Commit graph

200 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Yafang Shao
fe977716b4 bpf: Add a new kfunc for cgroup1 hierarchy
A new kfunc is added to acquire cgroup1 of a task:

- bpf_task_get_cgroup1
  Acquires the associated cgroup of a task whithin a specific cgroup1
  hierarchy. The cgroup1 hierarchy is identified by its hierarchy ID.

This new kfunc enables the tracing of tasks within a designated
container or cgroup directory in BPF programs.

Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231111090034.4248-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-14 08:56:56 -08:00
Dave Marchevsky
649924b76a bpf: Use bpf_mem_free_rcu when bpf_obj_dropping non-refcounted nodes
The use of bpf_mem_free_rcu to free refcounted local kptrs was added
in commit 7e26cd12ad ("bpf: Use bpf_mem_free_rcu when
bpf_obj_dropping refcounted nodes"). In the cover letter for the
series containing that patch [0] I commented:

    Perhaps it makes sense to move to mem_free_rcu for _all_
    non-owning refs in the future, not just refcounted. This might
    allow custom non-owning ref lifetime + invalidation logic to be
    entirely subsumed by MEM_RCU handling. IMO this needs a bit more
    thought and should be tackled outside of a fix series, so it's not
    attempted here.

It's time to start moving in the "non-owning refs have MEM_RCU
lifetime" direction. As mentioned in that comment, using
bpf_mem_free_rcu for all local kptrs - not just refcounted - is
necessarily the first step towards that goal. This patch does so.

After this patch the memory pointed to by all local kptrs will not be
reused until RCU grace period elapses. The verifier's understanding of
non-owning ref validity and the clobbering logic it uses to enforce
that understanding are not changed here, that'll happen gradually in
future work, including further patches in the series.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230821193311.3290257-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com/

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231107085639.3016113-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-09 19:07:51 -08:00
Dave Marchevsky
1500a5d9f4 bpf: Add KF_RCU flag to bpf_refcount_acquire_impl
Refcounted local kptrs are kptrs to user-defined types with a
bpf_refcount field. Recent commits ([0], [1]) modified the lifetime of
refcounted local kptrs such that the underlying memory is not reused
until RCU grace period has elapsed.

Separately, verification of bpf_refcount_acquire calls currently
succeeds for MAYBE_NULL non-owning reference input, which is a problem
as bpf_refcount_acquire_impl has no handling for this case.

This patch takes advantage of aforementioned lifetime changes to tag
bpf_refcount_acquire_impl kfunc KF_RCU, thereby preventing MAYBE_NULL
input to the kfunc. The KF_RCU flag applies to all kfunc params; it's
fine for it to apply to the void *meta__ign param as that's populated by
the verifier and is tagged __ign regardless.

  [0]: commit 7e26cd12ad ("bpf: Use bpf_mem_free_rcu when
       bpf_obj_dropping refcounted nodes") is the actual change to
       allocation behaivor
  [1]: commit 0816b8c6bf ("bpf: Consider non-owning refs to refcounted
       nodes RCU protected") modified verifier understanding of
       refcounted local kptrs to match [0]'s changes

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Fixes: 7c50b1cb76 ("bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231107085639.3016113-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-09 19:07:51 -08:00
Song Liu
74523c06ae bpf: Add __bpf_dynptr_data* for in kernel use
Different types of bpf dynptr have different internal data storage.
Specifically, SKB and XDP type of dynptr may have non-continuous data.
Therefore, it is not always safe to directly access dynptr->data.

Add __bpf_dynptr_data and __bpf_dynptr_data_rw to replace direct access to
dynptr->data.

Update bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature to use __bpf_dynptr_data instead of
dynptr->data.

Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vadim.fedorenko@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231107045725.2278852-2-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-09 19:07:38 -08:00
Hou Tao
fd381ce60a bpf: Check map->usercnt after timer->timer is assigned
When there are concurrent uref release and bpf timer init operations,
the following sequence diagram is possible. It will break the guarantee
provided by bpf_timer: bpf_timer will still be alive after userspace
application releases or unpins the map. It also will lead to kmemleak
for old kernel version which doesn't release bpf_timer when map is
released.

bpf program X:

bpf_timer_init()
  lock timer->lock
    read timer->timer as NULL
    read map->usercnt != 0

                process Y:

                close(map_fd)
                  // put last uref
                  bpf_map_put_uref()
                    atomic_dec_and_test(map->usercnt)
                      array_map_free_timers()
                        bpf_timer_cancel_and_free()
                          // just return
                          read timer->timer is NULL

    t = bpf_map_kmalloc_node()
    timer->timer = t
  unlock timer->lock

Fix the problem by checking map->usercnt after timer->timer is assigned,
so when there are concurrent uref release and bpf timer init, either
bpf_timer_cancel_and_free() from uref release reads a no-NULL timer
or the newly-added atomic64_read() returns a zero usercnt.

Because atomic_dec_and_test(map->usercnt) and READ_ONCE(timer->timer)
in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free() are not protected by a lock, so add
a memory barrier to guarantee the order between map->usercnt and
timer->timer. Also use WRITE_ONCE(timer->timer, x) to match the lockless
read of timer->timer in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free().

Reported-by: Hsin-Wei Hung <hsinweih@uci.edu>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABcoxUaT2k9hWsS1tNgXyoU3E-=PuOgMn737qK984fbFmfYixQ@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: b00628b1c7 ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231030063616.1653024-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-01 22:37:31 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
391145ba2a bpf: Add __bpf_kfunc_{start,end}_defs macros
BPF kfuncs are meant to be called from BPF programs. Accordingly, most
kfuncs are not called from anywhere in the kernel, which the
-Wmissing-prototypes warning is unhappy about. We've peppered
__diag_ignore_all("-Wmissing-prototypes", ... everywhere kfuncs are
defined in the codebase to suppress this warning.

This patch adds two macros meant to bound one or many kfunc definitions.
All existing kfunc definitions which use these __diag calls to suppress
-Wmissing-prototypes are migrated to use the newly-introduced macros.
A new __diag_ignore_all - for "-Wmissing-declarations" - is added to the
__bpf_kfunc_start_defs macro based on feedback from Andrii on an earlier
version of this patch [0] and another recent mailing list thread [1].

In the future we might need to ignore different warnings or do other
kfunc-specific things. This change will make it easier to make such
modifications for all kfunc defs.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzaE5dRWtK6RPLnjTW-MW9sx9K3Fn6uwqCTChK2Dcb1Xig@mail.gmail.com/
  [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZT+2qCc%2FaXep0%2FLf@krava/

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031215625.2343848-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-01 22:33:53 -07:00
Matthieu Baerts
05670f81d1 bpf: fix compilation error without CGROUPS
Our MPTCP CI complained [1] -- and KBuild too -- that it was no longer
possible to build the kernel without CONFIG_CGROUPS:

  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c: In function 'bpf_iter_css_task_new':
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:919:14: error: 'CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS' undeclared (first use in this function)
    919 |         case CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS | CSS_TASK_ITER_THREADED:
        |              ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:919:14: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:919:36: error: 'CSS_TASK_ITER_THREADED' undeclared (first use in this function)
    919 |         case CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS | CSS_TASK_ITER_THREADED:
        |                                    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:927:60: error: invalid application of 'sizeof' to incomplete type 'struct css_task_iter'
    927 |         kit->css_it = bpf_mem_alloc(&bpf_global_ma, sizeof(struct css_task_iter));
        |                                                            ^~~~~~
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:930:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'css_task_iter_start'; did you mean 'task_seq_start'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    930 |         css_task_iter_start(css, flags, kit->css_it);
        |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
        |         task_seq_start
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c: In function 'bpf_iter_css_task_next':
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:940:16: error: implicit declaration of function 'css_task_iter_next'; did you mean 'class_dev_iter_next'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    940 |         return css_task_iter_next(kit->css_it);
        |                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
        |                class_dev_iter_next
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:940:16: error: returning 'int' from a function with return type 'struct task_struct *' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Werror=int-conversion]
    940 |         return css_task_iter_next(kit->css_it);
        |                ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c: In function 'bpf_iter_css_task_destroy':
  kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:949:9: error: implicit declaration of function 'css_task_iter_end' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    949 |         css_task_iter_end(kit->css_it);
        |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

This patch simply surrounds with a #ifdef the new code requiring CGroups
support. It seems enough for the compiler and this is similar to
bpf_iter_css_{new,next,destroy}() functions where no other #ifdef have
been added in kernel/bpf/helpers.c and in the selftests.

Fixes: 9c66dc94b6 ("bpf: Introduce css_task open-coded iterator kfuncs")
Link: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/actions/runs/6665206927
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310260528.aHWgVFqq-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matttbe@kernel.org>
[ added missing ifdefs for BTF_ID cgroup definitions ]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231101181601.1493271-1-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-11-01 22:28:25 -07:00
Hou Tao
e383a45902 bpf: Use bpf_global_percpu_ma for per-cpu kptr in __bpf_obj_drop_impl()
The following warning was reported when running "./test_progs -t
test_bpf_ma/percpu_free_through_map_free":

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 68 at kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:342
  CPU: 1 PID: 68 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc2+ #222
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
  Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred
  RIP: 0010:bpf_mem_refill+0x21c/0x2a0
  ......
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   ? bpf_mem_refill+0x21c/0x2a0
   irq_work_single+0x27/0x70
   irq_work_run_list+0x2a/0x40
   irq_work_run+0x18/0x40
   __sysvec_irq_work+0x1c/0xc0
   sysvec_irq_work+0x73/0x90
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   asm_sysvec_irq_work+0x1b/0x20
  RIP: 0010:unit_free+0x50/0x80
   ......
   bpf_mem_free+0x46/0x60
   __bpf_obj_drop_impl+0x40/0x90
   bpf_obj_free_fields+0x17d/0x1a0
   array_map_free+0x6b/0x170
   bpf_map_free_deferred+0x54/0xa0
   process_scheduled_works+0xba/0x370
   worker_thread+0x16d/0x2e0
   kthread+0x105/0x140
   ret_from_fork+0x39/0x60
   ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The reason is simple: __bpf_obj_drop_impl() does not know the freeing
field is a per-cpu pointer and it uses bpf_global_ma to free the
pointer. Because bpf_global_ma is not a per-cpu allocator, so ksize() is
used to select the corresponding cache. The bpf_mem_cache with 16-bytes
unit_size will always be selected to do the unmatched free and it will
trigger the warning in free_bulk() eventually.

Because per-cpu kptr doesn't support list or rb-tree now, so fix the
problem by only checking whether or not the type of kptr is per-cpu in
bpf_obj_free_fields(), and using bpf_global_percpu_ma to these kptrs.

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020133202.4043247-7-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-20 14:15:13 -07:00
Hou Tao
e581a3461d bpf: Move the declaration of __bpf_obj_drop_impl() to bpf.h
both syscall.c and helpers.c have the declaration of
__bpf_obj_drop_impl(), so just move it to a common header file.

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231020133202.4043247-6-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-20 14:15:13 -07:00
Chuyi Zhou
dfab99df14 bpf: teach the verifier to enforce css_iter and task_iter in RCU CS
css_iter and task_iter should be used in rcu section. Specifically, in
sleepable progs explicit bpf_rcu_read_lock() is needed before use these
iters. In normal bpf progs that have implicit rcu_read_lock(), it's OK to
use them directly.

This patch adds a new a KF flag KF_RCU_PROTECTED for bpf_iter_task_new and
bpf_iter_css_new. It means the kfunc should be used in RCU CS. We check
whether we are in rcu cs before we want to invoke this kfunc. If the rcu
protection is guaranteed, we would let st->type = PTR_TO_STACK | MEM_RCU.
Once user do rcu_unlock during the iteration, state MEM_RCU of regs would
be cleared. is_iter_reg_valid_init() will reject if reg->type is UNTRUSTED.

It is worth noting that currently, bpf_rcu_read_unlock does not
clear the state of the STACK_ITER reg, since bpf_for_each_spilled_reg
only considers STACK_SPILL. This patch also let bpf_for_each_spilled_reg
search STACK_ITER.

Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-6-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-19 17:02:46 -07:00
Chuyi Zhou
7251d0905e bpf: Introduce css open-coded iterator kfuncs
This Patch adds kfuncs bpf_iter_css_{new,next,destroy} which allow
creation and manipulation of struct bpf_iter_css in open-coded iterator
style. These kfuncs actually wrapps css_next_descendant_{pre, post}.
css_iter can be used to:

1) iterating a sepcific cgroup tree with pre/post/up order

2) iterating cgroup_subsystem in BPF Prog, like
for_each_mem_cgroup_tree/cpuset_for_each_descendant_pre in kernel.

The API design is consistent with cgroup_iter. bpf_iter_css_new accepts
parameters defining iteration order and starting css. Here we also reuse
BPF_CGROUP_ITER_DESCENDANTS_PRE, BPF_CGROUP_ITER_DESCENDANTS_POST,
BPF_CGROUP_ITER_ANCESTORS_UP enums.

Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-5-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-19 17:02:46 -07:00
Chuyi Zhou
c68a78ffe2 bpf: Introduce task open coded iterator kfuncs
This patch adds kfuncs bpf_iter_task_{new,next,destroy} which allow
creation and manipulation of struct bpf_iter_task in open-coded iterator
style. BPF programs can use these kfuncs or through bpf_for_each macro to
iterate all processes in the system.

The API design keep consistent with SEC("iter/task"). bpf_iter_task_new()
accepts a specific task and iterating type which allows:

1. iterating all process in the system (BPF_TASK_ITER_ALL_PROCS)

2. iterating all threads in the system (BPF_TASK_ITER_ALL_THREADS)

3. iterating all threads of a specific task (BPF_TASK_ITER_PROC_THREADS)

Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-4-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-19 17:02:46 -07:00
Chuyi Zhou
9c66dc94b6 bpf: Introduce css_task open-coded iterator kfuncs
This patch adds kfuncs bpf_iter_css_task_{new,next,destroy} which allow
creation and manipulation of struct bpf_iter_css_task in open-coded
iterator style. These kfuncs actually wrapps css_task_iter_{start,next,
end}. BPF programs can use these kfuncs through bpf_for_each macro for
iteration of all tasks under a css.

css_task_iter_*() would try to get the global spin-lock *css_set_lock*, so
the bpf side has to be careful in where it allows to use this iter.
Currently we only allow it in bpf_lsm and bpf iter-s.

Signed-off-by: Chuyi Zhou <zhouchuyi@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231018061746.111364-3-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-10-19 17:02:46 -07:00
Yafang Shao
29a7e00ffa bpf: Fix missed rcu read lock in bpf_task_under_cgroup()
When employed within a sleepable program not under RCU protection, the
use of 'bpf_task_under_cgroup()' may trigger a warning in the kernel log,
particularly when CONFIG_PROVE_RCU is enabled:

  [ 1259.662357] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  [ 1259.662358] 6.5.0+ #33 Not tainted
  [ 1259.662360] -----------------------------
  [ 1259.662361] include/linux/cgroup.h:423 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

Other info that might help to debug this:

  [ 1259.662366] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  [ 1259.662368] 1 lock held by trace/72954:
  [ 1259.662369]  #0: ffffffffb5e3eda0 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x0/0xb0

Stack backtrace:

  [ 1259.662385] CPU: 50 PID: 72954 Comm: trace Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.5.0+ #33
  [ 1259.662391] Call Trace:
  [ 1259.662393]  <TASK>
  [ 1259.662395]  dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x90
  [ 1259.662401]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  [ 1259.662404]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x163/0x1b0
  [ 1259.662412]  task_css_set.part.0+0x23/0x30
  [ 1259.662417]  bpf_task_under_cgroup+0xe7/0xf0
  [ 1259.662422]  bpf_prog_7fffba481a3bcf88_lsm_run+0x5c/0x93
  [ 1259.662431]  bpf_trampoline_6442505574+0x60/0x1000
  [ 1259.662439]  bpf_lsm_bpf+0x5/0x20
  [ 1259.662443]  ? security_bpf+0x32/0x50
  [ 1259.662452]  __sys_bpf+0xe6/0xdd0
  [ 1259.662463]  __x64_sys_bpf+0x1a/0x30
  [ 1259.662467]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
  [ 1259.662472]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
  [ 1259.662479] RIP: 0033:0x7f487baf8e29
  [...]
  [ 1259.662504]  </TASK>

This issue can be reproduced by executing a straightforward program, as
demonstrated below:

SEC("lsm.s/bpf")
int BPF_PROG(lsm_run, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
{
        struct cgroup *cgrp = NULL;
        struct task_struct *task;
        int ret = 0;

        if (cmd != BPF_LINK_CREATE)
                return 0;

        // The cgroup2 should be mounted first
        cgrp = bpf_cgroup_from_id(1);
        if (!cgrp)
                goto out;
        task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
        if (bpf_task_under_cgroup(task, cgrp))
                ret = -1;
        bpf_cgroup_release(cgrp);

out:
        return ret;
}

After running the program, if you subsequently execute another BPF program,
you will encounter the warning.

It's worth noting that task_under_cgroup_hierarchy() is also utilized by
bpf_current_task_under_cgroup(). However, bpf_current_task_under_cgroup()
doesn't exhibit this issue because it cannot be used in sleepable BPF
programs.

Fixes: b5ad4cdc46 ("bpf: Add bpf_task_under_cgroup() kfunc")
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Cc: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231007135945.4306-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
2023-10-17 18:27:41 +02:00
Dave Marchevsky
4ac4546821 bpf: Introduce task_vma open-coded iterator kfuncs
This patch adds kfuncs bpf_iter_task_vma_{new,next,destroy} which allow
creation and manipulation of struct bpf_iter_task_vma in open-coded
iterator style. BPF programs can use these kfuncs directly or through
bpf_for_each macro for natural-looking iteration of all task vmas.

The implementation borrows heavily from bpf_find_vma helper's locking -
differing only in that it holds the mmap_read lock for all iterations
while the helper only executes its provided callback on a maximum of 1
vma. Aside from locking, struct vma_iterator and vma_next do all the
heavy lifting.

A pointer to an inner data struct, struct bpf_iter_task_vma_data, is the
only field in struct bpf_iter_task_vma. This is because the inner data
struct contains a struct vma_iterator (not ptr), whose size is likely to
change under us. If bpf_iter_task_vma_kern contained vma_iterator directly
such a change would require change in opaque bpf_iter_task_vma struct's
size. So better to allocate vma_iterator using BPF allocator, and since
that alloc must already succeed, might as well allocate all iter fields,
thereby freezing struct bpf_iter_task_vma size.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231013204426.1074286-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
2023-10-13 15:48:58 -07:00
David Vernet
d6247ecb6c bpf: Add ability to pin bpf timer to calling CPU
BPF supports creating high resolution timers using bpf_timer_* helper
functions. Currently, only the BPF_F_TIMER_ABS flag is supported, which
specifies that the timeout should be interpreted as absolute time. It
would also be useful to be able to pin that timer to a core. For
example, if you wanted to make a subset of cores run without timer
interrupts, and only have the timer be invoked on a single core.

This patch adds support for this with a new BPF_F_TIMER_CPU_PIN flag.
When specified, the HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED flag is passed to
hrtimer_start(). A subsequent patch will update selftests to validate.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231004162339.200702-2-void@manifault.com
2023-10-09 16:28:49 +02:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
7d3460632d bpf: Fix bpf_throw warning on 32-bit arch
On 32-bit architectures, the pointer width is 32-bit, while we try to
cast from a u64 down to it, the compiler complains on mismatch in
integer size. Fix this by first casting to long which should match
the pointer width on targets supported by Linux.

Fixes: ec5290a178 ("bpf: Prevent KASAN false positive with bpf_throw")
Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918155233.297024-3-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-09-19 02:07:36 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
fd548e1a46 bpf: Disallow fentry/fexit/freplace for exception callbacks
During testing, it was discovered that extensions to exception callbacks
had no checks, upon running a testcase, the kernel ended up running off
the end of a program having final call as bpf_throw, and hitting int3
instructions.

The reason is that while the default exception callback would have reset
the stack frame to return back to the main program's caller, the
replacing extension program will simply return back to bpf_throw, which
will instead return back to the program and the program will continue
execution, now in an undefined state where anything could happen.

The way to support extensions to an exception callback would be to mark
the BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT main subprog as an exception_cb, and prevent it
from calling bpf_throw. This would make the JIT produce a prologue that
restores saved registers and reset the stack frame. But let's not do
that until there is a concrete use case for this, and simply disallow
this for now.

Similar issues will exist for fentry and fexit cases, where trampoline
saves data on the stack when invoking exception callback, which however
will then end up resetting the stack frame, and on return, the fexit
program will never will invoked as the return address points to the main
program's caller in the kernel. Instead of additional complexity and
back and forth between the two stacks to enable such a use case, simply
forbid it.

One key point here to note is that currently X86_TAIL_CALL_OFFSET didn't
require any modifications, even though we emit instructions before the
corresponding endbr64 instruction. This is because we ensure that a main
subprog never serves as an exception callback, and therefore the
exception callback (which will be a global subprog) can never serve as
the tail call target, eliminating any discrepancies. However, once we
support a BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT to also act as an exception callback, it
will end up requiring change to the tail call offset to account for the
extra instructions. For simplicitly, tail calls could be disabled for
such targets.

Noting the above, it appears better to wait for a concrete use case
before choosing to permit extension programs to replace exception
callbacks.

As a precaution, we disable fentry and fexit for exception callbacks as
well.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-13-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-09-16 09:36:32 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
ec5290a178 bpf: Prevent KASAN false positive with bpf_throw
The KASAN stack instrumentation when CONFIG_KASAN_STACK is true poisons
the stack of a function when it is entered and unpoisons it when
leaving. However, in the case of bpf_throw, we will never return as we
switch our stack frame to the BPF exception callback. Later, this
discrepancy will lead to confusing KASAN splats when kernel resumes
execution on return from the BPF program.

Fix this by unpoisoning everything below the stack pointer of the BPF
program, which should cover the range that would not be unpoisoned. An
example splat is below:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stack_trace_consume_entry+0x14e/0x170
Write of size 8 at addr ffffc900013af958 by task test_progs/227

CPU: 0 PID: 227 Comm: test_progs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc2-g43f1c6c9052a-dirty #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-2.fc39 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
 print_report+0xcf/0x670
 ? arch_stack_walk+0x79/0x100
 kasan_report+0xda/0x110
 ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x14e/0x170
 ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x14e/0x170
 ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
 stack_trace_consume_entry+0x14e/0x170
 ? __sys_bpf+0xf2e/0x41b0
 arch_stack_walk+0x8b/0x100
 ? __sys_bpf+0xf2e/0x41b0
 ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x341/0x1c70
 ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x341/0x1c70
 stack_trace_save+0x9b/0xd0
 ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x180
 ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x341/0x1c70
 ? __sys_bpf+0xf2e/0x41b0
 ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0xc0
 ? do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
 kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 ? kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
 ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
 ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50
 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x180
 ? kmem_cache_free+0x191/0x460
 ? bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x341/0x1c70
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50
 __kasan_slab_free+0x109/0x180
 kmem_cache_free+0x191/0x460
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x341/0x1c70
 ? __pfx_bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x10/0x10
 ? __fget_light+0x51/0x220
 __sys_bpf+0xf2e/0x41b0
 ? __might_fault+0xa2/0x170
 ? __pfx___sys_bpf+0x10/0x10
 ? lock_release+0x1de/0x620
 ? __might_fault+0xcd/0x170
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0xc0
 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x20/0x50
 do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
RIP: 0033:0x7f0fbb38880d
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f3 45 12 00 f7 d8 64
89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe13907de8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe13908708 RCX: 00007f0fbb38880d
RDX: 0000000000000050 RSI: 00007ffe13907e20 RDI: 000000000000000a
RBP: 00007ffe13907e00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffe13907e20
R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f0fbb532000 R15: 0000000000cfbd90
 </TASK>

The buggy address belongs to stack of task test_progs/227
KASAN internal error: frame info validation failed; invalid marker: 0

The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
 [ffffc900013a8000, ffffc900013b1000) created by:
 kernel_clone+0xcd/0x600

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:00000000b70f4332 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x11418f
flags: 0x2fffe0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 02fffe0000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffc900013af800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc900013af880: 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00
>ffffc900013af900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 00 00 00 00
                                                    ^
 ffffc900013af980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffc900013afa00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-11-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-09-16 09:34:22 -07:00
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
f18b03faba bpf: Implement BPF exceptions
This patch implements BPF exceptions, and introduces a bpf_throw kfunc
to allow programs to throw exceptions during their execution at runtime.
A bpf_throw invocation is treated as an immediate termination of the
program, returning back to its caller within the kernel, unwinding all
stack frames.

This allows the program to simplify its implementation, by testing for
runtime conditions which the verifier has no visibility into, and assert
that they are true. In case they are not, the program can simply throw
an exception from the other branch.

BPF exceptions are explicitly *NOT* an unlikely slowpath error handling
primitive, and this objective has guided design choices of the
implementation of the them within the kernel (with the bulk of the cost
for unwinding the stack offloaded to the bpf_throw kfunc).

The implementation of this mechanism requires use of add_hidden_subprog
mechanism introduced in the previous patch, which generates a couple of
instructions to move R1 to R0 and exit. The JIT then rewrites the
prologue of this subprog to take the stack pointer and frame pointer as
inputs and reset the stack frame, popping all callee-saved registers
saved by the main subprog. The bpf_throw function then walks the stack
at runtime, and invokes this exception subprog with the stack and frame
pointers as parameters.

Reviewers must take note that currently the main program is made to save
all callee-saved registers on x86_64 during entry into the program. This
is because we must do an equivalent of a lightweight context switch when
unwinding the stack, therefore we need the callee-saved registers of the
caller of the BPF program to be able to return with a sane state.

Note that we have to additionally handle r12, even though it is not used
by the program, because when throwing the exception the program makes an
entry into the kernel which could clobber r12 after saving it on the
stack. To be able to preserve the value we received on program entry, we
push r12 and restore it from the generated subprogram when unwinding the
stack.

For now, bpf_throw invocation fails when lingering resources or locks
exist in that path of the program. In a future followup, bpf_throw will
be extended to perform frame-by-frame unwinding to release lingering
resources for each stack frame, removing this limitation.

Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912233214.1518551-5-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-09-16 09:34:21 -07:00
Yonghong Song
36d8bdf75a bpf: Add alloc/xchg/direct_access support for local percpu kptr
Add two new kfunc's, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl() and
bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl(), to allocate a percpu obj.
Two functions are very similar to bpf_obj_new_impl()
and bpf_obj_drop_impl(). The major difference is related
to percpu handling.

    bpf_rcu_read_lock()
    struct val_t __percpu_kptr *v = map_val->percpu_data;
    ...
    bpf_rcu_read_unlock()

For a percpu data map_val like above 'v', the reg->type
is set as
	PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU
if inside rcu critical section.

MEM_RCU marking here is similar to NON_OWN_REF as 'v'
is not a owning reference. But NON_OWN_REF is
trusted and typically inside the spinlock while
MEM_RCU is under rcu read lock. RCU is preferred here
since percpu data structures mean potential concurrent
access into its contents.

Also, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl() is restricted such that
no pointers or special fields are allowed. Therefore,
the bpf_list_head and bpf_rb_root will not be supported
in this patch set to avoid potential memory leak issue
due to racing between bpf_obj_free_fields() and another
bpf_kptr_xchg() moving an allocated object to
bpf_list_head and bpf_rb_root.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230827152744.1996739-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-09-08 08:42:17 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
5861d1e8db bpf: Allow bpf_spin_{lock,unlock} in sleepable progs
Commit 9e7a4d9831 ("bpf: Allow LSM programs to use bpf spin locks")
disabled bpf_spin_lock usage in sleepable progs, stating:

 Sleepable LSM programs can be preempted which means that allowng spin
 locks will need more work (disabling preemption and the verifier
 ensuring that no sleepable helpers are called when a spin lock is
 held).

This patch disables preemption before grabbing bpf_spin_lock. The second
requirement above "no sleepable helpers are called when a spin lock is
held" is implicitly enforced by current verifier logic due to helper
calls in spin_lock CS being disabled except for a few exceptions, none
of which sleep.

Due to above preemption changes, bpf_spin_lock CS can also be considered
a RCU CS, so verifier's in_rcu_cs check is modified to account for this.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821193311.3290257-7-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-08-25 09:23:17 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
7e26cd12ad bpf: Use bpf_mem_free_rcu when bpf_obj_dropping refcounted nodes
This is the final fix for the use-after-free scenario described in
commit 7793fc3bab ("bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for
non-owning refs"). That commit, by virtue of changing
bpf_refcount_acquire's refcount_inc to a refcount_inc_not_zero, fixed
the "refcount incr on 0" splat. The not_zero check in
refcount_inc_not_zero, though, still occurs on memory that could have
been free'd and reused, so the commit didn't properly fix the root
cause.

This patch actually fixes the issue by free'ing using the recently-added
bpf_mem_free_rcu, which ensures that the memory is not reused until
RCU grace period has elapsed. If that has happened then
there are no non-owning references alive that point to the
recently-free'd memory, so it can be safely reused.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821193311.3290257-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-08-25 09:23:16 -07:00
Kui-Feng Lee
5426700e68 bpf: fix bpf_dynptr_slice() to stop return an ERR_PTR.
Verify if the pointer obtained from bpf_xdp_pointer() is either an error or
NULL before returning it.

The function bpf_dynptr_slice() mistakenly returned an ERR_PTR. Instead of
solely checking for NULL, it should also verify if the pointer returned by
bpf_xdp_pointer() is an error or NULL.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/d1360219-85c3-4a03-9449-253ea905f9d1@moroto.mountain/
Fixes: 66e3a13e7c ("bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_slice and bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr")
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803231206.1060485-1-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
2023-08-04 14:53:15 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
6f5a630d7c bpf, net: Introduce skb_pointer_if_linear().
Network drivers always call skb_header_pointer() with non-null buffer.
Remove !buffer check to prevent accidental misuse of skb_header_pointer().
Introduce skb_pointer_if_linear() instead.

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718234021.43640-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-07-19 10:27:33 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
c3c510ce43 bpf: Add 'owner' field to bpf_{list,rb}_node
As described by Kumar in [0], in shared ownership scenarios it is
necessary to do runtime tracking of {rb,list} node ownership - and
synchronize updates using this ownership information - in order to
prevent races. This patch adds an 'owner' field to struct bpf_list_node
and bpf_rb_node to implement such runtime tracking.

The owner field is a void * that describes the ownership state of a
node. It can have the following values:

  NULL           - the node is not owned by any data structure
  BPF_PTR_POISON - the node is in the process of being added to a data
                   structure
  ptr_to_root    - the pointee is a data structure 'root'
                   (bpf_rb_root / bpf_list_head) which owns this node

The field is initially NULL (set by bpf_obj_init_field default behavior)
and transitions states in the following sequence:

  Insertion: NULL -> BPF_PTR_POISON -> ptr_to_root
  Removal:   ptr_to_root -> NULL

Before a node has been successfully inserted, it is not protected by any
root's lock, and therefore two programs can attempt to add the same node
to different roots simultaneously. For this reason the intermediate
BPF_PTR_POISON state is necessary. For removal, the node is protected
by some root's lock so this intermediate hop isn't necessary.

Note that bpf_list_pop_{front,back} helpers don't need to check owner
before removing as the node-to-be-removed is not passed in as input and
is instead taken directly from the list. Do the check anyways and
WARN_ON_ONCE in this unexpected scenario.

Selftest changes in this patch are entirely mechanical: some BTF
tests have hardcoded struct sizes for structs that contain
bpf_{list,rb}_node fields, those were adjusted to account for the new
sizes. Selftest additions to validate the owner field are added in a
further patch in the series.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/d7hyspcow5wtjcmw4fugdgyp3fwhljwuscp3xyut5qnwivyeru@ysdq543otzv2

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Suggested-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718083813.3416104-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-07-18 17:23:10 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
0a1f7bfe35 bpf: Introduce internal definitions for UAPI-opaque bpf_{rb,list}_node
Structs bpf_rb_node and bpf_list_node are opaquely defined in
uapi/linux/bpf.h, as BPF program writers are not expected to touch their
fields - nor does the verifier allow them to do so.

Currently these structs are simple wrappers around structs rb_node and
list_head and linked_list / rbtree implementation just casts and passes
to library functions for those data structures. Later patches in this
series, though, will add an "owner" field to bpf_{rb,list}_node, such
that they're not just wrapping an underlying node type. Moreover, the
bpf linked_list and rbtree implementations will deal with these owner
pointers directly in a few different places.

To avoid having to do

  void *owner = (void*)bpf_list_node + sizeof(struct list_head)

with opaque UAPI node types, add bpf_{list,rb}_node_kern struct
definitions to internal headers and modify linked_list and rbtree to use
the internal types where appropriate.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718083813.3416104-3-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-07-18 17:23:10 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
7793fc3bab bpf: Make bpf_refcount_acquire fallible for non-owning refs
This patch fixes an incorrect assumption made in the original
bpf_refcount series [0], specifically that the BPF program calling
bpf_refcount_acquire on some node can always guarantee that the node is
alive. In that series, the patch adding failure behavior to rbtree_add
and list_push_{front, back} breaks this assumption for non-owning
references.

Consider the following program:

  n = bpf_kptr_xchg(&mapval, NULL);
  /* skip error checking */

  bpf_spin_lock(&l);
  if(bpf_rbtree_add(&t, &n->rb, less)) {
    bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    /* Failed to add, do something else with the node */
  }
  bpf_spin_unlock(&l);

It's incorrect to assume that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed in this
scenario. bpf_refcount_acquire is being called in a critical section
here, but the lock being held is associated with rbtree t, which isn't
necessarily the lock associated with the tree that the node is already
in. So after bpf_rbtree_add fails to add the node and calls bpf_obj_drop
in it, the program has no ownership of the node's lifetime. Therefore
the node's refcount can be decr'd to 0 at any time after the failing
rbtree_add. If this happens before the refcount_acquire above, the node
might be free'd, and regardless refcount_acquire will be incrementing a
0 refcount.

Later patches in the series exercise this scenario, resulting in the
expected complaint from the kernel (without this patch's changes):

  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 207 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  CPU: 1 PID: 207 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G           O       6.3.0-rc7-02231-g723de1a718a2-dirty #371
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbc/0x110
  Code: 6f 64 f6 02 01 e8 84 a3 5c ff 0f 0b eb 9d 80 3d 5e 64 f6 02 00 75 94 48 c7 c7 e0 13 d2 82 c6 05 4e 64 f6 02 01 e8 64 a3 5c ff <0f> 0b e9 7a ff ff ff 80 3d 38 64 f6 02 00 0f 85 6d ff ff ff 48 c7
  RSP: 0018:ffff88810b9179b0 EFLAGS: 00010082
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000202 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff857c3680
  RBP: ffff88810027d3c0 R08: ffffffff8125f2a4 R09: ffff88810b9176e7
  R10: ffffed1021722edc R11: 746e756f63666572 R12: ffff88810027d388
  R13: ffff88810027d3c0 R14: ffffc900005fe030 R15: ffffc900005fe048
  FS:  00007fee0584a700(0000) GS:ffff88811b280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00005634a96f6c58 CR3: 0000000108ce9002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  PKRU: 55555554
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   bpf_refcount_acquire_impl+0xb5/0xc0

  (rest of output snipped)

The patch addresses this by changing bpf_refcount_acquire_impl to use
refcount_inc_not_zero instead of refcount_inc and marking
bpf_refcount_acquire KF_RET_NULL.

For owning references, though, we know the above scenario is not possible
and thus that bpf_refcount_acquire will always succeed. Some verifier
bookkeeping is added to track "is input owning ref?" for bpf_refcount_acquire
calls and return false from is_kfunc_ret_null for bpf_refcount_acquire on
owning refs despite it being marked KF_RET_NULL.

Existing selftests using bpf_refcount_acquire are modified where
necessary to NULL-check its return value.

  [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230415201811.343116-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com/

Fixes: d2dcc67df9 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Reported-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-06-05 13:17:20 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
cc0d76cafe bpf: Fix __bpf_{list,rbtree}_add's beginning-of-node calculation
Given the pointer to struct bpf_{rb,list}_node within a local kptr and
the byte offset of that field within the kptr struct, the calculation changed
by this patch is meant to find the beginning of the kptr so that it can
be passed to bpf_obj_drop.

Unfortunately instead of doing

  ptr_to_kptr = ptr_to_node_field - offset_bytes

the calculation is erroneously doing

  ptr_to_ktpr = ptr_to_node_field - (offset_bytes * sizeof(struct bpf_rb_node))

or the bpf_list_node equivalent.

This patch fixes the calculation.

Fixes: d2dcc67df9 ("bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail")
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230602022647.1571784-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-06-05 13:17:19 -07:00
Daniel Rosenberg
3bda08b636 bpf: Allow NULL buffers in bpf_dynptr_slice(_rw)
bpf_dynptr_slice(_rw) uses a user provided buffer if it can not provide
a pointer to a block of contiguous memory. This buffer is unused in the
case of local dynptrs, and may be unused in other cases as well. There
is no need to require the buffer, as the kfunc can just return NULL if
it was needed and not provided.

This adds another kfunc annotation, __opt, which combines with __sz and
__szk to allow the buffer associated with the size to be NULL. If the
buffer is NULL, the verifier does not check that the buffer is of
sufficient size.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230506013134.2492210-2-drosen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-05-06 16:42:57 -07:00
Feng Zhou
b5ad4cdc46 bpf: Add bpf_task_under_cgroup() kfunc
Add a kfunc that's similar to the bpf_current_task_under_cgroup.
The difference is that it is a designated task.

When hook sched related functions, sometimes it is necessary to
specify a task instead of the current task.

Signed-off-by: Feng Zhou <zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230506031545.35991-2-zhoufeng.zf@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-05-06 13:56:38 -07:00
Joanne Koong
361f129f3c bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_clone
The cloned dynptr will point to the same data as its parent dynptr,
with the same type, offset, size and read-only properties.

Any writes to a dynptr will be reflected across all instances
(by 'instance', this means any dynptrs that point to the same
underlying data).

Please note that data slice and dynptr invalidations will affect all
instances as well. For example, if bpf_dynptr_write() is called on an
skb-type dynptr, all data slices of dynptr instances to that skb
will be invalidated as well (eg data slices of any clones, parents,
grandparents, ...). Another example is if a ringbuf dynptr is submitted,
any instance of that dynptr will be invalidated.

Changing the view of the dynptr (eg advancing the offset or
trimming the size) will only affect that dynptr and not affect any
other instances.

One example use case where cloning may be helpful is for hashing or
iterating through dynptr data. Cloning will allow the user to maintain
the original view of the dynptr for future use, while also allowing
views to smaller subsets of the data after the offset is advanced or the
size is trimmed.

Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420071414.570108-5-joannelkoong@gmail.com
2023-04-27 10:40:47 +02:00
Joanne Koong
26662d7347 bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_size
bpf_dynptr_size returns the number of usable bytes in a dynptr.

Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420071414.570108-4-joannelkoong@gmail.com
2023-04-27 10:40:41 +02:00
Joanne Koong
540ccf96dd bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_is_null and bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly
bpf_dynptr_is_null returns true if the dynptr is null / invalid
(determined by whether ptr->data is NULL), else false if
the dynptr is a valid dynptr.

bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly returns true if the dynptr is read-only,
else false if the dynptr is read-writable. If the dynptr is
null / invalid, false is returned by default.

Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420071414.570108-3-joannelkoong@gmail.com
2023-04-27 10:40:36 +02:00
Joanne Koong
987d0242d1 bpf: Add bpf_dynptr_adjust
Add a new kfunc

int bpf_dynptr_adjust(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 start, u32 end);

which adjusts the dynptr to reflect the new [start, end) interval.
In particular, it advances the offset of the dynptr by "start" bytes,
and if end is less than the size of the dynptr, then this will trim the
dynptr accordingly.

Adjusting the dynptr interval may be useful in certain situations.
For example, when hashing which takes in generic dynptrs, if the dynptr
points to a struct but only a certain memory region inside the struct
should be hashed, adjust can be used to narrow in on the
specific region to hash.

Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230420071414.570108-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com
2023-04-27 10:40:31 +02:00
Dave Marchevsky
4ab07209d5 bpf: Fix bpf_refcount_acquire's refcount_t address calculation
When calculating the address of the refcount_t struct within a local
kptr, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl should add refcount_off bytes to the
address of the local kptr. Due to some missing parens, the function is
incorrectly adding sizeof(refcount_t) * refcount_off bytes. This patch
fixes the calculation.

Due to the incorrect calculation, bpf_refcount_acquire_impl was trying
to refcount_inc some memory well past the end of local kptrs, resulting
in kasan and refcount complaints, as reported in [0]. In that thread,
Florian and Eduard discovered that bpf selftests written in the new
style - with __success and an expected __retval, specifically - were
not actually being run. As a result, selftests added in bpf_refcount
series weren't really exercising this behavior, and thus didn't unearth
the bug.

With this fixed behavior it's safe to revert commit 7c4b96c000
("selftests/bpf: disable program test run for progs/refcounted_kptr.c"),
this patch does so.

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZEEp+j22imoN6rn9@strlen.de/

Fixes: 7c50b1cb76 ("bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc")
Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230421074431.3548349-1-davemarchevsky@fb.com
2023-04-21 16:31:37 +02:00
Dave Marchevsky
3e81740a90 bpf: Centralize btf_field-specific initialization logic
All btf_fields in an object are 0-initialized by memset in
bpf_obj_init. This might not be a valid initial state for some field
types, in which case kfuncs that use the type will properly initialize
their input if it's been 0-initialized. Some BPF graph collection types
and kfuncs do this: bpf_list_{head,node} and bpf_rb_node.

An earlier patch in this series added the bpf_refcount field, for which
the 0 state indicates that the refcounted object should be free'd.
bpf_obj_init treats this field specially, setting refcount to 1 instead
of relying on scattered "refcount is 0? Must have just been initialized,
let's set to 1" logic in kfuncs.

This patch extends this treatment to list and rbtree field types,
allowing most scattered initialization logic in kfuncs to be removed.

Note that bpf_{list_head,rb_root} may be inside a BPF map, in which case
they'll be 0-initialized without passing through the newly-added logic,
so scattered initialization logic must remain for these collection root
types.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-9-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
404ad75a36 bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_remove to possibly fail
This patch modifies bpf_rbtree_remove to account for possible failure
due to the input rb_node already not being in any collection.
The function can now return NULL, and does when the aforementioned
scenario occurs. As before, on successful removal an owning reference to
the removed node is returned.

Adding KF_RET_NULL to bpf_rbtree_remove's kfunc flags - now KF_RET_NULL |
KF_ACQUIRE - provides the desired verifier semantics:

  * retval must be checked for NULL before use
  * if NULL, retval's ref_obj_id is released
  * retval is a "maybe acquired" owning ref, not a non-owning ref,
    so it will live past end of critical section (bpf_spin_unlock), and
    thus can be checked for NULL after the end of the CS

BPF programs must add checks
============================

This does change bpf_rbtree_remove's verifier behavior. BPF program
writers will need to add NULL checks to their programs, but the
resulting UX looks natural:

  bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

  n = bpf_rbtree_first(&ghead);
  if (!n) { /* ... */}
  res = bpf_rbtree_remove(&ghead, &n->node);

  bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);

  if (!res)  /* Newly-added check after this patch */
    return 1;

  n = container_of(res, /* ... */);
  /* Do something else with n */
  bpf_obj_drop(n);
  return 0;

The "if (!res)" check above is the only addition necessary for the above
program to pass verification after this patch.

bpf_rbtree_remove no longer clobbers non-owning refs
====================================================

An issue arises when bpf_rbtree_remove fails, though. Consider this
example:

  struct node_data {
    long key;
    struct bpf_list_node l;
    struct bpf_rb_node r;
    struct bpf_refcount ref;
  };

  long failed_sum;

  void bpf_prog()
  {
    struct node_data *n = bpf_obj_new(/* ... */);
    struct bpf_rb_node *res;
    n->key = 10;

    bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

    bpf_list_push_back(&some_list, &n->l); /* n is now a non-owning ref */
    res = bpf_rbtree_remove(&some_tree, &n->r, /* ... */);
    if (!res)
      failed_sum += n->key;  /* not possible */

    bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
    /* if (res) { do something useful and drop } ... */
  }

The bpf_rbtree_remove in this example will always fail. Similarly to
bpf_spin_unlock, bpf_rbtree_remove is a non-owning reference
invalidation point. The verifier clobbers all non-owning refs after a
bpf_rbtree_remove call, so the "failed_sum += n->key" line will fail
verification, and in fact there's no good way to get information about
the node which failed to add after the invalidation. This patch removes
non-owning reference invalidation from bpf_rbtree_remove to allow the
above usecase to pass verification. The logic for why this is now
possible is as follows:

Before this series, bpf_rbtree_add couldn't fail and thus assumed that
its input, a non-owning reference, was in the tree. But it's easy to
construct an example where two non-owning references pointing to the same
underlying memory are acquired and passed to rbtree_remove one after
another (see rbtree_api_release_aliasing in
selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c).

So it was necessary to clobber non-owning refs to prevent this
case and, more generally, to enforce "non-owning ref is definitely
in some collection" invariant. This series removes that invariant and
the failure / runtime checking added in this patch provide a clean way
to deal with the aliasing issue - just fail to remove.

Because the aliasing issue prevented by clobbering non-owning refs is no
longer an issue, this patch removes the invalidate_non_owning_refs
call from verifier handling of bpf_rbtree_remove. Note that
bpf_spin_unlock - the other caller of invalidate_non_owning_refs -
clobbers non-owning refs for a different reason, so its clobbering
behavior remains unchanged.

No BPF program changes are necessary for programs to remain valid as a
result of this clobbering change. A valid program before this patch
passed verification with its non-owning refs having shorter (or equal)
lifetimes due to more aggressive clobbering.

Also, update existing tests to check bpf_rbtree_remove retval for NULL
where necessary, and move rbtree_api_release_aliasing from
progs/rbtree_fail.c to progs/rbtree.c since it's now expected to pass
verification.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-8-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
d2dcc67df9 bpf: Migrate bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} to possibly fail
Consider this code snippet:

  struct node {
    long key;
    bpf_list_node l;
    bpf_rb_node r;
    bpf_refcount ref;
  }

  int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx)
  {
    struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/*...*/), *m;

    bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->r, /* ... */);
    m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&other_tree, &m->r, /* ... */);

    bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);

    /* ... */
  }

After bpf_refcount_acquire, n and m point to the same underlying memory,
and that node's bpf_rb_node field is being used by the some_tree insert,
so overwriting it as a result of the second insert is an error. In order
to properly support refcounted nodes, the rbtree and list insert
functions must be allowed to fail. This patch adds such support.

The kfuncs bpf_rbtree_add, bpf_list_push_{front,back} are modified to
return an int indicating success/failure, with 0 -> success, nonzero ->
failure.

bpf_obj_drop on failure
=======================

Currently the only reason an insert can fail is the example above: the
bpf_{list,rb}_node is already in use. When such a failure occurs, the
insert kfuncs will bpf_obj_drop the input node. This allows the insert
operations to logically fail without changing their verifier owning ref
behavior, namely the unconditional release_reference of the input
owning ref.

With insert that always succeeds, ownership of the node is always passed
to the collection, since the node always ends up in the collection.

With a possibly-failed insert w/ bpf_obj_drop, ownership of the node
is always passed either to the collection (success), or to bpf_obj_drop
(failure). Regardless, it's correct to continue unconditionally
releasing the input owning ref, as something is always taking ownership
from the calling program on insert.

Keeping owning ref behavior unchanged results in a nice default UX for
insert functions that can fail. If the program's reaction to a failed
insert is "fine, just get rid of this owning ref for me and let me go
on with my business", then there's no reason to check for failure since
that's default behavior. e.g.:

  long important_failures = 0;

  int some_bpf_prog(void *ctx)
  {
    struct node *n, *m, *o; /* all bpf_obj_new'd */

    bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */);
    bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &m->node, /* ... */);
    if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &o->node, /* ... */)) {
      important_failures++;
    }
    bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
  }

If we instead chose to pass ownership back to the program on failed
insert - by returning NULL on success or an owning ref on failure -
programs would always have to do something with the returned ref on
failure. The most likely action is probably "I'll just get rid of this
owning ref and go about my business", which ideally would look like:

  if (n = bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */))
    bpf_obj_drop(n);

But bpf_obj_drop isn't allowed in a critical section and inserts must
occur within one, so in reality error handling would become a
hard-to-parse mess.

For refcounted nodes, we can replicate the "pass ownership back to
program on failure" logic with this patch's semantics, albeit in an ugly
way:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(/* ... */), *m;

  bpf_spin_lock(&glock);

  m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);
  if (bpf_rbtree_add(&some_tree, &n->node, /* ... */)) {
    /* Do something with m */
  }

  bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);
  bpf_obj_drop(m);

bpf_refcount_acquire is used to simulate "return owning ref on failure".
This should be an uncommon occurrence, though.

Addition of two verifier-fixup'd args to collection inserts
===========================================================

The actual bpf_obj_drop kfunc is
bpf_obj_drop_impl(void *, struct btf_struct_meta *), with bpf_obj_drop
macro populating the second arg with 0 and the verifier later filling in
the arg during insn fixup.

Because bpf_rbtree_add and bpf_list_push_{front,back} now might do
bpf_obj_drop, these kfuncs need a btf_struct_meta parameter that can be
passed to bpf_obj_drop_impl.

Similarly, because the 'node' param to those insert functions is the
bpf_{list,rb}_node within the node type, and bpf_obj_drop expects a
pointer to the beginning of the node, the insert functions need to be
able to find the beginning of the node struct. A second
verifier-populated param is necessary: the offset of {list,rb}_node within the
node type.

These two new params allow the insert kfuncs to correctly call
__bpf_obj_drop_impl:

  beginning_of_node = bpf_rb_node_ptr - offset
  if (already_inserted)
    __bpf_obj_drop_impl(beginning_of_node, btf_struct_meta->record);

Similarly to other kfuncs with "hidden" verifier-populated params, the
insert functions are renamed with _impl prefix and a macro is provided
for common usage. For example, bpf_rbtree_add kfunc is now
bpf_rbtree_add_impl and bpf_rbtree_add is now a macro which sets
"hidden" args to 0.

Due to the two new args BPF progs will need to be recompiled to work
with the new _impl kfuncs.

This patch also rewrites the "hidden argument" explanation to more
directly say why the BPF program writer doesn't need to populate the
arguments with anything meaningful.

How does this new logic affect non-owning references?
=====================================================

Currently, non-owning refs are valid until the end of the critical
section in which they're created. We can make this guarantee because, if
a non-owning ref exists, the referent was added to some collection. The
collection will drop() its nodes when it goes away, but it can't go away
while our program is accessing it, so that's not a problem. If the
referent is removed from the collection in the same CS that it was added
in, it can't be bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end. Those are the only
two ways to free the referent's memory and neither can happen until
after the non-owning ref's lifetime ends.

On first glance, having these collection insert functions potentially
bpf_obj_drop their input seems like it breaks the "can't be
bpf_obj_drop'd until after CS end" line of reasoning. But we care about
the memory not being _freed_ until end of CS end, and a previous patch
in the series modified bpf_obj_drop such that it doesn't free refcounted
nodes until refcount == 0. So the statement can be more accurately
rewritten as "can't be free'd until after CS end".

We can prove that this rewritten statement holds for any non-owning
reference produced by collection insert functions:

* If the input to the insert function is _not_ refcounted
  * We have an owning reference to the input, and can conclude it isn't
    in any collection
    * Inserting a node in a collection turns owning refs into
      non-owning, and since our input type isn't refcounted, there's no
      way to obtain additional owning refs to the same underlying
      memory
  * Because our node isn't in any collection, the insert operation
    cannot fail, so bpf_obj_drop will not execute
  * If bpf_obj_drop is guaranteed not to execute, there's no risk of
    memory being free'd

* Otherwise, the input to the insert function is refcounted
  * If the insert operation fails due to the node's list_head or rb_root
    already being in some collection, there was some previous successful
    insert which passed refcount to the collection
  * We have an owning reference to the input, it must have been
    acquired via bpf_refcount_acquire, which bumped the refcount
  * refcount must be >= 2 since there's a valid owning reference and the
    node is already in a collection
  * Insert triggering bpf_obj_drop will decr refcount to >= 1, never
    resulting in a free

So although we may do bpf_obj_drop during the critical section, this
will never result in memory being free'd, and no changes to non-owning
ref logic are needed in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-6-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
7c50b1cb76 bpf: Add bpf_refcount_acquire kfunc
Currently, BPF programs can interact with the lifetime of refcounted
local kptrs in the following ways:

  bpf_obj_new  - Initialize refcount to 1 as part of new object creation
  bpf_obj_drop - Decrement refcount and free object if it's 0
  collection add - Pass ownership to the collection. No change to
                   refcount but collection is responsible for
		   bpf_obj_dropping it

In order to be able to add a refcounted local kptr to multiple
collections we need to be able to increment the refcount and acquire a
new owning reference. This patch adds a kfunc, bpf_refcount_acquire,
implementing such an operation.

bpf_refcount_acquire takes a refcounted local kptr and returns a new
owning reference to the same underlying memory as the input. The input
can be either owning or non-owning. To reinforce why this is safe,
consider the following code snippets:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); // A
  struct node *m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n); // B

In the above snippet, n will be alive with refcount=1 after (A), and
since nothing changes that state before (B), it's obviously safe. If
n is instead added to some rbtree, we can still safely refcount_acquire
it:

  struct node *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n));
  struct node *m;

  bpf_spin_lock(&glock);
  bpf_rbtree_add(&groot, &n->node, less);   // A
  m = bpf_refcount_acquire(n);              // B
  bpf_spin_unlock(&glock);

In the above snippet, after (A) n is a non-owning reference, and after
(B) m is an owning reference pointing to the same memory as n. Although
n has no ownership of that memory's lifetime, it's guaranteed to be
alive until the end of the critical section, and n would be clobbered if
we were past the end of the critical section, so it's safe to bump
refcount.

Implementation details:

* From verifier's perspective, bpf_refcount_acquire handling is similar
  to bpf_obj_new and bpf_obj_drop. Like the former, it returns a new
  owning reference matching input type, although like the latter, type
  can be inferred from concrete kptr input. Verifier changes in
  {check,fixup}_kfunc_call and check_kfunc_args are largely copied from
  aforementioned functions' verifier changes.

* An exception to the above is the new KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR
  arg, indicated by new "__refcounted_kptr" kfunc arg suffix. This is
  necessary in order to handle both owning and non-owning input without
  adding special-casing to "__alloc" arg handling. Also a convenient
  place to confirm that input type has bpf_refcount field.

* The implemented kfunc is actually bpf_refcount_acquire_impl, with
  'hidden' second arg that the verifier sets to the type's struct_meta
  in fixup_kfunc_call.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-5-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:50 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
1512217c47 bpf: Support refcounted local kptrs in existing semantics
A local kptr is considered 'refcounted' when it is of a type that has a
bpf_refcount field. When such a kptr is created, its refcount should be
initialized to 1; when destroyed, the object should be free'd only if a
refcount decr results in 0 refcount.

Existing logic always frees the underlying memory when destroying a
local kptr, and 0-initializes all btf_record fields. This patch adds
checks for "is local kptr refcounted?" and new logic for that case in
the appropriate places.

This patch focuses on changing existing semantics and thus conspicuously
does _not_ provide a way for BPF programs in increment refcount. That
follows later in the series.

__bpf_obj_drop_impl is modified to do the right thing when it sees a
refcounted type. Container types for graph nodes (list, tree, stashed in
map) are migrated to use __bpf_obj_drop_impl as a destructor for their
nodes instead of each having custom destruction code in their _free
paths. Now that "drop" isn't a synonym for "free" when the type is
refcounted it makes sense to centralize this logic.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:49 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
cd2a807901 bpf: Remove btf_field_offs, use btf_record's fields instead
The btf_field_offs struct contains (offset, size) for btf_record fields,
sorted by offset. btf_field_offs is always used in conjunction with
btf_record, which has btf_field 'fields' array with (offset, type), the
latter of which btf_field_offs' size is derived from via
btf_field_type_size.

This patch adds a size field to struct btf_field and sorts btf_record's
fields by offset, making it possible to get rid of btf_field_offs. Less
data duplication and less code complexity results.

Since btf_field_offs' lifetime closely followed the btf_record used to
populate it, most complexity wins are from removal of initialization
code like:

  if (btf_record_successfully_initialized) {
    foffs = btf_parse_field_offs(rec);
    if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(foffs))
      // free the btf_record and return err
  }

Other changes in this patch are pretty mechanical:

  * foffs->field_off[i] -> rec->fields[i].offset
  * foffs->field_sz[i] -> rec->fields[i].size
  * Sort rec->fields in btf_parse_fields before returning
    * It's possible that this is necessary independently of other
      changes in this patch. btf_record_find in syscall.c expects
      btf_record's fields to be sorted by offset, yet there's no
      explicit sorting of them before this patch, record's fields are
      populated in the order they're read from BTF struct definition.
      BTF docs don't say anything about the sortedness of struct fields.
  * All functions taking struct btf_field_offs * input now instead take
    struct btf_record *. All callsites of these functions already have
    access to the correct btf_record.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415201811.343116-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-15 17:36:49 -07:00
David Vernet
6499fe6edc bpf: Remove bpf_cgroup_kptr_get() kfunc
Now that bpf_cgroup_acquire() is KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL,
bpf_cgroup_kptr_get() is redundant. Let's remove it, and update
selftests to instead use bpf_cgroup_acquire() where appropriate. The
next patch will update the BPF documentation to not mention
bpf_cgroup_kptr_get().

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230411041633.179404-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-12 12:57:54 -07:00
David Vernet
1d71283987 bpf: Make bpf_cgroup_acquire() KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL
struct cgroup is already an RCU-safe type in the verifier. We can
therefore update bpf_cgroup_acquire() to be KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL, and
subsequently remove bpf_cgroup_kptr_get(). This patch does the first of
these by updating bpf_cgroup_acquire() to be KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL, and
also updates selftests accordingly.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230411041633.179404-1-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-12 12:57:54 -07:00
Barret Rhoden
f3f2134977 bpf: ensure all memory is initialized in bpf_get_current_comm
BPF helpers that take an ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM must ensure that all of
the memory is set, including beyond the end of the string.

Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230407001808.1622968-1-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-06 18:48:24 -07:00
David Vernet
f85671c6ef bpf: Remove now-defunct task kfuncs
In commit 22df776a9a ("tasks: Extract rcu_users out of union"), the
'refcount_t rcu_users' field was extracted out of a union with the
'struct rcu_head rcu' field. This allows us to safely perform a
refcount_inc_not_zero() on task->rcu_users when acquiring a reference on
a task struct. A prior patch leveraged this by making struct task_struct
an RCU-protected object in the verifier, and by bpf_task_acquire() to
use the task->rcu_users field for synchronization.

Now that we can use RCU to protect tasks, we no longer need
bpf_task_kptr_get(), or bpf_task_acquire_not_zero(). bpf_task_kptr_get()
is truly completely unnecessary, as we can just use RCU to get the
object. bpf_task_acquire_not_zero() is now equivalent to
bpf_task_acquire().

In addition to these changes, this patch also updates the associated
selftests to no longer use these kfuncs.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230331195733.699708-3-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-01 09:07:20 -07:00
David Vernet
d02c48fa11 bpf: Make struct task_struct an RCU-safe type
struct task_struct objects are a bit interesting in terms of how their
lifetime is protected by refcounts. task structs have two refcount
fields:

1. refcount_t usage: Protects the memory backing the task struct. When
   this refcount drops to 0, the task is immediately freed, without
   waiting for an RCU grace period to elapse. This is the field that
   most callers in the kernel currently use to ensure that a task
   remains valid while it's being referenced, and is what's currently
   tracked with bpf_task_acquire() and bpf_task_release().

2. refcount_t rcu_users: A refcount field which, when it drops to 0,
   schedules an RCU callback that drops a reference held on the 'usage'
   field above (which is acquired when the task is first created). This
   field therefore provides a form of RCU protection on the task by
   ensuring that at least one 'usage' refcount will be held until an RCU
   grace period has elapsed. The qualifier "a form of" is important
   here, as a task can remain valid after task->rcu_users has dropped to
   0 and the subsequent RCU gp has elapsed.

In terms of BPF, we want to use task->rcu_users to protect tasks that
function as referenced kptrs, and to allow tasks stored as referenced
kptrs in maps to be accessed with RCU protection.

Let's first determine whether we can safely use task->rcu_users to
protect tasks stored in maps. All of the bpf_task* kfuncs can only be
called from tracepoint, struct_ops, or BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, program
types. For tracepoint and struct_ops programs, the struct task_struct
passed to a program handler will always be trusted, so it will always be
safe to call bpf_task_acquire() with any task passed to a program.
Note, however, that we must update bpf_task_acquire() to be KF_RET_NULL,
as it is possible that the task has exited by the time the program is
invoked, even if the pointer is still currently valid because the main
kernel holds a task->usage refcount. For BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, tasks
should never be passed as an argument to the any program handlers, so it
should not be relevant.

The second question is whether it's safe to use RCU to access a task
that was acquired with bpf_task_acquire(), and stored in a map. Because
bpf_task_acquire() now uses task->rcu_users, it follows that if the task
is present in the map, that it must have had at least one
task->rcu_users refcount by the time the current RCU cs was started.
Therefore, it's safe to access that task until the end of the current
RCU cs.

With all that said, this patch makes struct task_struct is an
RCU-protected object. In doing so, we also change bpf_task_acquire() to
be KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL, and adjust any selftests as
necessary. A subsequent patch will remove bpf_task_kptr_get(), and
bpf_task_acquire_not_zero() respectively.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230331195733.699708-2-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-04-01 09:07:20 -07:00
David Vernet
fb2211a57c bpf: Remove now-unnecessary NULL checks for KF_RELEASE kfuncs
Now that we're not invoking kfunc destructors when the kptr in a map was
NULL, we no longer require NULL checks in many of our KF_RELEASE kfuncs.
This patch removes those NULL checks.

Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325213144.486885-3-void@manifault.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-03-25 16:56:22 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
c9267aa8b7 bpf: Fix bpf_strncmp proto.
bpf_strncmp() doesn't write into its first argument.
Make sure that the verifier knows about it.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230313235845.61029-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
2023-03-13 23:08:21 -07:00
Dave Marchevsky
c8e1875409 bpf: Support __kptr to local kptrs
If a PTR_TO_BTF_ID type comes from program BTF - not vmlinux or module
BTF - it must have been allocated by bpf_obj_new and therefore must be
free'd with bpf_obj_drop. Such a PTR_TO_BTF_ID is considered a "local
kptr" and is tagged with MEM_ALLOC type tag by bpf_obj_new.

This patch adds support for treating __kptr-tagged pointers to "local
kptrs" as having an implicit bpf_obj_drop destructor for referenced kptr
acquire / release semantics. Consider the following example:

  struct node_data {
          long key;
          long data;
          struct bpf_rb_node node;
  };

  struct map_value {
          struct node_data __kptr *node;
  };

  struct {
          __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
          __type(key, int);
          __type(value, struct map_value);
          __uint(max_entries, 1);
  } some_nodes SEC(".maps");

If struct node_data had a matching definition in kernel BTF, the verifier would
expect a destructor for the type to be registered. Since struct node_data does
not match any type in kernel BTF, the verifier knows that there is no kfunc
that provides a PTR_TO_BTF_ID to this type, and that such a PTR_TO_BTF_ID can
only come from bpf_obj_new. So instead of searching for a registered dtor,
a bpf_obj_drop dtor can be assumed.

This allows the runtime to properly destruct such kptrs in
bpf_obj_free_fields, which enables maps to clean up map_vals w/ such
kptrs when going away.

Implementation notes:
  * "kernel_btf" variable is renamed to "kptr_btf" in btf_parse_kptr.
    Before this patch, the variable would only ever point to vmlinux or
    module BTFs, but now it can point to some program BTF for local kptr
    type. It's later used to populate the (btf, btf_id) pair in kptr btf
    field.
  * It's necessary to btf_get the program BTF when populating btf_field
    for local kptr. btf_record_free later does a btf_put.
  * Behavior for non-local referenced kptrs is not modified, as
    bpf_find_btf_id helper only searches vmlinux and module BTFs for
    matching BTF type. If such a type is found, btf_field_kptr's btf will
    pass btf_is_kernel check, and the associated release function is
    some one-argument dtor. If btf_is_kernel check fails, associated
    release function is two-arg bpf_obj_drop_impl. Before this patch
    only btf_field_kptr's w/ kernel or module BTFs were created.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230310230743.2320707-2-davemarchevsky@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2023-03-10 16:38:05 -08:00