Since commit 73f03c2b4b ("fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's
namespace or a descendant"), access to allow_other FUSE filesystems has
been limited to users in the mounting user namespace or descendants. This
prevents a process that is privileged in its userns - but not its parent
namespaces - from mounting a FUSE fs w/ allow_other that is accessible to
processes in parent namespaces.
While this restriction makes sense overall it breaks a legitimate usecase:
I have a tracing daemon which needs to peek into process' open files in
order to symbolicate - similar to 'perf'. The daemon is a privileged
process in the root userns, but is unable to peek into FUSE filesystems
mounted by processes in child namespaces.
This patch adds a module param, allow_sys_admin_access, to act as an escape
hatch for this descendant userns logic and for the allow_other mount option
in general. Setting allow_sys_admin_access allows processes with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial userns to access FUSE filesystems irrespective
of the mounting userns or whether allow_other was set. A sysadmin setting
this param must trust FUSEs on the host to not DoS processes as described
in 73f03c2b4b.
Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
As stated in https://sourceforge.net/projects/fuse/, "the FUSE project has
moved to https://github.com/libfuse/" in 22-Dec-2015. Update URLs to
reflect this.
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Converts fuse.txt to reStructuredText format, improving the presentation
without changing much of the underlying content.
Signed-off-by: Daniel W. S. Almeida <dwlsalmeida@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-02-06 16:39:28 +01:00
Renamed from Documentation/filesystems/fuse.txt (Browse further)
