commit 982bae43f1 upstream.
Mark kvm_mmu_x86_module_init() with __init, the entire reason it exists
is to initialize variables when kvm.ko is loaded, i.e. it must never be
called after module initialization.
Fixes: 1d0e848060 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Resolve nx_huge_pages when kvm.ko is loaded")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220803224957.1285926-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 156b9d76e8 upstream.
Windows 10/11 guests with Hyper-V role (WSL2) enabled are observed to
hang upon boot or shortly after when a non-default TSC frequency was
set for L1. The issue is observed on a host where TSC scaling is
supported. The problem appears to be that Windows doesn't use TSC
scaling for its guests, even when the feature is advertised, and KVM
filters SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING out when creating L2 controls from
L1's VMCS. This leads to L2 running with the default frequency (matching
host's) while L1 is running with an altered one.
Keep SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING in secondary exec controls for L2 when
it was set for L1. TSC_MULTIPLIER is already correctly computed and
written by prepare_vmcs02().
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Fixes: d041b5ea93 ("KVM: nVMX: Enable nested TSC scaling")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712135009.952805-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2626206963 upstream.
When injecting a #GP on LLDT/LTR due to a non-canonical LDT/TSS base, set
the error code to the selector. Intel SDM's says nothing about the #GP,
but AMD's APM explicitly states that both LLDT and LTR set the error code
to the selector, not zero.
Note, a non-canonical memory operand on LLDT/LTR does generate a #GP(0),
but the KVM code in question is specific to the base from the descriptor.
Fixes: e37a75a13c ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ec6e4d8632 upstream.
Wait to mark the TSS as busy during LTR emulation until after all fault
checks for the LTR have passed. Specifically, don't mark the TSS busy if
the new TSS base is non-canonical.
Opportunistically drop the one-off !seg_desc.PRESENT check for TR as the
only reason for the early check was to avoid marking a !PRESENT TSS as
busy, i.e. the common !PRESENT is now done before setting the busy bit.
Fixes: e37a75a13c ("KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR")
Reported-by: syzbot+760a73552f47a8cd0fd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711232750.1092012-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c7d855c2af upstream.
Inject a #UD if L1 attempts VMXON with a CR0 or CR4 that is disallowed
per the associated nested VMX MSRs' fixed0/1 settings. KVM cannot rely
on hardware to perform the checks, even for the few checks that have
higher priority than VM-Exit, as (a) KVM may have forced CR0/CR4 bits in
hardware while running the guest, (b) there may incompatible CR0/CR4 bits
that have lower priority than VM-Exit, e.g. CR0.NE, and (c) userspace may
have further restricted the allowed CR0/CR4 values by manipulating the
guest's nested VMX MSRs.
Note, despite a very strong desire to throw shade at Jim, commit
70f3aac964 ("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
is not to blame for the buggy behavior (though the comment...). That
commit only removed the CR0.PE, EFLAGS.VM, and COMPATIBILITY mode checks
(though it did erroneously drop the CPL check, but that has already been
remedied). KVM may force CR0.PE=1, but will do so only when also
forcing EFLAGS.VM=1 to emulate Real Mode, i.e. hardware will still #UD.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216033
Fixes: ec378aeef9 ("KVM: nVMX: Implement VMXON and VMXOFF")
Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli@ucdavis.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ca58f3aa53 upstream.
Check that the guest (L2) and host (L1) CR4 values that would be loaded
by nested VM-Enter and VM-Exit respectively are valid with respect to
KVM's (L0 host) allowed CR4 bits. Failure to check KVM reserved bits
would allow L1 to load an illegal CR4 (or trigger hardware VM-Fail or
failed VM-Entry) by massaging guest CPUID to allow features that are not
supported by KVM. Amusingly, KVM itself is an accomplice in its doom, as
KVM adjusts L1's MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 to allow L1 to enable bits for
L2 based on L1's CPUID model.
Note, although nested_{guest,host}_cr4_valid() are _currently_ used if
and only if the vCPU is post-VMXON (nested.vmxon == true), that may not
be true in the future, e.g. emulating VMXON has a bug where it doesn't
check the allowed/required CR0/CR4 bits.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3899152ccb ("KVM: nVMX: fix checks on CR{0,4} during virtual VMX operation")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8ae08f978 upstream.
Restrict the nVMX MSRs based on KVM's config, not based on the guest's
current config. Using the guest's config to audit the new config
prevents userspace from restoring the original config (KVM's config) if
at any point in the past the guest's config was restricted in any way.
Fixes: 62cc6b9dc6 ("KVM: nVMX: support restore of VMX capability MSRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c33f6f2228 upstream.
Split the common x86 parts of kvm_is_valid_cr4(), i.e. the reserved bits
checks, into a separate helper, __kvm_is_valid_cr4(), and export only the
inner helper to vendor code in order to prevent nested VMX from calling
back into vmx_is_valid_cr4() via kvm_is_valid_cr4().
On SVM, this is a nop as SVM doesn't place any additional restrictions on
CR4.
On VMX, this is also currently a nop, but only because nested VMX is
missing checks on reserved CR4 bits for nested VM-Enter. That bug will
be fixed in a future patch, and could simply use kvm_is_valid_cr4() as-is,
but nVMX has _another_ bug where VMXON emulation doesn't enforce VMX's
restrictions on CR0/CR4. The cleanest and most intuitive way to fix the
VMXON bug is to use nested_host_cr{0,4}_valid(). If the CR4 variant
routes through kvm_is_valid_cr4(), using nested_host_cr4_valid() won't do
the right thing for the VMXON case as vmx_is_valid_cr4() enforces VMX's
restrictions if and only if the vCPU is post-VMXON.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220607213604.3346000-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3ba2c95ea1 upstream.
Don't adjust the userspace address in the gfn=>pfn cache by the page
offset from the gpa. KVM should never use the user address directly, and
all KVM operations that translate a user address to something else
require the user address to be page aligned. Ignoring the offset will
allow the cache to reuse a gfn=>hva translation in the unlikely event
that the page offset of the gpa changes, but the gfn does not. And more
importantly, not having to (un)adjust the user address will simplify a
future bug fix.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429210025.3293691-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58cd407ca4 upstream.
Rework the gfn=>pfn cache (gpc) refresh logic to address multiple races
between the cache itself, and between the cache and mmu_notifier events.
The existing refresh code attempts to guard against races with the
mmu_notifier by speculatively marking the cache valid, and then marking
it invalid if a mmu_notifier invalidation occurs. That handles the case
where an invalidation occurs between dropping and re-acquiring gpc->lock,
but it doesn't handle the scenario where the cache is refreshed after the
cache was invalidated by the notifier, but before the notifier elevates
mmu_notifier_count. The gpc refresh can't use the "retry" helper as its
invalidation occurs _before_ mmu_notifier_count is elevated and before
mmu_notifier_range_start is set/updated.
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start()
|
-> gpc->valid = false;
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh()
|
|-> gpc->valid = true;
hva_to_pfn_retry()
|
-> acquire kvm->mmu_lock
kvm->mmu_notifier_count == 0
mmu_seq == kvm->mmu_notifier_seq
drop kvm->mmu_lock
return pfn 'X'
acquire kvm->mmu_lock
kvm_inc_notifier_count()
drop kvm->mmu_lock()
kernel frees pfn 'X'
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_check()
|
|-> gpc->valid == true
caller accesses freed pfn 'X'
Key off of mn_active_invalidate_count to detect that a pfncache refresh
needs to wait for an in-progress mmu_notifier invalidation. While
mn_active_invalidate_count is not guaranteed to be stable, it is
guaranteed to be elevated prior to an invalidation acquiring gpc->lock,
so either the refresh will see an active invalidation and wait, or the
invalidation will run after the refresh completes.
Speculatively marking the cache valid is itself flawed, as a concurrent
kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_check() would see a valid cache with stale pfn/khva
values. The KVM Xen use case explicitly allows/wants multiple users;
even though the caches are allocated per vCPU, __kvm_xen_has_interrupt()
can read a different vCPU (or vCPUs). Address this race by invalidating
the cache prior to dropping gpc->lock (this is made possible by fixing
the above mmu_notifier race).
Complicating all of this is the fact that both the hva=>pfn resolution
and mapping of the kernel address can sleep, i.e. must be done outside
of gpc->lock.
Fix the above races in one fell swoop, trying to fix each individual race
is largely pointless and essentially impossible to test, e.g. closing one
hole just shifts the focus to the other hole.
Fixes: 982ed0de47 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429210025.3293691-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93984f19e7 upstream.
Protect gfn=>pfn cache refresh with a mutex to fully serialize refreshes.
The refresh logic doesn't protect against
- concurrent unmaps, or refreshes with different GPAs (which may or may not
happen in practice, for example if a cache is only used under vcpu->mutex;
but it's allowed in the code)
- a false negative on the memslot generation. If the first refresh sees
a stale memslot generation, it will refresh the hva and generation before
moving on to the hva=>pfn translation. If it then drops gpc->lock, a
different user of the cache can come along, acquire gpc->lock, see that
the memslot generation is fresh, and skip the hva=>pfn update due to the
userspace address also matching (because it too was updated).
The refresh path can already sleep during hva=>pfn resolution, so wrap
the refresh with a mutex to ensure that any given refresh runs to
completion before other callers can start their refresh.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429210025.3293691-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3dddf65b4f upstream.
Put the struct page reference to pfn acquired by hva_to_pfn() when the
old and new pfns for a gfn=>pfn cache match. The cache already has a
reference via the old/current pfn, and will only put one reference when
the cache is done with the pfn.
Fixes: 982ed0de47 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429210025.3293691-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 345b0fd6fe upstream.
Drop the @pga param from __release_gpc() and rename the helper to make it
more obvious that the cache itself is not being released. The helper
will be reused by a future commit to release a pfn+khva combination that
is _never_ associated with the cache, at which point the current name
would go from slightly misleading to blatantly wrong.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220429210025.3293691-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c3f0e5fd2d upstream.
When the SIGP interpretation facility is present and a VCPU sends an
ecall to another VCPU in enabled wait, the sending VCPU receives a 56
intercept (partial execution), so KVM can wake up the receiving CPU.
Note that the SIGP interpretation facility will take care of the
interrupt delivery and KVM's only job is to wake the receiving VCPU.
For PV, the sending VCPU will receive a 108 intercept (pv notify) and
should continue like in the non-PV case, i.e. wake the receiving VCPU.
For PV and non-PV guests the interrupt delivery will occur through the
SIGP interpretation facility on SIE entry when SIE finds the X bit in
the status field set.
However, in handle_pv_notification(), there was no special handling for
SIGP, which leads to interrupt injection being requested by KVM for the
next SIE entry. This results in the interrupt being delivered twice:
once by the SIGP interpretation facility and once by KVM through the
IICTL.
Add the necessary special handling in handle_pv_notification(), similar
to handle_partial_execution(), which simply wakes the receiving VCPU and
leave interrupt delivery to the SIGP interpretation facility.
In contrast to external calls, emergency calls are not interpreted but
also cause a 108 intercept, which is why we still need to call
handle_instruction() for SIGP orders other than ecall.
Since kvm_s390_handle_sigp_pei() is now called for all SIGP orders which
cause a 108 intercept - even if they are actually handled by
handle_instruction() - move the tracepoint in kvm_s390_handle_sigp_pei()
to avoid possibly confusing trace messages.
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.7
Fixes: da24a0cc58 ("KVM: s390: protvirt: Instruction emulation")
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220718130434.73302-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Message-Id: <20220718130434.73302-1-nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 764643a6be upstream.
If a nested run isn't pending, snapshot vmcs01.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL
irrespective of whether or not VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in
vmcs12. When restoring nested state, e.g. after migration, without a
nested run pending, prepare_vmcs02() will propagate
nested.vmcs01_debugctl to vmcs02, i.e. will load garbage/zeros into
vmcs02.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.
If userspace restores nested state before MSRs, then loading garbage is a
non-issue as loading DEBUGCTL will also update vmcs02. But if usersepace
restores MSRs first, then KVM is responsible for propagating L2's value,
which is actually thrown into vmcs01, into vmcs02.
Restoring L2 MSRs into vmcs01, i.e. loading all MSRs before nested state
is all kinds of bizarre and ideally would not be supported. Sadly, some
VMMs do exactly that and rely on KVM to make things work.
Note, there's still a lurking SMM bug, as propagating vmcs01's DEBUGCTL
to vmcs02 across RSM may corrupt L2's DEBUGCTL. But KVM's entire VMX+SMM
emulation is flawed as SMI+RSM should not toouch _any_ VMCS when use the
"default treatment of SMIs", i.e. when not using an SMI Transfer Monitor.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yobt1XwOfb5M6Dfa@google.com
Fixes: 8fcc4b5923 ("kvm: nVMX: Introduce KVM_CAP_NESTED_STATE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220614215831.3762138-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fa578398a0 upstream.
If a nested run isn't pending, snapshot vmcs01.GUEST_BNDCFGS irrespective
of whether or not VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS is set in vmcs12. When restoring
nested state, e.g. after migration, without a nested run pending,
prepare_vmcs02() will propagate nested.vmcs01_guest_bndcfgs to vmcs02,
i.e. will load garbage/zeros into vmcs02.GUEST_BNDCFGS.
If userspace restores nested state before MSRs, then loading garbage is a
non-issue as loading BNDCFGS will also update vmcs02. But if usersepace
restores MSRs first, then KVM is responsible for propagating L2's value,
which is actually thrown into vmcs01, into vmcs02.
Restoring L2 MSRs into vmcs01, i.e. loading all MSRs before nested state
is all kinds of bizarre and ideally would not be supported. Sadly, some
VMMs do exactly that and rely on KVM to make things work.
Note, there's still a lurking SMM bug, as propagating vmcs01.GUEST_BNDFGS
to vmcs02 across RSM may corrupt L2's BNDCFGS. But KVM's entire VMX+SMM
emulation is flawed as SMI+RSM should not toouch _any_ VMCS when use the
"default treatment of SMIs", i.e. when not using an SMI Transfer Monitor.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yobt1XwOfb5M6Dfa@google.com
Fixes: 62cf9bd811 ("KVM: nVMX: Fix emulation of VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lei Wang <lei4.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220614215831.3762138-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d6b675687a upstream.
Touch switch state is received through WACOM_PAD_FIELD. However, it
is reported by touch_input. Don't register pad_input if no other pad
events require the interface.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ping Cheng <ping.cheng@wacom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7ccced33a0 upstream.
The generic routine, wacom_wac_pen_event, turns rotation value 90
degree anti-clockwise before posting the events. This non-zero
event trggers a non-zero ABS_Z event for non art pen tools. However,
HID_DG_TWIST is only supported by art pen.
[jkosina@suse.cz: fix build: add missing brace]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ping Cheng <ping.cheng@wacom.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ab5f3404b7 upstream.
joycon_dpad_inputs_jc[] is unterminated. This may result in odd warnings
such as
input: input_set_capability: invalid code 3077588140 for type 1
or in kernel crashes in nintendo_hid_probe(). Terminate the array to fix
the problem.
Fixes: 2af16c1f84 ("HID: nintendo: add nintendo switch controller driver")
Cc: Daniel J. Ogorchock <djogorchock@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit db925d8090 upstream.
Similar to the Surface Go (1), the (Elantech) touchscreen/digitizer in
the Surface Go 2 mistakenly reports the battery of the stylus. Instead
of over the touchscreen device, battery information is provided via
bluetooth and the touchscreen device reports an empty battery.
Apply the HID_BATTERY_QUIRK_IGNORE quirk to ignore this battery and
prevent the erroneous low battery warnings.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz <luzmaximilian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6930bcbfb6 upstream.
lockd doesn't currently vet the start and length in nlm4 requests like
it should, and can end up generating lock requests with arguments that
overflow when passed to the filesystem.
The NLM4 protocol uses unsigned 64-bit arguments for both start and
length, whereas struct file_lock tracks the start and end as loff_t
values. By the time we get around to calling nlm4svc_retrieve_args,
we've lost the information that would allow us to determine if there was
an overflow.
Start tracking the actual start and len for NLM4 requests in the
nlm_lock. In nlm4svc_retrieve_args, vet these values to ensure they
won't cause an overflow, and return NLM4_FBIG if they do.
Link: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=392
Reported-by: Jan Kasiak <j.kasiak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4252071b9 upstream.
Let's have a look at this piece of code in __bread_slow:
get_bh(bh);
bh->b_end_io = end_buffer_read_sync;
submit_bh(REQ_OP_READ, 0, bh);
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (buffer_uptodate(bh))
return bh;
Neither wait_on_buffer nor buffer_uptodate contain any memory barrier.
Consequently, if someone calls sb_bread and then reads the buffer data,
the read of buffer data may be executed before wait_on_buffer(bh) on
architectures with weak memory ordering and it may return invalid data.
Fix this bug by adding a memory barrier to set_buffer_uptodate and an
acquire barrier to buffer_uptodate (in a similar way as
folio_test_uptodate and folio_mark_uptodate).
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cc5250cdb4 upstream.
We won't really have enough skbs to need a 64-bit cookie,
and on 32-bit platforms storing the 64-bit cookie into the
void *rate_driver_data doesn't work anyway. Switch back to
using just a 32-bit cookie and uintptr_t for the type to
avoid compiler warnings about all this.
Fixes: 4ee186fa7e ("wifi: mac80211_hwsim: fix race condition in pending packet")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Jeongik Cha <jeongik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 58b6259d82 upstream.
The robots report that we're now casting to a differently
sized integer, which is correct, and the previous patch
had erroneously removed it.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 4ee186fa7e ("wifi: mac80211_hwsim: fix race condition in pending packet")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Cc: Jeongik Cha <jeongik@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ee186fa7e upstream.
A pending packet uses a cookie as an unique key, but it can be duplicated
because it didn't use atomic operators.
And also, a pending packet can be null in hwsim_tx_info_frame_received_nl
due to race condition with mac80211_hwsim_stop.
For this,
* Use an atomic type and operator for a cookie
* Add a lock around the loop for pending packets
Signed-off-by: Jeongik Cha <jeongik@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220704084354.3556326-1-jeongik@google.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3790a3d6db upstream.
The Lenovo Yoga 9 14IAP7 is set up similarly to the Thinkpad X1 7th and
8th Gen. It also has the speakers attached to NID 0x14 and the bass
speakers to NID 0x17, but here the codec misreports the NID 0x17 as
unconnected.
The pincfg and hda verbs connect and activate the bass speaker
amplifiers, but the generic driver will connect them to NID 0x06 which
has no volume control. Set connection list/preferred connections is
required to gain volume control.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=208555
Signed-off-by: Philipp Jungkamp <p.jungkamp@gmx.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220729162103.6062-1-p.jungkamp@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ffb2759df7 upstream.
When the driver fails in snd_card_register() at probe time, it will free
the 'bcd2k->midi_out_urb' before killing it, which may cause a UAF bug.
The following log can reveal it:
[ 50.727020] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bcd2000_input_complete+0x1f1/0x2e0 [snd_bcd2000]
[ 50.727623] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810fab0e88 by task swapper/4/0
[ 50.729530] Call Trace:
[ 50.732899] bcd2000_input_complete+0x1f1/0x2e0 [snd_bcd2000]
Fix this by adding usb_kill_urb() before usb_free_urb().
Fixes: b47a22290d ("ALSA: MIDI driver for Behringer BCD2000 USB device")
Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715010515.2087925-1-zheyuma97@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 23ba98de6d upstream.
We had a report from the spring Bake-a-thon of data corruption in some
nfstest_interop tests. Looking at the traces showed the NFS server
allowing a v3 WRITE to proceed while a read delegation was still
outstanding.
Currently, we only set NFSD_FILE_BREAK_* flags if
NFSD_MAY_NOT_BREAK_LEASE was set when we call nfsd_file_alloc.
NFSD_MAY_NOT_BREAK_LEASE was intended to be set when finding files for
COMMIT ops, where we need a writeable filehandle but don't need to
break read leases.
It doesn't make any sense to consult that flag when allocating a file
since the file may be used on subsequent calls where we do want to break
the lease (and the usage of it here seems to be reverse from what it
should be anyway).
Also, after calling nfsd_open_break_lease, we don't want to clear the
BREAK_* bits. A lease could end up being set on it later (more than
once) and we need to be able to break those leases as well.
This means that the NFSD_FILE_BREAK_* flags now just mirror
NFSD_MAY_{READ,WRITE} flags, so there's no need for them at all. Just
drop those flags and unconditionally call nfsd_open_break_lease every
time.
Reported-by: Olga Kornieskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2107360
Fixes: 65294c1f2c (nfsd: add a new struct file caching facility to nfsd)
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x : bb283ca18d NFSD: Clean up the show_nf_flags() macro
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4.x
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb283ca18d upstream.
The flags are defined using C macros, so TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM is
unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7836d75467 upstream.
The RPC/RDMA driver will return -EPROTO and -ENODEV as connection errors
under certain circumstances. Make sure that we handle them and report
them to the server. If not, we can end up cycling forever in a
LAYOUTGET/LAYOUTRETURN loop.
Fixes: a12f996d34 ("NFSv4/pNFS: Use connections to a DS that are all of the same protocol family")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11.x
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9597152d98 upstream.
This reverts commit c6eb58435b.
If a transport is down, then we want to fail over to other transports if
they are listed in the GETDEVICEINFO reply.
Fixes: c6eb58435b ("pNFS: nfs3_set_ds_client should set NFS_CS_NOPING")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11.x
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ffcf9c5700 upstream.
Users of GNU ld (BFD) from binutils 2.39+ will observe multiple
instances of a new warning when linking kernels in the form:
ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/pmjump.o: missing .note.GNU-stack section implies executable stack
ld: NOTE: This behaviour is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of the linker
ld: warning: arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions
Generally, we would like to avoid the stack being executable. Because
there could be a need for the stack to be executable, assembler sources
have to opt-in to this security feature via explicit creation of the
.note.GNU-stack feature (which compilers create by default) or command
line flag --noexecstack. Or we can simply tell the linker the
production of such sections is irrelevant and to link the stack as
--noexecstack.
LLVM's LLD linker defaults to -z noexecstack, so this flag isn't
strictly necessary when linking with LLD, only BFD, but it doesn't hurt
to be explicit here for all linkers IMO. --no-warn-rwx-segments is
currently BFD specific and only available in the current latest release,
so it's wrapped in an ld-option check.
While the kernel makes extensive usage of ELF sections, it doesn't use
permissions from ELF segments.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/3af4127a-f453-4cf7-f133-a181cce06f73@kernel.dk/
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/57009
Reported-and-tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0d362be5b1 upstream.
Users of GNU ld (BFD) from binutils 2.39+ will observe multiple
instances of a new warning when linking kernels in the form:
ld: warning: vmlinux: missing .note.GNU-stack section implies executable stack
ld: NOTE: This behaviour is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of the linker
ld: warning: vmlinux has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions
Generally, we would like to avoid the stack being executable. Because
there could be a need for the stack to be executable, assembler sources
have to opt-in to this security feature via explicit creation of the
.note.GNU-stack feature (which compilers create by default) or command
line flag --noexecstack. Or we can simply tell the linker the
production of such sections is irrelevant and to link the stack as
--noexecstack.
LLVM's LLD linker defaults to -z noexecstack, so this flag isn't
strictly necessary when linking with LLD, only BFD, but it doesn't hurt
to be explicit here for all linkers IMO. --no-warn-rwx-segments is
currently BFD specific and only available in the current latest release,
so it's wrapped in an ld-option check.
While the kernel makes extensive usage of ELF sections, it doesn't use
permissions from ELF segments.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/3af4127a-f453-4cf7-f133-a181cce06f73@kernel.dk/
Link: https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=ba951afb99912da01a6e8434126b8fac7aa75107
Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/57009
Reported-and-tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Suggested-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ba6e31af2b upstream.
RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of
conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively
execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't
completed yet.
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here.
Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro
can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based
attacks.
Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent
speculation while RSB is being filled.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b12993220 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fd97e4ad6d upstream.
In do_adb_query() function of drivers/macintosh/adb.c, req->data is copied
form userland. The parameter "req->data[2]" is missing check, the array
size of adb_handler[] is 16, so adb_handler[req->data[2]].original_address and
adb_handler[req->data[2]].handler_id will lead to oob read.
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ning Qiang <sohu0106@126.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713153734.2248-1-sohu0106@126.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 88b65887aa upstream.
The BCM4349B1, aka CYW/BCM89359, is a WiFi+BT chip and its Bluetooth
portion can be controlled over serial.
Extend the binding with its DT compatible.
Acked-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sean Christopherson