We're about to amend ACPI bus scan with DMI checks whether we're running
on a Mac to support Apple device properties in AML. The DMI checks are
performed for every single device, adding overhead for everything x86
that isn't Apple, which is the majority. Rafael and Andy therefore
request to perform the DMI match only once and cache the result.
Outside of ACPI various other Apple DMI checks exist and it seems
reasonable to use the cached value there as well. Rafael, Andy and
Darren suggest performing the DMI check in arch code and making it
available with a header in include/linux/platform_data/x86/.
To this end, add early_platform_quirks() to arch/x86/kernel/quirks.c
to perform the DMI check and invoke it from setup_arch(). Switch over
all existing Apple DMI checks, thereby fixing two deficiencies:
* They are now #defined to false on non-x86 arches and can thus be
optimized away if they're located in cross-arch code.
* Some of them only match "Apple Inc." but not "Apple Computer, Inc.",
which is used by BIOSes released between January 2006 (when the first
x86 Macs started shipping) and January 2007 (when the company name
changed upon introduction of the iPhone).
Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
On one of my test machines nhi_mailbox_cmd() called from icm_suspend()
times out and returnes an error which then is propagated to the
caller and causes the entire system suspend to be aborted which isn't
very useful.
Instead of aborting system suspend, print the error into the log
and continue.
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the NVM firmware can be upgraded by
using DMA configuration based mailbox commands. If we detect that the
host or device (device support starts from Intel Alpine Ridge) has the
DMA configuration based mailbox we expose NVM information to the
userspace as two separate Linux NVMem devices: nvm_active and
nvm_non_active. The former is read-only portion of the active NVM which
firmware upgrade tools can be use to find out suitable NVM image if the
device identification strings are not enough.
The latter is write-only portion where the new NVM image is to be
written by the userspace. It is up to the userspace to find out right
NVM image (the kernel does very minimal validation). The ICM firmware
itself authenticates the new NVM firmware and fails the operation if it
is not what is expected.
We also expose two new sysfs files per each switch: nvm_version and
nvm_authenticate which can be used to read the active NVM version and
start the upgrade process.
We also introduce safe mode which is the mode a switch goes when it does
not have properly authenticated firmware. In this mode the switch only
accepts a couple of commands including flashing a new NVM firmware image
and triggering power cycle.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Starting from Intel Falcon Ridge the internal connection manager running
on the Thunderbolt host controller has been supporting 4 security
levels. One reason for this is to prevent DMA attacks and only allow
connecting devices the user trusts.
The internal connection manager (ICM) is the preferred way of connecting
Thunderbolt devices over software only implementation typically used on
Macs. The driver communicates with ICM using special Thunderbolt ring 0
(control channel) messages. In order to handle these messages we add
support for the ICM messages to the control channel.
The security levels are as follows:
none - No security, all tunnels are created automatically
user - User needs to approve the device before tunnels are created
secure - User need to approve the device before tunnels are created.
The device is sent a challenge on future connects to be able
to verify it is actually the approved device.
dponly - Only Display Port and USB tunnels can be created and those
are created automatically.
The security levels are typically configurable from the system BIOS and
by default it is set to "user" on many systems.
In this patch each Thunderbolt device will have either one or two new
sysfs attributes: authorized and key. The latter appears for devices
that support secure connect.
In order to identify the device the user can read identication
information, including UUID and name of the device from sysfs and based
on that make a decision to authorize the device. The device is
authorized by simply writing 1 to the "authorized" sysfs attribute. This
is following the USB bus device authorization mechanism. The secure
connect requires an additional challenge step (writing 2 to the
"authorized" attribute) in future connects when the key has already been
stored to the NVM of the device.
Non-ICM systems (before Alpine Ridge) continue to use the existing
functionality and the security level is set to none. For systems with
Alpine Ridge, even on Apple hardware, we will use ICM.
This code is based on the work done by Amir Levy and Michael Jamet.
Signed-off-by: Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yehezkel Bernat <yehezkel.bernat@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
