[ Upstream commit 47d8ac011f ]
Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting
enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that
carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a
different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight
count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list.
sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM
S is an unconnected socket
L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable
V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped
connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc()
---------------- ------------------------- -----------
NS = unix_create1()
skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS)
L = unix_find_other(addr)
unix_state_lock(L)
unix_peer(S) = NS
// V count=1 inflight=0
NS = unix_peer(S)
skb2 = sock_alloc()
skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V])
// V became in-flight
// V count=2 inflight=1
close(V)
// V count=1 inflight=1
// GC candidate condition met
for u in gc_inflight_list:
if (total_refs == inflight_refs)
add u to gc_candidates
// gc_candidates={L, V}
for u in gc_candidates:
scan_children(u, dec_inflight)
// embryo (skb1) was not
// reachable from L yet, so V's
// inflight remains unchanged
__skb_queue_tail(L, skb1)
unix_state_unlock(L)
for u in gc_candidates:
if (u.inflight)
scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail)
// V count=1 inflight=2 (!)
If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This
makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After
flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if
there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At
this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already
taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
Fixes: 1fd05ba5a2 ("[AF_UNIX]: Rewrite garbage collector, fixes race.")
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409201047.1032217-1-mhal@rbox.co
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 97af84a6bb ]
When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).
Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 47d8ac011f ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 65acf6e050 ]
In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers
use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed
by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.
In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation
before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following
check:
if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
Fixes: 0c83842df4 ("netfilter: validate user input for expected length")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240409120741.3538135-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cf1b7201df ]
The log_martians variable is only used in an #ifdef, causing a 'make W=1'
warning with gcc:
net/ipv4/route.c: In function 'ip_rt_send_redirect':
net/ipv4/route.c:880:13: error: variable 'log_martians' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
Change the #ifdef to an equivalent IS_ENABLED() to let the compiler
see where the variable is used.
Fixes: 30038fc61a ("net: ip_rt_send_redirect() optimization")
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408074219.3030256-2-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 74043489fc ]
When CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is disabled, the only user is hidden, causing
a 'make W=1' warning:
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c: In function 'fib6_add':
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1388:32: error: variable 'pn' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
Add another #ifdef around the variable declaration, matching the other
uses in this file.
Fixes: 66729e18df ("[IPV6] ROUTE: Make sure we have fn->leaf when adding a node on subtree.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240322131746.904943-1-arnd@kernel.org/
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408074219.3030256-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b46f4eaa4f ]
syzkaller started to report deadlock of unix_gc_lock after commit
4090fa373f ("af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm."), but
it just uncovers the bug that has been there since commit 314001f0bf
("af_unix: Add OOB support").
The repro basically does the following.
from socket import *
from array import array
c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM)
c1.sendmsg([b'a'], [(SOL_SOCKET, SCM_RIGHTS, array("i", [c2.fileno()]))], MSG_OOB)
c2.recv(1) # blocked as no normal data in recv queue
c2.close() # done async and unblock recv()
c1.close() # done async and trigger GC
A socket sends its file descriptor to itself as OOB data and tries to
receive normal data, but finally recv() fails due to async close().
The problem here is wrong handling of OOB skb in manage_oob(). When
recvmsg() is called without MSG_OOB, manage_oob() is called to check
if the peeked skb is OOB skb. In such a case, manage_oob() pops it
out of the receive queue but does not clear unix_sock(sk)->oob_skb.
This is wrong in terms of uAPI.
Let's say we send "hello" with MSG_OOB, and "world" without MSG_OOB.
The 'o' is handled as OOB data. When recv() is called twice without
MSG_OOB, the OOB data should be lost.
>>> from socket import *
>>> c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)
>>> c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB) # 'o' is OOB data
5
>>> c1.send(b'world')
5
>>> c2.recv(5) # OOB data is not received
b'hell'
>>> c2.recv(5) # OOB date is skipped
b'world'
>>> c2.recv(5, MSG_OOB) # This should return an error
b'o'
In the same situation, TCP actually returns -EINVAL for the last
recv().
Also, if we do not clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb, unix_poll() always set
EPOLLPRI even though the data has passed through by previous recv().
To avoid these issues, we must clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb when dequeuing
it from recv queue.
The reason why the old GC did not trigger the deadlock is because the
old GC relied on the receive queue to detect the loop.
When it is triggered, the socket with OOB data is marked as GC candidate
because file refcount == inflight count (1). However, after traversing
all inflight sockets, the socket still has a positive inflight count (1),
thus the socket is excluded from candidates. Then, the old GC lose the
chance to garbage-collect the socket.
With the old GC, the repro continues to create true garbage that will
never be freed nor detected by kmemleak as it's linked to the global
inflight list. That's why we couldn't even notice the issue.
Fixes: 314001f0bf ("af_unix: Add OOB support")
Reported-by: syzbot+7f7f201cc2668a8fd169@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7f7f201cc2668a8fd169
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240405221057.2406-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 237f3cf13b ]
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549
CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7549:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391
___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
__vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline]
__vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392
__vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline]
vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530
bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162
bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895
__sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532
release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300
__mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345
exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc
>ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
^
ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
Fixes: 423f38329d ("xsk: add umem fill queue support and mmap")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Björn Töpel" <bjorn@kernel.org>
Cc: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240404202738.3634547-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4539f91f2a ]
On startup, ovs-vswitchd probes different datapath features including
support for timeout policies. While probing, it tries to execute
certain operations with OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PROBE or OVS_FLOW_ATTR_PROBE
attributes set. These attributes tell the openvswitch module to not
log any errors when they occur as it is expected that some of the
probes will fail.
For some reason, setting the timeout policy ignores the PROBE attribute
and logs a failure anyway. This is causing the following kernel log
on each re-start of ovs-vswitchd:
kernel: Failed to associated timeout policy `ovs_test_tp'
Fix that by using the same logging macro that all other messages are
using. The message will still be printed at info level when needed
and will be rate limited, but with a net rate limiter instead of
generic printk one.
The nf_ct_set_timeout() itself will still print some info messages,
but at least this change makes logging in openvswitch module more
consistent.
Fixes: 06bd2bdf19 ("openvswitch: Add timeout support to ct action")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240403203803.2137962-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit b1f532a3b1 upstream.
If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit
the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all
fragments (when enabled) or a single packet.
But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN
specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This
can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are
on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed.
There will just be an endless spam of
batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110)
in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the
timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and
therefore never be able to reduce the table even more.
There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of
BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too
high to fit inside a packet. Such a scenario can therefore happen also with
only a single VLAN + 7 non-purgable addresses - requiring at least 120
bytes.
While this should be handled proactively when:
* interface with too low MTU is added
* VLAN is added
* non-purgeable local mac is added
* MTU of an attached interface is reduced
* fragmentation setting gets disabled (which most likely requires dropping
attached interfaces)
not all of these scenarios can be prevented because batman-adv is only
consuming events without the the possibility to prevent these actions
(non-purgable MAC address added, MTU of an attached interface is reduced).
It is therefore necessary to also make sure that the code is able to handle
also the situations when there were already incompatible system
configuration are present.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a19d3d85e1 ("batman-adv: limit local translation table max size")
Reported-by: syzbot+a6a4b5bb3da165594cff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1bc83a019b upstream.
Hook unregistration is deferred to the commit phase, same occurs with
hook updates triggered by the table dormant flag. When both commands are
combined, this results in deleting a basechain while leaving its hook
still registered in the core.
Fixes: 179d9ba555 ("netfilter: nf_tables: fix table flag updates")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 0d459e2ffb upstream.
The commit mutex should not be released during the critical section
between nft_gc_seq_begin() and nft_gc_seq_end(), otherwise, async GC
worker could collect expired objects and get the released commit lock
within the same GC sequence.
nf_tables_module_autoload() temporarily releases the mutex to load
module dependencies, then it goes back to replay the transaction again.
Move it at the end of the abort phase after nft_gc_seq_end() is called.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 720344340f ("netfilter: nf_tables: GC transaction race with abort path")
Reported-by: Kuan-Ting Chen <hexrabbit@devco.re>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a45e688957 upstream.
Unlike early commit path stage which triggers a call to abort, an
explicit release of the batch is required on abort, otherwise mutex is
released and commit_list remains in place.
Add WARN_ON_ONCE to ensure commit_list is empty from the abort path
before releasing the mutex.
After this patch, commit_list is always assumed to be empty before
grabbing the mutex, therefore
03c1f1ef15 ("netfilter: Cleanup nft_net->module_list from nf_tables_exit_net()")
only needs to release the pending modules for registration.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c0391b6ab8 ("netfilter: nf_tables: missing validation from the abort path")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit ee534378f0 upstream.
Rafael reports that on a system with LX2160A and Marvell DSA switches,
if a reboot occurs while the DSA master (dpaa2-eth) is up, the following
panic can be seen:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00a0000800000041
[00a0000800000041] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00042-g8f5585009b24 #32
pc : dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4
lr : raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c
Call trace:
dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x54/0xa0
__dev_close_many+0x50/0x130
dev_close_many+0x84/0x120
unregister_netdevice_many+0x130/0x710
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x8c/0xd0
unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30
dpaa2_eth_remove+0x68/0x190
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x94/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40
__fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20
device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100
fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c
platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30
device_shutdown+0x154/0x330
__do_sys_reboot+0x1cc/0x250
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150
el0_svc+0x24/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c
It can be seen from the stack trace that the problem is that the
deregistration of the master causes a dev_close(), which gets notified
as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN to dsa_slave_netdevice_event().
But dsa_switch_shutdown() has already run, and this has unregistered the
DSA slave interfaces, and yet, the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler attempts to
call dev_close_many() on those slave interfaces, leading to the problem.
The previous attempt to avoid the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN on the master after
dsa_switch_shutdown() was called seems improper. Unregistering the slave
interfaces is unnecessary and unhelpful. Instead, after the slaves have
stopped being uppers of the DSA master, we can now reset to NULL the
master->dsa_ptr pointer, which will make DSA start ignoring all future
notifier events on the master.
Fixes: 0650bf52b3 ("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")
Reported-by: Rafael Richter <rafael.richter@gin.de>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: xu.xin16@zte.com.cn
Cc: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ed4cccef64 upstream.
If packets are GROed with fraglist they might be segmented later on and
continue their journey in the stack. In skb_segment_list those skbs can
be reused as-is. This is an issue as their destructor was removed in
skb_gro_receive_list but not the reference to their socket, and then
they can't be orphaned. Fix this by also removing the reference to the
socket.
For example this could be observed,
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:3131! (skb_orphan)
RIP: 0010:ip6_rcv_core+0x11bc/0x19a0
Call Trace:
ipv6_list_rcv+0x250/0x3f0
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x49d/0x8f0
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x634/0xd40
napi_complete_done+0x1d2/0x7d0
gro_cell_poll+0x118/0x1f0
A similar construction is found in skb_gro_receive, apply the same
change there.
Fixes: 5e10da5385 ("skbuff: allow 'slow_gro' for skb carring sock reference")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7a1b3490f4 upstream.
Current MPTCP servers increment MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK when they
accept non-MPC connections. As reported by Christoph, this is "surprising"
because the counter might become greater than MPTcpExtMPCapableSYNRX.
MPTcpExtMPCapableFallbackACK counter's name suggests it should only be
incremented when a connection was seen using MPTCP options, then a
fallback to TCP has been done. Let's do that by incrementing it when
the subflow context of an inbound MPC connection attempt is dropped.
Also, update mptcp_connect.sh kselftest, to ensure that the
above MIB does not increment in case a pure TCP client connects to a
MPTCP server.
Fixes: fc518953bc ("mptcp: add and use MIB counter infrastructure")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/449
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240329-upstream-net-20240329-fallback-mib-v1-1-324a8981da48@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 64235eabc4 upstream.
GRO has a fundamental issue with UDP tunnel packets as it can't detect
those in a foolproof way and GRO could happen before they reach the
tunnel endpoint. Previous commits have fixed issues when UDP tunnel
packets come from a remote host, but if those packets are issued locally
they could run into checksum issues.
If the inner packet has a partial checksum the information will be lost
in the GRO logic, either in udp4/6_gro_complete or in
udp_gro_complete_segment and packets will have an invalid checksum when
leaving the host.
Prevent local UDP tunnel packets from ever being GROed at the outer UDP
level.
Due to skb->encapsulation being wrongly used in some drivers this is
actually only preventing UDP tunnel packets with a partial checksum to
be GROed (see iptunnel_handle_offloads) but those were also the packets
triggering issues so in practice this should be sufficient.
Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2a ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.")
Fixes: 36707061d6 ("udp: allow forwarding of plain (non-fraglisted) UDP GRO packets")
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f0b8c30345 upstream.
UDP GRO validates checksums and in udp4/6_gro_complete fraglist packets
are converted to CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY to avoid later checks. However
this is an issue for CHECKSUM_PARTIAL packets as they can be looped in
an egress path and then their partial checksums are not fixed.
Different issues can be observed, from invalid checksum on packets to
traces like:
gen01: hw csum failure
skb len=3008 headroom=160 headlen=1376 tailroom=0
mac=(106,14) net=(120,40) trans=160
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=0 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0))
csum(0xffff232e ip_summed=2 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0)
hash(0x77e3d716 sw=1 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=12
...
Fix this by only converting CHECKSUM_NONE packets to
CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY by reusing __skb_incr_checksum_unnecessary. All
other checksum types are kept as-is, including CHECKSUM_COMPLETE as
fraglist packets being segmented back would have their skb->csum valid.
Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2a ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d010c8031 upstream.
When rx-udp-gro-forwarding is enabled UDP packets might be GROed when
being forwarded. If such packets might land in a tunnel this can cause
various issues and udp_gro_receive makes sure this isn't the case by
looking for a matching socket. This is performed in
udp4/6_gro_lookup_skb but only in the current netns. This is an issue
with tunneled packets when the endpoint is in another netns. In such
cases the packets will be GROed at the UDP level, which leads to various
issues later on. The same thing can happen with rx-gro-list.
We saw this with geneve packets being GROed at the UDP level. In such
case gso_size is set; later the packet goes through the geneve rx path,
the geneve header is pulled, the offset are adjusted and frag_list skbs
are not adjusted with regard to geneve. When those skbs hit
skb_fragment, it will misbehave. Different outcomes are possible
depending on what the GROed skbs look like; from corrupted packets to
kernel crashes.
One example is a BUG_ON[1] triggered in skb_segment while processing the
frag_list. Because gso_size is wrong (geneve header was pulled)
skb_segment thinks there is "geneve header size" of data in frag_list,
although it's in fact the next packet. The BUG_ON itself has nothing to
do with the issue. This is only one of the potential issues.
Looking up for a matching socket in udp_gro_receive is fragile: the
lookup could be extended to all netns (not speaking about performances)
but nothing prevents those packets from being modified in between and we
could still not find a matching socket. It's OK to keep the current
logic there as it should cover most cases but we also need to make sure
we handle tunnel packets being GROed too early.
This is done by extending the checks in udp_unexpected_gso: GSO packets
lacking the SKB_GSO_UDP_TUNNEL/_CSUM bits and landing in a tunnel must
be segmented.
[1] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4408!
RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xd2a/0xf70
__udp_gso_segment+0xaa/0x560
Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2a ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.")
Fixes: 36707061d6 ("udp: allow forwarding of plain (non-fraglisted) UDP GRO packets")
Signed-off-by: Antoine Tenart <atenart@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ff91059932 upstream.
syzkaller started using corpuses where a BPF tracing program deletes
elements from a sockmap/sockhash map. Because BPF tracing programs can be
invoked from any interrupt context, locks taken during a map_delete_elem
operation must be hardirq-safe. Otherwise a deadlock due to lock inversion
is possible, as reported by lockdep:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&host->lock);
lock(&htab->buckets[i].lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&host->lock);
Locks in sockmap are hardirq-unsafe by design. We expects elements to be
deleted from sockmap/sockhash only in task (normal) context with interrupts
enabled, or in softirq context.
Detect when map_delete_elem operation is invoked from a context which is
_not_ hardirq-unsafe, that is interrupts are disabled, and bail out with an
error.
Note that map updates are not affected by this issue. BPF verifier does not
allow updating sockmap/sockhash from a BPF tracing program today.
Fixes: 604326b41a ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bc922f476bd65abbd466@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: syzbot+d4066896495db380182e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d4066896495db380182e
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=bc922f476bd65abbd466
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240402104621.1050319-1-jakub@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 24225011d8 upstream.
nft_unregister_flowtable_type() within nf_flow_inet_module_exit() can
concurrent with __nft_flowtable_type_get() within nf_tables_newflowtable().
And thhere is not any protection when iterate over nf_tables_flowtables
list in __nft_flowtable_type_get(). Therefore, there is pertential
data-race of nf_tables_flowtables list entry.
Use list_for_each_entry_rcu() to iterate over nf_tables_flowtables list
in __nft_flowtable_type_get(), and use rcu_read_lock() in the caller
nft_flowtable_type_get() to protect the entire type query process.
Fixes: 3b49e2e94e ("netfilter: nf_tables: add flow table netlink frontend")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 62fc3357e0 upstream.
cp might be null, calling cp->cp_conn would produce null dereference
[Simon Horman adds:]
Analysis:
* cp is a parameter of __rds_rdma_map and is not reassigned.
* The following call-sites pass a NULL cp argument to __rds_rdma_map()
- rds_get_mr()
- rds_get_mr_for_dest
* Prior to the code above, the following assumes that cp may be NULL
(which is indicative, but could itself be unnecessary)
trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr(
sg, nents, rs, &mr->r_key, cp ? cp->cp_conn : NULL,
args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes,
need_odp ? ODP_ZEROBASED : ODP_NOT_NEEDED);
* The code modified by this patch is guarded by IS_ERR(trans_private),
where trans_private is assigned as per the previous point in this analysis.
The only implementation of get_mr that I could locate is rds_ib_get_mr()
which can return an ERR_PTR if the conn (4th) argument is NULL.
* ret is set to PTR_ERR(trans_private).
rds_ib_get_mr can return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV) if the conn (4th) argument is NULL.
Thus ret may be -ENODEV in which case the code in question will execute.
Conclusion:
* cp may be NULL at the point where this patch adds a check;
this patch does seem to address a possible bug
Fixes: c055fc00c0 ("net/rds: fix WARNING in rds_conn_connect_if_down")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: Mahmoud Adam <mngyadam@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240326153132.55580-1-mngyadam@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7835fcfd13 upstream.
struct hci_dev members conn_info_max_age, conn_info_min_age,
le_conn_max_interval, le_conn_min_interval, le_adv_max_interval,
and le_adv_min_interval can be modified from the HCI core code, as well
through debugfs.
The debugfs implementation, that's only available to privileged users,
will check for boundaries, making sure that the minimum value being set
is strictly above the maximum value that already exists, and vice-versa.
However, as both minimum and maximum values can be changed concurrently
to us modifying them, we need to make sure that the value we check is
the value we end up using.
For example, with ->conn_info_max_age set to 10, conn_info_min_age_set()
gets called from vfs handlers to set conn_info_min_age to 8.
In conn_info_min_age_set(), this goes through:
if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age)
return -EINVAL;
Concurrently, conn_info_max_age_set() gets called to set to set the
conn_info_max_age to 7:
if (val == 0 || val > hdev->conn_info_max_age)
return -EINVAL;
That check will also pass because we used the old value (10) for
conn_info_max_age.
After those checks that both passed, the struct hci_dev access
is mutex-locked, disabling concurrent access, but that does not matter
because the invalid value checks both passed, and we'll end up with
conn_info_min_age = 8 and conn_info_max_age = 7
To fix this problem, we need to lock the structure access before so the
check and assignment are not interrupted.
This fix was originally devised by the BassCheck[1] team, and
considered the problem to be an atomicity one. This isn't the case as
there aren't any concerns about the variable changing while we check it,
but rather after we check it parallel to another change.
This patch fixes CVE-2024-24858 and CVE-2024-24857.
[1] https://sites.google.com/view/basscheck/
Co-developed-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222161317.6255-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/
Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24858
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162931.6553-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/20231222162310.6461-1-2045gemini@gmail.com/
Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24857
Fixes: 31ad169148 ("Bluetooth: Add conn info lifetime parameters to debugfs")
Fixes: 729a1051da ("Bluetooth: Expose default LE advertising interval via debugfs")
Fixes: 71c3b60ec6 ("Bluetooth: Move BR/EDR debugfs file creation into hci_debugfs.c")
Signed-off-by: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c569242cd4 upstream.
We have a BT headset (Lenovo Thinkplus XT99), the pairing and
connecting has no problem, once this headset is paired, bluez will
remember this device and will auto re-connect it whenever the device
is powered on. The auto re-connecting works well with Windows and
Android, but with Linux, it always fails. Through debugging, we found
at the rfcomm connection stage, the bluetooth stack reports
"Connection refused - security block (0x0003)".
For this device, the re-connecting negotiation process is different
from other BT headsets, it sends the Link_KEY_REQUEST command before
the CONNECT_REQUEST completes, and it doesn't send ENCRYPT_CHANGE
command during the negotiation. When the device sends the "connect
complete" to hci, the ev->encr_mode is 1.
So here in the conn_complete_evt(), if ev->encr_mode is 1, link type
is ACL and HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT is not set, we set HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT to
this conn, and update conn->enc_key_size accordingly.
After this change, this BT headset could re-connect with Linux
successfully. This is the btmon log after applying the patch, after
receiving the "Connect Complete" with "Encryption: Enabled", will send
the command to read encryption key size:
> HCI Event: Connect Request (0x04) plen 10
Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA)
Class: 0x240404
Major class: Audio/Video (headset, speaker, stereo, video, vcr)
Minor class: Wearable Headset Device
Rendering (Printing, Speaker)
Audio (Speaker, Microphone, Headset)
Link type: ACL (0x01)
...
> HCI Event: Link Key Request (0x17) plen 6
Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA)
< HCI Command: Link Key Request Reply (0x01|0x000b) plen 22
Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA)
Link key: ${32-hex-digits-key}
...
> HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Address: 8C:3C:AA:D8:11:67 (OUI 8C-3C-AA)
Link type: ACL (0x01)
Encryption: Enabled (0x01)
< HCI Command: Read Encryption Key... (0x05|0x0008) plen 2
Handle: 256
< ACL Data TX: Handle 256 flags 0x00 dlen 10
L2CAP: Information Request (0x0a) ident 1 len 2
Type: Extended features supported (0x0002)
> HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 7
Read Encryption Key Size (0x05|0x0008) ncmd 1
Status: Success (0x00)
Handle: 256
Key size: 16
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/704
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Reviewed-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 151c9c724d ]
We had various syzbot reports about tcp timers firing after
the corresponding netns has been dismantled.
Fortunately Josef Bacik could trigger the issue more often,
and could test a patch I wrote two years ago.
When TCP sockets are closed, we call inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers()
to 'stop' the timers.
inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers() can be called from any context,
including when socket lock is held.
This is the reason it uses sk_stop_timer(), aka del_timer().
This means that ongoing timers might finish much later.
For user sockets, this is fine because each running timer
holds a reference on the socket, and the user socket holds
a reference on the netns.
For kernel sockets, we risk that the netns is freed before
timer can complete, because kernel sockets do not hold
reference on the netns.
This patch adds inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() function
that using sk_stop_timer_sync() to make sure all timers
are terminated before the kernel socket is released.
Modules using kernel sockets close them in their netns exit()
handler.
Also add sock_not_owned_by_me() helper to get LOCKDEP
support : inet_csk_clear_xmit_timers_sync() must not be called
while socket lock is held.
It is very possible we can revert in the future commit
3a58f13a88 ("net: rds: acquire refcount on TCP sockets")
which attempted to solve the issue in rds only.
(net/smc/af_smc.c and net/mptcp/subflow.c have similar code)
We probably can remove the check_net() tests from
tcp_out_of_resources() and __tcp_close() in the future.
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240314210740.GA2823176@perftesting/
Fixes: 26abe14379 ("net: Modify sk_alloc to not reference count the netns of kernel sockets.")
Fixes: 8a68173691 ("net: sk_clone_lock() should only do get_net() if the parent is not a kernel socket")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CANn89i+484ffqb93aQm1N-tjxxvb3WDKX0EbD7318RwRgsatjw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322135732.1535772-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d24b03535e ]
syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]:
nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload
length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload
and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size
payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be
silently discarded.
This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling
each message type handler codes.
Fixes: 6a2968aaf5 ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2]
Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 4f2bdb3c5e upstream.
When moving a station out of a VLAN and deleting the VLAN afterwards, the
fast_rx entry still holds a pointer to the VLAN's netdev, which can cause
use-after-free bugs. Fix this by immediately calling ieee80211_check_fast_rx
after the VLAN change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: ranygh@riseup.net
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240316074336.40442-1-nbd@nbd.name
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c034203b6a ]
The bug here is that you cannot rely on getting the same socket
from multiple calls to fget() because userspace can influence
that. This is a kind of double fetch bug.
The fix is to delete the svc_alien_sock() function and instead do
the checking inside the svc_addsock() function.
Fixes: 3064639423 ("nfsd: check passed socket's net matches NFSd superblock's one")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 7827c81f02 ]
The premise that "Once an svc thread is scheduled and executing an
RPC, no other processes will touch svc_rqst::rq_flags" is false.
svc_xprt_enqueue() examines the RQ_BUSY flag in scheduled nfsd
threads when determining which thread to wake up next.
Found via KCSAN.
Fixes: 28df098881 ("SUNRPC: Use RMW bitops in single-threaded hot paths")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 98124f5bd6 ]
The dust has settled a bit and it's become obvious what code is
totally common between nfsd_init_dirlist_pages() and
nfsd3_init_dirlist_pages(). Move that common code to SUNRPC.
The new helper brackets the existing xdr_init_decode_pages() API.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 103cc1fafe ]
Currently, SUNRPC clears the whole of .pc_argsize before processing
each incoming RPC transaction. Add an extra parameter to struct
svc_procedure to enable upper layers to reduce the amount of each
operation's argument structure that is zeroed by SUNRPC.
The size of struct nfsd4_compoundargs, in particular, is a lot to
clear on each incoming RPC Call. A subsequent patch will cut this
down to something closer to what NFSv2 and NFSv3 uses.
This patch should cause no behavior changes.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 28df098881 ]
I noticed CPU pipeline stalls while using perf.
Once an svc thread is scheduled and executing an RPC, no other
processes will touch svc_rqst::rq_flags. Thus bus-locked atomics are
not needed outside the svc thread scheduler.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 37902c6313 ]
Hoist svo_function back into svc_serv and remove struct
svc_serv_ops, since the struct is now devoid of fields.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit f49169c97f ]
struct svc_serv_ops is about to be removed.
Neil Brown says:
> I suspect svo_module can go as well - I don't think the thread is
> ever the thing that primarily keeps a module active.
A random sample of kthread_create() callers shows sunrpc is the only
one that manages module reference count in this way.
Suggested-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit c7d7ec8f04 ]
Clean up: svc_shutdown_net() now does nothing but call
svc_close_net(). Replace all external call sites.
svc_close_net() is renamed to be the inverse of svc_xprt_create().
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 4355d767a2 ]
Clean up: Use the "svc_xprt_<task>" function naming convention as
is used for other external APIs.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 352ad31448 ]
Clean up: Use the "svc_xprt_<task>" function naming convention as
is used for other external APIs.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 87cdd8641c ]
Clean up. Neil observed that "any code that calls svc_shutdown_net()
knows what the shutdown function should be, and so can call it
directly."
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit c0219c4997 ]
Neil says:
"These functions were separated in commit 0971374e28 ("SUNRPC:
Reduce contention in svc_xprt_enqueue()") so that the XPT_BUSY check
happened before taking any spinlocks.
We have since moved or removed the spinlocks so the extra test is
fairly pointless."
I've made this a separate patch in case the XPT_BUSY change has
unexpected consequences and needs to be reverted.
Suggested-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit a9ff2e99e9 ]
We have never been able to track down and address the underlying
cause of the performance issues with workqueue-based service
support. svo_enqueue_xprt is called multiple times per RPC, so
it adds instruction path length, but always ends up at the same
function: svc_xprt_do_enqueue(). We do not anticipate needing
this flexibility for dynamic nfsd thread management support.
As a micro-optimization, remove .svo_enqueue_xprt because
Spectre/Meltdown makes virtual function calls more costly.
This change essentially reverts commit b9e13cdfac ("nfsd/sunrpc:
turn enqueueing a svc_xprt into a svc_serv operation").
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 6b044fbaab ]
svc_set_num_threads() does everything that lockd_start_svc() does, except
set sv_maxconn. It also (when passed 0) finds the threads and
stops them with kthread_stop().
So move the setting for sv_maxconn, and use svc_set_num_thread()
We now don't need nlmsvc_task.
Now that we use svc_set_num_threads() it makes sense to set svo_module.
This request that the thread exists with module_put_and_exit().
Also fix the documentation for svo_module to make this explicit.
svc_prepare_thread is now only used where it is defined, so it can be
made static.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
[ cel: upstream, module_put_and_exit was replaced via a merge commit ]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 93aa619eb0 ]
Currently 'pooled' services hold a reference on the pool_map, and
'unpooled' services do not.
svc_destroy() uses the presence of ->svo_function (via
svc_serv_is_pooled()) to determine if the reference should be dropped.
There is no direct correlation between being pooled and the use of
svo_function, though in practice, lockd is the only non-pooled service,
and the only one not to use svo_function.
This is untidy and would cause problems if we changed lockd to use
svc_set_num_threads(), which requires the use of ->svo_function.
So change the test for "is the service pooled" to "is sv_nrpools > 1".
This means that when svc_pool_map_get() returns 1, it must NOT take a
reference to the pool.
We discard svc_serv_is_pooled(), and test sv_nrpools directly.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Michal Luczaj