Commit Graph

24 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Nick Desaulniers 2e20ce4a66 certs/blacklist: fix const confusion
Fixes commit 2be04df566 ("certs/blacklist_nohashes.c: fix const confusion
in certs blacklist")

Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-06-26 09:43:03 -07:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 5fb94e9ca3 docs: Fix some broken references
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
	./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix

Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.

Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-06-15 18:10:01 -03:00
Andi Kleen 2be04df566 certs/blacklist_nohashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist
const must be marked __initconst, not __initdata.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222001335.1987-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-02-21 15:35:43 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 5ccbdbf987 modsign: add markers to endif-statements in certs/Makefile
It's a bit hard for eye to track certs/Makefile if you are not
accustomed to it. This commit adds comments to key endif statements in
order to help to keep the context while reading this file.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-07-14 11:01:37 +10:00
Masahiro Yamada 6e7c2b4dd3 scripts/spelling.txt: add "intialise(d)" pattern and fix typo instances
Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:

  intialisation||initialisation
  intialised||initialised
  intialise||initialise

This commit does not intend to change the British spelling itself.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-18-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:13 -07:00
Mat Martineau 2b6aa412ff KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and data
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.

The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-04 14:10:10 -07:00
Mat Martineau aaf66c8838 KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functions
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.

Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.

Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
2017-04-03 10:24:56 -07:00
David Howells 734114f878 KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring
Add the following:

 (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
     blacklisted certificates and signatures.

 (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
     blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string.  The key accepts
     no payload.

 (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
     at build time.  This is done by setting
     CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
     that are in the form:

	"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"

     where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
     include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.

The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.

Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:

	root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
	Keyring
	 723359729 ---lswrv      0     0  keyring: .blacklist
	 676257228 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46

The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.

A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-03 16:07:24 +01:00
David Howells d3bfe84129 certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.

Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).

The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.

If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:48:09 +01:00
David Howells 77f68bac94 KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful.  Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.

Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().

Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:44:15 +01:00
David Howells a511e1af8b KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.

What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.

Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.

With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.

Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.

To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained.  For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.


If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject().  The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:43 +01:00
David Howells 99716b7cae KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.

This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.

Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-11 22:43:24 +01:00
David Howells 5ac7eace2d KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary.  This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails.  It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.

This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.

To this end:

 (1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
     the vetting function.  This is called as:

	int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
			     const struct key_type *key_type,
			     unsigned long key_flags,
			     const union key_payload *key_payload),

     where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
     key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
     AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.

     [*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
     	 KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.

     The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
     error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
     link.

     The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
     through keyring_alloc().

     Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
     method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
     is called.

 (2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added.  This can be passed to
     key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
     restriction check.

 (3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed.  The entire contents of a keyring
     with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
     virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.

 (4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
     used to set restrict_link in the new key.  This ensures that the
     pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
     of unrestrictedness.  Normally this argument will be NULL.

 (5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added.  It
     should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
     setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring.  This will be replaced in
     a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
     authoritative keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-04-11 22:37:37 +01:00
David Howells bda850cd21 PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.

verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 16:14:24 +01:00
David Howells e68503bd68 KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback.  This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.

If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function.  If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.

The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-04-06 16:14:24 +01:00
David Howells 0d1db3e370 certs: Fix misaligned data in extra certificate list
Fix the following warning found by kbuild:

	certs/system_certificates.S:24: Error: misaligned data

because:

	KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling

doesn't correctly align system_extra_cert_used.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-29 14:44:30 +00:00
Mehmet Kayaalp c4c3610595 KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
Place a system_extra_cert buffer of configurable size, right after the
system_certificate_list, so that inserted keys can be readily processed by
the existing mechanism. Added script takes a key file and a kernel image
and inserts its contents to the reserved area. The
system_certificate_list_size is also adjusted accordingly.

Call the script as:

    scripts/insert-sys-cert -b <vmlinux> -c <certfile>

If vmlinux has no symbol table, supply System.map file with -s flag.
Subsequent runs replace the previously inserted key, instead of appending
the new one.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-26 15:30:20 +00:00
Arnd Bergmann 5d06ee20b6 modsign: hide openssl output in silent builds
When a user calls 'make -s', we can assume they don't want to
see any output except for warnings and errors, but instead
they see this for a warning free build:

 ###
 ### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules.
 ###
 ### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the
 ### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up.  It
 ### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random
 ### number generator if one is available.
 ###
 Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
 .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................++
 ..............................................................................................................................++
 writing new private key to 'certs/signing_key.pem'
 -----
 ###
 ### Key pair generated.
 ###

The output can confuse simple build testing scripts that just check
for an empty build log.

This patch silences all the output:
 - "echo" is changed to "@$(kecho)", which is dropped when "-s" gets
   passed
 - the openssl command itself is only printed with V=1, using the
   $(Q) macro
 - The output of openssl gets redirected to /dev/null on "-s" builds.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-02-26 11:16:38 +00:00
David Howells 5d2787cf0b KEYS: Add an alloc flag to convey the builtinness of a key
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2016-02-09 16:40:46 +00:00
Paul Gortmaker 48dbc164b4 certs: add .gitignore to stop git nagging about x509_certificate_list
Currently we see this in "git status" if we build in the source dir:

Untracked files:
  (use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)

        certs/x509_certificate_list

It looks like it used to live in kernel/ so we squash that .gitignore
entry at the same time.  I didn't bother to dig through git history to
see when it moved, since it is just a minor annoyance at most.

Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-10-21 15:18:35 +01:00
David Woodhouse 3ee550f12c modsign: Handle signing key in source tree
Since commit 1329e8cc69 ("modsign: Extract signing cert from
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed"), the build system has carefully coped
with the signing key being specified as a relative path in either the
source or or the build trees.

However, the actual signing of modules has not worked if the filename
is relative to the source tree.

Fix that by moving the config_filename helper into scripts/Kbuild.include
so that it can be used from elsewhere, and then using it in the top-level
Makefile to find the signing key file.

Kill the intermediate $(MODPUBKEY) and $(MODSECKEY) variables too, while
we're at it. There's no need for them.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-08-14 16:32:52 +01:00
David Woodhouse 62172c81f2 modsign: Use if_changed rule for extracting cert from module signing key
We couldn't use if_changed for this before, because it didn't live in
the kernel/ directory so we couldn't add it to $(targets). It was easier
just to leave it as it was.

Now it's in the certs/ directory we can use if_changed, the same as we
do for the trusted certificate list.

Aside from making things consistent, this means we don't need to depend
explicitly on the include/config/module/sig/key.h file. And we also get
to automatically do the right thing and re-extract the cert if the user
does odd things like using a relative filename and then playing silly
buggers with adding/removing that file in both the source and object
trees. We always favour the one in the object tree if it exists, and
now we'll correctly re-extract the cert when it changes. Previously we'd
*only* re-extract the cert if the config option changed, even if the
actual file we're using did change.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2015-08-14 16:06:19 +01:00
David Howells cfc411e7ff Move certificate handling to its own directory
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2015-08-14 16:06:13 +01:00