couple of things of note:
- Conversion of the NFS documentation to RST
- A new document on how to help with documentation (and a maintainer
profile entry too)
Plus the usual collection of typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.6' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It has been a relatively quiet cycle for documentation, but there's
still a couple of things of note:
- Conversion of the NFS documentation to RST
- A new document on how to help with documentation (and a maintainer
profile entry too)
Plus the usual collection of typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.6' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (40 commits)
docs: filesystems: add overlayfs to index.rst
docs: usb: remove some broken references
scripts/find-unused-docs: Fix massive false positives
docs: nvdimm: use ReST notation for subsection
zram: correct documentation about sysfs node of huge page writeback
Documentation: zram: various fixes in zram.rst
Add a maintainer entry profile for documentation
Add a document on how to contribute to the documentation
docs: Keep up with the location of NoUri
Documentation: Call out example SYM_FUNC_* usage as x86-specific
Documentation: nfs: fault_injection: convert to ReST
Documentation: nfs: pnfs-scsi-server: convert to ReST
Documentation: nfs: convert pnfs-block-server to ReST
Documentation: nfs: idmapper: convert to ReST
Documentation: convert nfsd-admin-interfaces to ReST
Documentation: nfs-rdma: convert to ReST
Documentation: nfsroot.rst: COSMETIC: refill a paragraph
Documentation: nfsroot.txt: convert to ReST
Documentation: convert nfs.txt to ReST
Documentation: filesystems: convert vfat.txt to RST
...
Embargoed hardware issues is a necessary process guide, but leak of
Chinese version, since there is more Chinese hardware vendors in market.
We'd better have a Chinese version of this guide.
This patch translate the guide, add it into toctree. and also add a link
stub for the original doc.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: lizefan@huawei.com
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Harry Wei <harryxiyou@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1576811085-30544-1-git-send-email-alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Fill in "..." stubs with proper links to the mailing lists's encryption
keys and service description URLs. Similarly, fix wording to specify
that multiple members of Linux Foundation's IT team have access to
internal kernel.org infrastructure, and that all of them have similar
confidentiality obligations as the IT team director.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ryabitsev <konstantin@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191209192611.GA1688548@chatter.i7.local
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Add myself as the AMD ambassador to the embargoed hardware issues
document.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The role of the contact list provided by the disclosing party and how it
affects the disclosure process and the ability to include experts into
the development process is not really well explained.
Neither is it entirely clear when the disclosing party will be informed
about the fact that a developer who is not covered by an employer NDA needs
to be brought in and disclosed.
Explain the role of the contact list and the information policy along with
an eventual conflict resolution better.
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1909251028390.10825@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This adds myself as the Google contact for embargoed hardware security
issues and fixes some small typos.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Matt Linton <amuse@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/201909040922.56496BF70@keescook
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To address the requirements of embargoed hardware issues, like Meltdown,
Spectre, L1TF etc. it is necessary to define and document a process for
handling embargoed hardware security issues.
Following the discussion at the maintainer summit 2018 in Edinburgh
(https://lwn.net/Articles/769417/) the volunteered people have worked
out a process and a Memorandum of Understanding. The latter addresses
the fact that the Linux kernel community cannot sign NDAs for various
reasons.
The initial contact point for hardware security issues is different from
the regular kernel security contact to provide a known and neutral
interface for hardware vendors and researchers. The initial primary
contact team is proposed to be staffed by Linux Foundation Fellows, who
are not associated to a vendor or a distribution and are well connected
in the industry as a whole.
The process is designed with the experience of the past incidents in
mind and tries to address the remaining gaps, so future (hopefully rare)
incidents can be handled more efficiently. It won't remove the fact,
that most of this has to be done behind closed doors, but it is set up
to avoid big bureaucratic hurdles for individual developers.
The process is solely for handling hardware security issues and cannot
be used for regular kernel (software only) security bugs.
This memo can help with hardware companies who, and I quote, "[my
manager] doesn't want to bet his job on the list keeping things secret."
This despite numerous leaks directly from that company over the years,
and none ever so far from the kernel security team. Cognitive
dissidence seems to be a requirement to be a good manager.
To accelerate the adoption of this process, we introduce the concept of
ambassadors in participating companies. The ambassadors are there to
guide people to comply with the process, but are not automatically
involved in the disclosure of a particular incident.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190815212505.GC12041@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
