Add a CFI_NOSEAL() helper to mark functions that need to retain their
CFI information, despite not otherwise leaking their address.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215092707.669401084@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The current BPF call convention is __nocfi, except when it calls !JIT things,
then it calls regular C functions.
It so happens that with FineIBT the __nocfi and C calling conventions are
incompatible. Specifically __nocfi will call at func+0, while FineIBT will have
endbr-poison there, which is not a valid indirect target. Causing #CP.
Notably this only triggers on IBT enabled hardware, which is probably why this
hasn't been reported (also, most people will have JIT on anyway).
Implement proper CFI prologues for the BPF JIT codegen and drop __nocfi for
x86.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215092707.345270396@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Normal include order is that linux/foo.h should include asm/foo.h, CFI has it
the wrong way around.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231215092707.231038174@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Prohibit probing on the compiler generated CFI typeid checking code
because it is used for decoding typeid when CFI error happens.
The compiler generates the following instruction sequence for indirect
call checks on x86;
movl -<id>, %r10d ; 6 bytes
addl -4(%reg), %r10d ; 4 bytes
je .Ltmp1 ; 2 bytes
ud2 ; <- regs->ip
And handle_cfi_failure() decodes these instructions (movl and addl)
for the typeid and the target address. Thus if we put a kprobe on
those instructions, the decode will fail and report a wrong typeid
and target address.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/168904025785.116016.12766408611437534723.stgit@devnote2
Switch from Clang's original forward-edge control-flow integrity
implementation to -fsanitize=kcfi, which is better suited for the
kernel, as it doesn't require LTO, doesn't use a jump table that
requires altering function references, and won't break cross-module
function address equality.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-6-samitolvanen@google.com
The __CFI_ADDRESSABLE macro is used for init_module and cleanup_module
to ensure we have the address of the CFI jump table, and with
CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT to ensure LTO won't optimize away the symbols.
As __CFI_ADDRESSABLE is no longer necessary with -fsanitize=kcfi, add
a more flexible version of the __ADDRESSABLE macro and always ensure
these symbols won't be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-5-samitolvanen@google.com
In preparation to switching to -fsanitize=kcfi, remove support for the
CFI module shadow that will no longer be needed.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-4-samitolvanen@google.com
Since the references to the module init/exit points only have external
references, a module LTO run will consider them 'unused' and seal
them, leading to an immediate fail on module load.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308154319.113767246@infradead.org
This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler
injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure
the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This
restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for
an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored
function pointers. For more details, see:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain
visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported
with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between
independently compiled components.
With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into
the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For
cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler
calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines
the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This
patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address()
to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a
shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x.
Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and
offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables,
the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi
and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes
__cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone
assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would
result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we
default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler
generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each
address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function
with the address of the jump table entry.
Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local
to each component, they break cross-module function address
equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be
different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local
jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module,
it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This
may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other
components.
CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute.
Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by
filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI.
By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential
exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the
kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution
to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but
should only be enabled during development.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
