Commit graph

1217 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
3630056d96 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
 "This fixes the newly added drbg generator so that it actually works on
  32-bit machines.  Previously the code was only tested on 64-bit and on
  32-bit it overflowed and simply doesn't work"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle
  crypto: drbg - backport "fix maximum value checks on 32 bit systems"
2014-09-15 07:23:21 -07:00
Stephan Mueller
78f543a934 crypto: drbg - remove check for uninitialized DRBG handle
The drbg_healthcheck() contained a test to call the DRBG with an
uninitialized DRBG cipher handle. As this is an inappropriate use of the
kernel crypto API to try to generate random numbers before
initialization, checks verifying for an initialized DRBG have been
removed in previous patches.

Now, the drbg_healthcheck test must also be removed.

Changes V2: Added patch marker to email subject line.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-09-05 15:56:43 +08:00
David Howells
0aa0409401 PEFILE: Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert
Relax the check on the length of the PKCS#7 cert as it appears that the PE
file wrapper size gets rounded up to the nearest 8.

The debugging output looks like this:

	PEFILE: ==> verify_pefile_signature()
	PEFILE: ==> pefile_parse_binary()
	PEFILE: checksum @ 110
	PEFILE: header size = 200
	PEFILE: cert = 968 @547be0 [68 09 00 00 00 02 02 00 30 82 09 56 ]
	PEFILE: sig wrapper = { 968, 200, 2 }
	PEFILE: Signature data not PKCS#7

The wrapper is the first 8 bytes of the hex dump inside [].  This indicates a
length of 0x968 bytes, including the wrapper header - so 0x960 bytes of
payload.

The ASN.1 wrapper begins [ ... 30 82 09 56 ].  That indicates an object of size
0x956 - a four byte discrepency, presumably just padding for alignment
purposes.

So we just check that the ASN.1 container is no bigger than the payload and
reduce the recorded size appropriately.

Whilst we're at it, allow shorter PKCS#7 objects that manage to squeeze within
127 or 255 bytes.  It's just about conceivable if no X.509 certs are included
in the PKCS#7 message.

Reported-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-09-03 10:30:24 +10:00
David Howells
876c6e3e02 KEYS: Fix public_key asymmetric key subtype name
The length of the name of an asymmetric key subtype must be stored in struct
asymmetric_key_subtype::name_len so that it can be matched by a search for
"<subkey_name>:<partial_fingerprint>".  Fix the public_key subtype to have
name_len set.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-09-03 10:27:28 +10:00
Yinghai Lu
d97b07c54f initramfs: support initramfs that is bigger than 2GiB
Now with 64bit bzImage and kexec tools, we support ramdisk that size is
bigger than 2g, as we could put it above 4G.

Found compressed initramfs image could not be decompressed properly.  It
turns out that image length is int during decompress detection, and it
will become < 0 when length is more than 2G.  Furthermore, during
decompressing len as int is used for inbuf count, that has problem too.

Change len to long, that should be ok as on 32 bit platform long is
32bits.

Tested with following compressed initramfs image as root with kexec.
	gzip, bzip2, xz, lzma, lzop, lz4.
run time for populate_rootfs():
   size        name       Nehalem-EX  Westmere-EX  Ivybridge-EX
 9034400256 root_img     :   26s           24s          30s
 3561095057 root_img.lz4 :   28s           27s          27s
 3459554629 root_img.lzo :   29s           29s          28s
 3219399480 root_img.gz  :   64s           62s          49s
 2251594592 root_img.xz  :  262s          260s         183s
 2226366598 root_img.lzma:  386s          376s         277s
 2901482513 root_img.bz2 :  635s          599s

Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: "Daniel M. Weeks" <dan@danweeks.net>
Cc: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-08 15:57:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
bb2cbf5e93 Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this release:

   - PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
   - appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
   - bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
  X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
  netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
  netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
  netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
  PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
  tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
  tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
  tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
  tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
  tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
  PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
  Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
  X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
  PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
  KEYS: revert encrypted key change
  ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
  firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
  security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
  PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
  ...
2014-08-06 08:06:39 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c489d98c8c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm
Pull ARM updates from Russell King:
 "Included in this update:

   - perf updates from Will Deacon:

     The main changes are callchain stability fixes from Jean Pihet and
     event mapping and PMU name rework from Mark Rutland

     The latter is preparatory work for enabling some code re-use with
     arm64 in the future.

   - updates for nommu from Uwe Kleine-König:

     Two different fixes for the same problem making some ARM nommu
     configurations not boot since 3.6-rc1.  The problem is that
     user_addr_max returned the biggest available RAM address which
     makes some copy_from_user variants fail to read from XIP memory.

   - deprecate legacy OMAP DMA API, in preparation for it's removal.

     The popular drivers have been converted over, leaving a very small
     number of rarely used drivers, which hopefully can be converted
     during the next cycle with a bit more visibility (and hopefully
     people popping out of the woodwork to help test)

   - more tweaks for BE systems, particularly with the kernel image
     format.  In connection with this, I've cleaned up the way we
     generate the linker script for the decompressor.

   - removal of hard-coded assumptions of the kernel stack size, making
     everywhere depend on the value of THREAD_SIZE_ORDER.

   - MCPM updates from Nicolas Pitre.

   - Make it easier for proper CPU part number checks (which should
     always include the vendor field).

   - Assembly code optimisation - use the "bx" instruction when
     returning from a function on ARMv6+ rather than "mov pc, reg".

   - Save the last kernel misaligned fault location and report it via
     the procfs alignment file.

   - Clean up the way we create the initial stack frame, which is a
     repeated pattern in several different locations.

   - Support for 8-byte get_user(), needed for some DRM implementations.

   - mcs locking from Will Deacon.

   - Save and restore a few more Cortex-A9 registers (for errata
     workarounds)

   - Fix various aspects of the SWP emulation, and the ELF hwcap for the
     SWP instruction.

   - Update LPAE logic for pte_write and pmd_write to make it more
     correct.

   - Support for Broadcom Brahma15 CPU cores.

   - ARM assembly crypto updates from Ard Biesheuvel"

* 'for-linus' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: (53 commits)
  ARM: add comments to the early page table remap code
  ARM: 8122/1: smp_scu: enable SCU standby support
  ARM: 8121/1: smp_scu: use macro for SCU enable bit
  ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementation
  ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementation
  ARM: 8118/1: crypto: sha1/make use of common SHA-1 structures
  ARM: 8113/1: remove remaining definitions of PLAT_PHYS_OFFSET from <mach/memory.h>
  ARM: 8111/1: Enable erratum 798181 for Broadcom Brahma-B15
  ARM: 8110/1: do CPU-specific init for Broadcom Brahma15 cores
  ARM: 8109/1: mm: Modify pte_write and pmd_write logic for LPAE
  ARM: 8108/1: mm: Introduce {pte,pmd}_isset and {pte,pmd}_isclear
  ARM: hwcap: disable HWCAP_SWP if the CPU advertises it has exclusives
  ARM: SWP emulation: only initialise on ARMv7 CPUs
  ARM: SWP emulation: always enable when SMP is enabled
  ARM: 8103/1: save/restore Cortex-A9 CP15 registers on suspend/resume
  ARM: 8098/1: mcs lock: implement wfe-based polling for MCS locking
  ARM: 8091/2: add get_user() support for 8 byte types
  ARM: 8097/1: unistd.h: relocate comments back to place
  ARM: 8096/1: Describe required sort order for textofs-y (TEXT_OFFSET)
  ARM: 8090/1: add revision info for PL310 errata 588369 and 727915
  ...
2014-08-05 10:05:29 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3e7a716a92 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
 - CTR(AES) optimisation on x86_64 using "by8" AVX.
 - arm64 support to ccp
 - Intel QAT crypto driver
 - Qualcomm crypto engine driver
 - x86-64 assembly optimisation for 3DES
 - CTR(3DES) speed test
 - move FIPS panic from module.c so that it only triggers on crypto
   modules
 - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (drbg).
 - more test vectors for ghash.
 - tweak self tests to catch partial block bugs.
 - misc fixes.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (94 commits)
  crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytes
  crypto: ccp - Do not sign extend input data to CCP
  crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error strings
  crypto: atmel-tdes - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
  crypto: atmel-sha - Switch to managed version of kzalloc
  crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk tests
  crypto: qat - Fixed SKU1 dev issue
  crypto: qat - Use hweight for bit counting
  crypto: qat - Updated print outputs
  crypto: qat - change ae_num to ae_id
  crypto: qat - change slice->regions to slice->region
  crypto: qat - use min_t macro
  crypto: qat - remove unnecessary parentheses
  crypto: qat - remove unneeded header
  crypto: qat - checkpatch blank lines
  crypto: qat - remove unnecessary return codes
  crypto: Resolve shadow warnings
  crypto: ccp - Remove "select OF" from Kconfig
  crypto: caam - fix DECO RSR polling
  crypto: qce - Let 'DEV_QCE' depend on both HAS_DMA and HAS_IOMEM
  ...
2014-08-04 09:52:51 -07:00
David Howells
cf5b50fd2d X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key() so that PKCS#7 can use it if
compiled as a module.

Reported-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-08-03 12:54:48 +01:00
Jussi Kivilinna
c8611d712a ARM: 8120/1: crypto: sha512: add ARM NEON implementation
This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-512 and SHA-384
algorithms.

tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha512-generic vs sha512-neon-asm:

block-size      bytes/update    old-vs-new
16              16              2.99x
64              16              2.67x
64              64              3.00x
256             16              2.64x
256             64              3.06x
256             256             3.33x
1024            16              2.53x
1024            256             3.39x
1024            1024            3.52x
2048            16              2.50x
2048            256             3.41x
2048            1024            3.54x
2048            2048            3.57x
4096            16              2.49x
4096            256             3.42x
4096            1024            3.56x
4096            4096            3.59x
8192            16              2.48x
8192            256             3.42x
8192            1024            3.56x
8192            4096            3.60x
8192            8192            3.60x

Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-02 08:51:50 +01:00
Jussi Kivilinna
604682551a ARM: 8119/1: crypto: sha1: add ARM NEON implementation
This patch adds ARM NEON assembly implementation of SHA-1 algorithm.

tcrypt benchmark results on Cortex-A8, sha1-arm-asm vs sha1-neon-asm:

block-size      bytes/update    old-vs-new
16              16              1.04x
64              16              1.02x
64              64              1.05x
256             16              1.03x
256             64              1.04x
256             256             1.30x
1024            16              1.03x
1024            256             1.36x
1024            1024            1.52x
2048            16              1.03x
2048            256             1.39x
2048            1024            1.55x
2048            2048            1.59x
4096            16              1.03x
4096            256             1.40x
4096            1024            1.57x
4096            4096            1.62x
8192            16              1.03x
8192            256             1.40x
8192            1024            1.58x
8192            4096            1.63x
8192            8192            1.63x

Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
2014-08-02 08:51:47 +01:00
Stephan Mueller
ce5481d01f crypto: drbg - fix failure of generating multiple of 2**16 bytes
The function drbg_generate_long slices the request into 2**16 byte
or smaller chunks. However, the loop, however invokes the random number
generation function with zero bytes when the request size is a multiple
of 2**16 bytes. The fix prevents zero bytes requests.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-08-01 22:36:14 +08:00
Jarod Wilson
2fc0d258bc crypto: testmgr - add missing spaces to drbg error strings
There are a few missing spaces in the error text strings for
drbg_cavs_test, trivial fix.

CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-08-01 22:36:13 +08:00
Ard Biesheuvel
3b9b8fe0ad crypto: testmgr - use chunks smaller than algo block size in chunk tests
This patch updates many of the chunked tcrypt test cases so that not all of the
chunks are an exact multiple of the block size. This should help uncover cases
where the residue passed to blkcipher_walk_done() is incorrect.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-08-01 22:36:11 +08:00
Mark Rustad
3e3dc25fe7 crypto: Resolve shadow warnings
Change formal parameters to not clash with global names to
eliminate many W=2 warnings.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rustad <mark.d.rustad@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-08-01 22:35:55 +08:00
Milan Broz
4c63f83c2c crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket
Th AF_ALG socket was missing a security label (e.g. SELinux)
which means that socket was in "unlabeled" state.

This was recently demonstrated in the cryptsetup package
(cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later.)
See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1115120

This patch clones the sock's label from the parent sock
and resolves the issue (similar to AF_BLUETOOTH protocol family).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-31 21:54:00 +08:00
David Howells
412eccbadf PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
X.509 certificate issuer and subject fields are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
and so their existence needn't be tested for.  They are guaranteed to end up
with an empty string if the name material has nothing we can use (see
x509_fabricate_name()).

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-31 14:46:44 +01:00
David Howells
5ce43ad282 PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() and x509_request_asymmetric_key() do the same
thing, the latter being a copy of the former created by the IMA folks, so drop
the PKCS#7 version as the X.509 location is more general.

Whilst we're at it, rename the arguments of x509_request_asymmetric_key() to
better reflect what the values being passed in are intended to match on an
X.509 cert.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-29 13:07:58 +01:00
David Howells
185de09c6a X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need the lengths of the NUL-terminated
strings passing in as it can work that out for itself.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-28 14:55:55 +01:00
Wei Yongjun
63d2551ea7 PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
Fixes the following sparse warnings:

crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:73:17: warning:
 symbol 'key_type_pkcs7' was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-28 14:55:54 +01:00
David Howells
8f3438ccea PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c needs to #include linux/err.h rather
than relying on getting it through other headers.

Without this, the powerpc allyesconfig build fails.

Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-25 11:33:53 +01:00
Horia Geanta
29b77e5dd8 crypto: testmgr - avoid DMA mapping from text, rodata, stack
With DMA_API_DEBUG set, following warnings are emitted
(tested on CAAM accelerator):
DMA-API: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata
DMA-API: device driver maps memory from stack
and the culprits are:
-key in __test_aead and __test_hash
-result in __test_hash

MAX_KEYLEN is changed to accommodate maximum key length from
existing test vectors in crypto/testmgr.h (131 bytes) and rounded.

Signed-off-by: Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@freescale.com>
Acked-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-23 21:28:40 +08:00
David Howells
633706a2ee Merge branch 'keys-fixes' into keys-next
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-22 21:55:45 +01:00
David Howells
64724cfc6e Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-next
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-22 21:54:43 +01:00
David Howells
6204e00255 Signed PE file verifier
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 
 iQIVAwUAU71KqhOxKuMESys7AQKIwRAAgOXB0hjYkWKCHL2B1/8bNUtRKQKHsCms
 4HgNuLQ4v+RjpXDd4u0HvjkuD2ADDZlBPNSylsLsrnSXS7gH/b36vetAi8zYR/6B
 Tuvorh6BfnOkN61Xg0mwlnXkp9jisTwaZofMTDlpQ4gPAAy098Lb73ONIIlJFIH9
 WrUH/LLcPqtexdOOFtXPTBH0uz+qu8tcQHAotkP7Uwr4lDliVu1u4F2HkxRPvLjc
 IKSgb1mRa0AU0mKXbdqFREBhpVIOPS7r5mIisKnUh2d8LysSiA++zlD8/t2pfsVM
 enR7fo9pBEtJwhCrkff2p39DijR4M7s+SYF9soa9+9HQADt9D4bEtliqejGEkuQP
 CBl4LZ4eHlh1bjQbay+PixDmFxEbN14IKkvNaXBvoax8f0DdXV2URGxmhU0tM08U
 SFt2FaHhlBOsn4mhSoKJQnfHla5MP06ukrz4T+Qn2xd+lAX9e/sEBUQqT26o5Mgt
 3yTaBrg4PREYjPVhguKT04tWrMdtvxY0nKRuUUeEcT7EQNVB5v/efGaWCxLI5k3O
 wbkq5JvzSdq+VJOrby8m37fnEN7pxmF7mwOPXYfe3WPwJeX7xiYRc2ZGFntKdNzn
 zSNKC4/OYiNwn+2ANL89kcJ3pJyoJ57SsMPiXpCCekPIcLtvGddoCvZae6f171HA
 ZzlbxkjIxg0=
 =e1NL
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'keys-pefile-20140709' into keys-next

Here's a set of changes that implement a PE file signature checker.

This provides the following facility:

 (1) Extract the signature from the PE file.  This is a PKCS#7 message
     containing, as its data, a hash of the signed parts of the file.

 (2) Digest the signed parts of the file.

 (3) Compare the digest with the one from the PKCS#7 message.

 (4) Validate the signatures on the PKCS#7 message and indicate
     whether it was matched by a trusted key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-22 21:54:05 +01:00
David Howells
1ca72c96db PKCS#7 message parser
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v1
 
 iQIVAwUAU7vyohOxKuMESys7AQJRkQ//XhtkCB9qDPrD/Hq6s3SDB7FCPWk8eJ9M
 GhawiLonBFgsRqWst20cW1syc+7ECjkTZU0vD5GqMHealXj9Fho+7jyf08ShP+jM
 AFBRfjoHKklOuh4C1lhB5IglR1zAXpmLHA2mP/r58BjEpOBEwlmh8rri/9/kk6iX
 hAV79d23IaoM4ueGb4vVy61ZpsKA0YQadJK1xRjXzFPAuS3f4i6W7uKG9QmsJ56m
 DaP++rtyJPByRVb/tJqUeJAIPaXQg9JRXD8tNGJ2qCdulEbHJQhNzp2ukQEMmfhS
 RaogNO7jcfdM/4BeIoRJxNt3VcvHChSdbXP1YO4V792BdxnjsXO8GdEKXp53ijoP
 mZ6Z1JsmpFKPGvAWA0eQUMYU4vnRzAtIo4CgdsIAQYpGrxOOnv+28UWalm7NLC1l
 ++YCesD03atd/XrdSNF082Xh8TTcRKI1OBOtBDya2ZhKMy56Bj/l6rOYVBw+Au6E
 Yfressl7jCRaaT/ZHefZwKsJ5ac+MTcwAk0LlKflg+f8vdpMDnUfZxhUheM2EwWw
 RyTHHa6IWUyYIOTXQ88KF1PmNXgGWBhe90yrHO909yaNWBnvFbPdJ91DuXvKUjza
 SZ0GLS2+Vt+6TnlzxaHITE1ly5m3avZDAosIqEhGKymG6EL0mg469vpNGJNUbvIp
 5jZqJ8wSF5Q=
 =aRKT
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'keys-pkcs7-20140708' into keys-next

Here's a set of changes that implement a PKCS#7 message parser in the kernel.

The PKCS#7 message parsing will then be used to limit kexec to authenticated
kernels only if so configured.

The changes provide the following facilities:

 (1) Parse an ASN.1 PKCS#7 message and pick out useful bits such as the data
     content and the X.509 certificates used to sign it and all the data
     signatures.

 (2) Verify all the data signatures against the set of X.509 certificates
     available in the message.

 (3) Follow the certificate chains and verify that:

     (a) for every self-signed X.509 certificate, check that it validly signed
     	 itself, and:

     (b) for every non-self-signed certificate, if we have a 'parent'
     	 certificate, the former is validly signed by the latter.

 (4) Look for intersections between the certificate chains and the trusted
     keyring, if any intersections are found, verify that the trusted
     certificates signed the intersection point in the chain.

 (5) For testing purposes, a key type can be made available that will take a
     PKCS#7 message, check that the message is trustworthy, and if so, add its
     data content into the key.

Note that (5) has to be altered to take account of the preparsing patches
already committed to this branch.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-22 21:53:21 +01:00
David Howells
fc7c70e0b6 KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers
struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond
with those in struct key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2014-07-22 21:46:02 +01:00
David Howells
6a09d17bb6 KEYS: Provide a generic instantiation function
Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse
hook.  This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked
to retain the new key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
2014-07-18 18:56:34 +01:00
Jean Delvare
26c1821733 RSA: Don't select non-existent symbol
You can select MPILIB_EXTRA all you want, it doesn't exist ;-)

Surprised kconfig doesn't complain about that...

Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-17 21:01:27 +01:00
Dmitry Kasatkin
32c4741cb6 KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keys
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed only by
builtin keys on the system keyring.

This patch defines a new option 'builtin' for the kernel parameter
'keys_ownerid' to allow trust validation using builtin keys.

Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch

Changelog v7:
- rename builtin_keys to use_builtin_keys

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:17 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin
ffb70f61ba KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected key
Instead of allowing public keys, with certificates signed by any
key on the system trusted keyring, to be added to a trusted keyring,
this patch further restricts the certificates to those signed by a
particular key on the system keyring.

This patch defines a new kernel parameter 'ca_keys' to identify the
specific key which must be used for trust validation of certificates.

Simplified Mimi's "KEYS: define an owner trusted keyring" patch.

Changelog:
- support for builtin x509 public keys only
- export "asymmetric_keyid_match"
- remove ifndefs MODULE
- rename kernel boot parameter from keys_ownerid to ca_keys

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:16 -04:00
Dmitry Kasatkin
b3426827c8 KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated function
To avoid code duplication this patch refactors asymmetric_key_match(),
making partial ID string match a separate function.

This patch also implicitly fixes a bug in the code.  asymmetric_key_match()
allows to match the key by its subtype. But subtype matching could be
undone if asymmetric_key_id(key) would return NULL. This patch first
checks for matching spec and then for its value.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:16 -04:00
Mimi Zohar
3be4beaf7c KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring.  This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.

This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.

Changelog v6:
- on error free key - Dmitry
- validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry
- formatting cleanup

Changelog:
- define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
2014-07-17 09:35:15 -04:00
Fengguang Wu
96956aef2f crypto: drbg - drbg_exit() can be static
CC: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-10 16:52:04 +08:00
David Howells
98801c002f pefile: Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
Validate the PKCS#7 trust chain against the contents of the system keyring.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-09 14:58:47 +01:00
David Howells
af316fc442 pefile: Digest the PE binary and compare to the PKCS#7 data
Digest the signed parts of the PE binary, canonicalising the section table
before we need it, and then compare the the resulting digest to the one in the
PKCS#7 signed content.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
Vivek Goyal
dd7d66f21b pefile: Handle pesign using the wrong OID
The pesign utility had a bug where it was using OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose
instead of OID_msPeImageDataObjId - so allow both OIDs.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
David Howells
4c0b4b1d1a pefile: Parse the "Microsoft individual code signing" data blob
The PKCS#7 certificate should contain a "Microsoft individual code signing"
data blob as its signed content.  This blob contains a digest of the signed
content of the PE binary and the OID of the digest algorithm used (typically
SHA256).

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
David Howells
3968280c76 pefile: Parse the presumed PKCS#7 content of the certificate blob
Parse the content of the certificate blob, presuming it to be PKCS#7 format.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
David Howells
09dacbbda9 pefile: Strip the wrapper off of the cert data block
The certificate data block in a PE binary has a wrapper around the PKCS#7
signature we actually want to get at.  Strip this off and check that we've got
something that appears to be a PKCS#7 signature.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
David Howells
26d1164be3 pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein
Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein.  Later
patches will check the signature and add the key if the signature checks out.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-09 14:58:37 +01:00
David Howells
452069867c KEYS: X.509: Fix a spelling mistake
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
2014-07-08 17:21:01 +01:00
Stephan Mueller
5b635e280e crypto: drbg - HMAC-SHA1 DRBG has crypto strength of 128 bits
The patch corrects the security strength of the HMAC-SHA1 DRBG to 128
bits. This strength defines the size of the seed required for the DRBG.
Thus, the patch lowers the seeding requirement from 256 bits to 128 bits
for HMAC-SHA1.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:25 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
27e4de2bd1 crypto: drbg - Mix a time stamp into DRBG state
The current locking approach of the DRBG tries to keep the protected
code paths very minimal. It is therefore possible that two threads query
one DRBG instance at the same time. When thread A requests random
numbers, a shadow copy of the DRBG state is created upon which the
request for A is processed. After finishing the state for A's request is
merged back into the DRBG state. If now thread B requests random numbers
from the same DRBG after the request for thread A is received, but
before A's shadow state is merged back, the random numbers for B will be
identical to the ones for A. Please note that the time window is very
small for this scenario.

To prevent that there is even a theoretical chance for thread A and B
having the same DRBG state, the current time stamp is provided as
additional information string for each new request.

The addition of the time stamp as additional information string implies
that now all generate functions must be capable to process a linked
list with additional information strings instead of a scalar.

CC: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:25 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
4f15071879 crypto: drbg - Select correct DRBG core for stdrng
When the DRBG is initialized, the core is looked up using the DRBG name.
The name that can be used for the lookup is registered in
cra_driver_name. The cra_name value contains stdrng.

Thus, the lookup code must use crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name to obtain the
precise DRBG name and select the correct DRBG.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:24 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
72e7c25aa6 crypto: drbg - Call CTR DRBG DF function only once
The CTR DRBG requires the update function to be called twice when
generating a random number. In both cases, update function must process
the additional information string by using the DF function. As the DF
produces the same result in both cases, we can save one invocation of
the DF function when the first DF function result is reused.

The result of the DF function is stored in the scratchpad storage. The
patch ensures that the scratchpad is not cleared when we want to reuse
the DF result. For achieving this, the CTR DRBG update function must
know by whom and in which scenario it is called. This information is
provided with the reseed parameter to the update function.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:24 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
a9089571f2 crypto: drbg - Fix format string for debugging statements
The initial format strings caused warnings on several architectures. The
updated format strings now match the variable types.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
CC: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:23 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
e25e47ec3d crypto: drbg - cleanup of preprocessor macros
The structure used to construct the module description line was marked
problematic by the sparse code analysis tool. The module line
description now does not contain any ifdefs to prevent error reports
from sparse.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2014-07-08 21:18:23 +08:00
David Howells
22d01afb21 PKCS#7: Provide a key type for testing PKCS#7
Provide a key type for testing the PKCS#7 parser.  It is given a non-detached
PKCS#7 message as payload:

	keyctl padd pkcs7_test a @s <stuff.pkcs7

The PKCS#7 wrapper is validated against the trusted certificates available and
then stripped off.  If successful, the key can be read, which will give the
data content of the PKCS#7 message.

A suitable message can be created by running make on the attached Makefile.
This will produce a file called stuff.pkcs7 for test loading.  The key3.x509
file should be put into the kernel source tree before it is built and
converted to DER form:

	openssl x509 -in .../pkcs7/key3.x509 -outform DER -out key3.x509

###############################################################################
#
# Create a pkcs7 message and sign it twice
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
stuff.pkcs7: stuff.txt key2.priv key2.x509 key4.priv key4.x509 certs
	$(RM) $@
	openssl smime -sign \
		-signer key2.x509 \
		-inkey key2.priv \
		-signer key4.x509 \
		-inkey key4.priv \
		-in stuff.txt \
		-certfile certs \
		-out $@ -binary -outform DER -nodetach
	openssl pkcs7 -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7  -print_certs -noout
	openssl asn1parse -inform DER -in stuff.pkcs7  -i >out

stuff.txt:
	echo "The quick red fox jumped over the lazy brown dog" >stuff.txt

certs: key1.x509 key2.x509 key3.x509 key4.x509
	cat key{1,3}.x509 >$@

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key2.x509
#
###############################################################################
key2.x509: key2.x509_unsigned key1.priv key1.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key2.x509_unsigned \
		-out key2.x509 \
		-extfile key2.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key1.x509 \
		-CAkey key1.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key2.priv key2.x509_unsigned: key2.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key2.genkey \
		-keyout key2.priv \
		-out key2.x509_unsigned

key2.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 2"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key1.x509
#
###############################################################################
key1.x509: key1.x509_unsigned key4.priv key4.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key1.x509_unsigned \
		-out key1.x509 \
		-extfile key1.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key4.x509 \
		-CAkey key4.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key1.priv key1.x509_unsigned: key1.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key1.genkey \
		-keyout key1.priv \
		-out key1.x509_unsigned

key1.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 1"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a signed key
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key4.x509
#
###############################################################################
key4.x509: key4.x509_unsigned key3.priv key3.x509
	openssl x509 \
		-req -in key4.x509_unsigned \
		-out key4.x509 \
		-extfile key4.genkey -extensions myexts \
		-CA key3.x509 \
		-CAkey key3.priv \
		-CAcreateserial

key4.priv key4.x509_unsigned: key4.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -outform PEM \
		-config key4.genkey \
		-keyout key4.priv \
		-out key4.x509_unsigned

key4.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 4"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

###############################################################################
#
# Generate a couple of signing keys
#
#	openssl x509 -text -inform PEM -noout -in key3.x509
#
###############################################################################
key3.priv key3.x509: key3.genkey
	openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 36500 \
		-batch -x509 -outform PEM \
		-config key3.genkey \
		-keyout key3.priv \
		-out key3.x509

key3.genkey:
	@echo Generating X.509 key generation config
	@echo  >$@ "[ req ]"
	@echo >>$@ "default_bits = 4096"
	@echo >>$@ "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name"
	@echo >>$@ "prompt = no"
	@echo >>$@ "string_mask = utf8only"
	@echo >>$@ "x509_extensions = myexts"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ req_distinguished_name ]"
	@echo >>$@ "O = Magrathea"
	@echo >>$@ "CN = PKCS7 key 3"
	@echo >>$@ "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2"
	@echo >>$@
	@echo >>$@ "[ myexts ]"
	@echo >>$@ "basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE"
	@echo >>$@ "keyUsage=digitalSignature,keyCertSign"
	@echo >>$@ "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
	@echo >>$@ "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"

clean:
	$(RM) *~
	$(RM) key1.* key2.* key3.* key4.* stuff.* out certs

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2014-07-08 13:50:20 +01:00
David Howells
08815b62d7 PKCS#7: Find intersection between PKCS#7 message and known, trusted keys
Find the intersection between the X.509 certificate chain contained in a PKCS#7
message and a set of keys that we already know and trust.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2014-07-08 13:50:15 +01:00