commit 10950929e9 upstream.
[BUG]
A completely valid btrfs will refuse to mount, with error message like:
BTRFS critical (device sdb2): corrupt leaf: root=2 block=239681536 slot=172 \
bg_start=12018974720 bg_len=10888413184, invalid block group size, \
have 10888413184 expect (0, 10737418240]
This has been reported several times as the 4.19 kernel is now being
used. The filesystem refuses to mount, but is otherwise ok and booting
4.18 is a workaround.
Btrfs check returns no error, and all kernels used on this fs is later
than 2011, which should all have the 10G size limit commit.
[CAUSE]
For a 12 devices btrfs, we could allocate a chunk larger than 10G due to
stripe stripe bump up.
__btrfs_alloc_chunk()
|- max_stripe_size = 1G
|- max_chunk_size = 10G
|- data_stripe = 11
|- if (1G * 11 > 10G) {
stripe_size = 976128930;
stripe_size = round_up(976128930, SZ_16M) = 989855744
However the final stripe_size (989855744) * 11 = 10888413184, which is
still larger than 10G.
[FIX]
For the comprehensive check, we need to do the full check at chunk read
time, and rely on bg <-> chunk mapping to do the check.
We could just skip the length check for now.
Fixes: fce466eab7 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Reported-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 42a657f576 upstream.
The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release
trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop
body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the
loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a
use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is
released so that it will not be accessed.
Fixes: 0647bf564f ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 552f0329c7 upstream.
We have a race between enabling quotas end subvolume creation that cause
subvolume creation to fail with -EINVAL, and the following diagram shows
how it happens:
CPU 0 CPU 1
btrfs_ioctl()
btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl()
btrfs_quota_enable()
mutex_lock(fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock)
btrfs_ioctl()
create_subvol()
btrfs_qgroup_inherit()
-> save fs_info->quota_root
into quota_root
-> stores a NULL value
-> tries to lock the mutex
qgroup_ioctl_lock
-> blocks waiting for
the task at CPU0
-> sets BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED in fs_info
-> sets quota_root in fs_info->quota_root
(non-NULL value)
mutex_unlock(fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock)
-> checks quota enabled
flag is set
-> returns -EINVAL because
fs_info->quota_root was
NULL before it acquired
the mutex
qgroup_ioctl_lock
-> ioctl returns -EINVAL
Returning -EINVAL to user space will be confusing if all the arguments
passed to the subvolume creation ioctl were valid.
Fix it by grabbing the value from fs_info->quota_root after acquiring
the mutex.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aab15e8ec2 upstream.
After the simplification of the fast fsync patch done recently by commit
b5e6c3e170 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time") and
commit e7175a6927 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the
log_one_extent path"), we got a very short time window where we can get
extents logged without writeback completing first or extents logged
without logging the respective data checksums. Both issues can only happen
when doing a non-full (fast) fsync.
As soon as we enter btrfs_sync_file() we trigger writeback, then lock the
inode and then wait for the writeback to complete before starting to log
the inode. However before we acquire the inode's lock and after we started
writeback, it's possible that more writes happened and dirtied more pages.
If that happened and those pages get writeback triggered while we are
logging the inode (for example, the VM subsystem triggering it due to
memory pressure, or another concurrent fsync), we end up seeing the
respective extent maps in the inode's list of modified extents and will
log matching file extent items without waiting for the respective
ordered extents to complete, meaning that either of the following will
happen:
1) We log an extent after its writeback finishes but before its checksums
are added to the csum tree, leading to -EIO errors when attempting to
read the extent after a log replay.
2) We log an extent before its writeback finishes.
Therefore after the log replay we will have a file extent item pointing
to an unwritten extent (and without the respective data checksums as
well).
This could not happen before the fast fsync patch simplification, because
for any extent we found in the list of modified extents, we would wait for
its respective ordered extent to finish writeback or collect its checksums
for logging if it did not complete yet.
Fix this by triggering writeback again after acquiring the inode's lock
and before waiting for ordered extents to complete.
Fixes: e7175a6927 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path")
Fixes: b5e6c3e170 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f505754fd6 upstream.
We were using the path name received from user space without checking that
it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper
validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass
a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the
kernel. The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what
we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc).
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f8397d69da upstream.
When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook
is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails
to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This
leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all
available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely.
Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of
the data.
This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would
spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance
was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk
__btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which
corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test):
item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112
length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1
io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096
num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1
stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832
dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8
stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064
dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca
This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the
stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving
EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of
the balance operation.
Fixes: a826d6dcb3 ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 761333f2f5 upstream.
block_group_err shows the group system as a decimal value with a '0x'
prefix, which is somewhat misleading.
Fix it to print hexadecimal, as was intended.
Fixes: fce466eab7 ("btrfs: tree-checker: Verify block_group_item")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Shaokun Zhang <zhangshaokun@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac765f83f1 upstream.
We currently allow cloning a range from a file which includes the last
block of the file even if the file's size is not aligned to the block
size. This is fine and useful when the destination file has the same size,
but when it does not and the range ends somewhere in the middle of the
destination file, it leads to corruption because the bytes between the EOF
and the end of the block have undefined data (when there is support for
discard/trimming they have a value of 0x00).
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ export foo_size=$((256 * 1024 + 100))
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x3c 0 $foo_size" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb5 0 1M" /mnt/bar
$ xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/foo 0 512K $foo_size" /mnt/bar
$ od -A d -t x1 /mnt/bar
0000000 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5
*
0524288 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c 3c
*
0786528 3c 3c 3c 3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0786544 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
0790528 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5 b5
*
1048576
The bytes in the range from 786532 (512Kb + 256Kb + 100 bytes) to 790527
(512Kb + 256Kb + 4Kb - 1) got corrupted, having now a value of 0x00 instead
of 0xb5.
This is similar to the problem we had for deduplication that got recently
fixed by commit de02b9f6bb ("Btrfs: fix data corruption when
deduplicating between different files").
Fix this by not allowing such operations to be performed and return the
errno -EINVAL to user space. This is what XFS is doing as well at the VFS
level. This change however now makes us return -EINVAL instead of
-EOPNOTSUPP for cases where the source range maps to an inline extent and
the destination range's end is smaller then the destination file's size,
since the detection of inline extents is done during the actual process of
dropping file extent items (at __btrfs_drop_extents()). Returning the
-EINVAL error is done early on and solely based on the input parameters
(offsets and length) and destination file's size. This makes us consistent
with XFS and anyone else supporting cloning since this case is now checked
at a higher level in the VFS and is where the -EINVAL will be returned
from starting with kernel 4.20 (the VFS changed was introduced in 4.20-rc1
by commit 07d19dc9fb ("vfs: avoid problematic remapping requests into
partial EOF block"). So this change is more geared towards stable kernels,
as it's unlikely the new VFS checks get removed intentionally.
A test case for fstests follows soon, as well as an update to filter
existing tests that expect -EOPNOTSUPP to accept -EINVAL as well.
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 008c6753f7 upstream.
Recently we got a massive simplification for fsync, where for the fast
path we no longer log new extents while their respective ordered extents
are still running.
However that simplification introduced a subtle regression for the case
where we use a ranged fsync (msync). Consider the following example:
CPU 0 CPU 1
mmap write to range [2Mb, 4Mb[
mmap write to range [512Kb, 1Mb[
msync range [512K, 1Mb[
--> triggers fast fsync
(BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC
not set)
--> creates extent map A for this
range and adds it to list of
modified extents
--> starts ordered extent A for
this range
--> waits for it to complete
writeback triggered for range
[2Mb, 4Mb[
--> create extent map B and
adds it to the list of
modified extents
--> creates ordered extent B
--> start looking for and logging
modified extents
--> logs extent maps A and B
--> finds checksums for extent A
in the csum tree, but not for
extent B
fsync (msync) finishes
--> ordered extent B
finishes and its
checksums are added
to the csum tree
<power cut>
After replaying the log, we have the extent covering the range [2Mb, 4Mb[
but do not have the data checksum items covering that file range.
This happens because at the very beginning of an fsync (btrfs_sync_file())
we start and wait for IO in the given range [512Kb, 1Mb[ and therefore
wait for any ordered extents in that range to complete before we start
logging the extents. However if right before we start logging the extent
in our range [512Kb, 1Mb[, writeback is started for any other dirty range,
such as the range [2Mb, 4Mb[ due to memory pressure or a concurrent fsync
or msync (btrfs_sync_file() starts writeback before acquiring the inode's
lock), an ordered extent is created for that other range and a new extent
map is created to represent that range and added to the inode's list of
modified extents.
That means that we will see that other extent in that list when collecting
extents for logging (done at btrfs_log_changed_extents()) and log the
extent before the respective ordered extent finishes - namely before the
checksum items are added to the checksums tree, which is where
log_extent_csums() looks for the checksums, therefore making us log an
extent without logging its checksums. Before that massive simplification
of fsync, this wasn't a problem because besides looking for checkums in
the checksums tree, we also looked for them in any ordered extent still
running.
The consequence of data checksums missing for a file range is that users
attempting to read the affected file range will get -EIO errors and dmesg
reports the following:
[10188.358136] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 297 start 57344
[10188.359278] BTRFS warning (device sdc): csum failed root 5 ino 297 off 57344 csum 0x98f94189 expected csum 0x00000000 mirror 1
So fix this by skipping extents outside of our logging range at
btrfs_log_changed_extents() and leaving them on the list of modified
extents so that any subsequent ranged fsync may collect them if needed.
Also, if we find a hole extent outside of the range still log it, just
to prevent having gaps between extent items after replaying the log,
otherwise fsck will complain when we are not using the NO_HOLES feature
(fstest btrfs/056 triggers such case).
Fixes: e7175a6927 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 421f0922a2 upstream.
At inode.c:evict_inode_truncate_pages(), when we iterate over the
inode's extent states, we access an extent state record's "state" field
after we unlocked the inode's io tree lock. This can lead to a
use-after-free issue because after we unlock the io tree that extent
state record might have been freed due to being merged into another
adjacent extent state record (a previous inflight bio for a read
operation finished in the meanwhile which unlocked a range in the io
tree and cause a merge of extent state records, as explained in the
comment before the while loop added in commit 6ca0709756 ("Btrfs: fix
hang during inode eviction due to concurrent readahead")).
Fix this by keeping a copy of the extent state's flags in a local
variable and using it after unlocking the io tree.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201189
Fixes: b9d0b38928 ("btrfs: Add handler for invalidate page")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 30928e9baa upstream.
This could result in a really bad case where we do something like
evict
evict_refill_and_join
btrfs_commit_transaction
btrfs_run_delayed_iputs
evict
evict_refill_and_join
btrfs_commit_transaction
... forever
We have plenty of other places where we run delayed iputs that are much
safer, let those do the work.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 80ee54bfe8 upstream.
We were not handling the reserved byte accounting properly for data
references. Metadata was fine, if it errored out the error paths would
free the bytes_reserved count and pin the extent, but it even missed one
of the error cases. So instead move this handling up into
run_one_delayed_ref so we are sure that both cases are properly cleaned
up in case of a transaction abort.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 49940bdd57 upstream.
When we insert the file extent once the ordered extent completes we free
the reserved extent reservation as it'll have been migrated to the
bytes_used counter. However if we error out after this step we'll still
clear the reserved extent reservation, resulting in a negative
accounting of the reserved bytes for the block group and space info.
Fix this by only doing the free if we didn't successfully insert a file
extent for this extent.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fb5c39d7a8 upstream.
max_extent_size is supposed to be the largest contiguous range for the
space info, and ctl->free_space is the total free space in the block
group. We need to keep track of these separately and _only_ use the
max_free_space if we don't have a max_extent_size, as that means our
original request was too large to search any of the block groups for and
therefore wouldn't have a max_extent_size set.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ad22cf6ea4 upstream.
We can't use entry->bytes if our entry is a bitmap entry, we need to use
entry->max_extent_size in that case. Fix up all the logic to make this
consistent.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 21a94f7acf upstream.
If we use up our block group before allocating a new one we'll easily
get a max_extent_size that's set really really low, which will result in
a lot of fragmentation. We need to make sure we're resetting the
max_extent_size when we add a new chunk or add new space.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5ce555578e upstream.
When writing out a block group free space cache we can end deadlocking
with ourselves on an extent buffer lock resulting in a warning like the
following:
[245043.379979] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 2608 at fs/btrfs/locking.c:251 btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[245043.392792] CPU: 4 PID: 2608 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G
W I 4.16.8 #1
[245043.395489] RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[245043.396791] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000424b840 EFLAGS: 00010246
[245043.398093] RAX: 0000000000000a30 RBX: ffff8807e20a3d20 RCX: 0000000000000001
[245043.399414] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8807e20a3d20
[245043.400732] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff88041f39a700 R09: ffff880000000000
[245043.402021] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8807e20a3d20 R12: ffff8807cb220630
[245043.403296] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8807cb220628 R15: ffff88041fbdf000
[245043.404780] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88082fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[245043.406050] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[245043.407321] CR2: 00007fffdbdb9f10 CR3: 0000000001c09005 CR4: 00000000000206e0
[245043.408670] Call Trace:
[245043.409977] btrfs_search_slot+0x761/0xa60 [btrfs]
[245043.411278] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x62/0xb0 [btrfs]
[245043.412572] btrfs_insert_item+0x5b/0xc0 [btrfs]
[245043.413922] btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0xfb/0x1e0 [btrfs]
[245043.415216] do_chunk_alloc+0x1e5/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[245043.416487] find_free_extent+0xcd0/0xf60 [btrfs]
[245043.417813] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x96/0x1e0 [btrfs]
[245043.419105] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xfb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
[245043.420378] __btrfs_cow_block+0x127/0x550 [btrfs]
[245043.421652] btrfs_cow_block+0xee/0x190 [btrfs]
[245043.422979] btrfs_search_slot+0x227/0xa60 [btrfs]
[245043.424279] ? btrfs_update_inode_item+0x59/0x100 [btrfs]
[245043.425538] ? iput+0x72/0x1e0
[245043.426798] write_one_cache_group.isra.49+0x20/0x90 [btrfs]
[245043.428131] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x102/0x420 [btrfs]
[245043.429419] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x11b/0x880 [btrfs]
[245043.430712] ? start_transaction+0x8e/0x410 [btrfs]
[245043.432006] transaction_kthread+0x184/0x1a0 [btrfs]
[245043.433341] kthread+0xf0/0x130
[245043.434628] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x4e0/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[245043.435928] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
[245043.437236] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[245043.441054] ---[ end trace 15abaa2aaf36827f ]---
This is because at write_one_cache_group() when we are COWing a leaf from
the extent tree we end up allocating a new block group (chunk) and,
because we have hit a threshold on the number of bytes reserved for system
chunks, we attempt to finalize the creation of new block groups from the
current transaction, by calling btrfs_create_pending_block_groups().
However here we also need to modify the extent tree in order to insert
a block group item, and if the location for this new block group item
happens to be in the same leaf that we were COWing earlier, we deadlock
since btrfs_search_slot() tries to write lock the extent buffer that we
locked before at write_one_cache_group().
We have already hit similar cases in the past and commit d9a0540a79
("Btrfs: fix deadlock when finalizing block group creation") fixed some
of those cases by delaying the creation of pending block groups at the
known specific spots that could lead to a deadlock. This change reworks
that commit to be more generic so that we don't have to add similar logic
to every possible path that can lead to a deadlock. This is done by
making __btrfs_cow_block() disallowing the creation of new block groups
(setting the transaction's can_flush_pending_bgs to false) before it
attempts to allocate a new extent buffer for either the extent, chunk or
device trees, since those are the trees that pending block creation
modifies. Once the new extent buffer is allocated, it allows creation of
pending block groups to happen again.
This change depends on a recent patch from Josef which is not yet in
Linus' tree, named "btrfs: make sure we create all new block groups" in
order to avoid occasional warnings at btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata().
Fixes: d9a0540a79 ("Btrfs: fix deadlock when finalizing block group creation")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199753
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAJtFHUTHna09ST-_EEiyWmDH6gAqS6wa=zMNMBsifj8ABu99cw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: E V <eliventer@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7ed586d0a8 upstream.
When using the NO_HOLES feature and logging a regular file, we were
expecting that if we find an inline extent, that either its size in RAM
(uncompressed and unenconded) matches the size of the file or if it does
not, that it matches the sector size and it represents compressed data.
This assertion does not cover a case where the length of the inline extent
is smaller than the sector size and also smaller the file's size, such
case is possible through fallocate. Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f -O no-holes /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb60 0 21" /mnt/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "falloc 40 40" /mnt/foobar
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar
In the above example we trigger the assertion because the inline extent's
length is 21 bytes while the file size is 80 bytes. The fallocate() call
merely updated the file's size and did not touch the existing inline
extent, as expected.
So fix this by adjusting the assertion so that an inline extent length
smaller than the file size is valid if the file size is smaller than the
filesystem's sector size.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
Fixes: a89ca6f24f ("Btrfs: fix fsync after truncate when no_holes feature is enabled")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE5jQCfRSBC7n4pUTFJcmHh109=gwyT9mFkCOL+NKfzswmR=_Q@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3527a018c0 upstream.
At inode.c:compress_file_range(), under the "free_pages_out" label, we can
end up dereferencing the "pages" pointer when it has a NULL value. This
case happens when "start" has a value of 0 and we fail to allocate memory
for the "pages" pointer. When that happens we jump to the "cont" label and
then enter the "if (start == 0)" branch where we immediately call the
cow_file_range_inline() function. If that function returns 0 (success
creating an inline extent) or an error (like -ENOMEM for example) we jump
to the "free_pages_out" label and then access "pages[i]" leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, since "nr_pages" has a value greater than zero at
that point.
Fix this by setting "nr_pages" to 0 when we fail to allocate memory for
the "pages" pointer.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201119
Fixes: 771ed689d2 ("Btrfs: Optimize compressed writeback and reads")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9c7b0c2e8d upstream.
[BUG]
In the following case, rescan won't zero out the number of qgroup 1/0:
$ mkfs.btrfs -fq $DEV
$ mount $DEV /mnt
$ btrfs quota enable /mnt
$ btrfs qgroup create 1/0 /mnt
$ btrfs sub create /mnt/sub
$ btrfs qgroup assign 0/257 1/0 /mnt
$ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/sub/file bs=1k count=1000
$ btrfs sub snap /mnt/sub /mnt/snap
$ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt
$ btrfs qgroup show -pcre /mnt
qgroupid rfer excl max_rfer max_excl parent child
-------- ---- ---- -------- -------- ------ -----
0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
0/257 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none 1/0 ---
0/258 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
1/0 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- 0/257
So far so good, but:
$ btrfs qgroup remove 0/257 1/0 /mnt
WARNING: quotas may be inconsistent, rescan needed
$ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt
$ btrfs qgroup show -pcre /mnt
qgoupid rfer excl max_rfer max_excl parent child
-------- ---- ---- -------- -------- ------ -----
0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
0/257 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
0/258 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
1/0 1016.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- ---
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ not cleared
[CAUSE]
Before rescan we call qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking() to zero out all
qgroups' accounting numbers.
However we don't mark all qgroups dirty, but rely on rescan to do so.
If we have any high level qgroup without children, it won't be marked
dirty during rescan, since we cannot reach that qgroup.
This will cause QGROUP_INFO items of childless qgroups never get updated
in the quota tree, thus their numbers will stay the same in "btrfs
qgroup show" output.
[FIX]
Just mark all qgroups dirty in qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking(), so even if
we have childless qgroups, their QGROUP_INFO items will still get
updated during rescan.
Reported-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0f375eed92 upstream.
In a scenario like the following:
mkdir /mnt/A # inode 258
mkdir /mnt/B # inode 259
touch /mnt/B/bar # inode 260
sync
mv /mnt/B/bar /mnt/A/bar
mv -T /mnt/A /mnt/B
fsync /mnt/B/bar
<power fail>
After replaying the log we end up with file bar having 2 hard links, both
with the name 'bar' and one in the directory with inode number 258 and the
other in the directory with inode number 259. Also, we end up with the
directory inode 259 still existing and with the directory inode 258 still
named as 'A', instead of 'B'. In this scenario, file 'bar' should only
have one hard link, located at directory inode 258, the directory inode
259 should not exist anymore and the name for directory inode 258 should
be 'B'.
This incorrect behaviour happens because when attempting to log the old
parents of an inode, we skip any parents that no longer exist. Fix this
by forcing a full commit if an old parent no longer exists.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2d72f42d5 upstream.
When replaying a log which contains a tmpfile (which necessarily has a
link count of 0) we end up calling inc_nlink(), at
fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:replay_one_buffer(), which produces a warning like
the following:
[195191.943673] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6924 at fs/inode.c:342 inc_nlink+0x33/0x40
[195191.943723] CPU: 0 PID: 6924 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6-btrfs-next-38 #1
[195191.943724] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[195191.943726] RIP: 0010:inc_nlink+0x33/0x40
[195191.943728] RSP: 0018:ffffb96e425e3870 EFLAGS: 00010246
[195191.943730] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c0d1e6af4f0 RCX: 0000000000000006
[195191.943731] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8c0d1e6af4f0
[195191.943731] RBP: 0000000000000097 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[195191.943732] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb96e425e3a60
[195191.943733] R13: ffff8c0d10cff0c8 R14: ffff8c0d0d515348 R15: ffff8c0d78a1b3f8
[195191.943735] FS: 00007f570ee24480(0000) GS:ffff8c0dfb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[195191.943736] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[195191.943737] CR2: 00005593286277c8 CR3: 00000000bb8f2006 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[195191.943739] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[195191.943740] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[195191.943741] Call Trace:
[195191.943778] replay_one_buffer+0x797/0x7d0 [btrfs]
[195191.943802] walk_up_log_tree+0x1c1/0x250 [btrfs]
[195191.943809] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[195191.943825] walk_log_tree+0xae/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[195191.943840] btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1d7/0x4d0 [btrfs]
[195191.943856] ? replay_dir_deletes+0x280/0x280 [btrfs]
[195191.943870] open_ctree+0x1c3b/0x22a0 [btrfs]
[195191.943887] btrfs_mount_root+0x6b4/0x800 [btrfs]
[195191.943894] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[195191.943899] ? pcpu_alloc+0x55b/0x7c0
[195191.943906] ? mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
[195191.943908] mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
[195191.943912] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x36/0x50
[195191.943916] vfs_kern_mount+0x62/0x160
[195191.943927] btrfs_mount+0x134/0x890 [btrfs]
[195191.943936] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[195191.943938] ? pcpu_alloc+0x55b/0x7c0
[195191.943943] ? mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
[195191.943952] ? btrfs_remount+0x570/0x570 [btrfs]
[195191.943954] mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
[195191.943956] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x36/0x50
[195191.943960] vfs_kern_mount+0x62/0x160
[195191.943963] do_mount+0x1f9/0xd40
[195191.943967] ? memdup_user+0x4b/0x70
[195191.943971] ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
[195191.943974] __x64_sys_mount+0x21/0x30
[195191.943977] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0
[195191.943980] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[195191.943983] RIP: 0033:0x7f570e4e524a
[195191.943986] RSP: 002b:00007ffd83589478 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[195191.943989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563f335b2060 RCX: 00007f570e4e524a
[195191.943990] RDX: 0000563f335b2240 RSI: 0000563f335b2280 RDI: 0000563f335b2260
[195191.943992] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020
[195191.943993] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000563f335b2260
[195191.943994] R13: 0000563f335b2240 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
[195191.944002] irq event stamp: 8688
[195191.944010] hardirqs last enabled at (8687): [<ffffffff9cb004c3>] console_unlock+0x503/0x640
[195191.944012] hardirqs last disabled at (8688): [<ffffffff9ca037dd>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[195191.944018] softirqs last enabled at (8638): [<ffffffff9cc0a5d1>] __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0x101/0x150
[195191.944020] softirqs last disabled at (8634): [<ffffffff9cc26bbe>] wb_wakeup_delayed+0x2e/0x60
[195191.944022] ---[ end trace 5d6e873a9a0b811a ]---
This happens because the inode does not have the flag I_LINKABLE set,
which is a runtime only flag, not meant to be persisted, set when the
inode is created through open(2) if the flag O_EXCL is not passed to it.
Except for the warning, there are no other consequences (like corruptions
or metadata inconsistencies).
Since it's pointless to replay a tmpfile as it would be deleted in a
later phase of the log replay procedure (it has a link count of 0), fix
this by not logging tmpfiles and if a tmpfile is found in a log (created
by a kernel without this change), skip the replay of the inode.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes: 471d557afe ("Btrfs: fix loss of prealloc extents past i_size after fsync log replay")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+
Reported-by: Martin Steigerwald <martin@lichtvoll.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/3666619.NTnn27ZJZE@merkaba/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 545e3366db upstream.
Allocating new chunks modifies both the extent and chunk tree, which can
trigger new chunk allocations. So instead of doing list_for_each_safe,
just do while (!list_empty()) so we make sure we don't exit with other
pending bg's still on our list.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 553cceb496 upstream.
We need to clear the max_extent_size when we clear bits from a bitmap
since it could have been from the range that contains the
max_extent_size.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 84de76a2fb upstream.
If we're allocating a new space cache inode it's likely going to be
under a transaction handle, so we need to use memalloc_nofs_save() in
order to avoid deadlocks, and more importantly lockdep messages that
make xfstests fail.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f45c752b65 upstream.
We want to release the unused reservation we have since it refills the
delayed refs reserve, which will make everything go smoother when
running the delayed refs if we're short on our reservation.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7703bdd8d2 upstream.
During buffered writes, we follow this basic series of steps:
again:
lock all the pages
wait for writeback on all the pages
Take the extent range lock
wait for ordered extents on the whole range
clean all the pages
if (copy_from_user_in_atomic() hits a fault) {
drop our locks
goto again;
}
dirty all the pages
release all the locks
The extra waiting, cleaning and locking are there to make sure we don't
modify pages in flight to the drive, after they've been crc'd.
If some of the pages in the range were already dirty when the write
began, and we need to goto again, we create a window where a dirty page
has been cleaned and unlocked. It may be reclaimed before we're able to
lock it again, which means we'll read the old contents off the drive and
lose any modifications that had been pending writeback.
We don't actually need to clean the pages. All of the other locking in
place makes sure we don't start IO on the pages, so we can just leave
them dirty for the duration of the write.
Fixes: 73d59314e6 (the original btrfs merge)
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3aa7c7a31c upstream.
While testing my backport I noticed there was a panic if I ran
generic/416 generic/417 generic/418 all in a row. This just happened to
uncover a race where we had outstanding IO after we destroy all of our
workqueues, and then we'd go to queue the endio work on those free'd
workqueues.
This is because we aren't waiting for the caching threads to be done
before freeing everything up, so to fix this make sure we wait on any
outstanding caching that's being done before we free up the block group,
so we're sure to be done with all IO by the time we get to
btrfs_stop_all_workers(). This fixes the panic I was seeing
consistently in testing.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:6112!
SMP PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 27165 Comm: kworker/u4:7 Not tainted 4.16.0-02155-g3553e54a578d-dirty #875
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_cache_helper
RIP: 0010:btrfs_map_bio+0x346/0x370
RSP: 0000:ffffc900061e79d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880071542e00 RCX: 0000000000533000
RDX: ffff88006bb74380 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff880078160000
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff8800781cd200 R09: 0000000000503000
R10: ffff88006cd21200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800781cd200 R15: ffff880071542e00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000817ffc4 CR3: 0000000078314000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
btree_submit_bio_hook+0x8a/0xd0
submit_one_bio+0x5d/0x80
read_extent_buffer_pages+0x18a/0x320
btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xbc/0x200
? alloc_extent_buffer+0x359/0x3e0
read_tree_block+0x3d/0x60
read_block_for_search.isra.30+0x1a5/0x360
btrfs_search_slot+0x41b/0xa10
btrfs_next_old_leaf+0x212/0x470
caching_thread+0x323/0x490
normal_work_helper+0xc5/0x310
process_one_work+0x141/0x340
worker_thread+0x44/0x3c0
kthread+0xf8/0x130
? process_one_work+0x340/0x340
? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
RIP: btrfs_map_bio+0x346/0x370 RSP: ffffc900061e79d0
---[ end trace 827eb13e50846033 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fee7acc361 upstream.
Commit 499f377f49 (btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM)
fixed free space trimming, but introduced latency when it was running.
This is due to it pinning the transaction using both a incremented
refcount and holding the commit root sem for the duration of a single
trim operation.
This was to ensure safety but it's unnecessary. We already hold the the
chunk mutex so we know that the chunk we're using can't be allocated
while we're trimming it.
In order to check against chunks allocated already in this transaction,
we need to check the pending chunks list. To to that safely without
joining the transaction (or attaching than then having to commit it) we
need to ensure that the dev root's commit root doesn't change underneath
us and the pending chunk lists stays around until we're done with it.
We can ensure the former by holding the commit root sem and the latter
by pinning the transaction. We do this now, but the critical section
covers the trim operation itself and we don't need to do that.
This patch moves the pinning and unpinning logic into helpers and unpins
the transaction after performing the search and check for pending
chunks.
Limiting the critical section of the transaction pinning improves the
latency substantially on slower storage (e.g. image files over NFS).
Fixes: 499f377f49 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0be88e367f upstream.
We check whether any device the file system is using supports discard in
the ioctl call, but then we attempt to trim free extents on every device
regardless of whether discard is supported. Due to the way we mask off
EOPNOTSUPP, we can end up issuing the trim operations on each free range
on devices that don't support it, just wasting time.
Fixes: 499f377f49 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d4e329de5e upstream.
btrfs_trim_fs iterates over the fs_devices->alloc_list while holding the
device_list_mutex. The problem is that ->alloc_list is protected by the
chunk mutex. We don't want to hold the chunk mutex over the trim of the
entire file system. Fortunately, the ->dev_list list is protected by
the dev_list mutex and while it will give us all devices, including
read-only devices, we already just skip the read-only devices. Then we
can continue to take and release the chunk mutex while scanning each
device.
Fixes: 499f377f49 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ba9fc8e62 upstream.
[BUG]
fstrim on some btrfs only trims the unallocated space, not trimming any
space in existing block groups.
[CAUSE]
Before fstrim_range passed to btrfs_trim_fs(), it gets truncated to
range [0, super->total_bytes). So later btrfs_trim_fs() will only be
able to trim block groups in range [0, super->total_bytes).
While for btrfs, any bytenr aligned to sectorsize is valid, since btrfs
uses its logical address space, there is nothing limiting the location
where we put block groups.
For filesystem with frequent balance, it's quite easy to relocate all
block groups and bytenr of block groups will start beyond
super->total_bytes.
In that case, btrfs will not trim existing block groups.
[FIX]
Just remove the truncation in btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(), so btrfs_trim_fs()
can get the unmodified range, which is normally set to [0, U64_MAX].
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Fixes: f4c697e640 ("btrfs: return EINVAL if start > total_bytes in fitrim ioctl")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 93bba24d4b upstream.
Function btrfs_trim_fs() doesn't handle errors in a consistent way. If
error happens when trimming existing block groups, it will skip the
remaining blocks and continue to trim unallocated space for each device.
The return value will only reflect the final error from device trimming.
This patch will fix such behavior by:
1) Recording the last error from block group or device trimming
The return value will also reflect the last error during trimming.
Make developer more aware of the problem.
2) Continuing trimming if possible
If we failed to trim one block group or device, we could still try
the next block group or device.
3) Report number of failures during block group and device trimming
It would be less noisy, but still gives user a brief summary of
what's going wrong.
Such behavior can avoid confusion for cases like failure to trim the
first block group and then only unallocated space is trimmed.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add bg_ret and dev_ret to the messages ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5c06147128 upstream.
When we fail to start a transaction in btrfs_dev_replace_start, we leave
dev_replace->replace_start set to STARTED but clear ->srcdev and
->tgtdev. Later, that can result in an Oops in
btrfs_dev_replace_progress when having state set to STARTED or SUSPENDED
implies that ->srcdev is valid.
Also fix error handling when the state is already STARTED or SUSPENDED
while starting. That, too, will clear ->srcdev and ->tgtdev even though
it doesn't own them. This should be an impossible case to hit since we
should be protected by the BTRFS_FS_EXCL_OP bit being set. Let's add an
ASSERT there while we're at it.
Fixes: e93c89c1aa (Btrfs: add new sources for device replace code)
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b72c3aba09 upstream.
[BUG]
For certain crafted image, whose csum root leaf has missing backref, if
we try to trigger write with data csum, it could cause deadlock with the
following kernel WARN_ON():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 41 at fs/btrfs/locking.c:230 btrfs_tree_lock+0x3e2/0x400
CPU: 1 PID: 41 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #8
Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper
RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_lock+0x3e2/0x400
Call Trace:
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x39f/0x770
__btrfs_cow_block+0x285/0x9e0
btrfs_cow_block+0x191/0x2e0
btrfs_search_slot+0x492/0x1160
btrfs_lookup_csum+0xec/0x280
btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x2be/0xa60
add_pending_csums+0xaf/0xf0
btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x74b/0xc90
finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20
normal_work_helper+0xf6/0x500
btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20
process_one_work+0x302/0x770
worker_thread+0x81/0x6d0
kthread+0x180/0x1d0
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[CAUSE]
That crafted image has missing backref for csum tree root leaf. And
when we try to allocate new tree block, since there is no
EXTENT/METADATA_ITEM for csum tree root, btrfs consider it's free slot
and use it.
The extent tree of the image looks like:
Normal image | This fuzzed image
----------------------------------+--------------------------------
BG 29360128 | BG 29360128
One empty slot | One empty slot
29364224: backref to UUID tree | 29364224: backref to UUID tree
Two empty slots | Two empty slots
29376512: backref to CSUM tree | One empty slot (bad type) <<<
29380608: backref to D_RELOC tree | 29380608: backref to D_RELOC tree
... | ...
Since bytenr 29376512 has no METADATA/EXTENT_ITEM, when btrfs try to
alloc tree block, it's an valid slot for btrfs.
And for finish_ordered_write, when we need to insert csum, we try to CoW
csum tree root.
By accident, empty slots at bytenr BG_OFFSET, BG_OFFSET + 8K,
BG_OFFSET + 12K is already used by tree block COW for other trees, the
next empty slot is BG_OFFSET + 16K, which should be the backref for CSUM
tree.
But due to the bad type, btrfs can recognize it and still consider it as
an empty slot, and will try to use it for csum tree CoW.
Then in the following call trace, we will try to lock the new tree
block, which turns out to be the old csum tree root which is already
locked:
btrfs_search_slot() called on csum tree root, which is at 29376512
|- btrfs_cow_block()
|- btrfs_set_lock_block()
| |- Now locks tree block 29376512 (old csum tree root)
|- __btrfs_cow_block()
|- btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
|- btrfs_reserve_extent()
| Now it returns tree block 29376512, which extent tree
| shows its empty slot, but it's already hold by csum tree
|- btrfs_init_new_buffer()
|- btrfs_tree_lock()
| Triggers WARN_ON(eb->lock_owner == current->pid)
|- wait_event()
Wait lock owner to release the lock, but it's
locked by ourself, so it will deadlock
[FIX]
This patch will do the lock_owner and current->pid check at
btrfs_init_new_buffer().
So above deadlock can be avoided.
Since such problem can only happen in crafted image, we will still
trigger kernel warning for later aborted transaction, but with a little
more meaningful warning message.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200405
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 65c6e82bec upstream.
[BUG]
When mounting certain crafted image, btrfs will trigger kernel BUG_ON()
when trying to recover balance:
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:8956!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 662 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1-custom+ #10
RIP: 0010:walk_up_proc+0x336/0x480 [btrfs]
RSP: 0018:ffffb53540c9b890 EFLAGS: 00010202
Call Trace:
walk_up_tree+0x172/0x1f0 [btrfs]
btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x3a4/0x830 [btrfs]
merge_reloc_roots+0xe1/0x1d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_recover_relocation+0x3ea/0x420 [btrfs]
open_ctree+0x1af3/0x1dd0 [btrfs]
btrfs_mount_root+0x66b/0x740 [btrfs]
mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x140
btrfs_mount+0x16d/0x890 [btrfs]
mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x140
do_mount+0x1fd/0xda0
ksys_mount+0xba/0xd0
__x64_sys_mount+0x21/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[CAUSE]
Extent tree corruption. In this particular case, reloc tree root's
owner is DATA_RELOC_TREE (should be TREE_RELOC), thus its backref is
corrupted and we failed the owner check in walk_up_tree().
[FIX]
It's pretty hard to take care of every extent tree corruption, but at
least we can remove such BUG_ON() and exit more gracefully.
And since in this particular image, DATA_RELOC_TREE and TREE_RELOC share
the same root (which is obviously invalid), we needs to make
__del_reloc_root() more robust to detect such invalid sharing to avoid
possible NULL dereference as root->node can be NULL in this case.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200411
Reported-by: Xu Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3628b4ca64 upstream.
Some qgroup trace events like btrfs_qgroup_release_data() and
btrfs_qgroup_free_delayed_ref() can still be triggered even if qgroup is
not enabled.
This is caused by the lack of qgroup status check before calling some
qgroup functions. Thankfully the functions can handle quota disabled
case well and just do nothing for qgroup disabled case.
This patch will do earlier check before triggering related trace events.
And for enabled <-> disabled race case:
1) For enabled->disabled case
Disable will wipe out all qgroups data including reservation and
excl/rfer. Even if we leak some reservation or numbers, it will
still be cleared, so nothing will go wrong.
2) For disabled -> enabled case
Current btrfs_qgroup_release_data() will use extent_io tree to ensure
we won't underflow reservation. And for delayed_ref we use
head->qgroup_reserved to record the reserved space, so in that case
head->qgroup_reserved should be 0 and we won't underflow.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAJCQCtQau7DtuUUeycCkZ36qjbKuxNzsgqJ7+sJ6W0dK_NLE3w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'for-4.19-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
- fix for improper fsync after hardlink
- fix for a corruption during file deduplication
- use after free fixes
- RCU warning fix
- fix for buffered write to nodatacow file
* tag 'for-4.19-rc2-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in btrfs_debug_in_rcu
btrfs: use after free in btrfs_quota_enable
btrfs: btrfs_shrink_device should call commit transaction at the end
btrfs: fix qgroup_free wrong num_bytes in btrfs_subvolume_reserve_metadata
Btrfs: fix data corruption when deduplicating between different files
Btrfs: sync log after logging new name
Btrfs: fix unexpected failure of nocow buffered writes after snapshotting when low on space
Commit 672d599041 ("btrfs: Use wrapper macro for rcu string to remove
duplicate code") replaces some open coded RCU string handling with macro.
It turns out that btrfs_debug_in_rcu() is used for the first time and
the macro lacks lock/unlock of RCU string for non-debug case (i.e. when
the message is not printed), leading to suspicious RCU usage warning
when CONFIG_PROVE_RCU is on.
Fix this by adding a wrapper to call lock/unlock for the non-debug case
too.
Fixes: 672d599041 ("btrfs: Use wrapper macro for rcu string to remove duplicate code")
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The issue here is that btrfs_commit_transaction() frees "trans" on both
the error and the success path. So the problem would be if
btrfs_commit_transaction() succeeds, and then qgroup_rescan_init()
fails. That means that "ret" is non-zero and "trans" is non-NULL and it
leads to a use after free inside the btrfs_end_transaction() macro.
Fixes: 340f1aa27f ("btrfs: qgroups: Move transaction management inside btrfs_quota_enable/disable")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Test case btrfs/164 reports use-after-free:
[ 6712.084324] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
..
[ 6712.195423] btrfs_update_commit_device_size+0x75/0xf0 [btrfs]
[ 6712.201424] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x57d/0xa90 [btrfs]
[ 6712.206999] btrfs_rm_device+0x627/0x850 [btrfs]
[ 6712.211800] btrfs_ioctl+0x2b03/0x3120 [btrfs]
Reason for this is that btrfs_shrink_device adds the resized device to
the fs_devices::resized_devices after it has called the last commit
transaction.
So the list fs_devices::resized_devices is not empty when
btrfs_shrink_device returns. Now the parent function
btrfs_rm_device calls:
btrfs_close_bdev(device);
call_rcu(&device->rcu, free_device_rcu);
and then does the transactio ncommit. It goes through the
fs_devices::resized_devices in btrfs_update_commit_device_size and
leads to use-after-free.
Fix this by making sure btrfs_shrink_device calls the last needed
btrfs_commit_transaction before the return. This is consistent with what
the grow counterpart does and this makes sure the on-disk state is
persistent when the function returns.
Reported-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Tested-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ update changelog ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
After btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc(), num_bytes will be assigned
again by btrfs_calc_trans_metadata_size(). Once block_rsv fails, we
can't properly free the num_bytes of the previous qgroup_reserve. Use a
separate variable to store the num_bytes of the qgroup_reserve.
Delete the comment for the qgroup_reserved that does not exist and add a
comment about use_global_rsv.
Fixes: c4c129db5d ("btrfs: drop unused parameter qgroup_reserved")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18+
Signed-off-by: Lu Fengqi <lufq.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If we deduplicate extents between two different files we can end up
corrupting data if the source range ends at the size of the source file,
the source file's size is not aligned to the filesystem's block size
and the destination range does not go past the size of the destination
file size.
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x6b 0 2518890" /mnt/foo
# The first byte with a value of 0xae starts at an offset (2518890)
# which is not a multiple of the sector size.
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xae 2518890 102398" /mnt/foo
# Confirm the file content is full of bytes with values 0x6b and 0xae.
$ od -t x1 /mnt/foo
0000000 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
*
11467540 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b ae ae ae ae ae ae
11467560 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
*
11777540 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
11777550
# Create a second file with a length not aligned to the sector size,
# whose bytes all have the value 0x6b, so that its extent(s) can be
# deduplicated with the first file.
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0x6b 0 557771" /mnt/bar
# Now deduplicate the entire second file into a range of the first file
# that also has all bytes with the value 0x6b. The destination range's
# end offset must not be aligned to the sector size and must be less
# then the offset of the first byte with the value 0xae (byte at offset
# 2518890).
$ xfs_io -c "dedupe /mnt/bar 0 1957888 557771" /mnt/foo
# The bytes in the range starting at offset 2515659 (end of the
# deduplication range) and ending at offset 2519040 (start offset
# rounded up to the block size) must all have the value 0xae (and not
# replaced with 0x00 values). In other words, we should have exactly
# the same data we had before we asked for deduplication.
$ od -t x1 /mnt/foo
0000000 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
*
11467540 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b ae ae ae ae ae ae
11467560 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
*
11777540 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
11777550
# Unmount the filesystem and mount it again. This guarantees any file
# data in the page cache is dropped.
$ umount /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ od -t x1 /mnt/foo
0000000 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
*
11461300 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 00
11461320 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
11470000 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
*
11777540 ae ae ae ae ae ae ae ae
11777550
# The bytes in range 2515659 to 2519040 have a value of 0x00 and not a
# value of 0xae, data corruption happened due to the deduplication
# operation.
So fix this by rounding down, to the sector size, the length used for the
deduplication when the following conditions are met:
1) Source file's range ends at its i_size;
2) Source file's i_size is not aligned to the sector size;
3) Destination range does not cross the i_size of the destination file.
Fixes: e1d227a42e ("btrfs: Handle unaligned length in extent_same")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
When we add a new name for an inode which was logged in the current
transaction, we update the inode in the log so that its new name and
ancestors are added to the log. However when we do this we do not persist
the log, so the changes remain in memory only, and as a consequence, any
ancestors that were created in the current transaction are updated such
that future calls to btrfs_inode_in_log() return true. This leads to a
subsequent fsync against such new ancestor directories returning
immediately, without persisting the log, therefore after a power failure
the new ancestor directories do not exist, despite fsync being called
against them explicitly.
Example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ mkdir /mnt/A
$ mkdir /mnt/B
$ mkdir /mnt/A/C
$ touch /mnt/B/foo
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/B/foo
$ ln /mnt/B/foo /mnt/A/C/foo
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/A
<power failure>
After the power failure, directory "A" does not exist, despite the explicit
fsync on it.
Instead of fixing this by changing the behaviour of the explicit fsync on
directory "A" to persist the log instead of doing nothing, make the logging
of the new file name (which happens when creating a hard link or renaming)
persist the log. This approach not only is simpler, not requiring addition
of new fields to the inode in memory structure, but also gives us the same
behaviour as ext4, xfs and f2fs (possibly other filesystems too).
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes: 12fcfd22fe ("Btrfs: tree logging unlink/rename fixes")
Reported-by: Vijay Chidambaram <vvijay03@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>