
patchset applied, we should have a very clean view of zap_pte_range().

Only patch 1 needs to be backported to stable if necessary.

This patch (of 4):

The "details" pointer shouldn't be the token to decide whether we should
skip swap entries.

For example, when the callers specified details->zap_mapping==NULL, it
means the user wants to zap all the pages (including COWed pages), then
we need to look into swap entries because there can be private COWed
pages that was swapped out.

Skipping some swap entries when details is non-NULL may lead to wrongly
leaving some of the swap entries while we should have zapped them.

A reproducer of the problem:

===8<===
        #define _GNU_SOURCE         /* See feature_test_macros(7) */
        #include <stdio.h>
        #include <assert.h>
        #include <unistd.h>
        #include <sys/mman.h>
        #include <sys/types.h>

        int page_size;
        int shmem_fd;
        char *buffer;

        void main(void)
        {
                int ret;
                char val;

                page_size = getpagesize();
                shmem_fd = memfd_create("test", 0);
                assert(shmem_fd >= 0);

                ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size * 2);
                assert(ret == 0);

                buffer = mmap(NULL, page_size * 2, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                                MAP_PRIVATE, shmem_fd, 0);
                assert(buffer != MAP_FAILED);

                /* Write private page, swap it out */
                buffer[page_size] = 1;
                madvise(buffer, page_size * 2, MADV_PAGEOUT);

                /* This should drop private buffer[page_size] already */
                ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size);
                assert(ret == 0);
                /* Recover the size */
                ret = ftruncate(shmem_fd, page_size * 2);
                assert(ret == 0);

                /* Re-read the data, it should be all zero */
                val = buffer[page_size];
                if (val == 0)
                        printf("Good\n");
                else
                        printf("BUG\n");
        }
===8<===

We don't need to touch up the pmd path, because pmd never had a issue with
swap entries.  For example, shmem pmd migration will always be split into
pte level, and same to swapping on anonymous.

Add another helper should_zap_cows() so that we can also check whether we
should zap private mappings when there's no page pointer specified.

This patch drops that trick, so we handle swap ptes coherently.  Meanwhile
we should do the same check upon migration entry, hwpoison entry and
genuine swap entries too.

To be explicit, we should still remember to keep the private entries if
even_cows==false, and always zap them when even_cows==true.

The issue seems to exist starting from the initial commit of git.

[peterx@redhat.com: comment tweaks]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220217060746.71256-2-peterx@redhat.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220217060746.71256-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216094810.60572-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216094810.60572-2-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:19 +02:00
Miaohe Lin
323681ce7c mm/mlock: fix two bugs in user_shm_lock()
commit e97824ff66 upstream.

user_shm_lock forgets to set allowed to 0 when get_ucounts fails. So the
later user_shm_unlock might do the extra dec_rlimit_ucounts. Also in the
RLIM_INFINITY case, user_shm_lock will success regardless of the value of
memlock where memblock == LONG_MAX && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK) should fail.
Fix all of these by changing the code to leave lock_limit at ULONG_MAX aka
RLIM_INFINITY, leave "allowed" initialized to 0 and remove the special case
of RLIM_INFINITY as nothing can be greater than ULONG_MAX.

Credit goes to Eric W. Biederman for proposing simplifying the code and
thus catching the later bug.

Fixes: d7c9e99aee ("Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220310132417.41189-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220314064039.62972-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220322080918.59861-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:18 +02:00
Muchun Song
1e53f4ed16 mm: kfence: fix missing objcg housekeeping for SLAB
commit ae085d7f93 upstream.

The objcg is not cleared and put for kfence object when it is freed,
which could lead to memory leak for struct obj_cgroup and wrong
statistics of NR_SLAB_RECLAIMABLE_B or NR_SLAB_UNRECLAIMABLE_B.

Since the last freed object's objcg is not cleared,
mem_cgroup_from_obj() could return the wrong memcg when this kfence
object, which is not charged to any objcgs, is reallocated to other
users.

A real word issue [1] is caused by this bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cabcb505dae9e577@google.com/ [1]
Reported-by: syzbot+f8c45ccc7d5d45fc5965@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d3fb45f370 ("mm, kfence: insert KFENCE hooks for SLAB")
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-04-08 13:57:12 +02:00
Guo Ziliang
029c4628b2 mm: swap: get rid of livelock in swapin readahead
In our testing, a livelock task was found.  Through sysrq printing, same
stack was found every time, as follows:

  __swap_duplicate+0x58/0x1a0
  swapcache_prepare+0x24/0x30
  __read_swap_cache_async+0xac/0x220
  read_swap_cache_async+0x58/0xa0
  swapin_readahead+0x24c/0x628
  do_swap_page+0x374/0x8a0
  __handle_mm_fault+0x598/0xd60
  handle_mm_fault+0x114/0x200
  do_page_fault+0x148/0x4d0
  do_translation_fault+0xb0/0xd4
  do_mem_abort+0x50/0xb0

The reason for the livelock is that swapcache_prepare() always returns
EEXIST, indicating that SWAP_HAS_CACHE has not been cleared, so that it
cannot jump out of the loop.  We suspect that the task that clears the
SWAP_HAS_CACHE flag never gets a chance to run.  We try to lower the
priority of the task stuck in a livelock so that the task that clears
the SWAP_HAS_CACHE flag will run.  The results show that the system
returns to normal after the priority is lowered.

In our testing, multiple real-time tasks are bound to the same core, and
the task in the livelock is the highest priority task of the core, so
the livelocked task cannot be preempted.

Although cond_resched() is used by __read_swap_cache_async, it is an
empty function in the preemptive system and cannot achieve the purpose
of releasing the CPU.  A high-priority task cannot release the CPU
unless preempted by a higher-priority task.  But when this task is
already the highest priority task on this core, other tasks will not be
able to be scheduled.  So we think we should replace cond_resched() with
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1), schedule_timeout_interruptible will
call set_current_state first to set the task state, so the task will be
removed from the running queue, so as to achieve the purpose of giving
up the CPU and prevent it from running in kernel mode for too long.

(akpm: ugly hack becomes uglier.  But it fixes the issue in a
backportable-to-stable fashion while we hopefully work on something
better)

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220221111749.1928222-1-cgel.zte@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Guo Ziliang <guo.ziliang@zte.com.cn>
Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiang Xuexin <jiang.xuexin@zte.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Cc: Ziliang Guo <guo.ziliang@zte.com.cn>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-17 11:02:13 -07:00